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Root of The Middle Way – Session 05

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Collection: 
  • Buddhist Classics and Philosophy
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  • Rangjung Yeshe Institute - Nepal
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Starting with verses from "Root of the Middle Way," we emphasize the illusory nature of conventional constructs. The discussion deepens with a focus on Nāgārjuna's view that dependent objects neither truly arise nor cease, challenging our beliefs about reality.

Session 5 delves into Buddhist teachings on dependent origination and existence. It starts with verses from “Root of the Middle Way,” emphasizing the illusory nature of conventional constructs. The discussion deepens with a focus on Nāgārjuna’s view that dependent objects neither truly arise nor cease, challenging our beliefs about reality. The notion of “happening” is explored and that beliefs about reality may conflict with personal experiences is highlighted . It also distinguishes between flux and chaos in understanding ‘happening’ and it discusses ontological and phenomenological perspectives, encouraging students to introspect on their beliefs and perceptions, setting the stage for their philosophical journey.

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Let's just begin with the verses once more of homage at the beginning of "Root of the Middle Way,"
"That which originates dependently Does not cease and does not arise Is not annihilated and is not permanent, Does not come and does not go Is not different and not the same. To the true teacher who reveals this peace, The complete pacification of constructs, To the perfect Buddha I bow down."
We had the sequence of lines three and four changed. The sequence was off in the previous version, so this is how it should be.
With the homage and giving rise to the mind of awakening then Let's get into the subject matter where we have now spent some time trying to understand dependent origination along the lines of Buddhist doctrine in general; Where the outer and inner dependent origination is described with an emphasis on the inner dependent origination-- the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth, which is based on ignorance. And we said that the ignorance can be understood in terms of this belief that there is a self of a certain kind; that there's a self who is singular, who is permanent, and who is in control of the actions that this agent performs.
And yeah, perhaps.
So are there any questions in general at this point. Or otherwise, if someone would like to sort of give an account of where they are at, in terms of this idea of no self in relation to dependent origination, that would be nice! And I'm thinking that from Monday we can perhaps begin to do this system that they use in the monastic shedra, where we have a jar with people's names and then draw a name or two or three, and then here what? The relevant person has to has to say about perhaps it's nice if we can all think of something that we sort of boil our understanding, current understanding in the context down to, and then Additionally, there can also be some questions that that I will ask and sort of just to keep us... Yeah it can be a nice thing to have it will also be yeah... let's do that and... But at this point is there anyone who would volunteer with some inputs, reflections or questions before we start?
Student: "What about things that seem to form a system where it would seem that there's, you know, some relative amount, so to speak, to use a common word, some relative amount of 'singularity' even though there's many parts. So I'm thinking I'm thinking of things like forests, in which one doesn't, one doesn't just think of a bunch of random trees and shrubs and animals, and all that sort of stuff, just kind of sitting next to each other so to speak but there's a dynamic and cohesive system, that despite the fact that it's made up of many parts seems to form some sort of unity. Similarly even within, within the body Even though there's there's many parts,
there's an awful lot of communication between the various parts, I mean, the mind or the brain, if you want to say that one's feelings Shapes the immune system, for example, Impacts heart rate blood pressure, all sorts of things like that.
So there's, you know, despite the fact that there's many parts there is There's some sort of unity, some sort of singularity.
Okay, I'll I'll leave it at that those I'm thinking mainly of how things can form coherent, or more or less cohesives systems. I wonder how that fits into this idea of singularity." Yeah, thank you. The singularity that we have been considering here is the singularity of the person. Up until now We won't leave it at that. But up until now, it's the singularity of the of the person and that is...
So and we have in fact we have identified "person" with someone who is singular and permanent, and in control of actions. Yeah, that's our definition of-- We have defined person in that in that way. So when we say person at this point we are specifically referring to a person who displays these three features of being singular, of being permanent, and in control of actions.
Then we have looked at the body and the mind, which we immediately recognized is not one body and not one Mind either, but so many things, which again are themselves many things like the forest is not just made of trees. The trees are also made of something and so on. So what you talked about in the beginning, I think, reflects very much a general Buddhist understanding of what a person is. It is a construct based on,
I forgot your exact words, but the the many factors that are in some sort of systematic interplay, and in this way, gives this certain sense of coherence and endurance, which we associate with being a person. And then we think that there is such a person. And I'm the one actually, I'm precisely such an individual who is just one, and who continues as that one individual in time. But the analysis then shows that all my reasons for thinking of myself in this way are not founded on anything. At least if we look in terms of body and mind. There are other things perhaps that could give us reason to think of a oneness and permanence of personhood. But at this point, that's what we have been doing. But it could be some sort of eternal soul as well, that reflect.. that somehow is the ultimate ground for my belief that I am one And so on, there could be many perhaps ways that one could think philosophically about reasons for this notion of singular, enduring person. But in terms of sort of day-to-day experience and understanding of things common-sensical if we want, then probably
those body and mind are the immediate grounds for our belief. And we have then seen that there is no such thing to be found there; that the aggregates of our existence and The physical and the mental ones and whatever there may be in terms of their combinations;
those are empty of a singular and enduring person. To me it sounds like that was that's what you were describing, that those are facts, complex components and complex factors that together enable this
construction of a person. But it is just a construct, and not ultimately real. So when we are looking for singularity here, and looking for or testing for singularity, testing for permanence, then it is true singularity, true permanence that we're looking for. Not in the sense that the kind of singularity and the kind of permanence that we are looking for is not one that is simply constructed.
So, that I think takes us very far in terms of acknowledging a basic Buddhist view about persons and so about life too.
Then that is what we have been focusing on, we have said that if there is that construct, then it's not just any random construct. It's not like thinking about a forest, because sometimes there are forests around and sometimes they're not we can live very well without forests, and there's no sense at all that forest is somehow always in the back of our mind, and conditions our experience. But it's a different case with self, my self, this very spontaneous sense of being here now as an individual, as a constant individual is something that indeed is constantly there to condition our experience, and to Influence our actions very strongly right? Because if there's this notion of Me being here, unquestionably, and not just in this moment, but over time, so that I will have to take into account what happens to me down the line. I'll have to make sure that I get the things that I want, and that I avoid the things that I don't want to have happen to me. So in this way, just the very notion of self comes replete with all what is required for craving and agression, those tendencies will be let there, together with the notion of self, and so we will act also those emotions and that belief in self conscious,
can't just be ignored, they require, impels us, they impel us into action, and that action is driven by we would say now, ignorance, right? Because it's action that we are forced to engage in. because of a belief that has actually no bearing on reality. And so we have very strong tendencies that are based on this ignorant belief, and when we act in ways that are strongly craving or strongly aggressive, obviously, what contrary to what we think, this will be not a way of maintaining ourselves and keeping ourselves safe and hopefully getting what we want. It's quite the opposite. And that's why they typically are so often, when the Dharma teaching begins that, it will be mentioned that sentient beings they want the best for themselves, but what they do is actually the exact opposite. So it's not an innocent construct self, right? It's one that has huge implications, and hugely negative implications for an individual. And so the Buddhist path at this point has very much to do with seeing through that ignorance, and being able to therefore loosen the grip of those destructive tendencies of craving aggression and so on.
Then you also talked about the body as one. That is somewhat different and yet also not. And that's what we will begin to gradually consider. So it's quite interesting. We haven't talked about that and that is not intended here that we are supposed to think of the body really as a construct.
But just as the personal self can be labeled a 'self,' it's also possible to see the same kind of reification and construction with respect to anything else, like the body, as you mentioned. It's the same constructive phenomenon that expresses itself there, when I think, "I have" or "this is a body, one body" and yet, I can understand that this is not one body. It's not a permanent body, far from it. It's quite the contrary. And so the body is a construct based on other components, which themselves are also constructed. But it's an insight which will become much more to the forefront when we continue with the with the examinations. So, again, up until now we have been looking at body and mind and their combinations, and that the their components and the combinations of those components, to see that singular and permanent self is nowhere to be found, in the context of those components.
We noticed yesterday that Nāgārjuna qualifies dependent origination in this extraordinary way: That which originates dependently does not cease and does not arise. Is not annihilated and not permanent, does not come and does not go, is not different and not the same," and then We mark that dependent origination that does not cease and does not arise seems to be a contradiction. And yet, obviously, it doesn't sound as if the speaker of these verses considers it a contradiction, because he also says that this is the mark of the king of teachers, that he can explain dependent origination in these in these terms.
Then we get into the first of the chapters that make up this treatise. Each of them is an analysis so that's a certain topic which is
the subject of investigation. So just like we have spent some time now examining the personal self, now in Chapter One, the subject matter, or the topic of that is under investigation, is
causation, causality, the analysis of conditions and the notion that things take place because of other things, or take place because of something. That's what we're going to investigate. And again investigating it with the help of the structure of the arguments here, but against primarily our own understanding of what it means for something to be dependent on something else. For the existence or the being of something to be dependent, what does it mean for something to be caused? In our mind? From our perspective? That's what we're going to ask ourselves this question, these questions, and that's what we're going to work on making clear to ourselves.
So in the very first verse, Nāgārjuna he presents what the commentator says is the thesis of Chapter One. Where he says, "not from itself, not from another, not from both, and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise." So again, it's perhaps safe to say that that's an extraordinary way of beginning a philosophical treatise. Or any form of writing as a matter of fact. Perhaps poetry would be an exception, no? If in the first verse of a poem you read something like that, you are already in a space of mind where you're sort of ready to go with strange ideas, and see what they might, what sort of sense you might get, what kind of feeling you might get from them. But if this is meant to be rigorous philosophical investigation, and if this is indeed the thesis, like the root claim that he presents there, "this is what I say, try to defeat it." Then it's very extraordinary, is it not?
"Nowhere does anything ever arise." That seems to be an impossible conclusion and bound to fail, no? If you have that kind of claim that nothing ever happens anywhere, in any way at all, then how can you expect to be taken seriously? and who would really begin,
who would really say this? But that is what he does.
Then why/how is this?
So there are four versions of something being able to happen that he says, regardless of which one of them we look at, it is the case that nowhere does anything ever arise along those lines. So for example, nowhere does anything ever arise from itself. Nowhere does anything ever arise from an other, or from something else. Nowhere does anything ever arise from both, itself or another. And nowhere does anything ever arise in a way that is uncaused.
So there's a tradition of elaborating a fair bit on this first verse, And I think we should make that effort also, elaborating on it and coming quite.. as clear as we possibly can about what the thesis is, and what the justification for saying this may be.
And again it is very rewarding to begin by thinking to oneself, or for oneself.
Is that which is under investigation here something that is relevant to me? Meaning, is this something that I.. is what is investigated here something that I am a believer in? And what is, just like we said, am I a believer in, individuality in the sense of singularity of an individual, and of permanence of an individual, because who knows maybe it's it isn't the case. Maybe we don't have the particular beliefs that the author here is investigating and that doesn't make it uninteresting. If that's the case, it can still be a rewarding philosophical reading. But, of course, it's very different if What is the topic, Is something that I myself am all for; If it's a principle that I'm a hundred percent believer in, and then the treatise says "well, you know, sorry, but you are 100% wrong." That's a very different issue, no? Then if we are considering a particular philosophical view which is then under attack, a philosophical view that we don't have ourselves, therefore first of all, it's probably good to ask ourselves, do we basically.. these four alternatives that are presented in the beginning, they can be boiled down to two variations of something happening. They take as a given that something happens.
Something could happen by things being produced from themselves, from other things, from both, or they could happen without any causal dependence. So actually to really notice whether we are.. whether The view that is under investigation here is one that we share, then we first of all have to ask ourselves: "Do I believe that something happens, or that things happen?" Because if I don't, you know, I mean it's a very... Let's say that that we had a version of saying that I don't believe that anything ever happens. Then, again, we could perhaps agree with the conclusion or, in any case, whatever may be, yeah, we could agree with the conclusion. And so there would be no need to, On a personal level, to go any further. So do I believe that things happen?
Is there any, what would you say about that?
Of course we do, yeah...
Of course we do.
So it's still probably good to try to think "why do I think that something happens?"
It's not some doctrine that I have, that I'm a believer in the in the happening of things. It seems to be such a basic rudimentary acknowledgement that it is beyond belief almost. It's just the world is like that. It's full of things that happen, no? And if there's ever such a thing as an obvious fact, then that that would be it.
And because that is the case, because it seems so obvious, then that's why it sounds strange to ask "Do I believe this?" because precisely, obviously how could it be otherwise, who could possibly believe otherwise? It's possible to say something else, but really believe it? It's very, very difficult to even imagine what it would be like not to think I really believe nothing ever happens.
So.
In other words, it seems we are getting at something very very fundamental about not just our beliefs, but also the world, when we investigate this.
But then if these four options are given. The first three they are of a similar kind because they all three are variants of the idea that when things happen, then there's something that makes them happen.
There are certain things that have to be in place for certain other things to occur. There are causes and conditions, whatever we may, whichever way we may want to identify those, that's a different issue. There are myriads of ways that this can be done, but here the basic idea is just that things aren't random. They happen for reasons, not necessarily for reasons, but because of certain things-- causes and conditions. Then the the fourth option is different. It says that actually there are no causes, things just happen. It may seem as if they happen because of something else, but really that's not the case. They just... It just happened the way they do, randomly, spontaneously..


We said that we believe that things happen.
Now we have seen two variants of believing something about the way things happen. One, things happen in a way that is causally conditioned and another, not so-- Independent of causes and conditions. Would it be fair to say that if something happens, then it would have to be In either of those two ways? That either of those two further explanations about what it means for something to happen necessarily apply? Is that the case or not? That's also super important to ask myself. Because if there's a third option which is not considered here, then the whole... If all what we're going to do is to look at the four variants here, and they aren't fully exhaustive as for the nature of causation, then whether we can refute them or not as viable explanations of the fact that things happen, doesn't matter, because there's still further options that aren't considered. And alternatively, if we can come to the, to a very clear conclusion that if something happens it would have to be that either of these two scenarios apply, then whatever conclusion we get to about these four alternatives will be totally binding, no? Whatever we then conclude about. So if we fail, in other words, to find a place for the notion of arising, in terms of those four, that means that we have to give up the very idea of things happening. And we just said that that is an almost inconceivable stance to take. How could anyone believe that? And yet if we say that when things happen, either they happen because of something or not. And if we say that there's therefore no third option, and we cannot find any justification for either belief, then we are forced into that into that absurd conclusion.
Therefore what would we say? What would be an example of arising which is not causal arising and which is not random?
Student: "Maybe it's the belief that things happen because of destiny or or some kind of predestination because of a divine being." Uh-huh, but that would be a fine example of arising because of something. Things happen because of that divine being yeah. Then we can ask is that divine being and the thing that the divine being produces, Are those two identical? If we can say yes, they are, and that's how things arise then we have found That things arise from themselves. And if we say that no the divine being is different from the creation, then there would be a variant of the second option, that things arise from another. Or if we say that well, it's.., That's God and then there's the creation. And in some ways they're the same. There's this divine spark perhaps, you know, And at the same time they're different, because one is the creator and the other is the creation. Then there would be a variant of both.
But this is exactly the way to think, like, ok there must be other.. It seems so simple,no? We're talking about the very idea of things happening, and then we say: Well, "you know, it actually just comes down to two options." It seems very sort of what to say aloof, and and sort of presumptuous to say that that the whole story about, in a way, you know a whole story about things happening can be captured in just two variants of arising. It seems very dry and well, whatever else we can say, you know, there's something that makes us suspicious, if someone speaks in this way. "Ok, do you believe something happens or not?" And we say "yes of course, we do, don't you?" Then the next thing that happens is that that person then says: "Well, if you have that belief then you are committed to one of only two positions." That will be sort of irritating, no? To get that sort of response.
But is it true or not? That's what we have to ask ourselves. So if it's not true, then that means there has to be some way of expressing the idea of things happening which is not a causal account and which is not a statement of that things are random. So is such a thing possible? And now we just considered the divine creator principle, to see whether that would be an example of a third order arising. But then we sort of tersely said that "no, that would be an example of the first caused arising." Yeah, okay.
Student: "And what about awareness?" Awareness?
So the question then would be: awareness, is it something that arises? That happens? but the arising is not, the arising is not dependent on something, it just happens. Sorry, it's not dependent on... What am I trying to say? We will have to ask: awareness, is it sorry, awareness, is it the case that awareness does not arise because of certain things? It's not a dependent arising? And at the same time is not random. Yeah, so that's what we're considering now.
Could awareness be an instance of something that does indeed happen? But when it happens neither is it the case that, that it is a causal phenomenon, nor is it the case that it just arises spontaneously?
Is there place for thinking of awareness in some alternative fashion?
Student: "Sometimes awareness can be deluded but it is always there."
So if it's always there, then it doesn't arise, yeah? So then it's not what we are looking at here, we're talking about about things that happen. The strange thing is we could say, if awareness is always there,
then it doesn't happen. So we are talking about something that never happens. Is that descriptive of awareness?
But anyway, we're looking at...we're looking at the idea that things happen. And then we're trying to see.. so all the things that don't happen, we don't have to bother about here, whatever they may be. Like horns of a rabbit and so on. No, this is not what we are examining. We're examining those things that actually seem to take place. And then we are asking: is it always the case that when something happens, an event a thing that comes seemingly goes into existence, becomes an existent thing, when something that is born, arises, whatever we say, you know, is it the case that we can always, no matter what example of something emerging we may come up with, that it happens because of something? Or is it just a random occurrence that has nothing.. that is under no causal restriction at all?
Awareness, if it does indeed happen then, I'm not sure how we would be able to see it as something that either just happens completely randomly, without any causal story at all, or something that is somehow like you say, it can be deluded or not, and then that is under the influence of things. And if it is something that participates in somehow causal relationships, then it's a dependent entity, which then falls under the first category.
Student: "So I mean, I guess I could say that I don't believe that things happen, but I can't deny that I'm experiencing. You know, so I would have to say that I experience things, and I experience that things function in a certain way." Yeah, so I think that then at least your experience takes place, no? "Yeah." Student: "Yeah, I believe my experience. I don't believe that things happen." Okay, fine. Yeah, but your experience happens, if we can say that much then we are still, we are still as affected by the, we are still, We still subscribe to the basic view in exactly the same way, I think, fundamentally, whether we say that really the world is made of things that
go in and out of existence, or whether we say, as a matter of fact, I don't believe there is a world, but I believe in my experience of the world, and that experience occurs, then we're still believers in the notion of things happening, of things taking place, the things are then just a different kind of thing. It's experiential events and entities that we're talking about. Student: "But I come into a problem because even if I don't believe my experience, my experience doesn't cease." Mm-hmm. Yeah, so there's tons of... Yeah, at this point, we're just asking whether we we share this basic orientation, and sort of core heartfelt belief that things, that things happen. And we're not saying anything more about whether it's justified or not. We just say: "Do I believe that things happen or not?" Student: "Are we just.. I mean...sorry... What is our like very specific definition of 'happening'? I'm still actually yeah... Is it that they arise or..?" It's whatever we put individually think of as happening. That's another interesting thing about this treatise, that there's usually no need for definitions from anywhere else than our than the ones that we always come with, that we come with, ourselves. There will be a number of philosophical principles introduced, but only to be... What to say? Yeah, there will be some Buddhist principles that will be introduced and then refuted, but in order to really get something,
get somewhere with the progressive reasoning, what is by far most important is to think what do I mean by 'arising?'
Yeah, 'happening,' yeah, in this case we've been talking about 'happening' and then if If I feel that yeah, there's things 'happen' and I would like to call that the 'arising' of things. That's how it comes across to me. Then that's fine. That's just my belief about things happening. I'm a believer in things taking place because they seem to arise. But basically, what we if nowhere does anything ever arise, we can we can read that too as simply saying, nowhere does anything ever happen.
Student: "I guess where I'm still at is I don't believe that what I'm experiencing is intrinsically real. But my experience continues, so I can't help but... I can't even say believe but I'm experiencing it." So there okay, yeah, okay I get it. So I think, that's a very interesting point that you're making, which we will have certainly need to again and again consider, you know? The exact point that you're making that it may be possible to have a belief about the nature of things, that somehow seems to be contradicted by our experience, if I hear correctly. Like I may be convinced that actually nothing ever takes place, perhaps I'm a some believer in Madhyamika and so I 100% believe that Nāgārjuna is right when he says this. But it just doesn't fit with the way I see things, and the way I experience things. So that's totally thorough, entirely possible. And I think we can probably, as we go on with this, that sense of complete contradiction is very likely to come up. A complete contradiction between what we can notice under analysis and what seems to be the case. But what I would say then at this point is that we have to take our experience very seriously, our experience and our beliefs very seriously. So if part of us, so to speak, is still a believer in things happening, just because it seems so undeniable, then that has to be acknowledged. So when we are now asking ourselves these questions, right, then we have to look at the whole package of what we associate with ourselves: our beliefs, our scientific ideas, our religious ideas, our day-to-day thoughts and ideas, and our senses, whatever there may be..is there something anywhere in this great theater that somehow
makes me a subscriber to the notion that things happen? And if there is some sort of drama taking place then indeed, yeah, I'm still one of those who believe that things happen. Does that make some sense? The key being analyzing really our own thoughts and beliefs.
Then I think you had also a question.
Student: "To me it seems that there are things that that happen, meaning that they are not, not happening like a horn of a rabbit or, barren woman's son, but they are also, they're neither randomly happening nor depending on other things. I can't think of space, or Buddhahood, right? If I say Buddhahood, it clearly happens. I cannot say.. it does not belong to the same category as the barren woman's son, but then if I say Buddhahood, nor it certainly doesn't happen randomly, but if I say Buddahood happens because of a reason, or because of depending on something else, then it seems to be impermanent. Like if something happens based on something else, then or space right, it seems to be impermanent. So to me it seems there are some things that happen, but doesn't fall neither into these two categories." But why can we then say that Buddhahood happens, if it's not something that happens, because of something and it's not random either. Student: "Well, but how do you define 'happening?' Because if, yeah, therefore, if I say there is arising, then there must be ceasing, but I cannot say that for Buddhahood, so it seems." But maybe there is no Buddhahood then. Actually that is the kind of space of mind that can be very uncomfortable, no? Because we have a lot of hopes also. Let's acknowledge that. If we are practitioners of the Buddhist path and believe and have learned a lot from the Buddhist teachings, and so on, there are so many things that we find super relevant. And that it would be like the thought of having to say that this is just make-believe... It would be terrible, no? But that's nevertheless the kind of space of mind that we should enter when we get into this kind of investigation, yeah? We have to be willing to question absolutely anything, our most cherished beliefs, so that could be just the belief that I am here-- I love that thought and I can't live without it. But it could also be something much more profound than that, like the there must be awakening in the world and so on. But we have to be, we have to be completely fearless in terms of questioning our beliefs.
Because otherwise it won't be satisfying, right? Whatever we figure out we know in our heart of hearts that there are certain things that we have relegated and chosen not to take under investigation and so okay, we spent some time but whatever we come to understand has only a limited application.
Yeah, there's just a little time. Student: "Maybe it's similar to what was said from the person online, but I have this notion that of course every everything appears to be happening, things appear to be happening that's not an experience that I can deny. But if I investigate even for a moment, any one of those things that I perceive to be happening, then I agree very easily with this notion that any thing does not arise, right? Does not ever arise. Or no thing happens like there's no singular instant that's ever pinpointable, that is taking place. And so for me when I read this stanza, I'm thinking of 'happening,' that there is 'happening.' Not any 'thing' is happening, but that there is the experience of happening taking place, and that there seems to be some persistence underneath what's said here that could still be a possibility that could both be uncaused, I mean, sorry, that wouldn't be caused or random. Would just be." You are you thinking like in terms of the two truths, you know, is that what you mean? Student: "Maybe. I think I'm just trying to understand dependent origination from this perspective of constant flux, of no snapshot anything, no singular anything." But if yeah, okay.
If there is nevertheless a flux of something, that merits the term flux, then that happens, right? That certainly happens. I think you also said that, yeah, if there is this flux then the flux happens, and flux is that completely random? Or is there something that makes certain fluctuating events take place, rather than others? Student: "I think the flux literally is 'happening,' meaning, they're the same thing." Fine, and then when this flux takes place, as it does, is there some sense that it is, that there are causes and conditions at play? Or that it's utterly random? "It seems the moment we..." Perhaps the very idea of flux implies not just complete chaos, no? Like is there a difference between talking about flux and utter chaos? Probably, yeah? Student: "One seems more of a judgment than the other. Chaos to me seems like a judgment of something happening, versus flux just being happening itself." Right, so
then we are asking is flux then a candidate for this third category of not under the influence of conditions and causes, not explicable in terms... not explicable in terms of causes and conditions, and yet not something that just happens the way it does, independent of causes and conditions? Student: "Yes, yeah. I'm suggesting that." So let's try and think about that. We can all do that, try and think about that over the weekend. Why would it be that, what is your notion of flux, in other words? Try to sort of clarify that. Why is it that it's not... why is the flux not something that, why is it not fluctuating conditions that have an influence and on others? And why is it, while we cannot say that, why is it that the flux is not just utterly unpredictable and completely random? Yeah, I think we could all try to think of this that the notion of flux, which also has a history in in like Buddhist English. So is that something that is not affected by causes and conditions? Or is not somehow a framework of causes and conditions, and yet not a random flux? I don't know, in my mind random flux sounds like, like almost.. not a very easy concept to, not a very natural concept Yeah, did you have something to...?
Student: "Hey, hopefully it's helpful, more sort of another way to state what I think. The previous comments have been pointing toward and what you're pointing toward is when we say something is happening, does that have to be an ontological claim? Do there have to be ontological stakes and reasons, right? And I think what I'm hearing some folks push against, is that it has to be on ontological, that there are no other alternatives. Thinking, you know, of what I consider to be less ontological, more phenomenological, accounts from you know the Madhyāntavibhāga, for example. Yeah, that's also a very, very rich perspective to begin to inquire into. At this point, I think we can also say that the phenomenological perspective, I succeeded in saying it relatively, the phenomenological perspective, if that is one that sees things happening, which it would be, then is the phenomenological perception of these things one that is in terms of, "well, if I look here, I see a white flower. If I look over here, I see something else." In other words, I should turn, if I tire of looking at the white flower I should turn my head over there. That would be like any phenomenological experience, which is within the framework of causes and conditions.
So, we can choose to conduct this analysis in terms of ontology, but we can also say forget about, I will bracket all that ontological stuff and talk about what just seems to us! That's actually a very good point. That I have been trying to encourage, I suppose, when we say: "What do I mean? How do things come across to me? Rather than
particular claims about what reality is. What is most important is what do I believe, how do I perceive. That's also a way of saying that the phenomenological perspective is very valuable here and perhaps, yeah, so thank you! Let's then for Monday, think about these questions, think about if someone asks the strange question: "Do things happen?" What would you answer? and then secondly, if you agree that, or if you say "yes things happen," then would you agree with this reduction into just two possible accounts of arising, of things happening? Namely that either there is really, or truly or perhaps just seemingly so, arising in in terms of causes and conditions? Or is it the case that, really or truly, nothing arises causally, or just seemingly things appear to be uncaused? That's what we have to inquire about. So to make sure to check whether we are, whether we are affected by the.. whether we are subscribers to the claims that are under analysis. Because the further course of events depends very much on whether we are, whether the beliefs that are being investigated are our own beliefs and perhaps our own core beliefs, or whether they are just ideas of others. Okay thank you very much and have a great weekend.
Let's just begin with the verses once more of homage at the beginning of "Root of the Middle Way,"
"That which originates dependently Does not cease and does not arise Is not annihilated and is not permanent, Does not come and does not go Is not different and not the same. To the true teacher who reveals this peace, The complete pacification of constructs, To the perfect Buddha I bow down."
We had the sequence of lines three and four changed. The sequence was off in the previous version, so this is how it should be.
With the homage and giving rise to the mind of awakening then Let's get into the subject matter where we have now spent some time trying to understand dependent origination along the lines of Buddhist doctrine in general; Where the outer and inner dependent origination is described with an emphasis on the inner dependent origination-- the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth, which is based on ignorance. And we said that the ignorance can be understood in terms of this belief that there is a self of a certain kind; that there's a self who is singular, who is permanent, and who is in control of the actions that this agent performs.
And yeah, perhaps.
So are there any questions in general at this point. Or otherwise, if someone would like to sort of give an account of where they are at, in terms of this idea of no self in relation to dependent origination, that would be nice! And I'm thinking that from Monday we can perhaps begin to do this system that they use in the monastic shedra, where we have a jar with people's names and then draw a name or two or three, and then here what? The relevant person has to has to say about perhaps it's nice if we can all think of something that we sort of boil our understanding, current understanding in the context down to, and then Additionally, there can also be some questions that that I will ask and sort of just to keep us... Yeah it can be a nice thing to have it will also be yeah... let's do that and... But at this point is there anyone who would volunteer with some inputs, reflections or questions before we start?
Student: "What about things that seem to form a system where it would seem that there's, you know, some relative amount, so to speak, to use a common word, some relative amount of 'singularity' even though there's many parts. So I'm thinking I'm thinking of things like forests, in which one doesn't, one doesn't just think of a bunch of random trees and shrubs and animals, and all that sort of stuff, just kind of sitting next to each other so to speak but there's a dynamic and cohesive system, that despite the fact that it's made up of many parts seems to form some sort of unity. Similarly even within, within the body Even though there's there's many parts,
there's an awful lot of communication between the various parts, I mean, the mind or the brain, if you want to say that one's feelings Shapes the immune system, for example, Impacts heart rate blood pressure, all sorts of things like that.
So there's, you know, despite the fact that there's many parts there is There's some sort of unity, some sort of singularity.
Okay, I'll I'll leave it at that those I'm thinking mainly of how things can form coherent, or more or less cohesives systems. I wonder how that fits into this idea of singularity." Yeah, thank you. The singularity that we have been considering here is the singularity of the person. Up until now We won't leave it at that. But up until now, it's the singularity of the of the person and that is...
So and we have in fact we have identified "person" with someone who is singular and permanent, and in control of actions. Yeah, that's our definition of-- We have defined person in that in that way. So when we say person at this point we are specifically referring to a person who displays these three features of being singular, of being permanent, and in control of actions.
Then we have looked at the body and the mind, which we immediately recognized is not one body and not one Mind either, but so many things, which again are themselves many things like the forest is not just made of trees. The trees are also made of something and so on. So what you talked about in the beginning, I think, reflects very much a general Buddhist understanding of what a person is. It is a construct based on,
I forgot your exact words, but the the many factors that are in some sort of systematic interplay, and in this way, gives this certain sense of coherence and endurance, which we associate with being a person. And then we think that there is such a person. And I'm the one actually, I'm precisely such an individual who is just one, and who continues as that one individual in time. But the analysis then shows that all my reasons for thinking of myself in this way are not founded on anything. At least if we look in terms of body and mind. There are other things perhaps that could give us reason to think of a oneness and permanence of personhood. But at this point, that's what we have been doing. But it could be some sort of eternal soul as well, that reflect.. that somehow is the ultimate ground for my belief that I am one And so on, there could be many perhaps ways that one could think philosophically about reasons for this notion of singular, enduring person. But in terms of sort of day-to-day experience and understanding of things common-sensical if we want, then probably
those body and mind are the immediate grounds for our belief. And we have then seen that there is no such thing to be found there; that the aggregates of our existence and The physical and the mental ones and whatever there may be in terms of their combinations;
those are empty of a singular and enduring person. To me it sounds like that was that's what you were describing, that those are facts, complex components and complex factors that together enable this
construction of a person. But it is just a construct, and not ultimately real. So when we are looking for singularity here, and looking for or testing for singularity, testing for permanence, then it is true singularity, true permanence that we're looking for. Not in the sense that the kind of singularity and the kind of permanence that we are looking for is not one that is simply constructed.
So, that I think takes us very far in terms of acknowledging a basic Buddhist view about persons and so about life too.
Then that is what we have been focusing on, we have said that if there is that construct, then it's not just any random construct. It's not like thinking about a forest, because sometimes there are forests around and sometimes they're not we can live very well without forests, and there's no sense at all that forest is somehow always in the back of our mind, and conditions our experience. But it's a different case with self, my self, this very spontaneous sense of being here now as an individual, as a constant individual is something that indeed is constantly there to condition our experience, and to Influence our actions very strongly right? Because if there's this notion of Me being here, unquestionably, and not just in this moment, but over time, so that I will have to take into account what happens to me down the line. I'll have to make sure that I get the things that I want, and that I avoid the things that I don't want to have happen to me. So in this way, just the very notion of self comes replete with all what is required for craving and agression, those tendencies will be let there, together with the notion of self, and so we will act also those emotions and that belief in self conscious,
can't just be ignored, they require, impels us, they impel us into action, and that action is driven by we would say now, ignorance, right? Because it's action that we are forced to engage in. because of a belief that has actually no bearing on reality. And so we have very strong tendencies that are based on this ignorant belief, and when we act in ways that are strongly craving or strongly aggressive, obviously, what contrary to what we think, this will be not a way of maintaining ourselves and keeping ourselves safe and hopefully getting what we want. It's quite the opposite. And that's why they typically are so often, when the Dharma teaching begins that, it will be mentioned that sentient beings they want the best for themselves, but what they do is actually the exact opposite. So it's not an innocent construct self, right? It's one that has huge implications, and hugely negative implications for an individual. And so the Buddhist path at this point has very much to do with seeing through that ignorance, and being able to therefore loosen the grip of those destructive tendencies of craving aggression and so on.
Then you also talked about the body as one. That is somewhat different and yet also not. And that's what we will begin to gradually consider. So it's quite interesting. We haven't talked about that and that is not intended here that we are supposed to think of the body really as a construct.
But just as the personal self can be labeled a 'self,' it's also possible to see the same kind of reification and construction with respect to anything else, like the body, as you mentioned. It's the same constructive phenomenon that expresses itself there, when I think, "I have" or "this is a body, one body" and yet, I can understand that this is not one body. It's not a permanent body, far from it. It's quite the contrary. And so the body is a construct based on other components, which themselves are also constructed. But it's an insight which will become much more to the forefront when we continue with the with the examinations. So, again, up until now we have been looking at body and mind and their combinations, and that the their components and the combinations of those components, to see that singular and permanent self is nowhere to be found, in the context of those components.
We noticed yesterday that Nāgārjuna qualifies dependent origination in this extraordinary way: That which originates dependently does not cease and does not arise. Is not annihilated and not permanent, does not come and does not go, is not different and not the same," and then We mark that dependent origination that does not cease and does not arise seems to be a contradiction. And yet, obviously, it doesn't sound as if the speaker of these verses considers it a contradiction, because he also says that this is the mark of the king of teachers, that he can explain dependent origination in these in these terms.
Then we get into the first of the chapters that make up this treatise. Each of them is an analysis so that's a certain topic which is
the subject of investigation. So just like we have spent some time now examining the personal self, now in Chapter One, the subject matter, or the topic of that is under investigation, is
causation, causality, the analysis of conditions and the notion that things take place because of other things, or take place because of something. That's what we're going to investigate. And again investigating it with the help of the structure of the arguments here, but against primarily our own understanding of what it means for something to be dependent on something else. For the existence or the being of something to be dependent, what does it mean for something to be caused? In our mind? From our perspective? That's what we're going to ask ourselves this question, these questions, and that's what we're going to work on making clear to ourselves.
So in the very first verse, Nāgārjuna he presents what the commentator says is the thesis of Chapter One. Where he says, "not from itself, not from another, not from both, and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise." So again, it's perhaps safe to say that that's an extraordinary way of beginning a philosophical treatise. Or any form of writing as a matter of fact. Perhaps poetry would be an exception, no? If in the first verse of a poem you read something like that, you are already in a space of mind where you're sort of ready to go with strange ideas, and see what they might, what sort of sense you might get, what kind of feeling you might get from them. But if this is meant to be rigorous philosophical investigation, and if this is indeed the thesis, like the root claim that he presents there, "this is what I say, try to defeat it." Then it's very extraordinary, is it not?
"Nowhere does anything ever arise." That seems to be an impossible conclusion and bound to fail, no? If you have that kind of claim that nothing ever happens anywhere, in any way at all, then how can you expect to be taken seriously? and who would really begin,
who would really say this? But that is what he does.
Then why/how is this?
So there are four versions of something being able to happen that he says, regardless of which one of them we look at, it is the case that nowhere does anything ever arise along those lines. So for example, nowhere does anything ever arise from itself. Nowhere does anything ever arise from an other, or from something else. Nowhere does anything ever arise from both, itself or another. And nowhere does anything ever arise in a way that is uncaused.
So there's a tradition of elaborating a fair bit on this first verse, And I think we should make that effort also, elaborating on it and coming quite.. as clear as we possibly can about what the thesis is, and what the justification for saying this may be.
And again it is very rewarding to begin by thinking to oneself, or for oneself.
Is that which is under investigation here something that is relevant to me? Meaning, is this something that I.. is what is investigated here something that I am a believer in? And what is, just like we said, am I a believer in, individuality in the sense of singularity of an individual, and of permanence of an individual, because who knows maybe it's it isn't the case. Maybe we don't have the particular beliefs that the author here is investigating and that doesn't make it uninteresting. If that's the case, it can still be a rewarding philosophical reading. But, of course, it's very different if What is the topic, Is something that I myself am all for; If it's a principle that I'm a hundred percent believer in, and then the treatise says "well, you know, sorry, but you are 100% wrong." That's a very different issue, no? Then if we are considering a particular philosophical view which is then under attack, a philosophical view that we don't have ourselves, therefore first of all, it's probably good to ask ourselves, do we basically.. these four alternatives that are presented in the beginning, they can be boiled down to two variations of something happening. They take as a given that something happens.
Something could happen by things being produced from themselves, from other things, from both, or they could happen without any causal dependence. So actually to really notice whether we are.. whether The view that is under investigation here is one that we share, then we first of all have to ask ourselves: "Do I believe that something happens, or that things happen?" Because if I don't, you know, I mean it's a very... Let's say that that we had a version of saying that I don't believe that anything ever happens. Then, again, we could perhaps agree with the conclusion or, in any case, whatever may be, yeah, we could agree with the conclusion. And so there would be no need to, On a personal level, to go any further. So do I believe that things happen?
Is there any, what would you say about that?
Of course we do, yeah...
Of course we do.
So it's still probably good to try to think "why do I think that something happens?"
It's not some doctrine that I have, that I'm a believer in the in the happening of things. It seems to be such a basic rudimentary acknowledgement that it is beyond belief almost. It's just the world is like that. It's full of things that happen, no? And if there's ever such a thing as an obvious fact, then that that would be it.
And because that is the case, because it seems so obvious, then that's why it sounds strange to ask "Do I believe this?" because precisely, obviously how could it be otherwise, who could possibly believe otherwise? It's possible to say something else, but really believe it? It's very, very difficult to even imagine what it would be like not to think I really believe nothing ever happens.
So.
In other words, it seems we are getting at something very very fundamental about not just our beliefs, but also the world, when we investigate this.
But then if these four options are given. The first three they are of a similar kind because they all three are variants of the idea that when things happen, then there's something that makes them happen.
There are certain things that have to be in place for certain other things to occur. There are causes and conditions, whatever we may, whichever way we may want to identify those, that's a different issue. There are myriads of ways that this can be done, but here the basic idea is just that things aren't random. They happen for reasons, not necessarily for reasons, but because of certain things-- causes and conditions. Then the the fourth option is different. It says that actually there are no causes, things just happen. It may seem as if they happen because of something else, but really that's not the case. They just... It just happened the way they do, randomly, spontaneously..


We said that we believe that things happen.
Now we have seen two variants of believing something about the way things happen. One, things happen in a way that is causally conditioned and another, not so-- Independent of causes and conditions. Would it be fair to say that if something happens, then it would have to be In either of those two ways? That either of those two further explanations about what it means for something to happen necessarily apply? Is that the case or not? That's also super important to ask myself. Because if there's a third option which is not considered here, then the whole... If all what we're going to do is to look at the four variants here, and they aren't fully exhaustive as for the nature of causation, then whether we can refute them or not as viable explanations of the fact that things happen, doesn't matter, because there's still further options that aren't considered. And alternatively, if we can come to the, to a very clear conclusion that if something happens it would have to be that either of these two scenarios apply, then whatever conclusion we get to about these four alternatives will be totally binding, no? Whatever we then conclude about. So if we fail, in other words, to find a place for the notion of arising, in terms of those four, that means that we have to give up the very idea of things happening. And we just said that that is an almost inconceivable stance to take. How could anyone believe that? And yet if we say that when things happen, either they happen because of something or not. And if we say that there's therefore no third option, and we cannot find any justification for either belief, then we are forced into that into that absurd conclusion.
Therefore what would we say? What would be an example of arising which is not causal arising and which is not random?
Student: "Maybe it's the belief that things happen because of destiny or or some kind of predestination because of a divine being." Uh-huh, but that would be a fine example of arising because of something. Things happen because of that divine being yeah. Then we can ask is that divine being and the thing that the divine being produces, Are those two identical? If we can say yes, they are, and that's how things arise then we have found That things arise from themselves. And if we say that no the divine being is different from the creation, then there would be a variant of the second option, that things arise from another. Or if we say that well, it's.., That's God and then there's the creation. And in some ways they're the same. There's this divine spark perhaps, you know, And at the same time they're different, because one is the creator and the other is the creation. Then there would be a variant of both.
But this is exactly the way to think, like, ok there must be other.. It seems so simple,no? We're talking about the very idea of things happening, and then we say: Well, "you know, it actually just comes down to two options." It seems very sort of what to say aloof, and and sort of presumptuous to say that that the whole story about, in a way, you know a whole story about things happening can be captured in just two variants of arising. It seems very dry and well, whatever else we can say, you know, there's something that makes us suspicious, if someone speaks in this way. "Ok, do you believe something happens or not?" And we say "yes of course, we do, don't you?" Then the next thing that happens is that that person then says: "Well, if you have that belief then you are committed to one of only two positions." That will be sort of irritating, no? To get that sort of response.
But is it true or not? That's what we have to ask ourselves. So if it's not true, then that means there has to be some way of expressing the idea of things happening which is not a causal account and which is not a statement of that things are random. So is such a thing possible? And now we just considered the divine creator principle, to see whether that would be an example of a third order arising. But then we sort of tersely said that "no, that would be an example of the first caused arising." Yeah, okay.
Student: "And what about awareness?" Awareness?
So the question then would be: awareness, is it something that arises? That happens? but the arising is not, the arising is not dependent on something, it just happens. Sorry, it's not dependent on... What am I trying to say? We will have to ask: awareness, is it sorry, awareness, is it the case that awareness does not arise because of certain things? It's not a dependent arising? And at the same time is not random. Yeah, so that's what we're considering now.
Could awareness be an instance of something that does indeed happen? But when it happens neither is it the case that, that it is a causal phenomenon, nor is it the case that it just arises spontaneously?
Is there place for thinking of awareness in some alternative fashion?
Student: "Sometimes awareness can be deluded but it is always there."
So if it's always there, then it doesn't arise, yeah? So then it's not what we are looking at here, we're talking about about things that happen. The strange thing is we could say, if awareness is always there,
then it doesn't happen. So we are talking about something that never happens. Is that descriptive of awareness?
But anyway, we're looking at...we're looking at the idea that things happen. And then we're trying to see.. so all the things that don't happen, we don't have to bother about here, whatever they may be. Like horns of a rabbit and so on. No, this is not what we are examining. We're examining those things that actually seem to take place. And then we are asking: is it always the case that when something happens, an event a thing that comes seemingly goes into existence, becomes an existent thing, when something that is born, arises, whatever we say, you know, is it the case that we can always, no matter what example of something emerging we may come up with, that it happens because of something? Or is it just a random occurrence that has nothing.. that is under no causal restriction at all?
Awareness, if it does indeed happen then, I'm not sure how we would be able to see it as something that either just happens completely randomly, without any causal story at all, or something that is somehow like you say, it can be deluded or not, and then that is under the influence of things. And if it is something that participates in somehow causal relationships, then it's a dependent entity, which then falls under the first category.
Student: "So I mean, I guess I could say that I don't believe that things happen, but I can't deny that I'm experiencing. You know, so I would have to say that I experience things, and I experience that things function in a certain way." Yeah, so I think that then at least your experience takes place, no? "Yeah." Student: "Yeah, I believe my experience. I don't believe that things happen." Okay, fine. Yeah, but your experience happens, if we can say that much then we are still, we are still as affected by the, we are still, We still subscribe to the basic view in exactly the same way, I think, fundamentally, whether we say that really the world is made of things that
go in and out of existence, or whether we say, as a matter of fact, I don't believe there is a world, but I believe in my experience of the world, and that experience occurs, then we're still believers in the notion of things happening, of things taking place, the things are then just a different kind of thing. It's experiential events and entities that we're talking about. Student: "But I come into a problem because even if I don't believe my experience, my experience doesn't cease." Mm-hmm. Yeah, so there's tons of... Yeah, at this point, we're just asking whether we we share this basic orientation, and sort of core heartfelt belief that things, that things happen. And we're not saying anything more about whether it's justified or not. We just say: "Do I believe that things happen or not?" Student: "Are we just.. I mean...sorry... What is our like very specific definition of 'happening'? I'm still actually yeah... Is it that they arise or..?" It's whatever we put individually think of as happening. That's another interesting thing about this treatise, that there's usually no need for definitions from anywhere else than our than the ones that we always come with, that we come with, ourselves. There will be a number of philosophical principles introduced, but only to be... What to say? Yeah, there will be some Buddhist principles that will be introduced and then refuted, but in order to really get something,
get somewhere with the progressive reasoning, what is by far most important is to think what do I mean by 'arising?'
Yeah, 'happening,' yeah, in this case we've been talking about 'happening' and then if If I feel that yeah, there's things 'happen' and I would like to call that the 'arising' of things. That's how it comes across to me. Then that's fine. That's just my belief about things happening. I'm a believer in things taking place because they seem to arise. But basically, what we if nowhere does anything ever arise, we can we can read that too as simply saying, nowhere does anything ever happen.
Student: "I guess where I'm still at is I don't believe that what I'm experiencing is intrinsically real. But my experience continues, so I can't help but... I can't even say believe but I'm experiencing it." So there okay, yeah, okay I get it. So I think, that's a very interesting point that you're making, which we will have certainly need to again and again consider, you know? The exact point that you're making that it may be possible to have a belief about the nature of things, that somehow seems to be contradicted by our experience, if I hear correctly. Like I may be convinced that actually nothing ever takes place, perhaps I'm a some believer in Madhyamika and so I 100% believe that Nāgārjuna is right when he says this. But it just doesn't fit with the way I see things, and the way I experience things. So that's totally thorough, entirely possible. And I think we can probably, as we go on with this, that sense of complete contradiction is very likely to come up. A complete contradiction between what we can notice under analysis and what seems to be the case. But what I would say then at this point is that we have to take our experience very seriously, our experience and our beliefs very seriously. So if part of us, so to speak, is still a believer in things happening, just because it seems so undeniable, then that has to be acknowledged. So when we are now asking ourselves these questions, right, then we have to look at the whole package of what we associate with ourselves: our beliefs, our scientific ideas, our religious ideas, our day-to-day thoughts and ideas, and our senses, whatever there may be..is there something anywhere in this great theater that somehow
makes me a subscriber to the notion that things happen? And if there is some sort of drama taking place then indeed, yeah, I'm still one of those who believe that things happen. Does that make some sense? The key being analyzing really our own thoughts and beliefs.
Then I think you had also a question.
Student: "To me it seems that there are things that that happen, meaning that they are not, not happening like a horn of a rabbit or, barren woman's son, but they are also, they're neither randomly happening nor depending on other things. I can't think of space, or Buddhahood, right? If I say Buddhahood, it clearly happens. I cannot say.. it does not belong to the same category as the barren woman's son, but then if I say Buddhahood, nor it certainly doesn't happen randomly, but if I say Buddahood happens because of a reason, or because of depending on something else, then it seems to be impermanent. Like if something happens based on something else, then or space right, it seems to be impermanent. So to me it seems there are some things that happen, but doesn't fall neither into these two categories." But why can we then say that Buddhahood happens, if it's not something that happens, because of something and it's not random either. Student: "Well, but how do you define 'happening?' Because if, yeah, therefore, if I say there is arising, then there must be ceasing, but I cannot say that for Buddhahood, so it seems." But maybe there is no Buddhahood then. Actually that is the kind of space of mind that can be very uncomfortable, no? Because we have a lot of hopes also. Let's acknowledge that. If we are practitioners of the Buddhist path and believe and have learned a lot from the Buddhist teachings, and so on, there are so many things that we find super relevant. And that it would be like the thought of having to say that this is just make-believe... It would be terrible, no? But that's nevertheless the kind of space of mind that we should enter when we get into this kind of investigation, yeah? We have to be willing to question absolutely anything, our most cherished beliefs, so that could be just the belief that I am here-- I love that thought and I can't live without it. But it could also be something much more profound than that, like the there must be awakening in the world and so on. But we have to be, we have to be completely fearless in terms of questioning our beliefs.
Because otherwise it won't be satisfying, right? Whatever we figure out we know in our heart of hearts that there are certain things that we have relegated and chosen not to take under investigation and so okay, we spent some time but whatever we come to understand has only a limited application.
Yeah, there's just a little time. Student: "Maybe it's similar to what was said from the person online, but I have this notion that of course every everything appears to be happening, things appear to be happening that's not an experience that I can deny. But if I investigate even for a moment, any one of those things that I perceive to be happening, then I agree very easily with this notion that any thing does not arise, right? Does not ever arise. Or no thing happens like there's no singular instant that's ever pinpointable, that is taking place. And so for me when I read this stanza, I'm thinking of 'happening,' that there is 'happening.' Not any 'thing' is happening, but that there is the experience of happening taking place, and that there seems to be some persistence underneath what's said here that could still be a possibility that could both be uncaused, I mean, sorry, that wouldn't be caused or random. Would just be." You are you thinking like in terms of the two truths, you know, is that what you mean? Student: "Maybe. I think I'm just trying to understand dependent origination from this perspective of constant flux, of no snapshot anything, no singular anything." But if yeah, okay.
If there is nevertheless a flux of something, that merits the term flux, then that happens, right? That certainly happens. I think you also said that, yeah, if there is this flux then the flux happens, and flux is that completely random? Or is there something that makes certain fluctuating events take place, rather than others? Student: "I think the flux literally is 'happening,' meaning, they're the same thing." Fine, and then when this flux takes place, as it does, is there some sense that it is, that there are causes and conditions at play? Or that it's utterly random? "It seems the moment we..." Perhaps the very idea of flux implies not just complete chaos, no? Like is there a difference between talking about flux and utter chaos? Probably, yeah? Student: "One seems more of a judgment than the other. Chaos to me seems like a judgment of something happening, versus flux just being happening itself." Right, so
then we are asking is flux then a candidate for this third category of not under the influence of conditions and causes, not explicable in terms... not explicable in terms of causes and conditions, and yet not something that just happens the way it does, independent of causes and conditions? Student: "Yes, yeah. I'm suggesting that." So let's try and think about that. We can all do that, try and think about that over the weekend. Why would it be that, what is your notion of flux, in other words? Try to sort of clarify that. Why is it that it's not... why is the flux not something that, why is it not fluctuating conditions that have an influence and on others? And why is it, while we cannot say that, why is it that the flux is not just utterly unpredictable and completely random? Yeah, I think we could all try to think of this that the notion of flux, which also has a history in in like Buddhist English. So is that something that is not affected by causes and conditions? Or is not somehow a framework of causes and conditions, and yet not a random flux? I don't know, in my mind random flux sounds like, like almost.. not a very easy concept to, not a very natural concept Yeah, did you have something to...?
Student: "Hey, hopefully it's helpful, more sort of another way to state what I think. The previous comments have been pointing toward and what you're pointing toward is when we say something is happening, does that have to be an ontological claim? Do there have to be ontological stakes and reasons, right? And I think what I'm hearing some folks push against, is that it has to be on ontological, that there are no other alternatives. Thinking, you know, of what I consider to be less ontological, more phenomenological, accounts from you know the Madhyāntavibhāga, for example. Yeah, that's also a very, very rich perspective to begin to inquire into. At this point, I think we can also say that the phenomenological perspective, I succeeded in saying it relatively, the phenomenological perspective, if that is one that sees things happening, which it would be, then is the phenomenological perception of these things one that is in terms of, "well, if I look here, I see a white flower. If I look over here, I see something else." In other words, I should turn, if I tire of looking at the white flower I should turn my head over there. That would be like any phenomenological experience, which is within the framework of causes and conditions.
So, we can choose to conduct this analysis in terms of ontology, but we can also say forget about, I will bracket all that ontological stuff and talk about what just seems to us! That's actually a very good point. That I have been trying to encourage, I suppose, when we say: "What do I mean? How do things come across to me? Rather than
particular claims about what reality is. What is most important is what do I believe, how do I perceive. That's also a way of saying that the phenomenological perspective is very valuable here and perhaps, yeah, so thank you! Let's then for Monday, think about these questions, think about if someone asks the strange question: "Do things happen?" What would you answer? and then secondly, if you agree that, or if you say "yes things happen," then would you agree with this reduction into just two possible accounts of arising, of things happening? Namely that either there is really, or truly or perhaps just seemingly so, arising in in terms of causes and conditions? Or is it the case that, really or truly, nothing arises causally, or just seemingly things appear to be uncaused? That's what we have to inquire about. So to make sure to check whether we are, whether we are affected by the.. whether we are subscribers to the claims that are under analysis. Because the further course of events depends very much on whether we are, whether the beliefs that are being investigated are our own beliefs and perhaps our own core beliefs, or whether they are just ideas of others. Okay thank you very much and have a great weekend.
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