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Root of The Middle Way – Session 18

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  • Buddhist Classics and Philosophy
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  • Rangjung Yeshe Institute - Nepal
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We are invited to embark on a thought-provoking journey that challenges our preconceived notions of agents, actions, and places.

Session 18 takes us on a profound exploration of the intricate relationship between agents, actions, and places, challenging our conventional understanding and delving deep into the nature of emptiness as it relates to linguistic representation. The lecture expands upon the interdependence of agents and actions, illustrating that they cannot exist independently. we are pushed to reevaluate the very essence of linguistic representation and its connection to the profound concept of emptiness. As we navigate these intricate philosophical waters, we are encouraged to contemplate the elusive nature of grasping a fixed self or identity, ultimately leading to a profound shift in perception and interaction with the world.

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"That which originates dependently, does not cease and does not arise, is not annihilated and is not permanent, does not come and does not go, is not different and not the same. To the true teacher who reveals this peace, the complete pacification of constructs, to the perfect Buddha I bow down."
So this analysis of the action of going and the place of going that we went through yesterday, is there someone who can sort of present what's going on there in a compelling fashion?
Anybody like to give it a go?
Maybe for the rest, we should make this drawer here. It's nice to hear what people have to say, you know? I understand if you don't want to like... But okay, is there anyone then who has problems with it?
Like, where is it that you feel it's... Where is it that you feel it's... The wheels aren't really connecting in the machinery.
Yeah.
Student: "I just had one breakthrough. Thanks to discussing with my friends. Because I was quite hung up on that, you know, walking as in like the grammatical tense of a continuous action and I felt like, were we really authentically investigating it if it's happening over a period of time, but we're always looking at one moment. And you know, I was thinking like when you're in the middle of walking, you're still... You know, you can't examine it like that. Because that's not walking by itself, you have to look at them all together. But then I found out like, that's kind of the whole point. Like if you freeze frame a movie, the reality is that there isn't somebody walking, there's just stills." Is that continuous? "No." Never, yeah? "Yeah. "But that... I don't know, I couldn't get that until yesterday."
Yeah. "I mean, is it right?" Yeah, that sounds right.
I mean, in a way, it's like they say that you have a bundle of straw and you pull one and then they all fall apart, yeah? So like once you begin to see, or once we begin to see... I was going to say what's going on or how this works, yeah? But it's also like the absence of seeing something that is actually going on, no? Then anything is evidence of... is proof of emptiness, yeah?
So that's also interesting in itself, no? Like first we work hard to get one proof together, but then because it's true, and because it's a universally applicable insight, then it can be confirmed by anything, which is also... That itself is also a challenge, yeah? Like, okay, then what are we proving if anything is proof? Yeah? Like that's one way of criticizing this whole project also, is to say that if there's nothing that is not emptiness, then where do we begin and where do we end, and what is it at all that you're trying to do, no? So that kind of critique can be levelled against
anyone who says that we have proofs of emptiness and so on, yeah? So what would you by now think about that kind of critique? What we're proving is...
we could say whenever we examine what appears to be there, our conventions and so on, then we find that they are completely baseless, yeah? There's zero contact with anything real. So if that's the case with all of our conventions, then what are we actually doing? How can we tell ourselves that we are proving anything and that we are achieving anything? Do you see what I'm trying to say? Student: "Aren't we just like.." Then also, that's the classic objection. If all things are empty, then also the argument is empty, that's the beginning of the treatise, no? Someone says, so how can you get anywhere with this? And if your argument is not empty, then there are things that aren't empty, so what do you mean? That's the beginning of the Vigrahavyāvartanī treatise. Then the treatise follows to deal with that objection. But it's a very... what to say?
There's something profound there, in the objection. Student: "I mean, even if we just use the objections to increase our noticing of what's actually happening with our experience, then I don't know, that's how I would describe it to like a friend or something, not trying to prove emptiness, but just trying to see what's happening when we experience stuff."
To see what is happening. What do you think? Are we trying to see what is happening?
We are in a way, because we are investigating movement, but then in the light of what we find, can we say that we're trying to see what is happening?
Student: "Whether or not this helps or not, I have no idea, but what I was saying yesterday about trying to test this argument by substituting other verbs.
So in a way, no matter what verb we put in, I think we end up at the same place. But then I guess my question is, why then this verb? Or why this? Why motion? And not seeing, and not picking up, or not?" Seeing comes right after, in Chapter 3, but we had arising, like production of things, and now it's movement. They're very, very basic sort of rudimentary principles that are required for just about anything. So I think that's why. That's also what the commentator says in the "Ornament of Reason," that these are like the sort of main, the absence of arising and cessation, and the absence of going and coming are like the primary features of dependent ordination.
"One from online, Santiago?"
Something I felt yesterday through the reasonings we were going through is the feeling that it was artificially separating the parts of the sentence, like, "Girl walks path." And it felt artificial to think of one isolated, because we think of the sentence as a whole, like "Girl walks path," it doesn't make sense separating. But then maybe the point of the separation is to analyze if it does make sense to talk about those elements in themselves, and we see it doesn't. Is it something like that in the direction we're going?" Yeah, I think that sounds...
Of course, there are many theories about what goes on when we hear a sentence and so on, but if we leave all that complex and deep philosophy aside, then I think there's a way to... Yeah, we speak about one sentence, no? And "the girl walks on the path," it does make sense to say that, yeah, that this is one sort of carrier of meaning, no? But it also does make sense to say that it consists of elements, that there are three parts in the sentence, because if I say "girl," or if I say "path," or if I say "walks," we have something quite different in mind, no?
So that's then what we were trying to see, what really does this sentence mean, no? We have a clear feeling that something is conveyed, meaningful, when we say "the girl walks on the path." It's not a question whether this sentence is meaningful, no? And we all will agree readily that we get what the point is now, if we speak the language which the speaker speaks, then there's no issue. But then what is it that we mean? What is it that we understand when we hear that sentence? That's what we were beginning to look at, yeah? And then of course.. we often have the feeling that there's something we understand roughly, and then it helps to sort of be more precise, no? And zoom in on the different parts in the picture, to really be able to appreciate what's there, no? So then, but that's what we do, no? We say, okay, that was the sentence, and I feel it means something, but let me see what is it really about? It's about a girl, and she walks on a path, yeah? And then we said, okay, yeah, walks, that's a kind of action, and walks is a verb. So that's probably what it must be, the verb that refers to the action that is being carried out there walking, yeah?
But then we were saying that there's only one kind of walking, no? We're not talking about the girl walks various walks. I mean, if we did that, that would mean that she does like one style of walking after the other, no? It wouldn't mean that she simultaneously engages in several acts of walking, yeah? So there is just one act of walking that is expressed in our sentence, the girl walks on the path. And since that's the case, and since now we have said that the verb refers to that action, then where does she walk? She has to walk somewhere. If really the girl walks, her act has to take place somewhere, so it's required that there is some kind of locus of the action. And that's the path, of course, in that sentence. But what is the path? What do we mean when we say "the girl walks on the path?" Since we have assigned the verb to the action, then the path, the location where the action takes place, doesn't carry that sense, yeah? It's devoid of that sense. So what then happens, in other words, is that because we have said it's walks that refers to walking, which is a natural choice, no? Because we have done that, then the path is now some place which is not itself qualified by walking. So that perhaps sounds okay, because the path is just the path, yeah? And she's supposed to be walking there, and then it becomes a path of walking. But if the place where she walks has no association with walking, then the sentence which we're looking at is absurd, because it now says that the girl walks where there is no walking.
Right? Why is it we can't just say that it's the path, it's the path, and that's it, yeah? It should be okay now to have, like we talked about yesterday, stones and pebbles, and that's the path, and then there's someone walking there, no? But the path doesn't have to be about walking, does it?
What do you think?
Student: "I think a path is only meaningful when there is a walking taking place. So to me, it seems like in any given moment, like Pema said, that these three things that we're looking at, the subject, the agent, and the act, and the place of walking, if one of them, like for me, by verse one, we already said there's no current walking, and that seems pretty compelling to me. So if one of them is not there or is disproved, then the other two automatically collapse. So the gentleman yesterday was saying if you look at the subject and the object, if they're same or different, they're apparently not the same. I don't think we can say they're the same, but if we investigate if they're different, then they're also not completely different, because if there is no path, then it is not meaningful to talk about somebody who walks either. So it just seems to me these three things, they either, well, we cannot say they truly exist, I guess that's the point, but then we also cannot say that they are totally separate from each other, because one literally depends on the other. If there is no object, it doesn't, if there is no act, if there is no act of walking, it doesn't make sense to talk about a path. And if there is no act of walking, I mean an agent, what to say, like the agent is also meaningful when there is actually a doing. Right? We cannot say "agent" without somebody, without that agent doing something. So I just felt like these three are... they are so connected to each other, it's just impossible to talk about one thing out of the three. And if we can say that there is no current walking, then the other two are already dismissed or collapsed, what is the rest of the argument is trying to, like further prove something? What is…?" Yeah, so they can't be separated, and they can't be, at the same time, they can't be one and the same. That clearly is not the case either, no? So yeah, what you were saying, it takes us right into the number seven, which says, "If no existent, none existent, or both exist…" No, that's the different chapter. "If there's nothing that goes, going makes…" Is it that one? Yeah. "If there's nothing that goes, going makes no sense. In the absence of any going how could there be one who goes?" So this, according to the commentary, is about the way that the agent of going and the act of going are coextensive.
So until now we have basically looked at the action and the place where the action occurs. But of course there's also the girl who walks there on the path, no? So if the girl walks on the path, then the agent of walking, the girl, cannot be separate from the act of walking, in which case she would be someone who doesn't walk. And the act cannot be separate from the agent, because then there would be an action without anything that does it. It would be an empty action, no? Not performed by anything or anyone. So the agent and the action are inseparable.
So if there's nothing that goes, going makes no sense. If there isn't an agent of going, then there cannot be any going. And in the absence of going, how could there be anyone who goes? The agent of going requires an action, and the action requires an agent completely. So how do we actually succeed in making the distinction when we talk about the girl walks on the path, no? What do we think when we say that?
Any suggestion? Like I've used those sentences a lot, yeah? I walk to the coffee shop. So did I always mean that I and walking are completely inseparable? How did we make sense of sentences like that, no? Any suggestion?
If it makes sense to say that without someone who walks, there cannot be walking, and if there cannot be walking without someone who walks, then what is the basis for drawing a distinction between the agent and the action? What would you say?
Student: "It's only compelling without examining. Otherwise, we cannot say anything anymore. I've described something in a relative sense, and that's how I say I walk to school. But it cannot withstand some exam. It cannot withstand any known exam." But did we then never know what we meant when we said?
Or do we still know what we mean? What do you think? Any kind of input is welcome, yeah? There's no right answer to this, obviously, no? And no wrong answer?
Student: "We were talking about non-existent things. Because we were talking about a self that is continuous, sometimes walks, sometimes doesn't walk. So the whole sentence is built on things that actually don't exist. The walking doesn't exist as an enduring and progressing thing. The I also doesn't exist as an enduring thing that sometimes walks, sometimes doesn't. It's pretty much built on things that are not there."
Thank you.
Student: "It's built on something that doesn't exist, as Luis said, but it also feels extremely real. I mean, if we don't talk about walking, let's talk about stomach ache or headache or coughing. Yeah, it's just, you know, "I am sick," right? I mean physically, say. It's not not there, but it's also not correct to say that. I just feel that there's something very real about our world, like it's not, you know, pain is really real. Feels like that something is there."
Yeah, so it's easy to understand why people have come up with this idea with two truths, no? And the Buddha has taught about two truths, no? Because this seems to be sort of a perspective we are forced into. We have to say one thing about what we understand when we try to be reasonable and rational, and then something else when we don't apply this kind of analysis seems to require acknowledgement, yeah?
But it's clear that those two can't be altogether separate either, no? That would be yet another absurdity, no? There would be no connection between the two realities at all. Then there wouldn't be, why would we call them two realities? It would just, yeah, there would be no connection there, no? So there would just be chaos actually, no? Another version of this randomness if reality and two kinds of reality would sort of occur without any connection between them, no? There has to be a very profound connection. Like typically they would say that the ultimate truth is the nature of the conventional.
So the appearance of a difference will have to be pretty much an appearance, no?
Okay. Then the text continued. So again we can try to think about this question of what, now we're in a certain situation, we have a certain understanding, right now something is going on in our minds that we think is our current understanding. What might be the difference between this kind of understanding and the understanding that makes us get it for good, so to speak, that like, that makes us really see emptiness? What would be the difference? And anybody short? We can talk about that. Or we can proceed to eight, yeah? "One who goes does not go." So this is again now the agent we're looking at, the agent of walking, yeah? "One who goes does not go, nor does one who does not go. Other than goers and non-goers, what third party could be going?" Is there anyone who would give it a go to explain what is happening there? You can probably get quite a bit of it already. So now we're looking at the agent
who is supposed to be the one who walks, yeah?
But who is this agent of walking really, yeah? The agent of walking cannot be someone who walks, yeah? Because then the agent is himself or herself, itself qualified by walking, yeah? And then the act of walking will have to be a second kind, yeah? There will be two actions. If the walker is intrinsically someone who walks, then the walking performed by that agent will have to be a second kind of walking. So now we have two actions, and that's deeply problematic because if we have two actions, there has to be two agents also. So we started out with one agent, but now we have two. That comes at a consequence of saying that the agent of walking is someone who walks,

So what is it that walks? It's a walker, someone who is intrinsically associated with walking.
If that's the case, then what is the walking that, or let's put it even stronger, the walker is intrinsically walking. If there's that kind of identity between the act of walking and the agent, then what is the walking? It also ties in very nicely with what we just looked at in the notes before, that the two are coextensive, so we can't really separate them, no? So now we're trying to look at the agents separately nonetheless because the girl is the one who walks there on the path, yeah? So what is that girl? Is she a walker or is she a non-walker or some different entity, third order? So she couldn't be a walker by nature, because then she would be the nature of walking, and then her walking, which is supposed to be an action that she performs,
her walking would be a second kind of walking. And so we have two actions, two actions. Whenever there's an action, there's something that does that action, yeah? So now we have two agents, and with two agents and two actions, there's also a different location. So the whole thing becomes double by asserting that the girl is a walker, that she is a walker. Then how about just going the other way and saying that she's the girl? She can walk sometimes, but she doesn't have to do so always. Sometimes she becomes a walker, and that's because of associating with this, of performing this action. But in herself, in and of herself, she is not a walker. How about that? Then if the one who walks is in and of herself not a walker, then what is she?
If the one who performs the act of walking is in and of herself as she is, not a walker, then how can we rightly say that she walks?
Who is the girl then?
We have already said that in relation to the act of walking, she is not a walker. How about all the other things that we would like to say that she can do? She can do many things. She can sing, she can dance, she can read a book, she can talk about things, swim. But all of those things are not, she is not the singer, she is not the dancer, she is not the swimmer.
So that is the consequence of saying that, taking the alternative option, that the one who walks is not a walker in and of herself.
So the problem with saying that the walker is a walker, that the girl who walks there is naturally and intrinsically a walker, is that in this way we end up with two actions. The one that is her intrinsic property and then the act that she performs. The first action is the one that makes her what she is. And then as such an agent she performs. So there are two actions. If there are two actions, there are also two agents. And then the alternative is that she is not a walker and then she is intrinsically disengaged from walking. Then how could she ever walk anywhere? And finally, other than goers and non-goers, what third party could be going? What other options are there? Either the walker is a walker or she is not a walker. "When in the absence of going, a goer does not make sense, the statement going is engaged in by the one who goes. How could that possibly make sense?"
So now here we look at "the girl walks on the path."
The commentary says that now we are zooming in for a couple of verses on goers or walkers to see more clearly that walkers are not those who walk, which would otherwise probably be our first suggestion, no? So how do we get at that understanding that a walker couldn't be the agent of walking? Well, we can do the same operation that we did with respect to the action and the place. So now we can say, okay, the girl walks on the path. Let's say that walks is the word that picks out the action. The verb is the carrier of the meaning of the action. Then now the agent has no action left for him or her, itself because we have assigned the verb to be the carrier of the meaning of that action. So now the agent is inactive. So that's the problem if we.. "When in the absence of going, a goer does not make sense, then the statement going is engaged in by the one who goes, how could that possibly make sense?"
Since it's not possible for someone who isn't a walker to be walking, then how can we make sense of going is engaged in by the one who goes, walking is engaged in by the one who walks. Once we assign the verb, once we connect the verb and the action, then we end up with a non-walker being the walker. So how could that make sense? And then we have the opposite to clarify. "For those who hold that going is engaged in by the one who goes, it would then follow that there is one who goes in the absence of going, for it is asserted that going is performed by the one who goes." So if there's, if we go the other way and say walking is intrinsically associated with the agent, then that agent of going is always a walker, regardless of whether, regardless of whether, let's say.. if we associate the agent with the action and say, walker is, or the girl is, what in this sentence carries the meaning of walking, then that agent is intrinsically engaged in walking. And so also when not engaged in walking, would still be walking. So if the walker, if the girl is by nature a walker, then also when she sits down to have a cup of tea, she still walks.
And the alternative is that we don't associate walking with the girl and then she never walks. So either she walks forever or she never does.
Was there a question on, yeah, there's an online something.
"Online, John?"
"John, can you unmute?"
Student: "Yes, I was wondering about the girl that walks on the path well trodden, then needs to walk on the path not taken." Sorry? "The girl that walks on the well-trodden path then walks on the path not taken." She walks on the path taken? "Not taken. Not taken. I'm sorry, not taken." Okay.
How do you mean that? "I was just wondering, you know, as I was thinking about that as evidence of this agent that is associated with walking intentionally even, she was walking on the path well trodden and she took the path not taken."
So like everything just happens unintentionally or? "No, maybe intentionally, who knows. But there's certainly different paths." Yeah, that comes a little later. Someone will say exactly that. There's going because there are certainly paths. Maybe we should look at that. But thank you.
And then of course we could say, as we also tried with the action and the place, that why don't we just say that there is some kind of walking that makes the walker a walker and then there's the other aspect of walking which is the action itself. But what was the problem with that? It was that then we are splitting walking in two and then we have two actions. That means that there also has to be two agents. "If going is engaged in by the one who goes, it follows that there are two acts of going. One that characterizes the one who goes," that's the one that makes the agent a walker, the mark of the agent, that walking. And then there's what the agent as such can then perform that walking. So then there are two. The mark of the agent plus the action that he or she performs. And then we can no longer say that there's just one agent. There has to be two as well.
Yeah, so think now also at home, yeah, is is this altogether right, what we are saying here? Or is there some sort of trick going on?
That makes us confused. There may be some simple answer, no? Then we just get blinded by these strange words and strange questions. Try to zoom in and again like try to think and notice how you feel yourself, how you think yourself about this. That is by far the most satisfying way to go about it without thinking that, "okay, let me just say now I get it and then move on." Of course we can do that and that's what we are used to from so many learning contexts and it's usually relatively okay to do that, no? But in this case it's kind of defeating the purpose, if we say, yeah, I think I know this Mādhyamaka philosophy.
Defeats the purpose and as also Nāgārjuna is going to say later on this then it
it can become a kind of incurable condition because then we are.. yeah, like we are exposed to the remedy but don't really engage with it, yeah? Like with the medicine. Yeah.
Student: "I want to just go back to a question that you asked about what if this does, I forget exactly the words that you used but it was something along the lines of if this does make sense what would take it to the.. the way that I understood it is what would make it really transformative? And I think just like in listening to this discussion it feels, I wouldn't say that feels clear or like I got something but there's, I think actually through the course of all these classes there's this like what feels like it's a dawning sense that like trying to pick anything out or point at anything always results in pointing at something else so that I can't find anything to actually grasp or yeah I can't find anything to grasp. But I guess what I'm feeling from that with the question of what would allow this to be genuinely liberating is to try and point that back to myself or to take it to heart but in the sense of myself or what I consider myself to be is the thing that I'm always fixated on. Like walking.. it's like I can, it's like everything always comes back to this but if when I try and point this out I can't, then maybe." Yeah, I think that sounds like a very, I mean that's the view of the great vehicle no? I mean no, whatever we see when we try to grasp there's nothing to grasp at.
So yeah, no? I mean what else? So in a way what are you missing? Student: "Actually I think like what I'm.. it's interesting because like the last few hours I've been feeling myself as a burden, not as like I hate myself, but I have all the habits that are connoted to being a self feel burdensome. And I think that's made it a little bit more possible to feel like, it's not to let go but like this discussion has made, it feels like it's speaking to that burdensome and freeing it. And I think like it doesn't feel terrifying, it feels like it's answering this perpetual state of journey."
Yeah, thank you.
So if self and feeling that one is a sort of burden to oneself The self is also what we think of as one very important agent now is myself. So I couldn't be intrinsically any of the things that I do and I couldn't be intrinsically anything else than the things that I do. So just simple understanding of this kind is in terms of understanding. It's hard to think that there's much more to understand. That doesn't mean that we are enlightened or anything like that, no? But just if we try to think, so what else would I need to understand? Does this make sense? So that is I think one of the really amazing features of this text, that just spending a few days studying it, that can deliver such profound knowledge, profound insight, so that we can say, I mean, it doesn't mean that now we are great sages or anything like that. But on the other hand, if we can sort of ask ourselves, what more could there be to understand? And it's hard to come up with a question. Then that's noteworthy, that's something to write in one's diary, that among all the projects I have in my life, today I think I actually understood, I have achieved an understanding that I don't think can be improved. That is flawless.
That is definitely something to write down, no?
And then another thing I thought is good to also notice at this point is then that this understanding of, or just this recognition that whenever, like you said, whenever I try to grasp, there's nothing to grasp at, that's really extraordinary, no? Because we think there are so many things to grasp at, but when I try to grasp, I realize there's nothing to grasp at. So that very failure to find something to grasp at is not, it's certainly not a kind of..
it's not an inert, vacuous state at all, no? Because the very fact that we fail to find something to grasp at, what was I going to say?
Yeah, well, we could say that we fail to find something to grasp at, then to begin to focus on that as something to grasp at would be also absurd, no? It would be the opposite of taking to heart, as you said, what we just understood, no? If we think, "okay, there's nothing to grasp at so.." that clearly couldn't be the message, So.. in a way..
what we do then, what we do with this kind of understanding becomes, there's a sense in which we can see that what we then do now has much greater impact than what we're used to, what we're used to thinking. Because we're used to thinking that I'm here, I'm just whoever, and I can do certain things and that's the world, and I'm just one among such and such, no? I have limited power and also I'm somehow protected by my limitation, yeah? So what I think is not that important because it's just what I think, yeah? But when we realize that, as you said, whatever we look at, there's no basis, there's nothing to grasp at, then all of those structures that we otherwise take for given and affirm aren't real structures, no? At the same time, as we started out at the very beginning, it's undeniable, it would be really bizarre to say just "nothing ever occurs," just like that, it doesn't really cover all of this to say that, no? So if on the other hand there are no..
real structures that all of this ultimately depend on, then my thoughts now, what I do, my perceptions, every little thing matters extremely much, because this is then what shapes. It's not that I make the world, of course not, no? But all the things that go on in me, all the things that I do, they have incredible impact, no? I don't know, try and think about it and see if it makes sense, no? We can talk about it tomorrow, time is running out, but if there are no real ultimate structures that limit and determine, restrict any of this, then whatever happens, whatever I do, whatever we decide to do together, has ultimately infinite implications, no?
And that is actually the Buddhist teaching also, no? That it sounds, when we hear it about karma, that the karma of body and speech and of mind, and that every little thing that we think and every little perception that we do when we respond to it has some kind of implication for how the future is shaped, it sounds a little much, a little exaggerated. But when, with the help of this kind of perspective, where we can really discover the groundlessness of the conventions, which doesn't mean the end of convention obviously, which doesn't mean the end of experience, then I think there's a way of getting a whole new sense of the truth and the profundity of those instructions, that say, be careful with your, I mean I'm speaking to myself, we can do so much in many different directions, much more than what we usually think. Okay, so with this advice to myself, let's end for today and then we can meet again tomorrow. Thank you all very much.
"That which originates dependently, does not cease and does not arise, is not annihilated and is not permanent, does not come and does not go, is not different and not the same. To the true teacher who reveals this peace, the complete pacification of constructs, to the perfect Buddha I bow down."
So this analysis of the action of going and the place of going that we went through yesterday, is there someone who can sort of present what's going on there in a compelling fashion?
Anybody like to give it a go?
Maybe for the rest, we should make this drawer here. It's nice to hear what people have to say, you know? I understand if you don't want to like... But okay, is there anyone then who has problems with it?
Like, where is it that you feel it's... Where is it that you feel it's... The wheels aren't really connecting in the machinery.
Yeah.
Student: "I just had one breakthrough. Thanks to discussing with my friends. Because I was quite hung up on that, you know, walking as in like the grammatical tense of a continuous action and I felt like, were we really authentically investigating it if it's happening over a period of time, but we're always looking at one moment. And you know, I was thinking like when you're in the middle of walking, you're still... You know, you can't examine it like that. Because that's not walking by itself, you have to look at them all together. But then I found out like, that's kind of the whole point. Like if you freeze frame a movie, the reality is that there isn't somebody walking, there's just stills." Is that continuous? "No." Never, yeah? "Yeah. "But that... I don't know, I couldn't get that until yesterday."
Yeah. "I mean, is it right?" Yeah, that sounds right.
I mean, in a way, it's like they say that you have a bundle of straw and you pull one and then they all fall apart, yeah? So like once you begin to see, or once we begin to see... I was going to say what's going on or how this works, yeah? But it's also like the absence of seeing something that is actually going on, no? Then anything is evidence of... is proof of emptiness, yeah?
So that's also interesting in itself, no? Like first we work hard to get one proof together, but then because it's true, and because it's a universally applicable insight, then it can be confirmed by anything, which is also... That itself is also a challenge, yeah? Like, okay, then what are we proving if anything is proof? Yeah? Like that's one way of criticizing this whole project also, is to say that if there's nothing that is not emptiness, then where do we begin and where do we end, and what is it at all that you're trying to do, no? So that kind of critique can be levelled against
anyone who says that we have proofs of emptiness and so on, yeah? So what would you by now think about that kind of critique? What we're proving is...
we could say whenever we examine what appears to be there, our conventions and so on, then we find that they are completely baseless, yeah? There's zero contact with anything real. So if that's the case with all of our conventions, then what are we actually doing? How can we tell ourselves that we are proving anything and that we are achieving anything? Do you see what I'm trying to say? Student: "Aren't we just like.." Then also, that's the classic objection. If all things are empty, then also the argument is empty, that's the beginning of the treatise, no? Someone says, so how can you get anywhere with this? And if your argument is not empty, then there are things that aren't empty, so what do you mean? That's the beginning of the Vigrahavyāvartanī treatise. Then the treatise follows to deal with that objection. But it's a very... what to say?
There's something profound there, in the objection. Student: "I mean, even if we just use the objections to increase our noticing of what's actually happening with our experience, then I don't know, that's how I would describe it to like a friend or something, not trying to prove emptiness, but just trying to see what's happening when we experience stuff."
To see what is happening. What do you think? Are we trying to see what is happening?
We are in a way, because we are investigating movement, but then in the light of what we find, can we say that we're trying to see what is happening?
Student: "Whether or not this helps or not, I have no idea, but what I was saying yesterday about trying to test this argument by substituting other verbs.
So in a way, no matter what verb we put in, I think we end up at the same place. But then I guess my question is, why then this verb? Or why this? Why motion? And not seeing, and not picking up, or not?" Seeing comes right after, in Chapter 3, but we had arising, like production of things, and now it's movement. They're very, very basic sort of rudimentary principles that are required for just about anything. So I think that's why. That's also what the commentator says in the "Ornament of Reason," that these are like the sort of main, the absence of arising and cessation, and the absence of going and coming are like the primary features of dependent ordination.
"One from online, Santiago?"
Something I felt yesterday through the reasonings we were going through is the feeling that it was artificially separating the parts of the sentence, like, "Girl walks path." And it felt artificial to think of one isolated, because we think of the sentence as a whole, like "Girl walks path," it doesn't make sense separating. But then maybe the point of the separation is to analyze if it does make sense to talk about those elements in themselves, and we see it doesn't. Is it something like that in the direction we're going?" Yeah, I think that sounds...
Of course, there are many theories about what goes on when we hear a sentence and so on, but if we leave all that complex and deep philosophy aside, then I think there's a way to... Yeah, we speak about one sentence, no? And "the girl walks on the path," it does make sense to say that, yeah, that this is one sort of carrier of meaning, no? But it also does make sense to say that it consists of elements, that there are three parts in the sentence, because if I say "girl," or if I say "path," or if I say "walks," we have something quite different in mind, no?
So that's then what we were trying to see, what really does this sentence mean, no? We have a clear feeling that something is conveyed, meaningful, when we say "the girl walks on the path." It's not a question whether this sentence is meaningful, no? And we all will agree readily that we get what the point is now, if we speak the language which the speaker speaks, then there's no issue. But then what is it that we mean? What is it that we understand when we hear that sentence? That's what we were beginning to look at, yeah? And then of course.. we often have the feeling that there's something we understand roughly, and then it helps to sort of be more precise, no? And zoom in on the different parts in the picture, to really be able to appreciate what's there, no? So then, but that's what we do, no? We say, okay, that was the sentence, and I feel it means something, but let me see what is it really about? It's about a girl, and she walks on a path, yeah? And then we said, okay, yeah, walks, that's a kind of action, and walks is a verb. So that's probably what it must be, the verb that refers to the action that is being carried out there walking, yeah?
But then we were saying that there's only one kind of walking, no? We're not talking about the girl walks various walks. I mean, if we did that, that would mean that she does like one style of walking after the other, no? It wouldn't mean that she simultaneously engages in several acts of walking, yeah? So there is just one act of walking that is expressed in our sentence, the girl walks on the path. And since that's the case, and since now we have said that the verb refers to that action, then where does she walk? She has to walk somewhere. If really the girl walks, her act has to take place somewhere, so it's required that there is some kind of locus of the action. And that's the path, of course, in that sentence. But what is the path? What do we mean when we say "the girl walks on the path?" Since we have assigned the verb to the action, then the path, the location where the action takes place, doesn't carry that sense, yeah? It's devoid of that sense. So what then happens, in other words, is that because we have said it's walks that refers to walking, which is a natural choice, no? Because we have done that, then the path is now some place which is not itself qualified by walking. So that perhaps sounds okay, because the path is just the path, yeah? And she's supposed to be walking there, and then it becomes a path of walking. But if the place where she walks has no association with walking, then the sentence which we're looking at is absurd, because it now says that the girl walks where there is no walking.
Right? Why is it we can't just say that it's the path, it's the path, and that's it, yeah? It should be okay now to have, like we talked about yesterday, stones and pebbles, and that's the path, and then there's someone walking there, no? But the path doesn't have to be about walking, does it?
What do you think?
Student: "I think a path is only meaningful when there is a walking taking place. So to me, it seems like in any given moment, like Pema said, that these three things that we're looking at, the subject, the agent, and the act, and the place of walking, if one of them, like for me, by verse one, we already said there's no current walking, and that seems pretty compelling to me. So if one of them is not there or is disproved, then the other two automatically collapse. So the gentleman yesterday was saying if you look at the subject and the object, if they're same or different, they're apparently not the same. I don't think we can say they're the same, but if we investigate if they're different, then they're also not completely different, because if there is no path, then it is not meaningful to talk about somebody who walks either. So it just seems to me these three things, they either, well, we cannot say they truly exist, I guess that's the point, but then we also cannot say that they are totally separate from each other, because one literally depends on the other. If there is no object, it doesn't, if there is no act, if there is no act of walking, it doesn't make sense to talk about a path. And if there is no act of walking, I mean an agent, what to say, like the agent is also meaningful when there is actually a doing. Right? We cannot say "agent" without somebody, without that agent doing something. So I just felt like these three are... they are so connected to each other, it's just impossible to talk about one thing out of the three. And if we can say that there is no current walking, then the other two are already dismissed or collapsed, what is the rest of the argument is trying to, like further prove something? What is…?" Yeah, so they can't be separated, and they can't be, at the same time, they can't be one and the same. That clearly is not the case either, no? So yeah, what you were saying, it takes us right into the number seven, which says, "If no existent, none existent, or both exist…" No, that's the different chapter. "If there's nothing that goes, going makes…" Is it that one? Yeah. "If there's nothing that goes, going makes no sense. In the absence of any going how could there be one who goes?" So this, according to the commentary, is about the way that the agent of going and the act of going are coextensive.
So until now we have basically looked at the action and the place where the action occurs. But of course there's also the girl who walks there on the path, no? So if the girl walks on the path, then the agent of walking, the girl, cannot be separate from the act of walking, in which case she would be someone who doesn't walk. And the act cannot be separate from the agent, because then there would be an action without anything that does it. It would be an empty action, no? Not performed by anything or anyone. So the agent and the action are inseparable.
So if there's nothing that goes, going makes no sense. If there isn't an agent of going, then there cannot be any going. And in the absence of going, how could there be anyone who goes? The agent of going requires an action, and the action requires an agent completely. So how do we actually succeed in making the distinction when we talk about the girl walks on the path, no? What do we think when we say that?
Any suggestion? Like I've used those sentences a lot, yeah? I walk to the coffee shop. So did I always mean that I and walking are completely inseparable? How did we make sense of sentences like that, no? Any suggestion?
If it makes sense to say that without someone who walks, there cannot be walking, and if there cannot be walking without someone who walks, then what is the basis for drawing a distinction between the agent and the action? What would you say?
Student: "It's only compelling without examining. Otherwise, we cannot say anything anymore. I've described something in a relative sense, and that's how I say I walk to school. But it cannot withstand some exam. It cannot withstand any known exam." But did we then never know what we meant when we said?
Or do we still know what we mean? What do you think? Any kind of input is welcome, yeah? There's no right answer to this, obviously, no? And no wrong answer?
Student: "We were talking about non-existent things. Because we were talking about a self that is continuous, sometimes walks, sometimes doesn't walk. So the whole sentence is built on things that actually don't exist. The walking doesn't exist as an enduring and progressing thing. The I also doesn't exist as an enduring thing that sometimes walks, sometimes doesn't. It's pretty much built on things that are not there."
Thank you.
Student: "It's built on something that doesn't exist, as Luis said, but it also feels extremely real. I mean, if we don't talk about walking, let's talk about stomach ache or headache or coughing. Yeah, it's just, you know, "I am sick," right? I mean physically, say. It's not not there, but it's also not correct to say that. I just feel that there's something very real about our world, like it's not, you know, pain is really real. Feels like that something is there."
Yeah, so it's easy to understand why people have come up with this idea with two truths, no? And the Buddha has taught about two truths, no? Because this seems to be sort of a perspective we are forced into. We have to say one thing about what we understand when we try to be reasonable and rational, and then something else when we don't apply this kind of analysis seems to require acknowledgement, yeah?
But it's clear that those two can't be altogether separate either, no? That would be yet another absurdity, no? There would be no connection between the two realities at all. Then there wouldn't be, why would we call them two realities? It would just, yeah, there would be no connection there, no? So there would just be chaos actually, no? Another version of this randomness if reality and two kinds of reality would sort of occur without any connection between them, no? There has to be a very profound connection. Like typically they would say that the ultimate truth is the nature of the conventional.
So the appearance of a difference will have to be pretty much an appearance, no?
Okay. Then the text continued. So again we can try to think about this question of what, now we're in a certain situation, we have a certain understanding, right now something is going on in our minds that we think is our current understanding. What might be the difference between this kind of understanding and the understanding that makes us get it for good, so to speak, that like, that makes us really see emptiness? What would be the difference? And anybody short? We can talk about that. Or we can proceed to eight, yeah? "One who goes does not go." So this is again now the agent we're looking at, the agent of walking, yeah? "One who goes does not go, nor does one who does not go. Other than goers and non-goers, what third party could be going?" Is there anyone who would give it a go to explain what is happening there? You can probably get quite a bit of it already. So now we're looking at the agent
who is supposed to be the one who walks, yeah?
But who is this agent of walking really, yeah? The agent of walking cannot be someone who walks, yeah? Because then the agent is himself or herself, itself qualified by walking, yeah? And then the act of walking will have to be a second kind, yeah? There will be two actions. If the walker is intrinsically someone who walks, then the walking performed by that agent will have to be a second kind of walking. So now we have two actions, and that's deeply problematic because if we have two actions, there has to be two agents also. So we started out with one agent, but now we have two. That comes at a consequence of saying that the agent of walking is someone who walks,

So what is it that walks? It's a walker, someone who is intrinsically associated with walking.
If that's the case, then what is the walking that, or let's put it even stronger, the walker is intrinsically walking. If there's that kind of identity between the act of walking and the agent, then what is the walking? It also ties in very nicely with what we just looked at in the notes before, that the two are coextensive, so we can't really separate them, no? So now we're trying to look at the agents separately nonetheless because the girl is the one who walks there on the path, yeah? So what is that girl? Is she a walker or is she a non-walker or some different entity, third order? So she couldn't be a walker by nature, because then she would be the nature of walking, and then her walking, which is supposed to be an action that she performs,
her walking would be a second kind of walking. And so we have two actions, two actions. Whenever there's an action, there's something that does that action, yeah? So now we have two agents, and with two agents and two actions, there's also a different location. So the whole thing becomes double by asserting that the girl is a walker, that she is a walker. Then how about just going the other way and saying that she's the girl? She can walk sometimes, but she doesn't have to do so always. Sometimes she becomes a walker, and that's because of associating with this, of performing this action. But in herself, in and of herself, she is not a walker. How about that? Then if the one who walks is in and of herself not a walker, then what is she?
If the one who performs the act of walking is in and of herself as she is, not a walker, then how can we rightly say that she walks?
Who is the girl then?
We have already said that in relation to the act of walking, she is not a walker. How about all the other things that we would like to say that she can do? She can do many things. She can sing, she can dance, she can read a book, she can talk about things, swim. But all of those things are not, she is not the singer, she is not the dancer, she is not the swimmer.
So that is the consequence of saying that, taking the alternative option, that the one who walks is not a walker in and of herself.
So the problem with saying that the walker is a walker, that the girl who walks there is naturally and intrinsically a walker, is that in this way we end up with two actions. The one that is her intrinsic property and then the act that she performs. The first action is the one that makes her what she is. And then as such an agent she performs. So there are two actions. If there are two actions, there are also two agents. And then the alternative is that she is not a walker and then she is intrinsically disengaged from walking. Then how could she ever walk anywhere? And finally, other than goers and non-goers, what third party could be going? What other options are there? Either the walker is a walker or she is not a walker. "When in the absence of going, a goer does not make sense, the statement going is engaged in by the one who goes. How could that possibly make sense?"
So now here we look at "the girl walks on the path."
The commentary says that now we are zooming in for a couple of verses on goers or walkers to see more clearly that walkers are not those who walk, which would otherwise probably be our first suggestion, no? So how do we get at that understanding that a walker couldn't be the agent of walking? Well, we can do the same operation that we did with respect to the action and the place. So now we can say, okay, the girl walks on the path. Let's say that walks is the word that picks out the action. The verb is the carrier of the meaning of the action. Then now the agent has no action left for him or her, itself because we have assigned the verb to be the carrier of the meaning of that action. So now the agent is inactive. So that's the problem if we.. "When in the absence of going, a goer does not make sense, then the statement going is engaged in by the one who goes, how could that possibly make sense?"
Since it's not possible for someone who isn't a walker to be walking, then how can we make sense of going is engaged in by the one who goes, walking is engaged in by the one who walks. Once we assign the verb, once we connect the verb and the action, then we end up with a non-walker being the walker. So how could that make sense? And then we have the opposite to clarify. "For those who hold that going is engaged in by the one who goes, it would then follow that there is one who goes in the absence of going, for it is asserted that going is performed by the one who goes." So if there's, if we go the other way and say walking is intrinsically associated with the agent, then that agent of going is always a walker, regardless of whether, regardless of whether, let's say.. if we associate the agent with the action and say, walker is, or the girl is, what in this sentence carries the meaning of walking, then that agent is intrinsically engaged in walking. And so also when not engaged in walking, would still be walking. So if the walker, if the girl is by nature a walker, then also when she sits down to have a cup of tea, she still walks.
And the alternative is that we don't associate walking with the girl and then she never walks. So either she walks forever or she never does.
Was there a question on, yeah, there's an online something.
"Online, John?"
"John, can you unmute?"
Student: "Yes, I was wondering about the girl that walks on the path well trodden, then needs to walk on the path not taken." Sorry? "The girl that walks on the well-trodden path then walks on the path not taken." She walks on the path taken? "Not taken. Not taken. I'm sorry, not taken." Okay.
How do you mean that? "I was just wondering, you know, as I was thinking about that as evidence of this agent that is associated with walking intentionally even, she was walking on the path well trodden and she took the path not taken."
So like everything just happens unintentionally or? "No, maybe intentionally, who knows. But there's certainly different paths." Yeah, that comes a little later. Someone will say exactly that. There's going because there are certainly paths. Maybe we should look at that. But thank you.
And then of course we could say, as we also tried with the action and the place, that why don't we just say that there is some kind of walking that makes the walker a walker and then there's the other aspect of walking which is the action itself. But what was the problem with that? It was that then we are splitting walking in two and then we have two actions. That means that there also has to be two agents. "If going is engaged in by the one who goes, it follows that there are two acts of going. One that characterizes the one who goes," that's the one that makes the agent a walker, the mark of the agent, that walking. And then there's what the agent as such can then perform that walking. So then there are two. The mark of the agent plus the action that he or she performs. And then we can no longer say that there's just one agent. There has to be two as well.
Yeah, so think now also at home, yeah, is is this altogether right, what we are saying here? Or is there some sort of trick going on?
That makes us confused. There may be some simple answer, no? Then we just get blinded by these strange words and strange questions. Try to zoom in and again like try to think and notice how you feel yourself, how you think yourself about this. That is by far the most satisfying way to go about it without thinking that, "okay, let me just say now I get it and then move on." Of course we can do that and that's what we are used to from so many learning contexts and it's usually relatively okay to do that, no? But in this case it's kind of defeating the purpose, if we say, yeah, I think I know this Mādhyamaka philosophy.
Defeats the purpose and as also Nāgārjuna is going to say later on this then it
it can become a kind of incurable condition because then we are.. yeah, like we are exposed to the remedy but don't really engage with it, yeah? Like with the medicine. Yeah.
Student: "I want to just go back to a question that you asked about what if this does, I forget exactly the words that you used but it was something along the lines of if this does make sense what would take it to the.. the way that I understood it is what would make it really transformative? And I think just like in listening to this discussion it feels, I wouldn't say that feels clear or like I got something but there's, I think actually through the course of all these classes there's this like what feels like it's a dawning sense that like trying to pick anything out or point at anything always results in pointing at something else so that I can't find anything to actually grasp or yeah I can't find anything to grasp. But I guess what I'm feeling from that with the question of what would allow this to be genuinely liberating is to try and point that back to myself or to take it to heart but in the sense of myself or what I consider myself to be is the thing that I'm always fixated on. Like walking.. it's like I can, it's like everything always comes back to this but if when I try and point this out I can't, then maybe." Yeah, I think that sounds like a very, I mean that's the view of the great vehicle no? I mean no, whatever we see when we try to grasp there's nothing to grasp at.
So yeah, no? I mean what else? So in a way what are you missing? Student: "Actually I think like what I'm.. it's interesting because like the last few hours I've been feeling myself as a burden, not as like I hate myself, but I have all the habits that are connoted to being a self feel burdensome. And I think that's made it a little bit more possible to feel like, it's not to let go but like this discussion has made, it feels like it's speaking to that burdensome and freeing it. And I think like it doesn't feel terrifying, it feels like it's answering this perpetual state of journey."
Yeah, thank you.
So if self and feeling that one is a sort of burden to oneself The self is also what we think of as one very important agent now is myself. So I couldn't be intrinsically any of the things that I do and I couldn't be intrinsically anything else than the things that I do. So just simple understanding of this kind is in terms of understanding. It's hard to think that there's much more to understand. That doesn't mean that we are enlightened or anything like that, no? But just if we try to think, so what else would I need to understand? Does this make sense? So that is I think one of the really amazing features of this text, that just spending a few days studying it, that can deliver such profound knowledge, profound insight, so that we can say, I mean, it doesn't mean that now we are great sages or anything like that. But on the other hand, if we can sort of ask ourselves, what more could there be to understand? And it's hard to come up with a question. Then that's noteworthy, that's something to write in one's diary, that among all the projects I have in my life, today I think I actually understood, I have achieved an understanding that I don't think can be improved. That is flawless.
That is definitely something to write down, no?
And then another thing I thought is good to also notice at this point is then that this understanding of, or just this recognition that whenever, like you said, whenever I try to grasp, there's nothing to grasp at, that's really extraordinary, no? Because we think there are so many things to grasp at, but when I try to grasp, I realize there's nothing to grasp at. So that very failure to find something to grasp at is not, it's certainly not a kind of..
it's not an inert, vacuous state at all, no? Because the very fact that we fail to find something to grasp at, what was I going to say?
Yeah, well, we could say that we fail to find something to grasp at, then to begin to focus on that as something to grasp at would be also absurd, no? It would be the opposite of taking to heart, as you said, what we just understood, no? If we think, "okay, there's nothing to grasp at so.." that clearly couldn't be the message, So.. in a way..
what we do then, what we do with this kind of understanding becomes, there's a sense in which we can see that what we then do now has much greater impact than what we're used to, what we're used to thinking. Because we're used to thinking that I'm here, I'm just whoever, and I can do certain things and that's the world, and I'm just one among such and such, no? I have limited power and also I'm somehow protected by my limitation, yeah? So what I think is not that important because it's just what I think, yeah? But when we realize that, as you said, whatever we look at, there's no basis, there's nothing to grasp at, then all of those structures that we otherwise take for given and affirm aren't real structures, no? At the same time, as we started out at the very beginning, it's undeniable, it would be really bizarre to say just "nothing ever occurs," just like that, it doesn't really cover all of this to say that, no? So if on the other hand there are no..
real structures that all of this ultimately depend on, then my thoughts now, what I do, my perceptions, every little thing matters extremely much, because this is then what shapes. It's not that I make the world, of course not, no? But all the things that go on in me, all the things that I do, they have incredible impact, no? I don't know, try and think about it and see if it makes sense, no? We can talk about it tomorrow, time is running out, but if there are no real ultimate structures that limit and determine, restrict any of this, then whatever happens, whatever I do, whatever we decide to do together, has ultimately infinite implications, no?
And that is actually the Buddhist teaching also, no? That it sounds, when we hear it about karma, that the karma of body and speech and of mind, and that every little thing that we think and every little perception that we do when we respond to it has some kind of implication for how the future is shaped, it sounds a little much, a little exaggerated. But when, with the help of this kind of perspective, where we can really discover the groundlessness of the conventions, which doesn't mean the end of convention obviously, which doesn't mean the end of experience, then I think there's a way of getting a whole new sense of the truth and the profundity of those instructions, that say, be careful with your, I mean I'm speaking to myself, we can do so much in many different directions, much more than what we usually think. Okay, so with this advice to myself, let's end for today and then we can meet again tomorrow. Thank you all very much.
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