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Root of The Middle Way – Session 07
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- Buddhist Classics and Philosophy
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- Rangjung Yeshe Institute - Nepal
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Excerpt
Session 7 explores causality intricacies and interpretations of monism and non-arising. It concludes by encouraging contemplation of causal relationships challenging the notion of fundamental difference between cause and effect.
Description
Session 7 further delves into the first verse of the first investigation, exploring causality and arising from causes and conditions. Pure monism is rejected, perception’s role and the complexity of reconciling philosophies are discussed. The lecture briefly mentions the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras and the importance of diverse perspectives in Buddhist philosophy. It encourages contemplating causal relationships challenging the idea of fundamental difference between cause and effect.
Related Course Info
- Root of the Middle Way – Mūlamadhyamakakārikā A course on Nagarjuna’s brilliantly sharp reasoning, taught by Dr. Thomas Doctor at the Rangjung Yeshe Institute over a month. For everyone with an interest in the way things really are.
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Good morning everybody.
Hello. Good morning.
Very sorry I'm late,
but let's begin.
"That which originates
dependently does not
cease and does not arise,
is not annihilated
and is not permanent,
does not come and does not go,
is not different and
not the same
to the true teacher
who reveals this peace,
the complete pacification
of constructs,
to the perfect Buddha,
I bow down."
All Right. So, We are into first verse of the first investigation, the Analysis of Conditions.
And we have thought about whether things arise, whether there is at least some appearance of arising that we can recognize. Would you mind closing the door here? Thank you.
And then we have considered whether it is right to say that if there is such an appearance of arising, if it seems that things happen,
that then such arising of things could only happen in two different ways: eiither it would be an arising of things that is determined by and restricted by causal constellations, causes and conditions, or otherwise it is an arising that is completely independent of that. So uncaused arising, completely random arising. And I think we have all agreed, we have each individually said that the appearance of arising is something that we do know and cannot deny. And we have also, I haven't heard anyone object to this categorization into two basic forms of arising, and saying that that is all inclusive, that there's nothing, that doesn't find its place in these two categories. But please think about it still. Is there some form of arising that could be of a third order, neither causal nor random? And then we began to look at each of the four alternatives that are presented, because as we know, the first three are variants of the view that things arise based on causes and conditions, and then the fourth is the second alternative. So the first of the two alternatives: caused versus not caused arising, that first alternative is itself divided into three, where we say again, the aim is to come up with some categories that capture everything that comes under the main category. So what is the main category? It is arising based on causes and conditions. And then the author would like to have us agree that it is fair to say that any form of arising can be captured within three categories. Things arise, that would be the first explanation of the arising of things. Things arise from causes that are identical with the arisen thing. So cause and effect are identical. That is the first variant. Secondly, it could be the case that things arise from other things, from things that are different from themselves. In other words, the view that cause and effect are different. Or it could be the case that what is happening is really neither of the first two in isolation, but it's a combination of them - that things arise both from themselves and from other things. And then we wonder, is it true that again, this simple categorization is a way of capturing any form of arising? So causality, of course, is extremely complex. And yet here we are challenged to say, do we agree that regardless of the incredible complexity, the sort of the fathomless complexity of causality. Because who really can compreehend fully how things interact and give rise to each other. Despite this fathomless complexity of causality, that all forms of cause and effect find their place in this simple framework of three different views about it. It could be the view that we could think that this myriad forms of causes, conditions and effects are all really the same, that they are of the very same identity. Or we could think that they are different from each other, or we could think that they are a combination. So that is something that is very important for us to think of. Again, is there a fourth, in this case, possibility with respect to causality? So we did that to some extent yesterday also. And the point is to, whenever we consider questions here, to then keep them burning, in the breaks and at home, in your sessions of study, contemplation, and to come to a sense of precisely where you're at yourselves.
We also went further than this. We said that we began to consider the feasibility of the first account, that things, causes and effects are the same And we didn't spend much time on it. In effect, we dismissed it quite quickly. We said that the only way to defend this view is to say, is a sort of doctrine of illusion. The only way that we can get away with saying that cause and effect are the same is to say, that cause and effect aren't what they seem. Because cause and effect do come across as different from each other, no? There's cause and there's effect. So the only way to become a believer in the first option is to say,
it's just an illusion. What you see is not reality. In fact, cause and effect are no different from each other. And then we very sort of high-handedly, if that's the right expression, we dismissed any sort of philosophical orientation that takes that shape
by saying that if that is our idea, if we have this sort of framework that says appearance is illusory, reality is different, reality is one, the appearance is multiple and diverse. If that is our view, and there are many schools of thought that operate with this sort of view, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, ancient and modern, scientific accounts that take this form. But we sort of brush them all. We say, what you have there is not a pure monism. So in a way, the very idea of monism, that there is what reality is one, and the appearance of diversity and complexity is just appearance. All of that we swept aside with just a single remark. We said the fact that you acknowledge diversity at the level of appearance means that you are not a pure monist, that you cannot defend pure monism. In fact, what you defend is not the first alternative, that things arise from themselves, it's the third alternative. Because what you say is that in one way, things are different, namely in the way that they come across, in the way that they appear, but in fact they are one. So that doesn't cut it for the first alternative. The first alternative is a non-starter, in other words. It doesn't work to say that this is all that there is to say, all is one, because there is the appearance that we cannot deny. So that's a very... I don't know what to call that kind of approach. It's not being very patient with the opposition,
or with all the very many philosophical, religious, scientific approaches that make this claim of monism.
Because we say that the very idea just doesn't work. You may call it monism, but it's not. So I think that's more or less where we ended yesterday, and it would be great if someone can, whatever you have reflected about at home I'd be very happy to hear where you've got to. And again, the key is to say, where have I gotten to? That's actually the only thing that's really interesting at this point. We can study Mādhyamaka philosophy later, so to speak. There's this sense of a sort of first encounter, a direct encounter, where we don't have to keep any philosophical categories in mind at all, except from those that just present themselves naturally to us as truths.
So now we have said that monism isn't true. It's a hopelessly flawed idea, and it took us less than a minute to say so. So that's something to think of. Is this fair? It doesn't seem polite, at least. It doesn't seem very accommodating or not really willing to engage in any sort of dialogue. It's just throwing an argument in somebody's face, really in our own face, because we're talking about, we're investigating our own opinions. And perhaps monism has a great appeal in many ways. Perhaps it doesn't. Perhaps we are strongly against it. But there may be many of us who feel that that's a good case for that, whether we come from a philosophical, religious or scientific background.
Thank you.
Student: "Hello? I think that there is a good argument for monism, because you say that, okay, so we can't see it. No, I can't see it with having my eyes like this. But if I put on glasses and if I put on, you know, how do you say, the right tools, I can see atoms at some point. I can identify them with my, you know, reality, a view. And at that point, everything is the same. It is one. Like, you know, if it's all like, I don't know, then they split up the atoms, but it's not different anymore."
If we accept that what we see is a physical reality and so on, yeah? Student: "Yeah, because you said that, you know, the way of refuting this is to say, well, you can just see that there are causes, you know, that there are cause and effect. So we are in the third option. But I would refute that by saying, no, we're not in the third option, because it just depends on the tools we have to see that it is indeed the same." Right. So, yeah, I think what we need to say is we refute the very idea of monism as this sort of true monism really all is one and that's the whole story. Student: "But it is, right?" Yeah. So if that is what monism is, then we have refute monism hereby, arguably. And let's argue about it. But so how is that the case? If by saying that because we have to put on special glasses, that's why it's not just all the same. It's not the whole story. So we are not, we still have some sort of flame of monism burning somewhere. It hasn't died out entirely because we have just relegated it to a different category. We say monism, what people call monism isn't entirely monism, but okay, let's call it monism and then place it in the third category as an account of things arising both from themselves, meaning the shared identity of cause and effect, and then an acknowledgement of diversity and difference. Student: "But I don't like, because, okay, so let's say the other way. So what we talked about this yesterday, I go into a spaceship, people have been on spaceships and they have gone to Mars, right? Or the moon at least, not Mars, sorry." Yes, they have, no? Student: "Well, we don't know about it. Maybe we have. I'm not part of any secret group. Anyways, from that point, from the moon, the earth is one, right?" From the point of the moon, the earth is one? Student: "Yeah, like I'm just trying to…" So that is different. If we talk about constructs, if we say it's useful to speak about things as if they are all one, then fine. Here we are just trying to see, are these views and accounts actually true? True in terms of things as they are? Does it capture the nature of reality to say that all is one, period? Student: "Yeah, probably not when you say it like that." So okay, probably not when you say it like that. That's a very good example of don't agree easily. Okay. And think more about it, yeah?
Thank you.
Student: "So yeah, I think that this argument that you gave yesterday somewhat strawmans the like monist perspective. In other words, I don't think monists think themselves that appearances don't differ, right? So clearly a monist view has to incorporate the apparent difference of appearances. And so a more charitable read, trying to give monism a more charitable read, and I also want to bring in what we were talking about yesterday and the day before in terms of, do things happen?" Those are very related, yeah? Student: "They're very related. Yeah. And one thing that folks were talking about yesterday and the day before is this conceptual belief that things don't happen, but maybe a perceptual encounter with things happening. And I want to add to that and just talk about how there's kind of different ways to perceive happening. And meditation is a good example. When you meditate, things seem to happen a little bit differently or the nature of happening seems to change a little bit. In particular, I would say, just speaking personally, I've tried to meditate on things like thoughts or even physical appearances. And because of the encounter with impermanence, they never really seem to manifest the way that I conceptually impute them to manifest, when I'm just moving around in my daily life. So in other words, on a certain level of perception, things don't appear, things don't happen the way that I normally think that they do. So if we're trying to be a little bit more generous to monism, but also maybe even a monism that doesn't require some kind of ontological commitment to a substrate, a causal substrate that is actually the same between cause and effect, which I think is easily refuted by other arguments. What if we said something like cause and effect are actually the same and that neither cause nor effect happens. And yet we have the everyday appearance, the everyday encounter with causes and effects. So the monism is actually a monism of non-happening, non-arising, which is in line with what Nāgārjuna is arguing here. And so that seems to me to be a more charitable, more plausible account of monism." Right. Thank you. First about the meditation experience.
I think, yeah, the question is just whether it makes sense to say things happen. We are not committed at that point to any particular version of the arising of things or any particular version of the appearance of arising. It's just, is there that or not? Yeah. So even if it seems that there are times when there is no arising whatsoever, if there are other times where it does seem to be the case, then we would still be at the same basic position that things happen. They don't have to happen all the time, but if they do at least sometimes, then yeah, that's enough of a commitment here. That's the only question we're asking. Does it seem that things happen? Not necessarily all the time, not necessarily in a sort of predictable way or whatever else expectations we may have about it, but just does it seem to be the case? And then your defense of monism, I think, is very fine and accurate as an account also of classic monism. Well, it's actually not monism. The Sāṃkhya philosophy, because it's a basic dualism, but it just, there's a soul, a conscious being that perceives the world of prakṛti. But prakṛti, it is actually dualism, but within the principle of prakṛti, all the objects
there is a seeming difference between cause and effect, but in fact there is none. So as you say precisely, really it's a matter of ultimate non-arising and relative seeming arising. So that's the cause that I think any monist orientation will have to take, because otherwise it doesn't work. We have to acknowledge where we are right now as a starting point at least, and then we can say something about the reality of that. But what we are then further saying is that if that's what is the case with monism, then it shouldn't be considered a strong claim of the type that we see in the first alternative. It's sort of on the one hand, and on the other hand yes, on the other hand no kind of perspective. And whether that's acceptable to the monist thinker, believer or not, that's for them to decide. But arguably with this we have said that if you go for the strong claim, you aren't going to succeed. If you go for the strong claim to say all is one, plus that's it then you're missing a very important part of the story.
So is that fair to say that if you think you can be that strong, I don't even need to talk to you? If you think you can be that clear in your presentation of what all of this really is, then good luck, but you will never get anywhere.
Is that correct? Is it correct that the really strong claim is impossible to maintain and that it can be refuted very quickly and decisively by saying, well, don't you acknowledge at least some seeming appearance? What do you think? This is a real key to think of in your own hearts.
Student: "This is not like a response to that question that you just asked, but a little bit before. So I would say that I agree with the first option, that cause and effect are the same because my conceptual experience of both cause and effect arise out of the same illusionistic view that I am who I think I am. Therefore, they are both born out of the same personal narrative that I used to define myself and the world around me. And since they both arise from this personal narrative, although they may appear different, they are both born out of the same source of identity which I maintain throughout my life. Therefore, since they both are born out of the same notion of self-identity, they are the same thing."
Okay, let me see if I understood this correctly, that cause and effect are same insofar as they are, what to say, your constructs? Is that correct? Student: "Yeah, like cause and effect are both constructs that I have created. So they are the same thing." So whether you have created them or whether there's a little more to say about how they are created is a different story, you know, but yeah, sure, often we talk like that, yeah.
So but I guess that has to do with, what to say?
That's interesting. Cause and effect. So you say that you agree with the first, your views fit with the first alternative? Student: "Yeah, option one." Option one, because cause and effect or any instance of cause and effect is the same in being a construction. So, I think
we would reply the same as before, that okay, the same as construction but hey, the constructs, cause, effect are not identical, yeah. So in fact you came up with a sophisticated account of not the first, but the third alternative, yeah. You wanted to have room for some sameness of cause and effect, and you chose to let that sameness be in terms of construction and at the same time you wanted to say that there is this world, yeah, that gives an appearance of difference. So that would again be a version of option three.
Student: "Okay, thank you." Thank you. "So there's one online?" Yeah, absolutely, sure. "Hello Don, can you speak?"
Student: "Yes, I was wondering about these first two standards that we're talking about. You know, nowhere does anything ever arise? So then there's these four conditions as a reply, I'm assuming.
So the context of this analysis of conditions, Nāgārjuna is discussing this with someone.
And so the context is he's given a commentary on Shakyamuni's teaching on Vulture Peak Mountain.
So these four conditions, where it says there is no fifth condition, maybe it's not a condition, maybe there is no condition. That's why there isn't anything arising from itself from both or being not uncaused." I had a little hard time hearing in particular the last that you said. Student: "So that not from itself, not from another, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise. So maybe this is a statement of Shakyamuni teaching that
nothing really exists, that it's empty from the beginning, pure from the beginning, without any of this causal conditions."
Yes, I think that probably makes sense, that this is a way that we can see Nāgārjuna making a thesis out of the Prajñāpāramitā. When you read the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, then Nāgārjuna says, okay, let me put it into one thesis about reality, and here it is not from itself, not from another, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise.
So I think that makes good sense.
Student: "So I think that yesterday you said that you didn't want to really get into whether things really appear or it's a mere appearance, distinguishing between the two truths. So I think that in terms of my perception, things undeniably arise and appear and are there. Whether that's me or not, I think is a further step, but in terms of what I perceive, definitely they are there. And if I think of that and then think of whether I can say that cause and effect are the same, different or a combination, for me it has to be a combination, because definitely certain causes have certain results, regardless of the conditions, that are not other results. Like the usual, a mango seed will give a mango tree and not a banana tree because there's something there that's similar between them and that links them, that does not link certain causes with certain results. So in that sense, there's a similarity, but definitely in the way that things appear and that we see them, the seed is not the same as the tree. So they have to be different too. So for me, I would go for the third option, combination." Great. I think that's a very clear explanation, or way of putting it,
What to say? It's a very clear way to state precisely that perspective.
That if we "just" want to acknowledge what is the case from our perspective, then we can't do with the first alternative. It will have to be a combination. And then you also say that the second alternative is the same. That's not an exhaustive account, of cause and effect to say that they are based on other, that they are the arising of things that are different from their causes.
So that then very naturally takes us into the second alternative, to looking at what the alternative that presents itself when we say things, causes and effects are not the same, then what are they? If they aren't the same, it's easy to think that the immediate alternative and the option to consider immediately after this is that they are different from each other.
And this notion of difference is very, very prominent in a lot of Buddhist philosophy. So whereas the first alternative is by the commentators usually associated with the Sāṃkhya school, which has this account of the aware being that is fooled by the appearances of prakṛti, which in fact, despite their appearance of causes and effects, is just that universal principle of prakṛti. Whereas the first alternative, things arising from themselves is associated with that philosophy of classic Indian philosophy. The second option, that things arise from things that are different from themselves, is associated with the Buddhist view. So Buddhists believe that causes and effects are not the same. And that's very important for the doctrine of impermanence, that things change, right? And they change all the time, perhaps they change even on a momentary scale. Nothing remains the same for even a moment. So that's what the Abhidharma says about ultimate reality. The ultimate reality of not everything, but the ultimate reality of body and mind is in other words, about anything, the ultimate reality of body and mind, or the physical and the mental. That the physical world comes down to atoms, and those atoms do not endure. They are utterly impermanent. And the mind comes down to just moments of cognition, moments of awareness. And that's then this flux that we also talked about. It seems to us that there are things that last,
entities in the world, people, and so on. But under analysis, we find that all of these things that seem to feature permanence and duration are not actually and truly like that. They are not permanent and stable in the way that they appear, but constantly changing. And then we said before that seeing in particular that the notion of a permanent, singular, and controlling individual falls apart when we acknowledge that, when we acknowledge the infinite diversity we also talked about, the complexity of body and mind, which became immediately apparent when we began to investigate it, and the constant change, so to speak, of that complexity. When the idea of a permanent and singular and controlling individual is tested against this reality of body and mind or the physical and the mental, then it seems to be completely unfounded. And we then also considered the implications of that kind of discovery, that it's then possible to let go of the tendencies that otherwise drive consciousness mercilessly to react and respond in ways that in the end will, contrary to our expectations and our wishes, just perpetuate suffering. So by understanding that reality is like that, impermanent and complex, as opposed to that the reality of body and mind is like that, complex and impermanent, it's possible to set out on a path that allows liberation from the disturbing emotions, and ultimately freedom from cyclic existence.
So it's the Buddhist position that is under analysis next that things are impermanent, that causes and effects are impermanent entities, that are therefore also different from each other.
If the Buddhists cannot say that they are really different, then that whole understanding that we just tried to express, falls. Because what is it then that is not the same, that is not different? Then hundreds of questions will pop up, no? If we can't say conclusively that cause and effect are different, that these things are not the same in the way that they seem to be.
But Nāgārjuna has no p atience with that view either, so he dismisses it. He presents his dismissal of it in the very first stanza, of the very first analysis, and says that things do not arise from different things either. And how could he then claim that?
In a way the challenge with the second alternative is the opposite of the first, because in the first case our immediate perceptions tells us that there's something incomplete with the first alternative, that things arise from themselves. Why? Because we have the opposite impression. But in this case,
the appearance of the world is very much in terms of differences. Seed and sprout, wouldn't a natural statement to make, be to say that those are not same, but different things. A seed is not a sprout, a sprout is not a seed. There is a difference there. So if we're going to say that that is wrong, then how could we possibly do that? Before we insisted on the relevance of this appearance, and now we'll have to somehow dismiss the appearance. If we're going to succeed in refuting the view that cause and effect are different, then we will have to find a view of dismissing our perception of them as being different things. We will have to find a way of dismissing our perception of cause and effect as different, to the effect that, basically, that we will have to find a way of convincing ourselves that no, they're not. That's a tall order, but how could we possibly come to, in a justified way, think that when I say cause and effect are different, then I'm making a false statement?
That's where we will have to get to, if we can follow Nāgārjuna beyond the first, the refutation of the first alternative, and through a refutation of the second alternative. Then we will have to say that cause and effect are the apparent reality of different causes and effects, is in no way grounds for making the claim that cause and effect are different.
One way of approaching this is to think of, exactly as you brought up, causal relationships, the appearance of causal relationships. So again we revert to the way things seem to be.
Interesting, no? We always come back to that, what is the apparent reality? Let's try to be as true as we can to that. Then, on the basis of the apparent reality, we can make claims about ultimate reality, we can develop beliefs about ultimate reality, but if our beliefs about ultimate reality...
But having radical beliefs about ultimate reality doesn't give us a license to disregard the apparent reality. That's like one message to take when we just consider the flow of how this is going. That is a very sound advice, that no matter how radical and groundbreaking, unbelievable, profound our understanding of the ultimate reality may become, whether we take some philosophical approach, meditation experience, the path of science, whatever it is that we come to understand about ultimate reality doesn't license us to disregard the apparent reality.
So, the way of getting into the refutation of the second alternative is to begin to then think of what is the kind of relationship that we perceive between a seed and its sprout? It's indeed a relationship. There is a connection there. There's something that ties them together. The very idea of cause and effect builds on certain things having something that makes other things possible. If that certain something is not there, then the second thing is not going to manifest. That is what is so powerful about being able to understand causal relationships, because then once we have identified them, we can act in the world successfully, because we know what's going to happen. That too is an immediate fact and a seemingly undeniable fact of the world, that there are causal relationships, that it's possible to figure out things to some extent at least, so that we can successfully make informed choices about what to do and what not to do. If I feel thirsty, I will grab a glass of water and I will not hold up a burning match to my mouth, because I have a very clear sense of what water does for my thirst as opposed to fire.
Causal relationships, we may say that cause and effect, seed is seed and sprout is sprout, but there's also something that, and that is very key, connects them. In other words, as you were already suggesting, it is not good enough to say that cause and effect are purely different. The bravado that Sāṃkhya had when presenting the idea that cause and effect are one and the same was here expressed by a Buddhist. Let's say cause and effect are different, but just as we told the Sāṃkhya person, now we tell the Buddhist, "Save it for later. You don't belong in this category. Your account is not an account of pure difference." If it were, then these causal relationships would be inexplicable. There would be no way to explain why it is that precisely the rice seed gives rise to a rice sprout, and not to a mango tree, or to an elephant, or to the planet Mars. If cause and effect were just purely different from each other, then that would be universally the case. That is the Buddhist claim often, that all these causes and effects are different. So if we take that seriously, then it cancels the very idea of causation, because if there's a universal fact of difference with respect to anything, then where does that leave the possibility for relation? So that's where we will stop today and that's a very, very central point. So please consider this carefully and we will have plenty of time to consider this very point from many different angles as we go. But try already now to see how far you can come with this.
And in particular, what?
Yeah, in particular see
whether this simple appeal to causal relationships, to our noticing of causal relationships, makes the claim that cause and effect are different, untenable, without modification. Is it the case that we will have to say cause and effect are different, but... also such and such, whatever it might be, we will then have to find the commonality elsewhere. We will then have to find what it then is that allows the appearance of causal relationship. But is it at this point sufficient to say cause and effect are not different from each other, because we do indeed notice causal relationships? The very idea of cause and the very idea of effect in and of themselves deny pure difference as the correct account of the 'relationship' between cause and effect. Okay, thank you very much and see you again tomorrow. Bye.
All Right. So, We are into first verse of the first investigation, the Analysis of Conditions.
And we have thought about whether things arise, whether there is at least some appearance of arising that we can recognize. Would you mind closing the door here? Thank you.
And then we have considered whether it is right to say that if there is such an appearance of arising, if it seems that things happen,
that then such arising of things could only happen in two different ways: eiither it would be an arising of things that is determined by and restricted by causal constellations, causes and conditions, or otherwise it is an arising that is completely independent of that. So uncaused arising, completely random arising. And I think we have all agreed, we have each individually said that the appearance of arising is something that we do know and cannot deny. And we have also, I haven't heard anyone object to this categorization into two basic forms of arising, and saying that that is all inclusive, that there's nothing, that doesn't find its place in these two categories. But please think about it still. Is there some form of arising that could be of a third order, neither causal nor random? And then we began to look at each of the four alternatives that are presented, because as we know, the first three are variants of the view that things arise based on causes and conditions, and then the fourth is the second alternative. So the first of the two alternatives: caused versus not caused arising, that first alternative is itself divided into three, where we say again, the aim is to come up with some categories that capture everything that comes under the main category. So what is the main category? It is arising based on causes and conditions. And then the author would like to have us agree that it is fair to say that any form of arising can be captured within three categories. Things arise, that would be the first explanation of the arising of things. Things arise from causes that are identical with the arisen thing. So cause and effect are identical. That is the first variant. Secondly, it could be the case that things arise from other things, from things that are different from themselves. In other words, the view that cause and effect are different. Or it could be the case that what is happening is really neither of the first two in isolation, but it's a combination of them - that things arise both from themselves and from other things. And then we wonder, is it true that again, this simple categorization is a way of capturing any form of arising? So causality, of course, is extremely complex. And yet here we are challenged to say, do we agree that regardless of the incredible complexity, the sort of the fathomless complexity of causality. Because who really can compreehend fully how things interact and give rise to each other. Despite this fathomless complexity of causality, that all forms of cause and effect find their place in this simple framework of three different views about it. It could be the view that we could think that this myriad forms of causes, conditions and effects are all really the same, that they are of the very same identity. Or we could think that they are different from each other, or we could think that they are a combination. So that is something that is very important for us to think of. Again, is there a fourth, in this case, possibility with respect to causality? So we did that to some extent yesterday also. And the point is to, whenever we consider questions here, to then keep them burning, in the breaks and at home, in your sessions of study, contemplation, and to come to a sense of precisely where you're at yourselves.
We also went further than this. We said that we began to consider the feasibility of the first account, that things, causes and effects are the same And we didn't spend much time on it. In effect, we dismissed it quite quickly. We said that the only way to defend this view is to say, is a sort of doctrine of illusion. The only way that we can get away with saying that cause and effect are the same is to say, that cause and effect aren't what they seem. Because cause and effect do come across as different from each other, no? There's cause and there's effect. So the only way to become a believer in the first option is to say,
it's just an illusion. What you see is not reality. In fact, cause and effect are no different from each other. And then we very sort of high-handedly, if that's the right expression, we dismissed any sort of philosophical orientation that takes that shape
by saying that if that is our idea, if we have this sort of framework that says appearance is illusory, reality is different, reality is one, the appearance is multiple and diverse. If that is our view, and there are many schools of thought that operate with this sort of view, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, ancient and modern, scientific accounts that take this form. But we sort of brush them all. We say, what you have there is not a pure monism. So in a way, the very idea of monism, that there is what reality is one, and the appearance of diversity and complexity is just appearance. All of that we swept aside with just a single remark. We said the fact that you acknowledge diversity at the level of appearance means that you are not a pure monist, that you cannot defend pure monism. In fact, what you defend is not the first alternative, that things arise from themselves, it's the third alternative. Because what you say is that in one way, things are different, namely in the way that they come across, in the way that they appear, but in fact they are one. So that doesn't cut it for the first alternative. The first alternative is a non-starter, in other words. It doesn't work to say that this is all that there is to say, all is one, because there is the appearance that we cannot deny. So that's a very... I don't know what to call that kind of approach. It's not being very patient with the opposition,
or with all the very many philosophical, religious, scientific approaches that make this claim of monism.
Because we say that the very idea just doesn't work. You may call it monism, but it's not. So I think that's more or less where we ended yesterday, and it would be great if someone can, whatever you have reflected about at home I'd be very happy to hear where you've got to. And again, the key is to say, where have I gotten to? That's actually the only thing that's really interesting at this point. We can study Mādhyamaka philosophy later, so to speak. There's this sense of a sort of first encounter, a direct encounter, where we don't have to keep any philosophical categories in mind at all, except from those that just present themselves naturally to us as truths.
So now we have said that monism isn't true. It's a hopelessly flawed idea, and it took us less than a minute to say so. So that's something to think of. Is this fair? It doesn't seem polite, at least. It doesn't seem very accommodating or not really willing to engage in any sort of dialogue. It's just throwing an argument in somebody's face, really in our own face, because we're talking about, we're investigating our own opinions. And perhaps monism has a great appeal in many ways. Perhaps it doesn't. Perhaps we are strongly against it. But there may be many of us who feel that that's a good case for that, whether we come from a philosophical, religious or scientific background.
Thank you.
Student: "Hello? I think that there is a good argument for monism, because you say that, okay, so we can't see it. No, I can't see it with having my eyes like this. But if I put on glasses and if I put on, you know, how do you say, the right tools, I can see atoms at some point. I can identify them with my, you know, reality, a view. And at that point, everything is the same. It is one. Like, you know, if it's all like, I don't know, then they split up the atoms, but it's not different anymore."
If we accept that what we see is a physical reality and so on, yeah? Student: "Yeah, because you said that, you know, the way of refuting this is to say, well, you can just see that there are causes, you know, that there are cause and effect. So we are in the third option. But I would refute that by saying, no, we're not in the third option, because it just depends on the tools we have to see that it is indeed the same." Right. So, yeah, I think what we need to say is we refute the very idea of monism as this sort of true monism really all is one and that's the whole story. Student: "But it is, right?" Yeah. So if that is what monism is, then we have refute monism hereby, arguably. And let's argue about it. But so how is that the case? If by saying that because we have to put on special glasses, that's why it's not just all the same. It's not the whole story. So we are not, we still have some sort of flame of monism burning somewhere. It hasn't died out entirely because we have just relegated it to a different category. We say monism, what people call monism isn't entirely monism, but okay, let's call it monism and then place it in the third category as an account of things arising both from themselves, meaning the shared identity of cause and effect, and then an acknowledgement of diversity and difference. Student: "But I don't like, because, okay, so let's say the other way. So what we talked about this yesterday, I go into a spaceship, people have been on spaceships and they have gone to Mars, right? Or the moon at least, not Mars, sorry." Yes, they have, no? Student: "Well, we don't know about it. Maybe we have. I'm not part of any secret group. Anyways, from that point, from the moon, the earth is one, right?" From the point of the moon, the earth is one? Student: "Yeah, like I'm just trying to…" So that is different. If we talk about constructs, if we say it's useful to speak about things as if they are all one, then fine. Here we are just trying to see, are these views and accounts actually true? True in terms of things as they are? Does it capture the nature of reality to say that all is one, period? Student: "Yeah, probably not when you say it like that." So okay, probably not when you say it like that. That's a very good example of don't agree easily. Okay. And think more about it, yeah?
Thank you.
Student: "So yeah, I think that this argument that you gave yesterday somewhat strawmans the like monist perspective. In other words, I don't think monists think themselves that appearances don't differ, right? So clearly a monist view has to incorporate the apparent difference of appearances. And so a more charitable read, trying to give monism a more charitable read, and I also want to bring in what we were talking about yesterday and the day before in terms of, do things happen?" Those are very related, yeah? Student: "They're very related. Yeah. And one thing that folks were talking about yesterday and the day before is this conceptual belief that things don't happen, but maybe a perceptual encounter with things happening. And I want to add to that and just talk about how there's kind of different ways to perceive happening. And meditation is a good example. When you meditate, things seem to happen a little bit differently or the nature of happening seems to change a little bit. In particular, I would say, just speaking personally, I've tried to meditate on things like thoughts or even physical appearances. And because of the encounter with impermanence, they never really seem to manifest the way that I conceptually impute them to manifest, when I'm just moving around in my daily life. So in other words, on a certain level of perception, things don't appear, things don't happen the way that I normally think that they do. So if we're trying to be a little bit more generous to monism, but also maybe even a monism that doesn't require some kind of ontological commitment to a substrate, a causal substrate that is actually the same between cause and effect, which I think is easily refuted by other arguments. What if we said something like cause and effect are actually the same and that neither cause nor effect happens. And yet we have the everyday appearance, the everyday encounter with causes and effects. So the monism is actually a monism of non-happening, non-arising, which is in line with what Nāgārjuna is arguing here. And so that seems to me to be a more charitable, more plausible account of monism." Right. Thank you. First about the meditation experience.
I think, yeah, the question is just whether it makes sense to say things happen. We are not committed at that point to any particular version of the arising of things or any particular version of the appearance of arising. It's just, is there that or not? Yeah. So even if it seems that there are times when there is no arising whatsoever, if there are other times where it does seem to be the case, then we would still be at the same basic position that things happen. They don't have to happen all the time, but if they do at least sometimes, then yeah, that's enough of a commitment here. That's the only question we're asking. Does it seem that things happen? Not necessarily all the time, not necessarily in a sort of predictable way or whatever else expectations we may have about it, but just does it seem to be the case? And then your defense of monism, I think, is very fine and accurate as an account also of classic monism. Well, it's actually not monism. The Sāṃkhya philosophy, because it's a basic dualism, but it just, there's a soul, a conscious being that perceives the world of prakṛti. But prakṛti, it is actually dualism, but within the principle of prakṛti, all the objects
there is a seeming difference between cause and effect, but in fact there is none. So as you say precisely, really it's a matter of ultimate non-arising and relative seeming arising. So that's the cause that I think any monist orientation will have to take, because otherwise it doesn't work. We have to acknowledge where we are right now as a starting point at least, and then we can say something about the reality of that. But what we are then further saying is that if that's what is the case with monism, then it shouldn't be considered a strong claim of the type that we see in the first alternative. It's sort of on the one hand, and on the other hand yes, on the other hand no kind of perspective. And whether that's acceptable to the monist thinker, believer or not, that's for them to decide. But arguably with this we have said that if you go for the strong claim, you aren't going to succeed. If you go for the strong claim to say all is one, plus that's it then you're missing a very important part of the story.
So is that fair to say that if you think you can be that strong, I don't even need to talk to you? If you think you can be that clear in your presentation of what all of this really is, then good luck, but you will never get anywhere.
Is that correct? Is it correct that the really strong claim is impossible to maintain and that it can be refuted very quickly and decisively by saying, well, don't you acknowledge at least some seeming appearance? What do you think? This is a real key to think of in your own hearts.
Student: "This is not like a response to that question that you just asked, but a little bit before. So I would say that I agree with the first option, that cause and effect are the same because my conceptual experience of both cause and effect arise out of the same illusionistic view that I am who I think I am. Therefore, they are both born out of the same personal narrative that I used to define myself and the world around me. And since they both arise from this personal narrative, although they may appear different, they are both born out of the same source of identity which I maintain throughout my life. Therefore, since they both are born out of the same notion of self-identity, they are the same thing."
Okay, let me see if I understood this correctly, that cause and effect are same insofar as they are, what to say, your constructs? Is that correct? Student: "Yeah, like cause and effect are both constructs that I have created. So they are the same thing." So whether you have created them or whether there's a little more to say about how they are created is a different story, you know, but yeah, sure, often we talk like that, yeah.
So but I guess that has to do with, what to say?
That's interesting. Cause and effect. So you say that you agree with the first, your views fit with the first alternative? Student: "Yeah, option one." Option one, because cause and effect or any instance of cause and effect is the same in being a construction. So, I think
we would reply the same as before, that okay, the same as construction but hey, the constructs, cause, effect are not identical, yeah. So in fact you came up with a sophisticated account of not the first, but the third alternative, yeah. You wanted to have room for some sameness of cause and effect, and you chose to let that sameness be in terms of construction and at the same time you wanted to say that there is this world, yeah, that gives an appearance of difference. So that would again be a version of option three.
Student: "Okay, thank you." Thank you. "So there's one online?" Yeah, absolutely, sure. "Hello Don, can you speak?"
Student: "Yes, I was wondering about these first two standards that we're talking about. You know, nowhere does anything ever arise? So then there's these four conditions as a reply, I'm assuming.
So the context of this analysis of conditions, Nāgārjuna is discussing this with someone.
And so the context is he's given a commentary on Shakyamuni's teaching on Vulture Peak Mountain.
So these four conditions, where it says there is no fifth condition, maybe it's not a condition, maybe there is no condition. That's why there isn't anything arising from itself from both or being not uncaused." I had a little hard time hearing in particular the last that you said. Student: "So that not from itself, not from another, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise. So maybe this is a statement of Shakyamuni teaching that
nothing really exists, that it's empty from the beginning, pure from the beginning, without any of this causal conditions."
Yes, I think that probably makes sense, that this is a way that we can see Nāgārjuna making a thesis out of the Prajñāpāramitā. When you read the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, then Nāgārjuna says, okay, let me put it into one thesis about reality, and here it is not from itself, not from another, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise.
So I think that makes good sense.
Student: "So I think that yesterday you said that you didn't want to really get into whether things really appear or it's a mere appearance, distinguishing between the two truths. So I think that in terms of my perception, things undeniably arise and appear and are there. Whether that's me or not, I think is a further step, but in terms of what I perceive, definitely they are there. And if I think of that and then think of whether I can say that cause and effect are the same, different or a combination, for me it has to be a combination, because definitely certain causes have certain results, regardless of the conditions, that are not other results. Like the usual, a mango seed will give a mango tree and not a banana tree because there's something there that's similar between them and that links them, that does not link certain causes with certain results. So in that sense, there's a similarity, but definitely in the way that things appear and that we see them, the seed is not the same as the tree. So they have to be different too. So for me, I would go for the third option, combination." Great. I think that's a very clear explanation, or way of putting it,
What to say? It's a very clear way to state precisely that perspective.
That if we "just" want to acknowledge what is the case from our perspective, then we can't do with the first alternative. It will have to be a combination. And then you also say that the second alternative is the same. That's not an exhaustive account, of cause and effect to say that they are based on other, that they are the arising of things that are different from their causes.
So that then very naturally takes us into the second alternative, to looking at what the alternative that presents itself when we say things, causes and effects are not the same, then what are they? If they aren't the same, it's easy to think that the immediate alternative and the option to consider immediately after this is that they are different from each other.
And this notion of difference is very, very prominent in a lot of Buddhist philosophy. So whereas the first alternative is by the commentators usually associated with the Sāṃkhya school, which has this account of the aware being that is fooled by the appearances of prakṛti, which in fact, despite their appearance of causes and effects, is just that universal principle of prakṛti. Whereas the first alternative, things arising from themselves is associated with that philosophy of classic Indian philosophy. The second option, that things arise from things that are different from themselves, is associated with the Buddhist view. So Buddhists believe that causes and effects are not the same. And that's very important for the doctrine of impermanence, that things change, right? And they change all the time, perhaps they change even on a momentary scale. Nothing remains the same for even a moment. So that's what the Abhidharma says about ultimate reality. The ultimate reality of not everything, but the ultimate reality of body and mind is in other words, about anything, the ultimate reality of body and mind, or the physical and the mental. That the physical world comes down to atoms, and those atoms do not endure. They are utterly impermanent. And the mind comes down to just moments of cognition, moments of awareness. And that's then this flux that we also talked about. It seems to us that there are things that last,
entities in the world, people, and so on. But under analysis, we find that all of these things that seem to feature permanence and duration are not actually and truly like that. They are not permanent and stable in the way that they appear, but constantly changing. And then we said before that seeing in particular that the notion of a permanent, singular, and controlling individual falls apart when we acknowledge that, when we acknowledge the infinite diversity we also talked about, the complexity of body and mind, which became immediately apparent when we began to investigate it, and the constant change, so to speak, of that complexity. When the idea of a permanent and singular and controlling individual is tested against this reality of body and mind or the physical and the mental, then it seems to be completely unfounded. And we then also considered the implications of that kind of discovery, that it's then possible to let go of the tendencies that otherwise drive consciousness mercilessly to react and respond in ways that in the end will, contrary to our expectations and our wishes, just perpetuate suffering. So by understanding that reality is like that, impermanent and complex, as opposed to that the reality of body and mind is like that, complex and impermanent, it's possible to set out on a path that allows liberation from the disturbing emotions, and ultimately freedom from cyclic existence.
So it's the Buddhist position that is under analysis next that things are impermanent, that causes and effects are impermanent entities, that are therefore also different from each other.
If the Buddhists cannot say that they are really different, then that whole understanding that we just tried to express, falls. Because what is it then that is not the same, that is not different? Then hundreds of questions will pop up, no? If we can't say conclusively that cause and effect are different, that these things are not the same in the way that they seem to be.
But Nāgārjuna has no p atience with that view either, so he dismisses it. He presents his dismissal of it in the very first stanza, of the very first analysis, and says that things do not arise from different things either. And how could he then claim that?
In a way the challenge with the second alternative is the opposite of the first, because in the first case our immediate perceptions tells us that there's something incomplete with the first alternative, that things arise from themselves. Why? Because we have the opposite impression. But in this case,
the appearance of the world is very much in terms of differences. Seed and sprout, wouldn't a natural statement to make, be to say that those are not same, but different things. A seed is not a sprout, a sprout is not a seed. There is a difference there. So if we're going to say that that is wrong, then how could we possibly do that? Before we insisted on the relevance of this appearance, and now we'll have to somehow dismiss the appearance. If we're going to succeed in refuting the view that cause and effect are different, then we will have to find a view of dismissing our perception of them as being different things. We will have to find a way of dismissing our perception of cause and effect as different, to the effect that, basically, that we will have to find a way of convincing ourselves that no, they're not. That's a tall order, but how could we possibly come to, in a justified way, think that when I say cause and effect are different, then I'm making a false statement?
That's where we will have to get to, if we can follow Nāgārjuna beyond the first, the refutation of the first alternative, and through a refutation of the second alternative. Then we will have to say that cause and effect are the apparent reality of different causes and effects, is in no way grounds for making the claim that cause and effect are different.
One way of approaching this is to think of, exactly as you brought up, causal relationships, the appearance of causal relationships. So again we revert to the way things seem to be.
Interesting, no? We always come back to that, what is the apparent reality? Let's try to be as true as we can to that. Then, on the basis of the apparent reality, we can make claims about ultimate reality, we can develop beliefs about ultimate reality, but if our beliefs about ultimate reality...
But having radical beliefs about ultimate reality doesn't give us a license to disregard the apparent reality. That's like one message to take when we just consider the flow of how this is going. That is a very sound advice, that no matter how radical and groundbreaking, unbelievable, profound our understanding of the ultimate reality may become, whether we take some philosophical approach, meditation experience, the path of science, whatever it is that we come to understand about ultimate reality doesn't license us to disregard the apparent reality.
So, the way of getting into the refutation of the second alternative is to begin to then think of what is the kind of relationship that we perceive between a seed and its sprout? It's indeed a relationship. There is a connection there. There's something that ties them together. The very idea of cause and effect builds on certain things having something that makes other things possible. If that certain something is not there, then the second thing is not going to manifest. That is what is so powerful about being able to understand causal relationships, because then once we have identified them, we can act in the world successfully, because we know what's going to happen. That too is an immediate fact and a seemingly undeniable fact of the world, that there are causal relationships, that it's possible to figure out things to some extent at least, so that we can successfully make informed choices about what to do and what not to do. If I feel thirsty, I will grab a glass of water and I will not hold up a burning match to my mouth, because I have a very clear sense of what water does for my thirst as opposed to fire.
Causal relationships, we may say that cause and effect, seed is seed and sprout is sprout, but there's also something that, and that is very key, connects them. In other words, as you were already suggesting, it is not good enough to say that cause and effect are purely different. The bravado that Sāṃkhya had when presenting the idea that cause and effect are one and the same was here expressed by a Buddhist. Let's say cause and effect are different, but just as we told the Sāṃkhya person, now we tell the Buddhist, "Save it for later. You don't belong in this category. Your account is not an account of pure difference." If it were, then these causal relationships would be inexplicable. There would be no way to explain why it is that precisely the rice seed gives rise to a rice sprout, and not to a mango tree, or to an elephant, or to the planet Mars. If cause and effect were just purely different from each other, then that would be universally the case. That is the Buddhist claim often, that all these causes and effects are different. So if we take that seriously, then it cancels the very idea of causation, because if there's a universal fact of difference with respect to anything, then where does that leave the possibility for relation? So that's where we will stop today and that's a very, very central point. So please consider this carefully and we will have plenty of time to consider this very point from many different angles as we go. But try already now to see how far you can come with this.
And in particular, what?
Yeah, in particular see
whether this simple appeal to causal relationships, to our noticing of causal relationships, makes the claim that cause and effect are different, untenable, without modification. Is it the case that we will have to say cause and effect are different, but... also such and such, whatever it might be, we will then have to find the commonality elsewhere. We will then have to find what it then is that allows the appearance of causal relationship. But is it at this point sufficient to say cause and effect are not different from each other, because we do indeed notice causal relationships? The very idea of cause and the very idea of effect in and of themselves deny pure difference as the correct account of the 'relationship' between cause and effect. Okay, thank you very much and see you again tomorrow. Bye.
Good morning everybody.
Hello. Good morning.
Very sorry I'm late,
but let's begin.
"That which originates
dependently does not
cease and does not arise,
is not annihilated
and is not permanent,
does not come and does not go,
is not different and
not the same
to the true teacher
who reveals this peace,
the complete pacification
of constructs,
to the perfect Buddha,
I bow down."
All Right. So, We are into first verse of the first investigation, the Analysis of Conditions.
And we have thought about whether things arise, whether there is at least some appearance of arising that we can recognize. Would you mind closing the door here? Thank you.
And then we have considered whether it is right to say that if there is such an appearance of arising, if it seems that things happen,
that then such arising of things could only happen in two different ways: eiither it would be an arising of things that is determined by and restricted by causal constellations, causes and conditions, or otherwise it is an arising that is completely independent of that. So uncaused arising, completely random arising. And I think we have all agreed, we have each individually said that the appearance of arising is something that we do know and cannot deny. And we have also, I haven't heard anyone object to this categorization into two basic forms of arising, and saying that that is all inclusive, that there's nothing, that doesn't find its place in these two categories. But please think about it still. Is there some form of arising that could be of a third order, neither causal nor random? And then we began to look at each of the four alternatives that are presented, because as we know, the first three are variants of the view that things arise based on causes and conditions, and then the fourth is the second alternative. So the first of the two alternatives: caused versus not caused arising, that first alternative is itself divided into three, where we say again, the aim is to come up with some categories that capture everything that comes under the main category. So what is the main category? It is arising based on causes and conditions. And then the author would like to have us agree that it is fair to say that any form of arising can be captured within three categories. Things arise, that would be the first explanation of the arising of things. Things arise from causes that are identical with the arisen thing. So cause and effect are identical. That is the first variant. Secondly, it could be the case that things arise from other things, from things that are different from themselves. In other words, the view that cause and effect are different. Or it could be the case that what is happening is really neither of the first two in isolation, but it's a combination of them - that things arise both from themselves and from other things. And then we wonder, is it true that again, this simple categorization is a way of capturing any form of arising? So causality, of course, is extremely complex. And yet here we are challenged to say, do we agree that regardless of the incredible complexity, the sort of the fathomless complexity of causality. Because who really can compreehend fully how things interact and give rise to each other. Despite this fathomless complexity of causality, that all forms of cause and effect find their place in this simple framework of three different views about it. It could be the view that we could think that this myriad forms of causes, conditions and effects are all really the same, that they are of the very same identity. Or we could think that they are different from each other, or we could think that they are a combination. So that is something that is very important for us to think of. Again, is there a fourth, in this case, possibility with respect to causality? So we did that to some extent yesterday also. And the point is to, whenever we consider questions here, to then keep them burning, in the breaks and at home, in your sessions of study, contemplation, and to come to a sense of precisely where you're at yourselves.
We also went further than this. We said that we began to consider the feasibility of the first account, that things, causes and effects are the same And we didn't spend much time on it. In effect, we dismissed it quite quickly. We said that the only way to defend this view is to say, is a sort of doctrine of illusion. The only way that we can get away with saying that cause and effect are the same is to say, that cause and effect aren't what they seem. Because cause and effect do come across as different from each other, no? There's cause and there's effect. So the only way to become a believer in the first option is to say,
it's just an illusion. What you see is not reality. In fact, cause and effect are no different from each other. And then we very sort of high-handedly, if that's the right expression, we dismissed any sort of philosophical orientation that takes that shape
by saying that if that is our idea, if we have this sort of framework that says appearance is illusory, reality is different, reality is one, the appearance is multiple and diverse. If that is our view, and there are many schools of thought that operate with this sort of view, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, ancient and modern, scientific accounts that take this form. But we sort of brush them all. We say, what you have there is not a pure monism. So in a way, the very idea of monism, that there is what reality is one, and the appearance of diversity and complexity is just appearance. All of that we swept aside with just a single remark. We said the fact that you acknowledge diversity at the level of appearance means that you are not a pure monist, that you cannot defend pure monism. In fact, what you defend is not the first alternative, that things arise from themselves, it's the third alternative. Because what you say is that in one way, things are different, namely in the way that they come across, in the way that they appear, but in fact they are one. So that doesn't cut it for the first alternative. The first alternative is a non-starter, in other words. It doesn't work to say that this is all that there is to say, all is one, because there is the appearance that we cannot deny. So that's a very... I don't know what to call that kind of approach. It's not being very patient with the opposition,
or with all the very many philosophical, religious, scientific approaches that make this claim of monism.
Because we say that the very idea just doesn't work. You may call it monism, but it's not. So I think that's more or less where we ended yesterday, and it would be great if someone can, whatever you have reflected about at home I'd be very happy to hear where you've got to. And again, the key is to say, where have I gotten to? That's actually the only thing that's really interesting at this point. We can study Mādhyamaka philosophy later, so to speak. There's this sense of a sort of first encounter, a direct encounter, where we don't have to keep any philosophical categories in mind at all, except from those that just present themselves naturally to us as truths.
So now we have said that monism isn't true. It's a hopelessly flawed idea, and it took us less than a minute to say so. So that's something to think of. Is this fair? It doesn't seem polite, at least. It doesn't seem very accommodating or not really willing to engage in any sort of dialogue. It's just throwing an argument in somebody's face, really in our own face, because we're talking about, we're investigating our own opinions. And perhaps monism has a great appeal in many ways. Perhaps it doesn't. Perhaps we are strongly against it. But there may be many of us who feel that that's a good case for that, whether we come from a philosophical, religious or scientific background.
Thank you.
Student: "Hello? I think that there is a good argument for monism, because you say that, okay, so we can't see it. No, I can't see it with having my eyes like this. But if I put on glasses and if I put on, you know, how do you say, the right tools, I can see atoms at some point. I can identify them with my, you know, reality, a view. And at that point, everything is the same. It is one. Like, you know, if it's all like, I don't know, then they split up the atoms, but it's not different anymore."
If we accept that what we see is a physical reality and so on, yeah? Student: "Yeah, because you said that, you know, the way of refuting this is to say, well, you can just see that there are causes, you know, that there are cause and effect. So we are in the third option. But I would refute that by saying, no, we're not in the third option, because it just depends on the tools we have to see that it is indeed the same." Right. So, yeah, I think what we need to say is we refute the very idea of monism as this sort of true monism really all is one and that's the whole story. Student: "But it is, right?" Yeah. So if that is what monism is, then we have refute monism hereby, arguably. And let's argue about it. But so how is that the case? If by saying that because we have to put on special glasses, that's why it's not just all the same. It's not the whole story. So we are not, we still have some sort of flame of monism burning somewhere. It hasn't died out entirely because we have just relegated it to a different category. We say monism, what people call monism isn't entirely monism, but okay, let's call it monism and then place it in the third category as an account of things arising both from themselves, meaning the shared identity of cause and effect, and then an acknowledgement of diversity and difference. Student: "But I don't like, because, okay, so let's say the other way. So what we talked about this yesterday, I go into a spaceship, people have been on spaceships and they have gone to Mars, right? Or the moon at least, not Mars, sorry." Yes, they have, no? Student: "Well, we don't know about it. Maybe we have. I'm not part of any secret group. Anyways, from that point, from the moon, the earth is one, right?" From the point of the moon, the earth is one? Student: "Yeah, like I'm just trying to…" So that is different. If we talk about constructs, if we say it's useful to speak about things as if they are all one, then fine. Here we are just trying to see, are these views and accounts actually true? True in terms of things as they are? Does it capture the nature of reality to say that all is one, period? Student: "Yeah, probably not when you say it like that." So okay, probably not when you say it like that. That's a very good example of don't agree easily. Okay. And think more about it, yeah?
Thank you.
Student: "So yeah, I think that this argument that you gave yesterday somewhat strawmans the like monist perspective. In other words, I don't think monists think themselves that appearances don't differ, right? So clearly a monist view has to incorporate the apparent difference of appearances. And so a more charitable read, trying to give monism a more charitable read, and I also want to bring in what we were talking about yesterday and the day before in terms of, do things happen?" Those are very related, yeah? Student: "They're very related. Yeah. And one thing that folks were talking about yesterday and the day before is this conceptual belief that things don't happen, but maybe a perceptual encounter with things happening. And I want to add to that and just talk about how there's kind of different ways to perceive happening. And meditation is a good example. When you meditate, things seem to happen a little bit differently or the nature of happening seems to change a little bit. In particular, I would say, just speaking personally, I've tried to meditate on things like thoughts or even physical appearances. And because of the encounter with impermanence, they never really seem to manifest the way that I conceptually impute them to manifest, when I'm just moving around in my daily life. So in other words, on a certain level of perception, things don't appear, things don't happen the way that I normally think that they do. So if we're trying to be a little bit more generous to monism, but also maybe even a monism that doesn't require some kind of ontological commitment to a substrate, a causal substrate that is actually the same between cause and effect, which I think is easily refuted by other arguments. What if we said something like cause and effect are actually the same and that neither cause nor effect happens. And yet we have the everyday appearance, the everyday encounter with causes and effects. So the monism is actually a monism of non-happening, non-arising, which is in line with what Nāgārjuna is arguing here. And so that seems to me to be a more charitable, more plausible account of monism." Right. Thank you. First about the meditation experience.
I think, yeah, the question is just whether it makes sense to say things happen. We are not committed at that point to any particular version of the arising of things or any particular version of the appearance of arising. It's just, is there that or not? Yeah. So even if it seems that there are times when there is no arising whatsoever, if there are other times where it does seem to be the case, then we would still be at the same basic position that things happen. They don't have to happen all the time, but if they do at least sometimes, then yeah, that's enough of a commitment here. That's the only question we're asking. Does it seem that things happen? Not necessarily all the time, not necessarily in a sort of predictable way or whatever else expectations we may have about it, but just does it seem to be the case? And then your defense of monism, I think, is very fine and accurate as an account also of classic monism. Well, it's actually not monism. The Sāṃkhya philosophy, because it's a basic dualism, but it just, there's a soul, a conscious being that perceives the world of prakṛti. But prakṛti, it is actually dualism, but within the principle of prakṛti, all the objects
there is a seeming difference between cause and effect, but in fact there is none. So as you say precisely, really it's a matter of ultimate non-arising and relative seeming arising. So that's the cause that I think any monist orientation will have to take, because otherwise it doesn't work. We have to acknowledge where we are right now as a starting point at least, and then we can say something about the reality of that. But what we are then further saying is that if that's what is the case with monism, then it shouldn't be considered a strong claim of the type that we see in the first alternative. It's sort of on the one hand, and on the other hand yes, on the other hand no kind of perspective. And whether that's acceptable to the monist thinker, believer or not, that's for them to decide. But arguably with this we have said that if you go for the strong claim, you aren't going to succeed. If you go for the strong claim to say all is one, plus that's it then you're missing a very important part of the story.
So is that fair to say that if you think you can be that strong, I don't even need to talk to you? If you think you can be that clear in your presentation of what all of this really is, then good luck, but you will never get anywhere.
Is that correct? Is it correct that the really strong claim is impossible to maintain and that it can be refuted very quickly and decisively by saying, well, don't you acknowledge at least some seeming appearance? What do you think? This is a real key to think of in your own hearts.
Student: "This is not like a response to that question that you just asked, but a little bit before. So I would say that I agree with the first option, that cause and effect are the same because my conceptual experience of both cause and effect arise out of the same illusionistic view that I am who I think I am. Therefore, they are both born out of the same personal narrative that I used to define myself and the world around me. And since they both arise from this personal narrative, although they may appear different, they are both born out of the same source of identity which I maintain throughout my life. Therefore, since they both are born out of the same notion of self-identity, they are the same thing."
Okay, let me see if I understood this correctly, that cause and effect are same insofar as they are, what to say, your constructs? Is that correct? Student: "Yeah, like cause and effect are both constructs that I have created. So they are the same thing." So whether you have created them or whether there's a little more to say about how they are created is a different story, you know, but yeah, sure, often we talk like that, yeah.
So but I guess that has to do with, what to say?
That's interesting. Cause and effect. So you say that you agree with the first, your views fit with the first alternative? Student: "Yeah, option one." Option one, because cause and effect or any instance of cause and effect is the same in being a construction. So, I think
we would reply the same as before, that okay, the same as construction but hey, the constructs, cause, effect are not identical, yeah. So in fact you came up with a sophisticated account of not the first, but the third alternative, yeah. You wanted to have room for some sameness of cause and effect, and you chose to let that sameness be in terms of construction and at the same time you wanted to say that there is this world, yeah, that gives an appearance of difference. So that would again be a version of option three.
Student: "Okay, thank you." Thank you. "So there's one online?" Yeah, absolutely, sure. "Hello Don, can you speak?"
Student: "Yes, I was wondering about these first two standards that we're talking about. You know, nowhere does anything ever arise? So then there's these four conditions as a reply, I'm assuming.
So the context of this analysis of conditions, Nāgārjuna is discussing this with someone.
And so the context is he's given a commentary on Shakyamuni's teaching on Vulture Peak Mountain.
So these four conditions, where it says there is no fifth condition, maybe it's not a condition, maybe there is no condition. That's why there isn't anything arising from itself from both or being not uncaused." I had a little hard time hearing in particular the last that you said. Student: "So that not from itself, not from another, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise. So maybe this is a statement of Shakyamuni teaching that
nothing really exists, that it's empty from the beginning, pure from the beginning, without any of this causal conditions."
Yes, I think that probably makes sense, that this is a way that we can see Nāgārjuna making a thesis out of the Prajñāpāramitā. When you read the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, then Nāgārjuna says, okay, let me put it into one thesis about reality, and here it is not from itself, not from another, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise.
So I think that makes good sense.
Student: "So I think that yesterday you said that you didn't want to really get into whether things really appear or it's a mere appearance, distinguishing between the two truths. So I think that in terms of my perception, things undeniably arise and appear and are there. Whether that's me or not, I think is a further step, but in terms of what I perceive, definitely they are there. And if I think of that and then think of whether I can say that cause and effect are the same, different or a combination, for me it has to be a combination, because definitely certain causes have certain results, regardless of the conditions, that are not other results. Like the usual, a mango seed will give a mango tree and not a banana tree because there's something there that's similar between them and that links them, that does not link certain causes with certain results. So in that sense, there's a similarity, but definitely in the way that things appear and that we see them, the seed is not the same as the tree. So they have to be different too. So for me, I would go for the third option, combination." Great. I think that's a very clear explanation, or way of putting it,
What to say? It's a very clear way to state precisely that perspective.
That if we "just" want to acknowledge what is the case from our perspective, then we can't do with the first alternative. It will have to be a combination. And then you also say that the second alternative is the same. That's not an exhaustive account, of cause and effect to say that they are based on other, that they are the arising of things that are different from their causes.
So that then very naturally takes us into the second alternative, to looking at what the alternative that presents itself when we say things, causes and effects are not the same, then what are they? If they aren't the same, it's easy to think that the immediate alternative and the option to consider immediately after this is that they are different from each other.
And this notion of difference is very, very prominent in a lot of Buddhist philosophy. So whereas the first alternative is by the commentators usually associated with the Sāṃkhya school, which has this account of the aware being that is fooled by the appearances of prakṛti, which in fact, despite their appearance of causes and effects, is just that universal principle of prakṛti. Whereas the first alternative, things arising from themselves is associated with that philosophy of classic Indian philosophy. The second option, that things arise from things that are different from themselves, is associated with the Buddhist view. So Buddhists believe that causes and effects are not the same. And that's very important for the doctrine of impermanence, that things change, right? And they change all the time, perhaps they change even on a momentary scale. Nothing remains the same for even a moment. So that's what the Abhidharma says about ultimate reality. The ultimate reality of not everything, but the ultimate reality of body and mind is in other words, about anything, the ultimate reality of body and mind, or the physical and the mental. That the physical world comes down to atoms, and those atoms do not endure. They are utterly impermanent. And the mind comes down to just moments of cognition, moments of awareness. And that's then this flux that we also talked about. It seems to us that there are things that last,
entities in the world, people, and so on. But under analysis, we find that all of these things that seem to feature permanence and duration are not actually and truly like that. They are not permanent and stable in the way that they appear, but constantly changing. And then we said before that seeing in particular that the notion of a permanent, singular, and controlling individual falls apart when we acknowledge that, when we acknowledge the infinite diversity we also talked about, the complexity of body and mind, which became immediately apparent when we began to investigate it, and the constant change, so to speak, of that complexity. When the idea of a permanent and singular and controlling individual is tested against this reality of body and mind or the physical and the mental, then it seems to be completely unfounded. And we then also considered the implications of that kind of discovery, that it's then possible to let go of the tendencies that otherwise drive consciousness mercilessly to react and respond in ways that in the end will, contrary to our expectations and our wishes, just perpetuate suffering. So by understanding that reality is like that, impermanent and complex, as opposed to that the reality of body and mind is like that, complex and impermanent, it's possible to set out on a path that allows liberation from the disturbing emotions, and ultimately freedom from cyclic existence.
So it's the Buddhist position that is under analysis next that things are impermanent, that causes and effects are impermanent entities, that are therefore also different from each other.
If the Buddhists cannot say that they are really different, then that whole understanding that we just tried to express, falls. Because what is it then that is not the same, that is not different? Then hundreds of questions will pop up, no? If we can't say conclusively that cause and effect are different, that these things are not the same in the way that they seem to be.
But Nāgārjuna has no p atience with that view either, so he dismisses it. He presents his dismissal of it in the very first stanza, of the very first analysis, and says that things do not arise from different things either. And how could he then claim that?
In a way the challenge with the second alternative is the opposite of the first, because in the first case our immediate perceptions tells us that there's something incomplete with the first alternative, that things arise from themselves. Why? Because we have the opposite impression. But in this case,
the appearance of the world is very much in terms of differences. Seed and sprout, wouldn't a natural statement to make, be to say that those are not same, but different things. A seed is not a sprout, a sprout is not a seed. There is a difference there. So if we're going to say that that is wrong, then how could we possibly do that? Before we insisted on the relevance of this appearance, and now we'll have to somehow dismiss the appearance. If we're going to succeed in refuting the view that cause and effect are different, then we will have to find a view of dismissing our perception of them as being different things. We will have to find a way of dismissing our perception of cause and effect as different, to the effect that, basically, that we will have to find a way of convincing ourselves that no, they're not. That's a tall order, but how could we possibly come to, in a justified way, think that when I say cause and effect are different, then I'm making a false statement?
That's where we will have to get to, if we can follow Nāgārjuna beyond the first, the refutation of the first alternative, and through a refutation of the second alternative. Then we will have to say that cause and effect are the apparent reality of different causes and effects, is in no way grounds for making the claim that cause and effect are different.
One way of approaching this is to think of, exactly as you brought up, causal relationships, the appearance of causal relationships. So again we revert to the way things seem to be.
Interesting, no? We always come back to that, what is the apparent reality? Let's try to be as true as we can to that. Then, on the basis of the apparent reality, we can make claims about ultimate reality, we can develop beliefs about ultimate reality, but if our beliefs about ultimate reality...
But having radical beliefs about ultimate reality doesn't give us a license to disregard the apparent reality. That's like one message to take when we just consider the flow of how this is going. That is a very sound advice, that no matter how radical and groundbreaking, unbelievable, profound our understanding of the ultimate reality may become, whether we take some philosophical approach, meditation experience, the path of science, whatever it is that we come to understand about ultimate reality doesn't license us to disregard the apparent reality.
So, the way of getting into the refutation of the second alternative is to begin to then think of what is the kind of relationship that we perceive between a seed and its sprout? It's indeed a relationship. There is a connection there. There's something that ties them together. The very idea of cause and effect builds on certain things having something that makes other things possible. If that certain something is not there, then the second thing is not going to manifest. That is what is so powerful about being able to understand causal relationships, because then once we have identified them, we can act in the world successfully, because we know what's going to happen. That too is an immediate fact and a seemingly undeniable fact of the world, that there are causal relationships, that it's possible to figure out things to some extent at least, so that we can successfully make informed choices about what to do and what not to do. If I feel thirsty, I will grab a glass of water and I will not hold up a burning match to my mouth, because I have a very clear sense of what water does for my thirst as opposed to fire.
Causal relationships, we may say that cause and effect, seed is seed and sprout is sprout, but there's also something that, and that is very key, connects them. In other words, as you were already suggesting, it is not good enough to say that cause and effect are purely different. The bravado that Sāṃkhya had when presenting the idea that cause and effect are one and the same was here expressed by a Buddhist. Let's say cause and effect are different, but just as we told the Sāṃkhya person, now we tell the Buddhist, "Save it for later. You don't belong in this category. Your account is not an account of pure difference." If it were, then these causal relationships would be inexplicable. There would be no way to explain why it is that precisely the rice seed gives rise to a rice sprout, and not to a mango tree, or to an elephant, or to the planet Mars. If cause and effect were just purely different from each other, then that would be universally the case. That is the Buddhist claim often, that all these causes and effects are different. So if we take that seriously, then it cancels the very idea of causation, because if there's a universal fact of difference with respect to anything, then where does that leave the possibility for relation? So that's where we will stop today and that's a very, very central point. So please consider this carefully and we will have plenty of time to consider this very point from many different angles as we go. But try already now to see how far you can come with this.
And in particular, what?
Yeah, in particular see
whether this simple appeal to causal relationships, to our noticing of causal relationships, makes the claim that cause and effect are different, untenable, without modification. Is it the case that we will have to say cause and effect are different, but... also such and such, whatever it might be, we will then have to find the commonality elsewhere. We will then have to find what it then is that allows the appearance of causal relationship. But is it at this point sufficient to say cause and effect are not different from each other, because we do indeed notice causal relationships? The very idea of cause and the very idea of effect in and of themselves deny pure difference as the correct account of the 'relationship' between cause and effect. Okay, thank you very much and see you again tomorrow. Bye.
All Right. So, We are into first verse of the first investigation, the Analysis of Conditions.
And we have thought about whether things arise, whether there is at least some appearance of arising that we can recognize. Would you mind closing the door here? Thank you.
And then we have considered whether it is right to say that if there is such an appearance of arising, if it seems that things happen,
that then such arising of things could only happen in two different ways: eiither it would be an arising of things that is determined by and restricted by causal constellations, causes and conditions, or otherwise it is an arising that is completely independent of that. So uncaused arising, completely random arising. And I think we have all agreed, we have each individually said that the appearance of arising is something that we do know and cannot deny. And we have also, I haven't heard anyone object to this categorization into two basic forms of arising, and saying that that is all inclusive, that there's nothing, that doesn't find its place in these two categories. But please think about it still. Is there some form of arising that could be of a third order, neither causal nor random? And then we began to look at each of the four alternatives that are presented, because as we know, the first three are variants of the view that things arise based on causes and conditions, and then the fourth is the second alternative. So the first of the two alternatives: caused versus not caused arising, that first alternative is itself divided into three, where we say again, the aim is to come up with some categories that capture everything that comes under the main category. So what is the main category? It is arising based on causes and conditions. And then the author would like to have us agree that it is fair to say that any form of arising can be captured within three categories. Things arise, that would be the first explanation of the arising of things. Things arise from causes that are identical with the arisen thing. So cause and effect are identical. That is the first variant. Secondly, it could be the case that things arise from other things, from things that are different from themselves. In other words, the view that cause and effect are different. Or it could be the case that what is happening is really neither of the first two in isolation, but it's a combination of them - that things arise both from themselves and from other things. And then we wonder, is it true that again, this simple categorization is a way of capturing any form of arising? So causality, of course, is extremely complex. And yet here we are challenged to say, do we agree that regardless of the incredible complexity, the sort of the fathomless complexity of causality. Because who really can compreehend fully how things interact and give rise to each other. Despite this fathomless complexity of causality, that all forms of cause and effect find their place in this simple framework of three different views about it. It could be the view that we could think that this myriad forms of causes, conditions and effects are all really the same, that they are of the very same identity. Or we could think that they are different from each other, or we could think that they are a combination. So that is something that is very important for us to think of. Again, is there a fourth, in this case, possibility with respect to causality? So we did that to some extent yesterday also. And the point is to, whenever we consider questions here, to then keep them burning, in the breaks and at home, in your sessions of study, contemplation, and to come to a sense of precisely where you're at yourselves.
We also went further than this. We said that we began to consider the feasibility of the first account, that things, causes and effects are the same And we didn't spend much time on it. In effect, we dismissed it quite quickly. We said that the only way to defend this view is to say, is a sort of doctrine of illusion. The only way that we can get away with saying that cause and effect are the same is to say, that cause and effect aren't what they seem. Because cause and effect do come across as different from each other, no? There's cause and there's effect. So the only way to become a believer in the first option is to say,
it's just an illusion. What you see is not reality. In fact, cause and effect are no different from each other. And then we very sort of high-handedly, if that's the right expression, we dismissed any sort of philosophical orientation that takes that shape
by saying that if that is our idea, if we have this sort of framework that says appearance is illusory, reality is different, reality is one, the appearance is multiple and diverse. If that is our view, and there are many schools of thought that operate with this sort of view, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, ancient and modern, scientific accounts that take this form. But we sort of brush them all. We say, what you have there is not a pure monism. So in a way, the very idea of monism, that there is what reality is one, and the appearance of diversity and complexity is just appearance. All of that we swept aside with just a single remark. We said the fact that you acknowledge diversity at the level of appearance means that you are not a pure monist, that you cannot defend pure monism. In fact, what you defend is not the first alternative, that things arise from themselves, it's the third alternative. Because what you say is that in one way, things are different, namely in the way that they come across, in the way that they appear, but in fact they are one. So that doesn't cut it for the first alternative. The first alternative is a non-starter, in other words. It doesn't work to say that this is all that there is to say, all is one, because there is the appearance that we cannot deny. So that's a very... I don't know what to call that kind of approach. It's not being very patient with the opposition,
or with all the very many philosophical, religious, scientific approaches that make this claim of monism.
Because we say that the very idea just doesn't work. You may call it monism, but it's not. So I think that's more or less where we ended yesterday, and it would be great if someone can, whatever you have reflected about at home I'd be very happy to hear where you've got to. And again, the key is to say, where have I gotten to? That's actually the only thing that's really interesting at this point. We can study Mādhyamaka philosophy later, so to speak. There's this sense of a sort of first encounter, a direct encounter, where we don't have to keep any philosophical categories in mind at all, except from those that just present themselves naturally to us as truths.
So now we have said that monism isn't true. It's a hopelessly flawed idea, and it took us less than a minute to say so. So that's something to think of. Is this fair? It doesn't seem polite, at least. It doesn't seem very accommodating or not really willing to engage in any sort of dialogue. It's just throwing an argument in somebody's face, really in our own face, because we're talking about, we're investigating our own opinions. And perhaps monism has a great appeal in many ways. Perhaps it doesn't. Perhaps we are strongly against it. But there may be many of us who feel that that's a good case for that, whether we come from a philosophical, religious or scientific background.
Thank you.
Student: "Hello? I think that there is a good argument for monism, because you say that, okay, so we can't see it. No, I can't see it with having my eyes like this. But if I put on glasses and if I put on, you know, how do you say, the right tools, I can see atoms at some point. I can identify them with my, you know, reality, a view. And at that point, everything is the same. It is one. Like, you know, if it's all like, I don't know, then they split up the atoms, but it's not different anymore."
If we accept that what we see is a physical reality and so on, yeah? Student: "Yeah, because you said that, you know, the way of refuting this is to say, well, you can just see that there are causes, you know, that there are cause and effect. So we are in the third option. But I would refute that by saying, no, we're not in the third option, because it just depends on the tools we have to see that it is indeed the same." Right. So, yeah, I think what we need to say is we refute the very idea of monism as this sort of true monism really all is one and that's the whole story. Student: "But it is, right?" Yeah. So if that is what monism is, then we have refute monism hereby, arguably. And let's argue about it. But so how is that the case? If by saying that because we have to put on special glasses, that's why it's not just all the same. It's not the whole story. So we are not, we still have some sort of flame of monism burning somewhere. It hasn't died out entirely because we have just relegated it to a different category. We say monism, what people call monism isn't entirely monism, but okay, let's call it monism and then place it in the third category as an account of things arising both from themselves, meaning the shared identity of cause and effect, and then an acknowledgement of diversity and difference. Student: "But I don't like, because, okay, so let's say the other way. So what we talked about this yesterday, I go into a spaceship, people have been on spaceships and they have gone to Mars, right? Or the moon at least, not Mars, sorry." Yes, they have, no? Student: "Well, we don't know about it. Maybe we have. I'm not part of any secret group. Anyways, from that point, from the moon, the earth is one, right?" From the point of the moon, the earth is one? Student: "Yeah, like I'm just trying to…" So that is different. If we talk about constructs, if we say it's useful to speak about things as if they are all one, then fine. Here we are just trying to see, are these views and accounts actually true? True in terms of things as they are? Does it capture the nature of reality to say that all is one, period? Student: "Yeah, probably not when you say it like that." So okay, probably not when you say it like that. That's a very good example of don't agree easily. Okay. And think more about it, yeah?
Thank you.
Student: "So yeah, I think that this argument that you gave yesterday somewhat strawmans the like monist perspective. In other words, I don't think monists think themselves that appearances don't differ, right? So clearly a monist view has to incorporate the apparent difference of appearances. And so a more charitable read, trying to give monism a more charitable read, and I also want to bring in what we were talking about yesterday and the day before in terms of, do things happen?" Those are very related, yeah? Student: "They're very related. Yeah. And one thing that folks were talking about yesterday and the day before is this conceptual belief that things don't happen, but maybe a perceptual encounter with things happening. And I want to add to that and just talk about how there's kind of different ways to perceive happening. And meditation is a good example. When you meditate, things seem to happen a little bit differently or the nature of happening seems to change a little bit. In particular, I would say, just speaking personally, I've tried to meditate on things like thoughts or even physical appearances. And because of the encounter with impermanence, they never really seem to manifest the way that I conceptually impute them to manifest, when I'm just moving around in my daily life. So in other words, on a certain level of perception, things don't appear, things don't happen the way that I normally think that they do. So if we're trying to be a little bit more generous to monism, but also maybe even a monism that doesn't require some kind of ontological commitment to a substrate, a causal substrate that is actually the same between cause and effect, which I think is easily refuted by other arguments. What if we said something like cause and effect are actually the same and that neither cause nor effect happens. And yet we have the everyday appearance, the everyday encounter with causes and effects. So the monism is actually a monism of non-happening, non-arising, which is in line with what Nāgārjuna is arguing here. And so that seems to me to be a more charitable, more plausible account of monism." Right. Thank you. First about the meditation experience.
I think, yeah, the question is just whether it makes sense to say things happen. We are not committed at that point to any particular version of the arising of things or any particular version of the appearance of arising. It's just, is there that or not? Yeah. So even if it seems that there are times when there is no arising whatsoever, if there are other times where it does seem to be the case, then we would still be at the same basic position that things happen. They don't have to happen all the time, but if they do at least sometimes, then yeah, that's enough of a commitment here. That's the only question we're asking. Does it seem that things happen? Not necessarily all the time, not necessarily in a sort of predictable way or whatever else expectations we may have about it, but just does it seem to be the case? And then your defense of monism, I think, is very fine and accurate as an account also of classic monism. Well, it's actually not monism. The Sāṃkhya philosophy, because it's a basic dualism, but it just, there's a soul, a conscious being that perceives the world of prakṛti. But prakṛti, it is actually dualism, but within the principle of prakṛti, all the objects
there is a seeming difference between cause and effect, but in fact there is none. So as you say precisely, really it's a matter of ultimate non-arising and relative seeming arising. So that's the cause that I think any monist orientation will have to take, because otherwise it doesn't work. We have to acknowledge where we are right now as a starting point at least, and then we can say something about the reality of that. But what we are then further saying is that if that's what is the case with monism, then it shouldn't be considered a strong claim of the type that we see in the first alternative. It's sort of on the one hand, and on the other hand yes, on the other hand no kind of perspective. And whether that's acceptable to the monist thinker, believer or not, that's for them to decide. But arguably with this we have said that if you go for the strong claim, you aren't going to succeed. If you go for the strong claim to say all is one, plus that's it then you're missing a very important part of the story.
So is that fair to say that if you think you can be that strong, I don't even need to talk to you? If you think you can be that clear in your presentation of what all of this really is, then good luck, but you will never get anywhere.
Is that correct? Is it correct that the really strong claim is impossible to maintain and that it can be refuted very quickly and decisively by saying, well, don't you acknowledge at least some seeming appearance? What do you think? This is a real key to think of in your own hearts.
Student: "This is not like a response to that question that you just asked, but a little bit before. So I would say that I agree with the first option, that cause and effect are the same because my conceptual experience of both cause and effect arise out of the same illusionistic view that I am who I think I am. Therefore, they are both born out of the same personal narrative that I used to define myself and the world around me. And since they both arise from this personal narrative, although they may appear different, they are both born out of the same source of identity which I maintain throughout my life. Therefore, since they both are born out of the same notion of self-identity, they are the same thing."
Okay, let me see if I understood this correctly, that cause and effect are same insofar as they are, what to say, your constructs? Is that correct? Student: "Yeah, like cause and effect are both constructs that I have created. So they are the same thing." So whether you have created them or whether there's a little more to say about how they are created is a different story, you know, but yeah, sure, often we talk like that, yeah.
So but I guess that has to do with, what to say?
That's interesting. Cause and effect. So you say that you agree with the first, your views fit with the first alternative? Student: "Yeah, option one." Option one, because cause and effect or any instance of cause and effect is the same in being a construction. So, I think
we would reply the same as before, that okay, the same as construction but hey, the constructs, cause, effect are not identical, yeah. So in fact you came up with a sophisticated account of not the first, but the third alternative, yeah. You wanted to have room for some sameness of cause and effect, and you chose to let that sameness be in terms of construction and at the same time you wanted to say that there is this world, yeah, that gives an appearance of difference. So that would again be a version of option three.
Student: "Okay, thank you." Thank you. "So there's one online?" Yeah, absolutely, sure. "Hello Don, can you speak?"
Student: "Yes, I was wondering about these first two standards that we're talking about. You know, nowhere does anything ever arise? So then there's these four conditions as a reply, I'm assuming.
So the context of this analysis of conditions, Nāgārjuna is discussing this with someone.
And so the context is he's given a commentary on Shakyamuni's teaching on Vulture Peak Mountain.
So these four conditions, where it says there is no fifth condition, maybe it's not a condition, maybe there is no condition. That's why there isn't anything arising from itself from both or being not uncaused." I had a little hard time hearing in particular the last that you said. Student: "So that not from itself, not from another, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise. So maybe this is a statement of Shakyamuni teaching that
nothing really exists, that it's empty from the beginning, pure from the beginning, without any of this causal conditions."
Yes, I think that probably makes sense, that this is a way that we can see Nāgārjuna making a thesis out of the Prajñāpāramitā. When you read the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, then Nāgārjuna says, okay, let me put it into one thesis about reality, and here it is not from itself, not from another, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise.
So I think that makes good sense.
Student: "So I think that yesterday you said that you didn't want to really get into whether things really appear or it's a mere appearance, distinguishing between the two truths. So I think that in terms of my perception, things undeniably arise and appear and are there. Whether that's me or not, I think is a further step, but in terms of what I perceive, definitely they are there. And if I think of that and then think of whether I can say that cause and effect are the same, different or a combination, for me it has to be a combination, because definitely certain causes have certain results, regardless of the conditions, that are not other results. Like the usual, a mango seed will give a mango tree and not a banana tree because there's something there that's similar between them and that links them, that does not link certain causes with certain results. So in that sense, there's a similarity, but definitely in the way that things appear and that we see them, the seed is not the same as the tree. So they have to be different too. So for me, I would go for the third option, combination." Great. I think that's a very clear explanation, or way of putting it,
What to say? It's a very clear way to state precisely that perspective.
That if we "just" want to acknowledge what is the case from our perspective, then we can't do with the first alternative. It will have to be a combination. And then you also say that the second alternative is the same. That's not an exhaustive account, of cause and effect to say that they are based on other, that they are the arising of things that are different from their causes.
So that then very naturally takes us into the second alternative, to looking at what the alternative that presents itself when we say things, causes and effects are not the same, then what are they? If they aren't the same, it's easy to think that the immediate alternative and the option to consider immediately after this is that they are different from each other.
And this notion of difference is very, very prominent in a lot of Buddhist philosophy. So whereas the first alternative is by the commentators usually associated with the Sāṃkhya school, which has this account of the aware being that is fooled by the appearances of prakṛti, which in fact, despite their appearance of causes and effects, is just that universal principle of prakṛti. Whereas the first alternative, things arising from themselves is associated with that philosophy of classic Indian philosophy. The second option, that things arise from things that are different from themselves, is associated with the Buddhist view. So Buddhists believe that causes and effects are not the same. And that's very important for the doctrine of impermanence, that things change, right? And they change all the time, perhaps they change even on a momentary scale. Nothing remains the same for even a moment. So that's what the Abhidharma says about ultimate reality. The ultimate reality of not everything, but the ultimate reality of body and mind is in other words, about anything, the ultimate reality of body and mind, or the physical and the mental. That the physical world comes down to atoms, and those atoms do not endure. They are utterly impermanent. And the mind comes down to just moments of cognition, moments of awareness. And that's then this flux that we also talked about. It seems to us that there are things that last,
entities in the world, people, and so on. But under analysis, we find that all of these things that seem to feature permanence and duration are not actually and truly like that. They are not permanent and stable in the way that they appear, but constantly changing. And then we said before that seeing in particular that the notion of a permanent, singular, and controlling individual falls apart when we acknowledge that, when we acknowledge the infinite diversity we also talked about, the complexity of body and mind, which became immediately apparent when we began to investigate it, and the constant change, so to speak, of that complexity. When the idea of a permanent and singular and controlling individual is tested against this reality of body and mind or the physical and the mental, then it seems to be completely unfounded. And we then also considered the implications of that kind of discovery, that it's then possible to let go of the tendencies that otherwise drive consciousness mercilessly to react and respond in ways that in the end will, contrary to our expectations and our wishes, just perpetuate suffering. So by understanding that reality is like that, impermanent and complex, as opposed to that the reality of body and mind is like that, complex and impermanent, it's possible to set out on a path that allows liberation from the disturbing emotions, and ultimately freedom from cyclic existence.
So it's the Buddhist position that is under analysis next that things are impermanent, that causes and effects are impermanent entities, that are therefore also different from each other.
If the Buddhists cannot say that they are really different, then that whole understanding that we just tried to express, falls. Because what is it then that is not the same, that is not different? Then hundreds of questions will pop up, no? If we can't say conclusively that cause and effect are different, that these things are not the same in the way that they seem to be.
But Nāgārjuna has no p atience with that view either, so he dismisses it. He presents his dismissal of it in the very first stanza, of the very first analysis, and says that things do not arise from different things either. And how could he then claim that?
In a way the challenge with the second alternative is the opposite of the first, because in the first case our immediate perceptions tells us that there's something incomplete with the first alternative, that things arise from themselves. Why? Because we have the opposite impression. But in this case,
the appearance of the world is very much in terms of differences. Seed and sprout, wouldn't a natural statement to make, be to say that those are not same, but different things. A seed is not a sprout, a sprout is not a seed. There is a difference there. So if we're going to say that that is wrong, then how could we possibly do that? Before we insisted on the relevance of this appearance, and now we'll have to somehow dismiss the appearance. If we're going to succeed in refuting the view that cause and effect are different, then we will have to find a view of dismissing our perception of them as being different things. We will have to find a way of dismissing our perception of cause and effect as different, to the effect that, basically, that we will have to find a way of convincing ourselves that no, they're not. That's a tall order, but how could we possibly come to, in a justified way, think that when I say cause and effect are different, then I'm making a false statement?
That's where we will have to get to, if we can follow Nāgārjuna beyond the first, the refutation of the first alternative, and through a refutation of the second alternative. Then we will have to say that cause and effect are the apparent reality of different causes and effects, is in no way grounds for making the claim that cause and effect are different.
One way of approaching this is to think of, exactly as you brought up, causal relationships, the appearance of causal relationships. So again we revert to the way things seem to be.
Interesting, no? We always come back to that, what is the apparent reality? Let's try to be as true as we can to that. Then, on the basis of the apparent reality, we can make claims about ultimate reality, we can develop beliefs about ultimate reality, but if our beliefs about ultimate reality...
But having radical beliefs about ultimate reality doesn't give us a license to disregard the apparent reality. That's like one message to take when we just consider the flow of how this is going. That is a very sound advice, that no matter how radical and groundbreaking, unbelievable, profound our understanding of the ultimate reality may become, whether we take some philosophical approach, meditation experience, the path of science, whatever it is that we come to understand about ultimate reality doesn't license us to disregard the apparent reality.
So, the way of getting into the refutation of the second alternative is to begin to then think of what is the kind of relationship that we perceive between a seed and its sprout? It's indeed a relationship. There is a connection there. There's something that ties them together. The very idea of cause and effect builds on certain things having something that makes other things possible. If that certain something is not there, then the second thing is not going to manifest. That is what is so powerful about being able to understand causal relationships, because then once we have identified them, we can act in the world successfully, because we know what's going to happen. That too is an immediate fact and a seemingly undeniable fact of the world, that there are causal relationships, that it's possible to figure out things to some extent at least, so that we can successfully make informed choices about what to do and what not to do. If I feel thirsty, I will grab a glass of water and I will not hold up a burning match to my mouth, because I have a very clear sense of what water does for my thirst as opposed to fire.
Causal relationships, we may say that cause and effect, seed is seed and sprout is sprout, but there's also something that, and that is very key, connects them. In other words, as you were already suggesting, it is not good enough to say that cause and effect are purely different. The bravado that Sāṃkhya had when presenting the idea that cause and effect are one and the same was here expressed by a Buddhist. Let's say cause and effect are different, but just as we told the Sāṃkhya person, now we tell the Buddhist, "Save it for later. You don't belong in this category. Your account is not an account of pure difference." If it were, then these causal relationships would be inexplicable. There would be no way to explain why it is that precisely the rice seed gives rise to a rice sprout, and not to a mango tree, or to an elephant, or to the planet Mars. If cause and effect were just purely different from each other, then that would be universally the case. That is the Buddhist claim often, that all these causes and effects are different. So if we take that seriously, then it cancels the very idea of causation, because if there's a universal fact of difference with respect to anything, then where does that leave the possibility for relation? So that's where we will stop today and that's a very, very central point. So please consider this carefully and we will have plenty of time to consider this very point from many different angles as we go. But try already now to see how far you can come with this.
And in particular, what?
Yeah, in particular see
whether this simple appeal to causal relationships, to our noticing of causal relationships, makes the claim that cause and effect are different, untenable, without modification. Is it the case that we will have to say cause and effect are different, but... also such and such, whatever it might be, we will then have to find the commonality elsewhere. We will then have to find what it then is that allows the appearance of causal relationship. But is it at this point sufficient to say cause and effect are not different from each other, because we do indeed notice causal relationships? The very idea of cause and the very idea of effect in and of themselves deny pure difference as the correct account of the 'relationship' between cause and effect. Okay, thank you very much and see you again tomorrow. Bye.
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