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Root of The Middle Way – Session 09

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  • Buddhist Classics and Philosophy
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  • Rangjung Yeshe Institute - Nepal
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This session centers on the nature of cause and effect. It dismisses notions of them being identical, entirely different, or a mix of both due to a lack of real instances demonstrating sameness or difference.

Session 9 explores Buddhist ideas of causality and questions whether phenomena, particularly body and mind, can operate through cause-and-effect relationships.
The debate centers on the nature of cause and effect. It dismisses notions of them being identical, entirely different, or a mix of both due to a lack of real instances demonstrating sameness or difference. The lecture raises the issue of whether rejecting causes and conditions leads to chaos.he lecture encourages further contemplation on causality and the interplay between conventional and ultimate reality in Buddhist philosophy.

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...place for the Buddhist perspective on things which says that the phenomena of body and mind are all distinct entities that work in that way as cause and effect. Is there someone who can propose a way to retain that framework?
Which would not, yeah
Student: "Is our perception of cause and effect, for example, our perception of what is a rock, and what is a spark, based on a conceptual framework of the world,
which is created from an illusion of self identity and self narration. So I guess if I make up that construct of a rock and a spark in that sense am I also making up the construct of cause and effect in the same way?" What we're talking about here is cause and effect, it's the idea that things that are discrete entities can nevertheless work as cause and effect.
So is there a way of doing that?
Of affirming that account of causality, which is the Buddhist position, in a way that is not harmed by this kind of analysis?
So why would it be a problem to say that cause and effect are discrete entities?
Student: "I guess that's a problem maybe because whichever cause you arrive at you can always say that is only the result of something else that causes it. So you never really reach an entity that is just completely independent and not affected by anything else? That's why you can't say that these cause and effects are discrete entities."
That would be the same with the self arising also, no? If this is a problem, if it is. I'm not sure it is a problem. We can still talk about cause and effect within a sequence that is seemingly beginningless No? I would say. So that in itself I don't think makes it difficult to maintain that cause and effect are different entities So we started out looking at an account that says that appearance of different cause and effect is an illusion. And in reality cause and effect are one and the same nature. And then we said that doesn't work because the very appearance of causes and conditions tells a different story than what we just said. It says at least we will have to assert that at the level of the way things appear and the way we think about them, so within the realm of our senses and our intellect, cause and effect appear different. So even if we say that ultimately they are the same, to say that cause and effect are the same is not the full story. And so this first position falls, that cause and effect are the same, period. Then this alternative was the statement that then acknowledges the appearance of distinct causes and conditions, and says in fact that is how it is, there are causes and effects and those remain distinct entities. Whatever we think of in terms of sameness of cause and effect is just something that we ascribe to things that really are different from each other. So it's because of our mental conditioning we again and again impute a sense of wholeness and duration onto things that actually are completely impermanent, and hence distinct from each other.
"One from online?"
Student: "Can you hear me?" Yes! "Distinct entities and discrete entities can't be, I can hear myself, it's a bit strange, they can't be causal because they cannot contact.
If effect arise from cause which is a discrete entity that is different from it, when the result arises, the cause is already gone. And a non-existent cause cannot make an effect arise. So if we analyze it on this level, then it doesn't make sense. And the only way to hold arising from other is as Nāgārjuna does on the 26th chapter, which is just claiming for dependent origination. Depending on this, that arises, when this ceases, that ceases. And not go much further, but just on this level of appearance. Then we can affirm other arising, but not if we start talking about discrete entities being real." Okay, great, so because there could be no contact between cause and effect if things were different,
if things that are completely different from each other, they don't connect. So there could be no contact. Then whether that again goes down, what you then continue to say goes down into a key issue that has been debated, and discussed, and developed in the course of the history of Mādhyamika philosophy namely, so what is the... Because of this we cannot say that in reality things arise from other. But what about the seeming nature of things? So is it the case that
the appearance of different causes and effects, that we said there is, that we say it seems to us that there are causes and that there are effects, and so those are different things, they are not one and the same. Can we from that acknowledgement of the apparent nature of things also conclude, also what to say, come up with an account of relative reality? Like you said, dependent origination as Nāgārjuna speaks about it, because of that, this arises; when this is the case, that comes to be and so on, those statements, simple, very simple statements of causality which acknowledge this appearance of causal constellations that lead to certain effects and incompleteness of those constellations. In fact, on the other hand, preclude the arising of the effect. Can we, from that perception of different causes and effects, also say that the right thing to say about conventional reality, or the seeming reality,
is that cause and effect are different? And then some will say, "yes, certainly." And if we say "yes, certainly," then that opens the door widely to bringing back Dharmakīrti into the room.
So, if we say that, "yes, indeed, we have a perception of things as being, of causes and effects as being different, we think about them as different, and in terms of the conventional reality they really are different." If we say that then we go the path of Śāntarakṣita
and the masters who have been described as Svātantrika.
They are people who say that we can say a whole lot with a certain superior veracity with respect to the conventional reality. None of what appears to us conventionally has ultimate existence, so in other words, now we are full into this idea of two truths. There is a way things seem to be, and then there is the way they really are. And how did we get there? Well, we got there by looking at the apparent reality and then failing to find ultimate grounds for our beliefs, our perceptions and so on. But at the same time, certainly these appearances don't disappear just because we think that, "hey, what really does all this mean?" But while we fail to find any support for our opinions, perceptions, and so on in ultimate terms, we keep being alive so to speak. There's our world and sentient beings and so on. So because of that, some Mādhyamikas will say we should be very careful about our opinions and beliefs with respect to this conventional reality. By no means should we think that this is the ultimate reality. But there are certain things that we can say about these appearances that are right in conventional terms, and others that aren't in conventional terms. And for example, one thing that we can say is true in terms of the appearances of conventional reality is that everything is momentary. And when it seems to us differently, it's just because again, in conventional terms only, we impute a sense of endurance and singularity onto these utterly discrete momentary events. The causes and effects that make all this happen in conventional terms, those causes and effects are momentary factors. And because they're momentary, there is no real...
Because they're momentary, they are discrete and distinct from each other. There's nothing that really binds them together apart from our imputations.
So that's a philosophical system, right? That says something like that which the Svātantrika will say, we should appreciate and acknowledge because it's super accurate.
But then there are others who say that we should certainly be very careful and observant about these appearances. Meaning we should try to understand and acknowledge them as far as we can.
But precisely because we want to be accurate in terms of what we perceive and think in terms of,
then we should also make sure not to make the mistake of saying that these appearances are appearances based on discrete causes and effects.
We should simply acknowledge what seems to be the case. And what seems to be the case is not that, it's certainly not that we...
It makes no sense even in conventional terms to say that there is.. that there are causes and effects which really and truly are different, and, nonetheless, they arise in causal relations. Just as much as it doesn't make sense in ultimate terms, the case is precisely the same with respect to the conventional reality. What should make it more reasonable to say that cause and effect are different yet related? Just because we qualify it as "apparently so"? It's not apparently so. When we examine we find that that idea is flawed. And if on top of that we look at the way things "really" so to speak appear to us, and the way we actually think about things,
then we don't think of cause and effect as being different, like for example this example of the seed. We dig a little hole, put a seed in it and then after some years a beautiful tree has grown. And we say, "I'm the one who obviously did a little sapling." Then if we put in a little sapling of a tree, a mango or an oak, what have you, and then after 20 years we come back and we see a large tree, then we say, "I planted that tree." And so our idea of cause and effect is not one of difference. We feel that it's that cause, which we now see as a tree. So neither does it make sense from an analytic perspective to say that cause and effect are different in conventional terms. Nor does it make sense in terms of the way we just think, in the way we speak with each other and in the way we experience the world. So there's a great debate which is extremely... something there's a very rich literature. And again if we have spent some time getting into the core issues with the help of the "Root of the Middle Way." then all of those discussions take on a very sort of live quality. Because, for example, here in our contemplations we're beginning to wonder what to say about the apparent reality. What can we say about it, what should we, what must we perhaps say about conventional reality? And then it's extremely helpful to know that there are different ways that you can go. Very different ways, those are very different ways of responding to that challenge, whether you become a Svātantrika or Prāsaṅgika. And even the issues are so contested that some say: "Well if you go one way you lose it, and you're no longer a Mādhyamika." And that's on both sides of how we draw that divide between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is also up for debate.
So these terms for philosophical schools are really like a pair of...
sort of general...
That's one word I'm looking for, I can't find it So they are terms that sound as if they refer to obvious schools of thought represented by such and such people, in such and such works, and that is also the case to some extent, but at the same time the very definition of what makes someone Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is itself part of the debate. So using this framework of Svātantrika versus Prāsaṅgika is a way of getting deeper into the issue as a whole. In the same way as the two truths, or the same, in the same way as the two truths, the three natures.. Not because there really and truly are two truths, not because there really and truly are three natures. They are devices that we can apply to gain insight. Similarly with this framework of Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika as we work with it and try to see what makes more sense, we come to see more and more about the two truths with greater and greater clarity. So it's a very marvelous literature that has developed around those questions. So some who are considered Prāsaṅgikas will say that if you are Svātantrika you aren't actually a Mādhyamika. And perhaps even the possibility of liberation which all of this is about discovering, perhaps even that is erased, if you get entangled in this system. And others will say about who are considered Prāsaṅgikas, or who call themselves Prāsaṅgikas, that if you take this route you become a nihilist, forget about liberation. So there's that kind of seriousness about it and others again they make a big effort to show that the two are compatible, and that they are entirely compatible, and that they appear different because of various purposes, higher purposes.
It's a rich literature that wherever we look all the great authors, whichever side they take on this, we can learn something in a very profound fashion. So that's just commenting on what you said that dependent origination is a different cause and effect conventionally. It's a question that we can and should keep in the back of our minds as we go forward in the treatise. What is it really that appears to us at the level of convention, the seeming reality? What is it that we experience and can and should think about in terms of cause and effect, when it comes to the conventional reality?
So in this way we have dismissed not from itself, and not from another.
And then yesterday we said while the natural feeling that we probably have at this point is that therefore we need both. That move won't help us. It's very natural to get that sense of both being the solution, because what we were saying about the first alternative Is that it doesn't make sense to say cause and effect are the same because there is also this appearance of diversity with respect to cause and effect. That by definition causes and effects couldn't be just the same, then we wouldn't be speaking of them as different. So in that way we say, "Okay perhaps same in a certain sense why not?" It should be possible to speak about cause and effect as one and the same in such and such context, from such and such perspective, but not in all regards. And so there is a sense of both. Similarly with other, we said that yes, as we just said causes are causes, effects are effects, but they are nonetheless related. Again we wouldn't be talking about cause and effect, if they weren't related. Then they would just be two different things and that would be all what we needed to say and state. But we want something more, when we say cause and effect we want to speak about two things that are, on the one hand, different but also deeply connected. So connected that we can rely on very certain things coming to be, when A is the case, then we can rely on very certain things coming to be in terms of B.
So again that's the sense of a combination, it's both different, apparent difference, and yet, sameness and connection in terms of the relationship between these two. But then we said that, in fact, that won't work; although, indeed, we do speak in this way, although indeed we think in this way, using a combination all the time of same and different, not just about cause and effect but anything, We operate, we think and believe and act in terms of things being, on the one hand, the same and, on the other hand, different.
If we can't take that, if we cannot rightly think of things as same, and think of things as different, then it's hard to think of what we can think of at all.
We certainly do think and operate in this way, and we are confirmed by our experience that it makes sense to say that: "Don't just put a, don't just... what to say,
Well if we want to grow a tree, then we can say you don't have to dig up a large tree and move it into the garden. Just get a seed and if you do the right thing then a tree will grow." So in other words, we make a distinction between the seed, the cause, and the effect that is the tree.
And if someone is not aware of that, then someone else can make that person aware and say, "Here's the seed, just try it out, you'll see and it works." We are confirmed in our belief that this seed is one thing, and the tree is another one, that we can get to grow in our garden by doing certain things to the seed. But at the same time we also, we don't want to say that what then happens there is something completely different than the seed. And if we try to explain why it is that the seed can grow a tree, then we begin to discover more and more things that are in the seed, that are also in the tree. So we make use of same and different in order to do something like that, plant a tree or grow a tree in our garden. And the more reasonable and sort of scientific we become about it, the more we have to make these kind of distinctions between same and different, and the more we have to be comfortable with talking about these things as both, same in certain senses, and different in certain other senses. But what we said yesterday is, that: "Wait a minute, what is it that we avail ourselves of at this point? We talk about same as if things could be same, as if it's possible to talk about two things as being really the same? But again, wait a minute, two things, just the very point of departure says that we are profoundly wrong if we say that those are the same. If they were the same, how come we can speak of, we can compare them?"
And strangely we had the exact same problem with difference, because if we say that these two things are really and truly completely different, then we have already qualified them both as things. So that's something that is exactly the same with respect to those two. So, in other words, where we are at now is at a point where we don't seem to find any cases of things that are really the same, and things that are really different. The whole realm of experience, all what we can think of, all what we can hear, all what we can learn, there is no instance anywhere that is an instance of actual sameness, and actual difference. So the profound problem with combining these two, hoping to arrive at an account of reality, is that we are using two components which are not just partially successful. And that's what we talked about yesterday as well. If there was just some truth to the fact, if there was just some truth to the statement that these are the same, or if there was just some truth to the statement that these are different, then we could just try to separate what's wrong from what's right, and then combine the two checks and we would get the account that we want to have, the combination of the two. But because same fails completely, profoundly,
if we cannot find, ok we have talked about same, things that are the same as long as we have been speaking probably. And we have been thinking in those terms. But at this point we fail to find a single example of things that are the same. So what actually have we been speaking about in all these years? When we said same then what did we mean? There must be some example now that we can point to. Well "same like.." whichever example we come up with is not an example of same. Just as problematically, what did we mean when we said different? Any example that we come up with is not an example of difference. So what were we talking about? What were we thinking?
That's why the third alternative doesn't work.
So if this is true, that's what you should think of for tomorrow. If this is true, then at this point we will have to conclude that there are no real causes and conditions. That's a terrible conclusion, no?
That's a terrible conclusion that drives us into the fourth alternative, no? Complete chaos.
So please think of that carefully, why would it be such,
why must we then at this point conclude that hence there are no real causes? Because we started out looking at cause and effect and causality, causal relationships. And we said it makes perfectly good sense to say that causes and effects can only be of three kinds. They can be one and the same, they can be different from each other, and they can be both. By now, if we cannot find any justification for any one of these three alternatives, then because there is no fourth option, the very idea of real causes and conditions will have to be relinquished.
So please think about that at home, from the beginning try to go through why was it that it didn't work to say that cause and effect were the same? Why was it that it didn't work to say that cause and effect are different? And why was it finally that it didn't work to say that cause and effect are both same and different? So make sure that you have that explanation readily in mind, and then spend time thinking if those conclusions still hold. In particular, we haven't had much time to contemplate the problems with the third alternative. So let's also ponder that in particular.
And yeah, then see what happens.
So the fourth alternative is that things are uncaused. If we must dismiss things arising from themselves, if we must dismiss the idea that things really arise from other things, if we must give up the idea that they can be a combination of sameness and difference, cause and effect, then there is no longer any justification for believing in true causes and conditions.
Okay, maybe we say that then let's just believe in seeming causes and conditions, but what kind of belief is that? A belief in false causes and conditions? When were you ever taught that you have to believe in something false? Sometimes we hear that, yeah? But it's a strange thing to say, you know? You must believe in something wrong.
So, no causes and conditions. In other words, we started out saying also that nonetheless things appear. All of this doesn't mean that our experience ceases by no means. And all the while it seems that we have been talking about something things happen, as we started out saying. So they must then appear in a way that really has nothing to do with causal contingency.
That when things happen they aren't restricted in any way to causal dependency. They just happen randomly, spontaneously. So is that a viable conclusion, then? Is that the truth, then? Because we have dismissed causes and conditions, there are no real causes and conditions. We know that. Is reality then chaos?
Student: "Could we just check, so if we compare chaos to when you were talking about Dharmakīrti a little, and the second option from another.
So I see a little bit of a similarity between those two, like you were saying we impute the sense onto things that are only momentary. So just to help us kind of separate the random option from that, could you clarify a little more?" Yeah, that's a good point. So when the Buddhists say that causes and effects are different from each other, that is still within the context of causal accounts. So the Buddhist says that not just to say that really they are different, so when you think of it differently, it is something that you ascribe or impute onto the reality of distinct entities. But nonetheless there certainly are causal relationships, and so you can figure those out, you can understand those, and if you rely on those causal relationships skillfully, that's how you can have success in the world and that's how you can find success on the spiritual path. That's why there is liberation, that's why there are three jewels, and so on. So it's the thoroughly causal account. But the fourth alternative is one that says that all of that is just make-believe. There are no, no matter how good you are, you can't be good at finding causal relationships because there aren't any.
So is that the truth then?
Student: "I would say that there are no causes and conditions, but there are causes and conditions at the same time, like they both exist. I would say that the very basis of the universe is without causes and conditions, but our relative experience of samsara is one with causes and conditions. And I think they are both important."
So okay, you said that for whichever reasons you have for saying that, the universe is not ultimately causal. But it seems to us that there are causal relationships. So then we look at that appearance of causes and conditions, and say the causes and conditions and effects, causes and conditions and effects, as you say, it doesn't make sense to talk about one single cause that produces one single effect and so on. So the causal matrix and the result of that as it appears to us. Are those two the same? Or are they different from each other? Or are they a combination?
Student: "I think they are based on sort of our perception of relative reality which is like a construct of being a human being. So I would say like, I don't know, neither."
What did I ask you now? Oh yeah, there aren't any of those, yeah? Any of those three. They are not the same, they are not different and they are not both. Then why do you call them cause and effect?
Student: "I guess that's just what our experience is in relative samsara. Our experience as living in this human dimension is one of cause and effect. That's what it feels like, and I guess that's how we can describe it." Yeah, so
Yeah, so, yeah, interesting.
That's what it feels like, yeah?
But is that the best we can say about this? It's just what it feels like? So think about what it is we are looking at, we are talking about cause and effect like as a framework for understanding the world, for being in the world. And all what we can say is, it just feels like that! Student: "I feel like that's the best I can say, but just right now at least." So let's see if it's possible to say something better than that. But at this time probably, maybe we can't, yeah? We can't say much more, because we said that if there really are causes and effects, then either they are actually the same, or otherwise they are different from each other. Or otherwise finally there could be some combination of, on the one hand the same. and on the other hand, different. But we can see very clearly that that's not the case with whatever it is that we feel is cause, and whatever it is that we feel is effect. So then the only thing we can say is, "Well I just get that sense that there are causes and conditions." So in one way that sounds very stupid, no, to say... But on the other hand it's probably very important to say. Because if we don't say that, then we could very easily just check the fourth alternative, no? And say things are completely chaotic, they have nothing to do with causes and effects.
But, so what would make it problematic for us to say that this is then the truth? Just forget about causes and effects, then you get it. There's this world, and it seems to be one of causal relationships, but not at all. It's just totally random.
When you think you're getting good at understanding something and connecting one thing with another. it's just a complete illusion, that has nothing to do with the way things actually are, yeah?
What would be wrong in saying that?
Student: "I think it's completely unsatisfactionary to just say that then it's chaos, because I feel that then we again impute something and we end in almost option one, which we very quickly refuted, that everything is one, because now everything is chaos. So I feel it's like we are walking around in circles, it's just nonsense for me, and I like, I mean even if they imputed, like if we talked about the Svātantrikas and saying okay, so then there's an imputed reality, just because I feel like, well, then if I analyze that because that's also imputation, is also a belief in cause and effect. I end in the same place, so where I have ended is that.. That there is some kind of unsolvable paradox here, and that I'm completely crazy. That's my end point, because I don't want to live in falsehood. I don't want to say, okay then I just believe in seemingly things and, you know, like what kind of life is that? So yeah, so there's like, no chaos is just utterly unsatisfactionary. It's like just saying, like history of science, is like saying, okay then there's God. Like we can't explain it, so now it's all God, right?"
Yeah, that makes a lot of sense, no?
And that's, yeah, that makes a huge difference, yeah?
So in fact, when we say that, "well it just seems like that," in one way we're saying something dumb, because we can't justify it beyond that. And not only that, we know that we can't justify it. But at the same time,
why would we not acknowledge what we see and what we experience, no? And what we see and what we experience is something of that sort, no? It is that it makes, we can't figure out exactly how they work, those causal relationships, and we can't rely on them in a hundred percent categorical way. But there are some examples of causal relationships that usually work pretty good. And why would we not acknowledge that? Like, I'm getting thirsty now and the idea of a glass of water begins to come to my mind, and I think I'll be alright now, there are many things that could happen in between that point, and many things could go, but I plan to get a glass of water, and I strongly expect that I will feel a whole lot better. I mean, not that I feel terrible now, but I will feel very different and refreshed when I have drunk that glass of water. That's not to say that it will definitely happen, and that's not to say that it couldn't be very different, I could make a mistake and pour in some liquid that will not make me feel like that, I could never make it to the glass of water and so on. But those sorts of causal relationships, here just about a glass of water, no? But life is very rich, no? And in particular, the more we think in terms of the teachings, the potential that comes with human life is extraordinary. So all of that has to do with our ability to notice something that we can rely on. And move from A to B and something new happens, there's a new scenery that we can learn something from, and so on. Not only why would we say goodbye to that, but what would allow us to do that? That's also what you were saying, no? That there's no justification for then saying, "So it's all uncaused" Why is it all uncaused?
It surely doesn't seem like that, no? So just like we couldn't say, that's a very good point, no? Just like we couldn't say it's all the nature of God or all the nature of the universal principle, prakṛti, or whichever. It's all just physics, just as we can't say that. We can't say, make this kind of declaration either, no? That it's all just uncaused and come to some sort of meta conclusion of that kind. That would be the same mistake in one way, but it would also be a deeply unsatisfying and dangerous mistake to make, no? Because where does it leave us? Nowhere, no? But a dangerous nowhere, so not just nowhere, but a bad nowhere. Student: "Actually, I was also thinking about how when we think about chaos, we think it's random but at the same time, when I think of Nepal's traffic system, it looks like chaos. But there is a certain, it's like organized chaos, things are working, there's a way that things move and you can get to your place, right? But that's more on a gross level, and I was kind of thinking, when you look at things more subtly, I think we don't have a language. Can you hear me? Because we are thinking in such dualistic ways of cause, effect, you know? And that's a more gross way of understanding reality. So as you kind of go more subtler, there is this sense of the last thing, the fourth point where it becomes so subtle that it almost touches on emptiness. That's kind of what I think, there is a question that is not answered, because the way we think or our physical reality, our thoughts, just doesn't feel like it's enough."
So there is a sense that we cannot, we can see that our thoughts and concepts don't capture
anything of what we thought they would. Like they seem to not refer to anything, and at the same time, just that conclusion in itself is also not satisfying, as you say Not just satisfying, but it's also not warranted. So that's a very interesting point.
So the concepts don't refer, but that conclusion itself is what?
Did you have a comment? "One from online?" "Yeah." Can you speak?
"John, can you speak?" Student: "Yes, can you hear me?" Yes "So I have, I'd like to say something I thought about this business of causes, but first I'd like to put it in the context of how I interpret that first paragraph.
Seems to me that we're thinking that there's a beginning to things and an end to things, and the way I've always interpreted dependent origination was that it has no beginning.
So I see this almost like a conservation law. There's really nothing that comes into existence or goes out of existence ever. So that would explain the last line, that nowhere does anything ever arise." It would also be in perfect accord with the... "Can I just finish?" Sure! "And the thing I have about cause is that I think it's not necessarily true that to think, because things are uncaused that, that the alternative is chaos. I think that we see cause and effect because of persistent correlations,
and that things, first of all things don't cause other things at all.
There's something else going on, and just one example I could give is that
like light, when you see a stick partially in water and you see it bent, the reason for that is because light takes something called the path of least action, and not because of any causes. It's just that there's a, it's like a rule, so
it's not that the photons are caused to go that way.
So it seems to me that there can be order inherent in the universe, without it being one thing causing another."
Okay, so this would be, the first you said that doesn't arise and does not cease, that is actually the way that dependent origination is qualified.
You are then in complete agreement with Nāgārjuna in the beginning? "Yes."
What you are in fact proposing is that there is a fifth way, that there is a way that things happen which is not cause or a third just to make it easier now because you say this is not a story of causal dependencies, and it's not a story of no causes either as in chaos. But there is something else, and then you said the path of least resistance, something like that, how would you qualify that third alternative? Student: "Just that order, there are rules about the way the world behaves. So would, perhaps you could, yeah So if we can say that these rules make the world the way it is, I think it's safe to say that that is still within the framework of causes and conditions, as it's understood in the context here. As long as there is something that when it's there, makes something else happen, then we are talking about cause and effect. So if the fact of the rules being there and being the case is the reason that the world is the way it is, then this would still be something that one could ask, is the relationship between the rules and the world one of identity? Or is there a difference between the rules and the manifest world? Or is it a combination of sameness and difference? Thank you very much and see you then tomorrow. Thank you.
...place for the Buddhist perspective on things which says that the phenomena of body and mind are all distinct entities that work in that way as cause and effect. Is there someone who can propose a way to retain that framework?
Which would not, yeah
Student: "Is our perception of cause and effect, for example, our perception of what is a rock, and what is a spark, based on a conceptual framework of the world,
which is created from an illusion of self identity and self narration. So I guess if I make up that construct of a rock and a spark in that sense am I also making up the construct of cause and effect in the same way?" What we're talking about here is cause and effect, it's the idea that things that are discrete entities can nevertheless work as cause and effect.
So is there a way of doing that?
Of affirming that account of causality, which is the Buddhist position, in a way that is not harmed by this kind of analysis?
So why would it be a problem to say that cause and effect are discrete entities?
Student: "I guess that's a problem maybe because whichever cause you arrive at you can always say that is only the result of something else that causes it. So you never really reach an entity that is just completely independent and not affected by anything else? That's why you can't say that these cause and effects are discrete entities."
That would be the same with the self arising also, no? If this is a problem, if it is. I'm not sure it is a problem. We can still talk about cause and effect within a sequence that is seemingly beginningless No? I would say. So that in itself I don't think makes it difficult to maintain that cause and effect are different entities So we started out looking at an account that says that appearance of different cause and effect is an illusion. And in reality cause and effect are one and the same nature. And then we said that doesn't work because the very appearance of causes and conditions tells a different story than what we just said. It says at least we will have to assert that at the level of the way things appear and the way we think about them, so within the realm of our senses and our intellect, cause and effect appear different. So even if we say that ultimately they are the same, to say that cause and effect are the same is not the full story. And so this first position falls, that cause and effect are the same, period. Then this alternative was the statement that then acknowledges the appearance of distinct causes and conditions, and says in fact that is how it is, there are causes and effects and those remain distinct entities. Whatever we think of in terms of sameness of cause and effect is just something that we ascribe to things that really are different from each other. So it's because of our mental conditioning we again and again impute a sense of wholeness and duration onto things that actually are completely impermanent, and hence distinct from each other.
"One from online?"
Student: "Can you hear me?" Yes! "Distinct entities and discrete entities can't be, I can hear myself, it's a bit strange, they can't be causal because they cannot contact.
If effect arise from cause which is a discrete entity that is different from it, when the result arises, the cause is already gone. And a non-existent cause cannot make an effect arise. So if we analyze it on this level, then it doesn't make sense. And the only way to hold arising from other is as Nāgārjuna does on the 26th chapter, which is just claiming for dependent origination. Depending on this, that arises, when this ceases, that ceases. And not go much further, but just on this level of appearance. Then we can affirm other arising, but not if we start talking about discrete entities being real." Okay, great, so because there could be no contact between cause and effect if things were different,
if things that are completely different from each other, they don't connect. So there could be no contact. Then whether that again goes down, what you then continue to say goes down into a key issue that has been debated, and discussed, and developed in the course of the history of Mādhyamika philosophy namely, so what is the... Because of this we cannot say that in reality things arise from other. But what about the seeming nature of things? So is it the case that
the appearance of different causes and effects, that we said there is, that we say it seems to us that there are causes and that there are effects, and so those are different things, they are not one and the same. Can we from that acknowledgement of the apparent nature of things also conclude, also what to say, come up with an account of relative reality? Like you said, dependent origination as Nāgārjuna speaks about it, because of that, this arises; when this is the case, that comes to be and so on, those statements, simple, very simple statements of causality which acknowledge this appearance of causal constellations that lead to certain effects and incompleteness of those constellations. In fact, on the other hand, preclude the arising of the effect. Can we, from that perception of different causes and effects, also say that the right thing to say about conventional reality, or the seeming reality,
is that cause and effect are different? And then some will say, "yes, certainly." And if we say "yes, certainly," then that opens the door widely to bringing back Dharmakīrti into the room.
So, if we say that, "yes, indeed, we have a perception of things as being, of causes and effects as being different, we think about them as different, and in terms of the conventional reality they really are different." If we say that then we go the path of Śāntarakṣita
and the masters who have been described as Svātantrika.
They are people who say that we can say a whole lot with a certain superior veracity with respect to the conventional reality. None of what appears to us conventionally has ultimate existence, so in other words, now we are full into this idea of two truths. There is a way things seem to be, and then there is the way they really are. And how did we get there? Well, we got there by looking at the apparent reality and then failing to find ultimate grounds for our beliefs, our perceptions and so on. But at the same time, certainly these appearances don't disappear just because we think that, "hey, what really does all this mean?" But while we fail to find any support for our opinions, perceptions, and so on in ultimate terms, we keep being alive so to speak. There's our world and sentient beings and so on. So because of that, some Mādhyamikas will say we should be very careful about our opinions and beliefs with respect to this conventional reality. By no means should we think that this is the ultimate reality. But there are certain things that we can say about these appearances that are right in conventional terms, and others that aren't in conventional terms. And for example, one thing that we can say is true in terms of the appearances of conventional reality is that everything is momentary. And when it seems to us differently, it's just because again, in conventional terms only, we impute a sense of endurance and singularity onto these utterly discrete momentary events. The causes and effects that make all this happen in conventional terms, those causes and effects are momentary factors. And because they're momentary, there is no real...
Because they're momentary, they are discrete and distinct from each other. There's nothing that really binds them together apart from our imputations.
So that's a philosophical system, right? That says something like that which the Svātantrika will say, we should appreciate and acknowledge because it's super accurate.
But then there are others who say that we should certainly be very careful and observant about these appearances. Meaning we should try to understand and acknowledge them as far as we can.
But precisely because we want to be accurate in terms of what we perceive and think in terms of,
then we should also make sure not to make the mistake of saying that these appearances are appearances based on discrete causes and effects.
We should simply acknowledge what seems to be the case. And what seems to be the case is not that, it's certainly not that we...
It makes no sense even in conventional terms to say that there is.. that there are causes and effects which really and truly are different, and, nonetheless, they arise in causal relations. Just as much as it doesn't make sense in ultimate terms, the case is precisely the same with respect to the conventional reality. What should make it more reasonable to say that cause and effect are different yet related? Just because we qualify it as "apparently so"? It's not apparently so. When we examine we find that that idea is flawed. And if on top of that we look at the way things "really" so to speak appear to us, and the way we actually think about things,
then we don't think of cause and effect as being different, like for example this example of the seed. We dig a little hole, put a seed in it and then after some years a beautiful tree has grown. And we say, "I'm the one who obviously did a little sapling." Then if we put in a little sapling of a tree, a mango or an oak, what have you, and then after 20 years we come back and we see a large tree, then we say, "I planted that tree." And so our idea of cause and effect is not one of difference. We feel that it's that cause, which we now see as a tree. So neither does it make sense from an analytic perspective to say that cause and effect are different in conventional terms. Nor does it make sense in terms of the way we just think, in the way we speak with each other and in the way we experience the world. So there's a great debate which is extremely... something there's a very rich literature. And again if we have spent some time getting into the core issues with the help of the "Root of the Middle Way." then all of those discussions take on a very sort of live quality. Because, for example, here in our contemplations we're beginning to wonder what to say about the apparent reality. What can we say about it, what should we, what must we perhaps say about conventional reality? And then it's extremely helpful to know that there are different ways that you can go. Very different ways, those are very different ways of responding to that challenge, whether you become a Svātantrika or Prāsaṅgika. And even the issues are so contested that some say: "Well if you go one way you lose it, and you're no longer a Mādhyamika." And that's on both sides of how we draw that divide between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is also up for debate.
So these terms for philosophical schools are really like a pair of...
sort of general...
That's one word I'm looking for, I can't find it So they are terms that sound as if they refer to obvious schools of thought represented by such and such people, in such and such works, and that is also the case to some extent, but at the same time the very definition of what makes someone Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is itself part of the debate. So using this framework of Svātantrika versus Prāsaṅgika is a way of getting deeper into the issue as a whole. In the same way as the two truths, or the same, in the same way as the two truths, the three natures.. Not because there really and truly are two truths, not because there really and truly are three natures. They are devices that we can apply to gain insight. Similarly with this framework of Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika as we work with it and try to see what makes more sense, we come to see more and more about the two truths with greater and greater clarity. So it's a very marvelous literature that has developed around those questions. So some who are considered Prāsaṅgikas will say that if you are Svātantrika you aren't actually a Mādhyamika. And perhaps even the possibility of liberation which all of this is about discovering, perhaps even that is erased, if you get entangled in this system. And others will say about who are considered Prāsaṅgikas, or who call themselves Prāsaṅgikas, that if you take this route you become a nihilist, forget about liberation. So there's that kind of seriousness about it and others again they make a big effort to show that the two are compatible, and that they are entirely compatible, and that they appear different because of various purposes, higher purposes.
It's a rich literature that wherever we look all the great authors, whichever side they take on this, we can learn something in a very profound fashion. So that's just commenting on what you said that dependent origination is a different cause and effect conventionally. It's a question that we can and should keep in the back of our minds as we go forward in the treatise. What is it really that appears to us at the level of convention, the seeming reality? What is it that we experience and can and should think about in terms of cause and effect, when it comes to the conventional reality?
So in this way we have dismissed not from itself, and not from another.
And then yesterday we said while the natural feeling that we probably have at this point is that therefore we need both. That move won't help us. It's very natural to get that sense of both being the solution, because what we were saying about the first alternative Is that it doesn't make sense to say cause and effect are the same because there is also this appearance of diversity with respect to cause and effect. That by definition causes and effects couldn't be just the same, then we wouldn't be speaking of them as different. So in that way we say, "Okay perhaps same in a certain sense why not?" It should be possible to speak about cause and effect as one and the same in such and such context, from such and such perspective, but not in all regards. And so there is a sense of both. Similarly with other, we said that yes, as we just said causes are causes, effects are effects, but they are nonetheless related. Again we wouldn't be talking about cause and effect, if they weren't related. Then they would just be two different things and that would be all what we needed to say and state. But we want something more, when we say cause and effect we want to speak about two things that are, on the one hand, different but also deeply connected. So connected that we can rely on very certain things coming to be, when A is the case, then we can rely on very certain things coming to be in terms of B.
So again that's the sense of a combination, it's both different, apparent difference, and yet, sameness and connection in terms of the relationship between these two. But then we said that, in fact, that won't work; although, indeed, we do speak in this way, although indeed we think in this way, using a combination all the time of same and different, not just about cause and effect but anything, We operate, we think and believe and act in terms of things being, on the one hand, the same and, on the other hand, different.
If we can't take that, if we cannot rightly think of things as same, and think of things as different, then it's hard to think of what we can think of at all.
We certainly do think and operate in this way, and we are confirmed by our experience that it makes sense to say that: "Don't just put a, don't just... what to say,
Well if we want to grow a tree, then we can say you don't have to dig up a large tree and move it into the garden. Just get a seed and if you do the right thing then a tree will grow." So in other words, we make a distinction between the seed, the cause, and the effect that is the tree.
And if someone is not aware of that, then someone else can make that person aware and say, "Here's the seed, just try it out, you'll see and it works." We are confirmed in our belief that this seed is one thing, and the tree is another one, that we can get to grow in our garden by doing certain things to the seed. But at the same time we also, we don't want to say that what then happens there is something completely different than the seed. And if we try to explain why it is that the seed can grow a tree, then we begin to discover more and more things that are in the seed, that are also in the tree. So we make use of same and different in order to do something like that, plant a tree or grow a tree in our garden. And the more reasonable and sort of scientific we become about it, the more we have to make these kind of distinctions between same and different, and the more we have to be comfortable with talking about these things as both, same in certain senses, and different in certain other senses. But what we said yesterday is, that: "Wait a minute, what is it that we avail ourselves of at this point? We talk about same as if things could be same, as if it's possible to talk about two things as being really the same? But again, wait a minute, two things, just the very point of departure says that we are profoundly wrong if we say that those are the same. If they were the same, how come we can speak of, we can compare them?"
And strangely we had the exact same problem with difference, because if we say that these two things are really and truly completely different, then we have already qualified them both as things. So that's something that is exactly the same with respect to those two. So, in other words, where we are at now is at a point where we don't seem to find any cases of things that are really the same, and things that are really different. The whole realm of experience, all what we can think of, all what we can hear, all what we can learn, there is no instance anywhere that is an instance of actual sameness, and actual difference. So the profound problem with combining these two, hoping to arrive at an account of reality, is that we are using two components which are not just partially successful. And that's what we talked about yesterday as well. If there was just some truth to the fact, if there was just some truth to the statement that these are the same, or if there was just some truth to the statement that these are different, then we could just try to separate what's wrong from what's right, and then combine the two checks and we would get the account that we want to have, the combination of the two. But because same fails completely, profoundly,
if we cannot find, ok we have talked about same, things that are the same as long as we have been speaking probably. And we have been thinking in those terms. But at this point we fail to find a single example of things that are the same. So what actually have we been speaking about in all these years? When we said same then what did we mean? There must be some example now that we can point to. Well "same like.." whichever example we come up with is not an example of same. Just as problematically, what did we mean when we said different? Any example that we come up with is not an example of difference. So what were we talking about? What were we thinking?
That's why the third alternative doesn't work.
So if this is true, that's what you should think of for tomorrow. If this is true, then at this point we will have to conclude that there are no real causes and conditions. That's a terrible conclusion, no?
That's a terrible conclusion that drives us into the fourth alternative, no? Complete chaos.
So please think of that carefully, why would it be such,
why must we then at this point conclude that hence there are no real causes? Because we started out looking at cause and effect and causality, causal relationships. And we said it makes perfectly good sense to say that causes and effects can only be of three kinds. They can be one and the same, they can be different from each other, and they can be both. By now, if we cannot find any justification for any one of these three alternatives, then because there is no fourth option, the very idea of real causes and conditions will have to be relinquished.
So please think about that at home, from the beginning try to go through why was it that it didn't work to say that cause and effect were the same? Why was it that it didn't work to say that cause and effect are different? And why was it finally that it didn't work to say that cause and effect are both same and different? So make sure that you have that explanation readily in mind, and then spend time thinking if those conclusions still hold. In particular, we haven't had much time to contemplate the problems with the third alternative. So let's also ponder that in particular.
And yeah, then see what happens.
So the fourth alternative is that things are uncaused. If we must dismiss things arising from themselves, if we must dismiss the idea that things really arise from other things, if we must give up the idea that they can be a combination of sameness and difference, cause and effect, then there is no longer any justification for believing in true causes and conditions.
Okay, maybe we say that then let's just believe in seeming causes and conditions, but what kind of belief is that? A belief in false causes and conditions? When were you ever taught that you have to believe in something false? Sometimes we hear that, yeah? But it's a strange thing to say, you know? You must believe in something wrong.
So, no causes and conditions. In other words, we started out saying also that nonetheless things appear. All of this doesn't mean that our experience ceases by no means. And all the while it seems that we have been talking about something things happen, as we started out saying. So they must then appear in a way that really has nothing to do with causal contingency.
That when things happen they aren't restricted in any way to causal dependency. They just happen randomly, spontaneously. So is that a viable conclusion, then? Is that the truth, then? Because we have dismissed causes and conditions, there are no real causes and conditions. We know that. Is reality then chaos?
Student: "Could we just check, so if we compare chaos to when you were talking about Dharmakīrti a little, and the second option from another.
So I see a little bit of a similarity between those two, like you were saying we impute the sense onto things that are only momentary. So just to help us kind of separate the random option from that, could you clarify a little more?" Yeah, that's a good point. So when the Buddhists say that causes and effects are different from each other, that is still within the context of causal accounts. So the Buddhist says that not just to say that really they are different, so when you think of it differently, it is something that you ascribe or impute onto the reality of distinct entities. But nonetheless there certainly are causal relationships, and so you can figure those out, you can understand those, and if you rely on those causal relationships skillfully, that's how you can have success in the world and that's how you can find success on the spiritual path. That's why there is liberation, that's why there are three jewels, and so on. So it's the thoroughly causal account. But the fourth alternative is one that says that all of that is just make-believe. There are no, no matter how good you are, you can't be good at finding causal relationships because there aren't any.
So is that the truth then?
Student: "I would say that there are no causes and conditions, but there are causes and conditions at the same time, like they both exist. I would say that the very basis of the universe is without causes and conditions, but our relative experience of samsara is one with causes and conditions. And I think they are both important."
So okay, you said that for whichever reasons you have for saying that, the universe is not ultimately causal. But it seems to us that there are causal relationships. So then we look at that appearance of causes and conditions, and say the causes and conditions and effects, causes and conditions and effects, as you say, it doesn't make sense to talk about one single cause that produces one single effect and so on. So the causal matrix and the result of that as it appears to us. Are those two the same? Or are they different from each other? Or are they a combination?
Student: "I think they are based on sort of our perception of relative reality which is like a construct of being a human being. So I would say like, I don't know, neither."
What did I ask you now? Oh yeah, there aren't any of those, yeah? Any of those three. They are not the same, they are not different and they are not both. Then why do you call them cause and effect?
Student: "I guess that's just what our experience is in relative samsara. Our experience as living in this human dimension is one of cause and effect. That's what it feels like, and I guess that's how we can describe it." Yeah, so
Yeah, so, yeah, interesting.
That's what it feels like, yeah?
But is that the best we can say about this? It's just what it feels like? So think about what it is we are looking at, we are talking about cause and effect like as a framework for understanding the world, for being in the world. And all what we can say is, it just feels like that! Student: "I feel like that's the best I can say, but just right now at least." So let's see if it's possible to say something better than that. But at this time probably, maybe we can't, yeah? We can't say much more, because we said that if there really are causes and effects, then either they are actually the same, or otherwise they are different from each other. Or otherwise finally there could be some combination of, on the one hand the same. and on the other hand, different. But we can see very clearly that that's not the case with whatever it is that we feel is cause, and whatever it is that we feel is effect. So then the only thing we can say is, "Well I just get that sense that there are causes and conditions." So in one way that sounds very stupid, no, to say... But on the other hand it's probably very important to say. Because if we don't say that, then we could very easily just check the fourth alternative, no? And say things are completely chaotic, they have nothing to do with causes and effects.
But, so what would make it problematic for us to say that this is then the truth? Just forget about causes and effects, then you get it. There's this world, and it seems to be one of causal relationships, but not at all. It's just totally random.
When you think you're getting good at understanding something and connecting one thing with another. it's just a complete illusion, that has nothing to do with the way things actually are, yeah?
What would be wrong in saying that?
Student: "I think it's completely unsatisfactionary to just say that then it's chaos, because I feel that then we again impute something and we end in almost option one, which we very quickly refuted, that everything is one, because now everything is chaos. So I feel it's like we are walking around in circles, it's just nonsense for me, and I like, I mean even if they imputed, like if we talked about the Svātantrikas and saying okay, so then there's an imputed reality, just because I feel like, well, then if I analyze that because that's also imputation, is also a belief in cause and effect. I end in the same place, so where I have ended is that.. That there is some kind of unsolvable paradox here, and that I'm completely crazy. That's my end point, because I don't want to live in falsehood. I don't want to say, okay then I just believe in seemingly things and, you know, like what kind of life is that? So yeah, so there's like, no chaos is just utterly unsatisfactionary. It's like just saying, like history of science, is like saying, okay then there's God. Like we can't explain it, so now it's all God, right?"
Yeah, that makes a lot of sense, no?
And that's, yeah, that makes a huge difference, yeah?
So in fact, when we say that, "well it just seems like that," in one way we're saying something dumb, because we can't justify it beyond that. And not only that, we know that we can't justify it. But at the same time,
why would we not acknowledge what we see and what we experience, no? And what we see and what we experience is something of that sort, no? It is that it makes, we can't figure out exactly how they work, those causal relationships, and we can't rely on them in a hundred percent categorical way. But there are some examples of causal relationships that usually work pretty good. And why would we not acknowledge that? Like, I'm getting thirsty now and the idea of a glass of water begins to come to my mind, and I think I'll be alright now, there are many things that could happen in between that point, and many things could go, but I plan to get a glass of water, and I strongly expect that I will feel a whole lot better. I mean, not that I feel terrible now, but I will feel very different and refreshed when I have drunk that glass of water. That's not to say that it will definitely happen, and that's not to say that it couldn't be very different, I could make a mistake and pour in some liquid that will not make me feel like that, I could never make it to the glass of water and so on. But those sorts of causal relationships, here just about a glass of water, no? But life is very rich, no? And in particular, the more we think in terms of the teachings, the potential that comes with human life is extraordinary. So all of that has to do with our ability to notice something that we can rely on. And move from A to B and something new happens, there's a new scenery that we can learn something from, and so on. Not only why would we say goodbye to that, but what would allow us to do that? That's also what you were saying, no? That there's no justification for then saying, "So it's all uncaused" Why is it all uncaused?
It surely doesn't seem like that, no? So just like we couldn't say, that's a very good point, no? Just like we couldn't say it's all the nature of God or all the nature of the universal principle, prakṛti, or whichever. It's all just physics, just as we can't say that. We can't say, make this kind of declaration either, no? That it's all just uncaused and come to some sort of meta conclusion of that kind. That would be the same mistake in one way, but it would also be a deeply unsatisfying and dangerous mistake to make, no? Because where does it leave us? Nowhere, no? But a dangerous nowhere, so not just nowhere, but a bad nowhere. Student: "Actually, I was also thinking about how when we think about chaos, we think it's random but at the same time, when I think of Nepal's traffic system, it looks like chaos. But there is a certain, it's like organized chaos, things are working, there's a way that things move and you can get to your place, right? But that's more on a gross level, and I was kind of thinking, when you look at things more subtly, I think we don't have a language. Can you hear me? Because we are thinking in such dualistic ways of cause, effect, you know? And that's a more gross way of understanding reality. So as you kind of go more subtler, there is this sense of the last thing, the fourth point where it becomes so subtle that it almost touches on emptiness. That's kind of what I think, there is a question that is not answered, because the way we think or our physical reality, our thoughts, just doesn't feel like it's enough."
So there is a sense that we cannot, we can see that our thoughts and concepts don't capture
anything of what we thought they would. Like they seem to not refer to anything, and at the same time, just that conclusion in itself is also not satisfying, as you say Not just satisfying, but it's also not warranted. So that's a very interesting point.
So the concepts don't refer, but that conclusion itself is what?
Did you have a comment? "One from online?" "Yeah." Can you speak?
"John, can you speak?" Student: "Yes, can you hear me?" Yes "So I have, I'd like to say something I thought about this business of causes, but first I'd like to put it in the context of how I interpret that first paragraph.
Seems to me that we're thinking that there's a beginning to things and an end to things, and the way I've always interpreted dependent origination was that it has no beginning.
So I see this almost like a conservation law. There's really nothing that comes into existence or goes out of existence ever. So that would explain the last line, that nowhere does anything ever arise." It would also be in perfect accord with the... "Can I just finish?" Sure! "And the thing I have about cause is that I think it's not necessarily true that to think, because things are uncaused that, that the alternative is chaos. I think that we see cause and effect because of persistent correlations,
and that things, first of all things don't cause other things at all.
There's something else going on, and just one example I could give is that
like light, when you see a stick partially in water and you see it bent, the reason for that is because light takes something called the path of least action, and not because of any causes. It's just that there's a, it's like a rule, so
it's not that the photons are caused to go that way.
So it seems to me that there can be order inherent in the universe, without it being one thing causing another."
Okay, so this would be, the first you said that doesn't arise and does not cease, that is actually the way that dependent origination is qualified.
You are then in complete agreement with Nāgārjuna in the beginning? "Yes."
What you are in fact proposing is that there is a fifth way, that there is a way that things happen which is not cause or a third just to make it easier now because you say this is not a story of causal dependencies, and it's not a story of no causes either as in chaos. But there is something else, and then you said the path of least resistance, something like that, how would you qualify that third alternative? Student: "Just that order, there are rules about the way the world behaves. So would, perhaps you could, yeah So if we can say that these rules make the world the way it is, I think it's safe to say that that is still within the framework of causes and conditions, as it's understood in the context here. As long as there is something that when it's there, makes something else happen, then we are talking about cause and effect. So if the fact of the rules being there and being the case is the reason that the world is the way it is, then this would still be something that one could ask, is the relationship between the rules and the world one of identity? Or is there a difference between the rules and the manifest world? Or is it a combination of sameness and difference? Thank you very much and see you then tomorrow. Thank you.
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