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Root of The Middle Way – Session 13
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- Buddhist Classics and Philosophy
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- Rangjung Yeshe Institute - Nepal
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Excerpt
Session 13 delves into whether an effect exists within the gathering of causes and conditions. This leads to uncertainty about cause, effect, and non-cause distinctions.
Description
Session 13 begins with a deep exploration of dependent origination, questioning fundamental concepts like arising, cessation, and more. Observed conditions are scrutinized, raising doubts about perception’s nature without them. Simultaneous cause and effect are challenged, prompting discussions about perception as an illusion. Abhidharmic conditions, including the “immediately preceding condition” and the “ruling condition,” are dissected. Questions arise about whether a moment’s cessation can condition the next. The absence of inherent nature in things is examined through dependent origination.
Related Course Info
- Root of the Middle Way – Mūlamadhyamakakārikā A course on Nagarjuna’s brilliantly sharp reasoning, taught by Dr. Thomas Doctor at the Rangjung Yeshe Institute over a month. For everyone with an interest in the way things really are.
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"That which originates
dependently
does not cease and does
not arise,
is not annigilated and is not permanent,
does not come and does not go
is not different and the not the same.
To the true teacher who
reveals this peace,
The complete
pacification of constructs,
to the perfect Buddha I bow down."
So we ended with the stanza number 8, right?
Which was about the observed condition.
The idea that there is something that can present itself to the mind such that a moment of consciousness, a moment of cognition arises based on that.
So...
It is perhaps difficult to imagine
the world without that sort of structure, no? Unless there is something in the world that can be noticed in perception. Like... Yeah, any visual form for the moment of visual perception. Something must be there to be seen for us to have a moment of seeing. And the same with the other senses. Is it possible to think of perception, experience, without this sort of structure? What do you think? Like I sit here and look out in the class I think there is something there to see. You are there that I can see and it's because you are there that I can see you.
But is it possible to think of this experience in another way which is not then dependent on observed conditions? It will probably, if anyone has comments, you are welcome. Otherwise it would seem that it is possible to experience differently because arguably that's what we do. Yeah, okay.
Student: "Thanks, Thomas. I'm not sure if I will be clear what I'm trying to say. But I think at this point it seems to... I'm okay to accept that, for instance, if I see that flower, momentarily it changes. So I cannot say it always existed in a way that it doesn't change. However, when I think about this momentariness, in a very small moment, in a split second, it seems still in that moment the perception of that flower is caused by something, by that mental object. But then it yes, and then it stays and then it ceases and then it rises again. So this continuity of momentariness, it seems to be... I'm not convinced that it's not there, this continuity of momentariness." Right. So here we are simply looking at that moment you talked about, the one moment of seeing a flower that seems like there's something
that is responsible for my experience as an observed condition. I mean it's a pretty good term, it's very intuitive. There's a condition for my perception and I perceive it, and so I have this visual perception, for example. But maybe that is not the case because..
it is explained that with existent phenomena there are no observations whatsoever. So when I have this moment of seeing something like the camera say in front of me, there's this moment when I see the camera. But at the time when that experience is already there, when the perception is present, and after all that's what I'm trying to talk about. I'm trying to talk about a moment of witnessing, perceiving an object. At that moment when it's present, then how can I say that there's something that conditions it? It's already there, no? When an effect is present, then that which produces the effect will have done its job, no?
Otherwise we can't really say that this is cause and effect, no? If the condition's job must have been fulfilled entirely when the real effect is there, is fully present, then how could the condition still play a role? If the condition still has a role to play, it means that the effect is not yet fully manifest, no? And what I'm interested in here is a moment of perception as we have them all the time, no? So I'm not talking about something that is underway to becoming perception or anything like that, no? I'm talking about what we all know from experience and perception, a moment of seeing something. So when I see something like that, how can I say that there is something in the world that conditions, that is the condition for that experience? I can't, no? And on the other hand, when then the condition, let's say there is a condition in the world for, the camera is there and so I'm ready to perceive it, no? But at that time, on the other way around, how could a phenomenon for which there is no observation ever relate to an observation? So how could a moment of consciousness which does not have an observed condition be conditioned by an observed condition? And it seems to leave no option possible for this otherwise extremely natural and beyond plausible account that there are things in the world that serve as conditions for our perceptions, no?
When the perception is there, then how can I say that there is something that is its condition? And when the perception is not there, how can I say that there is something that is its condition? So when is the time for the observed condition to be that, to become an observed condition?
So what do you think? Student: "I guess my question is then what to do with this very seemingly natural and something that I've been so used to, habituated towards, it seems like I don't know what to do with it now.
Yeah, like if I have to come to this class, I have to gather conditions and come, you know? Otherwise, how do I even get to a classroom? So with that, it seems like I have nothing else to do but just to sort of come to peace and rest, just relax about it. I mean, what else can I do?" Yeah, but first of all, that's all very relevant, no? So that's if we think that this makes perfect sense, that actually there can't be observed conditions. Then what to do with that insight or whatever we should call it? That's of course the natural question. But before we get there, is there anyone who feels less convinced about this?
"Luis, do you want to unmute yourself and say something?"
Student: "Can you hear me, Thomas?" Yes, I can, thank you. "I can hear myself as well. Something that came to mind is the notion that the two might be simultaneous and condition each other being simultaneous in the way the example of the two reefs of reed that support each other. So they might be simultaneous, they might be conditioning not in the manner of cause and effect, but in the way of two, I think the word used there is reef or reed that support each other so they don't fall. And then another idea that came to mind is the idea that perception is imagination. So it's not seeing something that caused it but it's projecting something.
That's an idea coming from neuroscience nowadays for example, that perception is a prediction."
The first thing you said was, sorry, you said two things, yeah? Student: "The first one is mind and the object being simultaneous. And even being simultaneous, they condition each other's way of being. And the other one is the idea that perception is a prediction." Yes.
So two things that are each other's condition simultaneously. Like also an example they use is the beams, what are they called, in the roof that's beams, that support each other so that the roof stays a roof. So yeah, that is one is the condition for the support of the other.
But..just how much sense does that really make to say that,
like there is such a thing as a moment of perception, no? So there's a moment of seeing something. If there isn't that, then what is that, no? If there are no, if we can't say that at least there's such a thing as a moment of perception, no? So in that moment of perception, I see something, and so there's the visual perception. But if I say that the thing that I see is the cause of my visual perception, then doesn't that imply that there is some sort of, something has to happen, no? Otherwise I may say that there's the thing I see and then there's me seeing it, my moment, not me seeing it, but my moment of consciousness, whatever we want to say, yeah? If we say that there are those two things in the same moment, aren't we just talking about the same moment then? Aren't we just describing the same moment in different ways? There's the thing that I see and then that's whatever we want to,
however gestures we want to make to sort of show that I see something, yeah? That there's this seeing, many people can get a lot of time, spend a lot of time trying to formulate what that feels like, is like and so on, yeah? Consciousness. But if we say there are moments of perception, and moments of perception must have some content, no? That's why we call it a moment of perception. And then there must be the perceptual quality of it, so there must be some consciousness, something there as well, yeah? But if we're talking about the very same moment, aren't those two equally just ways of describing that moment? It's not really talking about a causal relationship, we're just sort of as if we were looking around in a house and saying, "yeah, there's this and there's that, you know, in the building." So in that building, our moment of consciousness, there are two elements that we can zoom in on, but it's all the same. It's not that one causes the other. If one causes the other, there has to be some sort of process, no? Cause means process, no? So we can call it mutually present cause and effect, but it's not a very satisfying concept, is it?
If cause and effect imply process, then simultaneous cause and effect does not make sense, no? And doesn't cause and effect imply process? Otherwise, what are we talking about? So that's what I would say about the first, and then about, we actually don't see anything, at least not anything of the sort that we think we see, which is common in neuroscience. Not to pretend that I have much understanding of that, but nonetheless, it is frequently explained that the whole structure of consciousness is by no means a reflection of reality, and in fact, completely contrary to the nature of reality.
So in that case, then I guess we can ask the same. So if that is the case, if there's something that, whether we say it's the brain or any other substrate, it could be many, it could be physical, mental, who knows what substrate, beyond the two of them that is somehow responsible, that is the projector or the source of my fantasies. So if that is the case, then also there are no observed conditions. So then in this case, I suppose the neuroscientist and others who have this idea of a substrate which is entirely beyond the fabric of perception, and yeah. That also makes it very difficult to say that we can actually intellectually understand that substrate if it really is utterly beyond the perception, but that's a side issue. But if that is the idea, then it's not possible to say that there are observed conditions. I would say no. Wouldn't you agree? If all of this is fantasy, then.. that doesn't leave any room for observed conditions, no? There's nothing then that causally structures my experience.
Somebody said something? So if that... So is it then the case that now we are in a situation where...
Yeah, we can give up the idea that there are actual things that are responsible for my perceptions? If so, then there are various ways that one can do that, which is what you were getting at. It's not obvious where we then go from there.
I suppose one way, one path that one could take is that which is evinced in these neuroscientific approaches, where there's some idea of profound illusion.
Profound illusion. But then, if this is profound illusion, it's a good question whether we then rightly... What we can rightly say about the substrate that is responsible for this illusion, no? This is something that we can keep as a question on the burner as we proceed, no? If really all of this is hallucination, which is... I think one way of understanding neuroscientific perspectives, we hallucinate, then there's maybe some usefulness of it or whatever. But some are very... Of course there's no unified perspective of cognitive science either, but some go very far in this declaration of the whole realm of perception as being wholly illusory or just sheer hallucination.
And suddenly when we apply an analysis of the kind that we have here, then perhaps it does seem like all of this is hallucination. And then if all of this, the objects that I see and my own perception of it, is something that cannot be explained in terms of causality, then perhaps there's something suspect about appealing to a sense of a substrate that is beyond. Where are we licensed to designate the existence of such a substrate? Think about it now. What we're saying is that there's nothing that... That my sense of there being things that present themselves to my perceptions, such that I can have moments of perception, if that is a baseless notion that I have, then what could be the basis for me subsequently saying that there's some transcendent substrate that is the source of these perceptions? So I think this is something if we ever get there, then in chapter three, which is about perception, then it's something that we will have an opportunity to really zoom in on the relation between the seen and the seer, the process of seeing. I think it's a very... satisfying and rewarding approach to take to these kinds of analysis, to apply it to live perception. This is also what we will see in the next chapter, where the topic is movement, and not just movement as a conceptual structure, but movement as we know it from experience. So here in this chapter on conditions.. because there is this thing with cause and effect that makes it cause and effect related, but also occurring at different times, we are a little bit more abstract in this initial chapter than in the subsequent two, because we're talking about two principles, conditions and their effects, which necessarily aren't simultaneous. So we are a bit more.. the perspective is slightly more abstract than what it will be when concerned with present movement and with present seeing and so on. But here we get a taste of it anyway, in verse eight. Then there's this notion of an immediately preceding condition for consciousness, which is the moment that was there before, the moment of mind that was there before, having to have ceased. So that is one of these four Abhidharmic conditions, which is meant to be an exhaustive summary of all possible conditions. So just like the observed condition, the immediately preceding condition is something that only occurs with consciousness, with moments of mind. And in critique of that principle, then the verse number nine says, "If phenomena have not arisen, cessation makes no sense, hence an immediately preceding condition is untenable. If it has ceased, how could it be a condition?" So the idea is, as we just said, that there is my moment of, again, let's say visual perception now. I see the camera in this moment, but then for me to see the next moment of camera, which will be a little different from the one I had otherwise just now, my present moment of seeing has to cease.
And that itself, that cessation of the perception that was there before, is a condition. Without that, the next moment cannot occur. It's also very plausible and makes good sense. If we talk about a unique moment of experience, then because it's unique and it's a unique moment, then in other words the moment that was there just before must be over before this unique moment can happen. Agree? Unless that has ceased, then there's no chance for that to happen, this unique perception.
But if phenomena have not arisen, so meaning again the phenomena are the factors of cognition, the moment of perception, for example, the moment of visual perception, for example, if that has not yet arisen, then it makes no sense to say that the moment that was there before has ceased. In other words, if my moment of looking at this petal, let's say, of course it is typically in Abhidharma, these moments are very short, and so when I look here I see an object I think that is ongoing, but in fact the perception of an enduring object is something that is imputed on the basis of moments, so very short moments. When I look here I think maybe I can call it a moment of seeing a flower. Abhidharma also has room for that, a moment of seeing a flower, and that can take some time, but there's also this notion of very short, extremely short moments that are like a string, a string of moments one after the other. So if my moment of looking at this petal has not yet, or let's say like this, first I look at this petal here to the left, and then I move slightly to the right and look at another petal. If the moment of looking at the petal to the left is not over yet, then of course the subsequent moment of just for the sake of being able to distinguish them more easily, looking at the next petal, cannot have arisen yet. So if, in other words, the second moment has not yet arisen, it doesn't make sense to say that the original moment of looking at the left petal is over. Very simple. It sounds a little convoluted, but the idea is very, very simple, no?
So therefore it does not make sense to say that the cessation of that moment conditions or creates or contributes to the manifestation of the second moment, no?
And on the other hand, if it has ceased, if that moment is over, then it is no more. And so something that doesn't exist and is gone, how could that serve as a condition for the arising of anything? So either we say that the moment is still there, and in that case it doesn't make sense to say that it has ceased and it's the cessation of it that conditions the arising of the next moment, because it's still there. And on the other hand, if it has ceased, then it's gone and is no more, and how could something that is nothing contribute to the manifestation of anything?
So that is about the immediately preceding condition. And then there's only one left, yeah? And that is the... What is it called now?
Ruling condition, yeah, thank you. The ruling condition, which is defined simply as any form of condition, which is not any of the first three that we have talked about, yeah? So the first was the causal condition, which is what we understand to be the main cause, like the seed in the case of the growth of the sprout, or the perceived... No, that would not be... Yeah, the object that is there to be seen also works as a cause for the production of a moment of consciousness. The next is the observed condition, which is something that then only is relevant to mental events. And there we talk about the percept itself, so to speak, distinguished in that way, which it makes good intuitive sense to say is something that effectuates our perception. And on the other hand we have seen that that actually doesn't make much sense, and perhaps talking about the percept is just another way of talking about the experience itself, the moment, and there's nothing causal about this at all. And then there was the immediately preceding condition that a moment of mind that was there before a given effect must have ceased if that given effect, another moment of mind, has to arise, yeah? So any kind of condition that is not any of these three is yet a condition, and yet something that contributes to the manifestation of the effect, is a ruling condition. So in the case of the seed, obvious things like rich soil, moisture, sunshine, and so on, and time, whatever else needs to be there for the seed to sprout. So all of these many different conditions that are as a whole referred to as the ruling condition, the way the text dismisses them is to say since there is no existence of things that have no nature, saying this occurs because of that would not make any sense. "This occurs because of that" is one of the most classic ways of describing dependent origination. It's the Buddha's own words for what dependent origination is. It's about being, it's precisely these sorts of relationship. You have something present, and by virtue of that being present, something else will come about. If that first thing is not there, the second thing will not be. This is how the Buddha speaks in the Sūtras also, to explain dependent origination, no? But things that have no nature don't exist, he says here. So it could not make any sense to say that this occurs because of that.
Yeah. Doesn't this sound a little too much to say that things that don't have any nature of their own don't exist? And therefore, this statement that because this is, that comes to be, because this exists, that will be, is nonsensical.
In the commentary there is some anticipation of an objection. Someone says that this is not really a good argument, what you're giving there, because it's actually not an argument at all, because if the person you are talking to already believes and understands that things have no nature, and therefore don't exist, then they already agree with the statement that you say. If they don't believe and understand why things have no nature of their own, then they will not accept the evidence that you produce to make your point. So why is it? So what the stanza claims is that the statement "This occurs because of that," is nonsensical. And why? Because things that have no nature don't exist. And so if someone already agrees that things do not exist by virtue of their own nature, then they also agree with this statement, so there's no point in telling it to somebody like that. And on the other hand, if we're talking to someone who does not believe it, then the very part of the argument that you rely on to be the proof or the evidence that leads to the conclusion will not be a valid proof or a valid evidence for someone like that, because that person doesn't accept that things such as this have no nature of their own. But then it is suggested that it still makes good sense to do this, because for someone who has not understood that things have no nature, then that point can be made by pointing to dependent origination,
by noticing how all of these things are dependent on things that are other than themselves, which again depend on other things and so on, infinitely, then it becomes clear that there's nothing that has a nature of its own. If all of this is what it is, in dependence on something else, which again is what it is only in dependence on something else and not by virtue of itself at all, and if that discovery can be made with respect to absolutely everything, so that there's no possible end to this search for a ground, then that's as much as saying that things have no nature of their own. If all what they are is thoroughly dependent on other things, which again are dependent on other things, that again are dependent on other things, again and again and again, infinitely so, without any even hope of finding a ground that can be the basis for this kind of dependent origination, then obviously nothing exists by virtue of itself. And so from that point of view, what really are we saying when we say that "this occurs because of that"? What is "this"? What is "that"?
So in this way there are four verses here, 7 to 10, that each deal with,
that together deal with each of the four conditions.
Then in 11, now we're talking about, again going back to the notion of whether the effect is present in the cause, but from a slightly different angle, it says "In separate conditions and in their gathering, the effect is entirely absent. How could something that does not exist in the conditions ever arise from them?
So now we're thinking not of just cause and effect, but of effect based on a whole matrix of causes and conditions, which we together call the conditions for the arising of the effect. And those conditions have to come together, they have to gather, assemble before we can have the effect occur. So let us try to look at whether it's possible for an effect to be present in such a set of conditions.
There's one effect we say, there's one sprout for example, that grew from a seed, from the moisture, from the rich soil, from the sunshine, from the openness of space and so on. But the effect is not present in those conditions individually. The sprout is definitely not present in the soil, it's not present in the sunshine and so on. If we were to say that it is, then we would have to be able to find it there, but we don't, we clearly don't find the effect in the individual conditions.
And if they are in their gathering, then what is the gathering apart from the individual causes? If we say that there is such a gathering, then we're still left with the same problem of having to be able to notice that the effect is present in the gathering of conditions. And we can't just say that the effect is the gathering of the conditions. That's what we found out already in the first stanza, no? We can't say that they're one and the same. So if we want to keep a notion of the gathering of causes and conditions having somehow the effect within them, then we'll have to say that there is a part of it, a part of these gathered causes and conditions that contains the effect. And then there's something else that doesn't. And then, in other words, now we say that the conditions are part the effect and part conditions. It's not very plausible, yeah?
So in this way, it becomes very difficult to say that the effect is present in the conditions. In fact, we find that it is entirely absent from it. When we look at matters in this way, the gathering of the conditions on an individual basis, we don't find the effect there at all. It's wholly absent. But how could something that does not exist in the conditions ever arise from them? So that's also what we have been considering before in the context of the first stanza.
If an effect is entirely absent in a purported set of conditions, then what makes that suggested set of conditions, 'conditions'? They're just as unrelated to the effect as anything else that we would readily agree are not conditions for the arising of that effect. So if the sprout is not present at all in the seed and in the soil and in the moisture, etc.
Then how can we say that the seed, the soil, the moisture, etc. are any different than stone, fire, whatever else we don't consider a condition for the growth of a sprout?
So in other words, cause and non-cause become equal. If we say that the effect is not present in the conditions, then we have no longer a way of identifying something as the condition for anything because what goes for the purported condition goes also for anything that we refer to as a non-cause.
So if without being present there it were still to arise from conditions, why would it not also arise from that which is not a condition? That is exactly the absurd consequence that comes from this idea that you can have distinct cause and effect. Effect and conditions exist and are different from each other. If that is the suggestion, then how can we make sense of our perception of causal relationships? Anything could then arise based on anything, if this were the case.
The effect may be of its condition's nature, but these conditions have no nature of their own. How could the effect of that which is not an entity itself be of the nature of that which conditions it?
So here we then go back to an idea of effects that are of the nature of the conditions, that there is something that ties them, that the effect is what it is by virtue of its conditions. So the causal power is somehow responsible for the manifestation of the effect.
But what we then refer to as responsible for the character of the effect are themselves things that don't have a nature of their own. That is what we just recognized by seeing that the soil and the moisture and so on also depends itself.. each of these elements depend on other things and ultimately are constructed based on other apparent entities, which again are in just the same way. So how could the effect of that which is not an entity itself, meaning the conditions, we have no grounds for saying that they exist as conditions, that there is something that makes them what they are on their own. Whatever they are is all due to something else, which again is due to something else and so on without any end. So how could the effect of that which is not an entity itself be of the nature of that which conditions it?
So since these conditions don't have a nature of itself, how can we allow ourselves to say that the effect is something that is the carrier of the nature of the conditions? So this chapter 13 is a way of defending the idea of real causal arising by saying that yes, there is real causal arising, because we have causal factors, conditions, which have a certain power, a certain character, a certain constitution, and it's that force or that power of the conditions that transfers and gives rise to the nature of the effect, such that when the effect is present, it is really the nature of the causes that is in there in the effect. But since the causes and conditions themselves have no identity, how could we say that there's something which has achieved identity by virtue of those?
Hence, the effect is not of the nature of its conditions, nor of the nature of that which are not its conditions. So at this point of conclusion, when we look at an effect, then we can now conclude that the effect is not a carrier of the nature of the causes that produced it, but it could not be the carrier of things that are not its causes either. So what kind of effect is that? It cannot feasibly be the carrier of its causes, nor can it be the carrier of what are not its causes, as there is no effect. How could they be conditions as well as non-conditions? So the whole framework of cause, effect, and that which is not cause, just a big question mark. So let's end there. And then tomorrow, try to go through the whole chapter here, and really think where you are at now with this. In two ways, think about intellectually how convincing or not has this been? And probably it is, if it is very convincing, then try to note down carefully why exactly it is so convincing. If it is not convincing at all, then of course you note that down also, but probably a lot of this is also zooming in on the grey zone, where it seems Yes, but... that is exactly where to throw the light of analysis and just observation very clearly. It is where we are in two minds. And so that is very important. That's probably the primary importance at this point, that you think exactly how much sense does this make to me?
Is each and every step in these lines of reason irrefutable? Try to set the bar, what should I say? Ask for much. Is it the case that the first chapter, the 'Analysis of Conditions' in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā presents lines of reason that are completely irrefutable? Or not?
Try and see if you.. tomorrow, does everyone agree that this is completely irrefutable? Let's see, you know? And if you are hesitant to say this, then why? It is maybe a good way of bringing out our sort of lingering doubts. If you say, can I stand up and say "This reasoning is utterly irrefutable," or not? And then if you don't feel confident to do that, then try to think what is it that makes you hesitate? And if you do feel that this is completely irrefutable, then try to think, as we tried also today, where does this then take us and what to say now on the basis of this? Okay, thank you and all the best. Tomorrow we can then begin with chapter two, I suppose.
So we ended with the stanza number 8, right?
Which was about the observed condition.
The idea that there is something that can present itself to the mind such that a moment of consciousness, a moment of cognition arises based on that.
So...
It is perhaps difficult to imagine
the world without that sort of structure, no? Unless there is something in the world that can be noticed in perception. Like... Yeah, any visual form for the moment of visual perception. Something must be there to be seen for us to have a moment of seeing. And the same with the other senses. Is it possible to think of perception, experience, without this sort of structure? What do you think? Like I sit here and look out in the class I think there is something there to see. You are there that I can see and it's because you are there that I can see you.
But is it possible to think of this experience in another way which is not then dependent on observed conditions? It will probably, if anyone has comments, you are welcome. Otherwise it would seem that it is possible to experience differently because arguably that's what we do. Yeah, okay.
Student: "Thanks, Thomas. I'm not sure if I will be clear what I'm trying to say. But I think at this point it seems to... I'm okay to accept that, for instance, if I see that flower, momentarily it changes. So I cannot say it always existed in a way that it doesn't change. However, when I think about this momentariness, in a very small moment, in a split second, it seems still in that moment the perception of that flower is caused by something, by that mental object. But then it yes, and then it stays and then it ceases and then it rises again. So this continuity of momentariness, it seems to be... I'm not convinced that it's not there, this continuity of momentariness." Right. So here we are simply looking at that moment you talked about, the one moment of seeing a flower that seems like there's something
that is responsible for my experience as an observed condition. I mean it's a pretty good term, it's very intuitive. There's a condition for my perception and I perceive it, and so I have this visual perception, for example. But maybe that is not the case because..
it is explained that with existent phenomena there are no observations whatsoever. So when I have this moment of seeing something like the camera say in front of me, there's this moment when I see the camera. But at the time when that experience is already there, when the perception is present, and after all that's what I'm trying to talk about. I'm trying to talk about a moment of witnessing, perceiving an object. At that moment when it's present, then how can I say that there's something that conditions it? It's already there, no? When an effect is present, then that which produces the effect will have done its job, no?
Otherwise we can't really say that this is cause and effect, no? If the condition's job must have been fulfilled entirely when the real effect is there, is fully present, then how could the condition still play a role? If the condition still has a role to play, it means that the effect is not yet fully manifest, no? And what I'm interested in here is a moment of perception as we have them all the time, no? So I'm not talking about something that is underway to becoming perception or anything like that, no? I'm talking about what we all know from experience and perception, a moment of seeing something. So when I see something like that, how can I say that there is something in the world that conditions, that is the condition for that experience? I can't, no? And on the other hand, when then the condition, let's say there is a condition in the world for, the camera is there and so I'm ready to perceive it, no? But at that time, on the other way around, how could a phenomenon for which there is no observation ever relate to an observation? So how could a moment of consciousness which does not have an observed condition be conditioned by an observed condition? And it seems to leave no option possible for this otherwise extremely natural and beyond plausible account that there are things in the world that serve as conditions for our perceptions, no?
When the perception is there, then how can I say that there is something that is its condition? And when the perception is not there, how can I say that there is something that is its condition? So when is the time for the observed condition to be that, to become an observed condition?
So what do you think? Student: "I guess my question is then what to do with this very seemingly natural and something that I've been so used to, habituated towards, it seems like I don't know what to do with it now.
Yeah, like if I have to come to this class, I have to gather conditions and come, you know? Otherwise, how do I even get to a classroom? So with that, it seems like I have nothing else to do but just to sort of come to peace and rest, just relax about it. I mean, what else can I do?" Yeah, but first of all, that's all very relevant, no? So that's if we think that this makes perfect sense, that actually there can't be observed conditions. Then what to do with that insight or whatever we should call it? That's of course the natural question. But before we get there, is there anyone who feels less convinced about this?
"Luis, do you want to unmute yourself and say something?"
Student: "Can you hear me, Thomas?" Yes, I can, thank you. "I can hear myself as well. Something that came to mind is the notion that the two might be simultaneous and condition each other being simultaneous in the way the example of the two reefs of reed that support each other. So they might be simultaneous, they might be conditioning not in the manner of cause and effect, but in the way of two, I think the word used there is reef or reed that support each other so they don't fall. And then another idea that came to mind is the idea that perception is imagination. So it's not seeing something that caused it but it's projecting something.
That's an idea coming from neuroscience nowadays for example, that perception is a prediction."
The first thing you said was, sorry, you said two things, yeah? Student: "The first one is mind and the object being simultaneous. And even being simultaneous, they condition each other's way of being. And the other one is the idea that perception is a prediction." Yes.
So two things that are each other's condition simultaneously. Like also an example they use is the beams, what are they called, in the roof that's beams, that support each other so that the roof stays a roof. So yeah, that is one is the condition for the support of the other.
But..just how much sense does that really make to say that,
like there is such a thing as a moment of perception, no? So there's a moment of seeing something. If there isn't that, then what is that, no? If there are no, if we can't say that at least there's such a thing as a moment of perception, no? So in that moment of perception, I see something, and so there's the visual perception. But if I say that the thing that I see is the cause of my visual perception, then doesn't that imply that there is some sort of, something has to happen, no? Otherwise I may say that there's the thing I see and then there's me seeing it, my moment, not me seeing it, but my moment of consciousness, whatever we want to say, yeah? If we say that there are those two things in the same moment, aren't we just talking about the same moment then? Aren't we just describing the same moment in different ways? There's the thing that I see and then that's whatever we want to,
however gestures we want to make to sort of show that I see something, yeah? That there's this seeing, many people can get a lot of time, spend a lot of time trying to formulate what that feels like, is like and so on, yeah? Consciousness. But if we say there are moments of perception, and moments of perception must have some content, no? That's why we call it a moment of perception. And then there must be the perceptual quality of it, so there must be some consciousness, something there as well, yeah? But if we're talking about the very same moment, aren't those two equally just ways of describing that moment? It's not really talking about a causal relationship, we're just sort of as if we were looking around in a house and saying, "yeah, there's this and there's that, you know, in the building." So in that building, our moment of consciousness, there are two elements that we can zoom in on, but it's all the same. It's not that one causes the other. If one causes the other, there has to be some sort of process, no? Cause means process, no? So we can call it mutually present cause and effect, but it's not a very satisfying concept, is it?
If cause and effect imply process, then simultaneous cause and effect does not make sense, no? And doesn't cause and effect imply process? Otherwise, what are we talking about? So that's what I would say about the first, and then about, we actually don't see anything, at least not anything of the sort that we think we see, which is common in neuroscience. Not to pretend that I have much understanding of that, but nonetheless, it is frequently explained that the whole structure of consciousness is by no means a reflection of reality, and in fact, completely contrary to the nature of reality.
So in that case, then I guess we can ask the same. So if that is the case, if there's something that, whether we say it's the brain or any other substrate, it could be many, it could be physical, mental, who knows what substrate, beyond the two of them that is somehow responsible, that is the projector or the source of my fantasies. So if that is the case, then also there are no observed conditions. So then in this case, I suppose the neuroscientist and others who have this idea of a substrate which is entirely beyond the fabric of perception, and yeah. That also makes it very difficult to say that we can actually intellectually understand that substrate if it really is utterly beyond the perception, but that's a side issue. But if that is the idea, then it's not possible to say that there are observed conditions. I would say no. Wouldn't you agree? If all of this is fantasy, then.. that doesn't leave any room for observed conditions, no? There's nothing then that causally structures my experience.
Somebody said something? So if that... So is it then the case that now we are in a situation where...
Yeah, we can give up the idea that there are actual things that are responsible for my perceptions? If so, then there are various ways that one can do that, which is what you were getting at. It's not obvious where we then go from there.
I suppose one way, one path that one could take is that which is evinced in these neuroscientific approaches, where there's some idea of profound illusion.
Profound illusion. But then, if this is profound illusion, it's a good question whether we then rightly... What we can rightly say about the substrate that is responsible for this illusion, no? This is something that we can keep as a question on the burner as we proceed, no? If really all of this is hallucination, which is... I think one way of understanding neuroscientific perspectives, we hallucinate, then there's maybe some usefulness of it or whatever. But some are very... Of course there's no unified perspective of cognitive science either, but some go very far in this declaration of the whole realm of perception as being wholly illusory or just sheer hallucination.
And suddenly when we apply an analysis of the kind that we have here, then perhaps it does seem like all of this is hallucination. And then if all of this, the objects that I see and my own perception of it, is something that cannot be explained in terms of causality, then perhaps there's something suspect about appealing to a sense of a substrate that is beyond. Where are we licensed to designate the existence of such a substrate? Think about it now. What we're saying is that there's nothing that... That my sense of there being things that present themselves to my perceptions, such that I can have moments of perception, if that is a baseless notion that I have, then what could be the basis for me subsequently saying that there's some transcendent substrate that is the source of these perceptions? So I think this is something if we ever get there, then in chapter three, which is about perception, then it's something that we will have an opportunity to really zoom in on the relation between the seen and the seer, the process of seeing. I think it's a very... satisfying and rewarding approach to take to these kinds of analysis, to apply it to live perception. This is also what we will see in the next chapter, where the topic is movement, and not just movement as a conceptual structure, but movement as we know it from experience. So here in this chapter on conditions.. because there is this thing with cause and effect that makes it cause and effect related, but also occurring at different times, we are a little bit more abstract in this initial chapter than in the subsequent two, because we're talking about two principles, conditions and their effects, which necessarily aren't simultaneous. So we are a bit more.. the perspective is slightly more abstract than what it will be when concerned with present movement and with present seeing and so on. But here we get a taste of it anyway, in verse eight. Then there's this notion of an immediately preceding condition for consciousness, which is the moment that was there before, the moment of mind that was there before, having to have ceased. So that is one of these four Abhidharmic conditions, which is meant to be an exhaustive summary of all possible conditions. So just like the observed condition, the immediately preceding condition is something that only occurs with consciousness, with moments of mind. And in critique of that principle, then the verse number nine says, "If phenomena have not arisen, cessation makes no sense, hence an immediately preceding condition is untenable. If it has ceased, how could it be a condition?" So the idea is, as we just said, that there is my moment of, again, let's say visual perception now. I see the camera in this moment, but then for me to see the next moment of camera, which will be a little different from the one I had otherwise just now, my present moment of seeing has to cease.
And that itself, that cessation of the perception that was there before, is a condition. Without that, the next moment cannot occur. It's also very plausible and makes good sense. If we talk about a unique moment of experience, then because it's unique and it's a unique moment, then in other words the moment that was there just before must be over before this unique moment can happen. Agree? Unless that has ceased, then there's no chance for that to happen, this unique perception.
But if phenomena have not arisen, so meaning again the phenomena are the factors of cognition, the moment of perception, for example, the moment of visual perception, for example, if that has not yet arisen, then it makes no sense to say that the moment that was there before has ceased. In other words, if my moment of looking at this petal, let's say, of course it is typically in Abhidharma, these moments are very short, and so when I look here I see an object I think that is ongoing, but in fact the perception of an enduring object is something that is imputed on the basis of moments, so very short moments. When I look here I think maybe I can call it a moment of seeing a flower. Abhidharma also has room for that, a moment of seeing a flower, and that can take some time, but there's also this notion of very short, extremely short moments that are like a string, a string of moments one after the other. So if my moment of looking at this petal has not yet, or let's say like this, first I look at this petal here to the left, and then I move slightly to the right and look at another petal. If the moment of looking at the petal to the left is not over yet, then of course the subsequent moment of just for the sake of being able to distinguish them more easily, looking at the next petal, cannot have arisen yet. So if, in other words, the second moment has not yet arisen, it doesn't make sense to say that the original moment of looking at the left petal is over. Very simple. It sounds a little convoluted, but the idea is very, very simple, no?
So therefore it does not make sense to say that the cessation of that moment conditions or creates or contributes to the manifestation of the second moment, no?
And on the other hand, if it has ceased, if that moment is over, then it is no more. And so something that doesn't exist and is gone, how could that serve as a condition for the arising of anything? So either we say that the moment is still there, and in that case it doesn't make sense to say that it has ceased and it's the cessation of it that conditions the arising of the next moment, because it's still there. And on the other hand, if it has ceased, then it's gone and is no more, and how could something that is nothing contribute to the manifestation of anything?
So that is about the immediately preceding condition. And then there's only one left, yeah? And that is the... What is it called now?
Ruling condition, yeah, thank you. The ruling condition, which is defined simply as any form of condition, which is not any of the first three that we have talked about, yeah? So the first was the causal condition, which is what we understand to be the main cause, like the seed in the case of the growth of the sprout, or the perceived... No, that would not be... Yeah, the object that is there to be seen also works as a cause for the production of a moment of consciousness. The next is the observed condition, which is something that then only is relevant to mental events. And there we talk about the percept itself, so to speak, distinguished in that way, which it makes good intuitive sense to say is something that effectuates our perception. And on the other hand we have seen that that actually doesn't make much sense, and perhaps talking about the percept is just another way of talking about the experience itself, the moment, and there's nothing causal about this at all. And then there was the immediately preceding condition that a moment of mind that was there before a given effect must have ceased if that given effect, another moment of mind, has to arise, yeah? So any kind of condition that is not any of these three is yet a condition, and yet something that contributes to the manifestation of the effect, is a ruling condition. So in the case of the seed, obvious things like rich soil, moisture, sunshine, and so on, and time, whatever else needs to be there for the seed to sprout. So all of these many different conditions that are as a whole referred to as the ruling condition, the way the text dismisses them is to say since there is no existence of things that have no nature, saying this occurs because of that would not make any sense. "This occurs because of that" is one of the most classic ways of describing dependent origination. It's the Buddha's own words for what dependent origination is. It's about being, it's precisely these sorts of relationship. You have something present, and by virtue of that being present, something else will come about. If that first thing is not there, the second thing will not be. This is how the Buddha speaks in the Sūtras also, to explain dependent origination, no? But things that have no nature don't exist, he says here. So it could not make any sense to say that this occurs because of that.
Yeah. Doesn't this sound a little too much to say that things that don't have any nature of their own don't exist? And therefore, this statement that because this is, that comes to be, because this exists, that will be, is nonsensical.
In the commentary there is some anticipation of an objection. Someone says that this is not really a good argument, what you're giving there, because it's actually not an argument at all, because if the person you are talking to already believes and understands that things have no nature, and therefore don't exist, then they already agree with the statement that you say. If they don't believe and understand why things have no nature of their own, then they will not accept the evidence that you produce to make your point. So why is it? So what the stanza claims is that the statement "This occurs because of that," is nonsensical. And why? Because things that have no nature don't exist. And so if someone already agrees that things do not exist by virtue of their own nature, then they also agree with this statement, so there's no point in telling it to somebody like that. And on the other hand, if we're talking to someone who does not believe it, then the very part of the argument that you rely on to be the proof or the evidence that leads to the conclusion will not be a valid proof or a valid evidence for someone like that, because that person doesn't accept that things such as this have no nature of their own. But then it is suggested that it still makes good sense to do this, because for someone who has not understood that things have no nature, then that point can be made by pointing to dependent origination,
by noticing how all of these things are dependent on things that are other than themselves, which again depend on other things and so on, infinitely, then it becomes clear that there's nothing that has a nature of its own. If all of this is what it is, in dependence on something else, which again is what it is only in dependence on something else and not by virtue of itself at all, and if that discovery can be made with respect to absolutely everything, so that there's no possible end to this search for a ground, then that's as much as saying that things have no nature of their own. If all what they are is thoroughly dependent on other things, which again are dependent on other things, that again are dependent on other things, again and again and again, infinitely so, without any even hope of finding a ground that can be the basis for this kind of dependent origination, then obviously nothing exists by virtue of itself. And so from that point of view, what really are we saying when we say that "this occurs because of that"? What is "this"? What is "that"?
So in this way there are four verses here, 7 to 10, that each deal with,
that together deal with each of the four conditions.
Then in 11, now we're talking about, again going back to the notion of whether the effect is present in the cause, but from a slightly different angle, it says "In separate conditions and in their gathering, the effect is entirely absent. How could something that does not exist in the conditions ever arise from them?
So now we're thinking not of just cause and effect, but of effect based on a whole matrix of causes and conditions, which we together call the conditions for the arising of the effect. And those conditions have to come together, they have to gather, assemble before we can have the effect occur. So let us try to look at whether it's possible for an effect to be present in such a set of conditions.
There's one effect we say, there's one sprout for example, that grew from a seed, from the moisture, from the rich soil, from the sunshine, from the openness of space and so on. But the effect is not present in those conditions individually. The sprout is definitely not present in the soil, it's not present in the sunshine and so on. If we were to say that it is, then we would have to be able to find it there, but we don't, we clearly don't find the effect in the individual conditions.
And if they are in their gathering, then what is the gathering apart from the individual causes? If we say that there is such a gathering, then we're still left with the same problem of having to be able to notice that the effect is present in the gathering of conditions. And we can't just say that the effect is the gathering of the conditions. That's what we found out already in the first stanza, no? We can't say that they're one and the same. So if we want to keep a notion of the gathering of causes and conditions having somehow the effect within them, then we'll have to say that there is a part of it, a part of these gathered causes and conditions that contains the effect. And then there's something else that doesn't. And then, in other words, now we say that the conditions are part the effect and part conditions. It's not very plausible, yeah?
So in this way, it becomes very difficult to say that the effect is present in the conditions. In fact, we find that it is entirely absent from it. When we look at matters in this way, the gathering of the conditions on an individual basis, we don't find the effect there at all. It's wholly absent. But how could something that does not exist in the conditions ever arise from them? So that's also what we have been considering before in the context of the first stanza.
If an effect is entirely absent in a purported set of conditions, then what makes that suggested set of conditions, 'conditions'? They're just as unrelated to the effect as anything else that we would readily agree are not conditions for the arising of that effect. So if the sprout is not present at all in the seed and in the soil and in the moisture, etc.
Then how can we say that the seed, the soil, the moisture, etc. are any different than stone, fire, whatever else we don't consider a condition for the growth of a sprout?
So in other words, cause and non-cause become equal. If we say that the effect is not present in the conditions, then we have no longer a way of identifying something as the condition for anything because what goes for the purported condition goes also for anything that we refer to as a non-cause.
So if without being present there it were still to arise from conditions, why would it not also arise from that which is not a condition? That is exactly the absurd consequence that comes from this idea that you can have distinct cause and effect. Effect and conditions exist and are different from each other. If that is the suggestion, then how can we make sense of our perception of causal relationships? Anything could then arise based on anything, if this were the case.
The effect may be of its condition's nature, but these conditions have no nature of their own. How could the effect of that which is not an entity itself be of the nature of that which conditions it?
So here we then go back to an idea of effects that are of the nature of the conditions, that there is something that ties them, that the effect is what it is by virtue of its conditions. So the causal power is somehow responsible for the manifestation of the effect.
But what we then refer to as responsible for the character of the effect are themselves things that don't have a nature of their own. That is what we just recognized by seeing that the soil and the moisture and so on also depends itself.. each of these elements depend on other things and ultimately are constructed based on other apparent entities, which again are in just the same way. So how could the effect of that which is not an entity itself, meaning the conditions, we have no grounds for saying that they exist as conditions, that there is something that makes them what they are on their own. Whatever they are is all due to something else, which again is due to something else and so on without any end. So how could the effect of that which is not an entity itself be of the nature of that which conditions it?
So since these conditions don't have a nature of itself, how can we allow ourselves to say that the effect is something that is the carrier of the nature of the conditions? So this chapter 13 is a way of defending the idea of real causal arising by saying that yes, there is real causal arising, because we have causal factors, conditions, which have a certain power, a certain character, a certain constitution, and it's that force or that power of the conditions that transfers and gives rise to the nature of the effect, such that when the effect is present, it is really the nature of the causes that is in there in the effect. But since the causes and conditions themselves have no identity, how could we say that there's something which has achieved identity by virtue of those?
Hence, the effect is not of the nature of its conditions, nor of the nature of that which are not its conditions. So at this point of conclusion, when we look at an effect, then we can now conclude that the effect is not a carrier of the nature of the causes that produced it, but it could not be the carrier of things that are not its causes either. So what kind of effect is that? It cannot feasibly be the carrier of its causes, nor can it be the carrier of what are not its causes, as there is no effect. How could they be conditions as well as non-conditions? So the whole framework of cause, effect, and that which is not cause, just a big question mark. So let's end there. And then tomorrow, try to go through the whole chapter here, and really think where you are at now with this. In two ways, think about intellectually how convincing or not has this been? And probably it is, if it is very convincing, then try to note down carefully why exactly it is so convincing. If it is not convincing at all, then of course you note that down also, but probably a lot of this is also zooming in on the grey zone, where it seems Yes, but... that is exactly where to throw the light of analysis and just observation very clearly. It is where we are in two minds. And so that is very important. That's probably the primary importance at this point, that you think exactly how much sense does this make to me?
Is each and every step in these lines of reason irrefutable? Try to set the bar, what should I say? Ask for much. Is it the case that the first chapter, the 'Analysis of Conditions' in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā presents lines of reason that are completely irrefutable? Or not?
Try and see if you.. tomorrow, does everyone agree that this is completely irrefutable? Let's see, you know? And if you are hesitant to say this, then why? It is maybe a good way of bringing out our sort of lingering doubts. If you say, can I stand up and say "This reasoning is utterly irrefutable," or not? And then if you don't feel confident to do that, then try to think what is it that makes you hesitate? And if you do feel that this is completely irrefutable, then try to think, as we tried also today, where does this then take us and what to say now on the basis of this? Okay, thank you and all the best. Tomorrow we can then begin with chapter two, I suppose.
"That which originates
dependently
does not cease and does
not arise,
is not annigilated and is not permanent,
does not come and does not go
is not different and the not the same.
To the true teacher who
reveals this peace,
The complete
pacification of constructs,
to the perfect Buddha I bow down."
So we ended with the stanza number 8, right?
Which was about the observed condition.
The idea that there is something that can present itself to the mind such that a moment of consciousness, a moment of cognition arises based on that.
So...
It is perhaps difficult to imagine
the world without that sort of structure, no? Unless there is something in the world that can be noticed in perception. Like... Yeah, any visual form for the moment of visual perception. Something must be there to be seen for us to have a moment of seeing. And the same with the other senses. Is it possible to think of perception, experience, without this sort of structure? What do you think? Like I sit here and look out in the class I think there is something there to see. You are there that I can see and it's because you are there that I can see you.
But is it possible to think of this experience in another way which is not then dependent on observed conditions? It will probably, if anyone has comments, you are welcome. Otherwise it would seem that it is possible to experience differently because arguably that's what we do. Yeah, okay.
Student: "Thanks, Thomas. I'm not sure if I will be clear what I'm trying to say. But I think at this point it seems to... I'm okay to accept that, for instance, if I see that flower, momentarily it changes. So I cannot say it always existed in a way that it doesn't change. However, when I think about this momentariness, in a very small moment, in a split second, it seems still in that moment the perception of that flower is caused by something, by that mental object. But then it yes, and then it stays and then it ceases and then it rises again. So this continuity of momentariness, it seems to be... I'm not convinced that it's not there, this continuity of momentariness." Right. So here we are simply looking at that moment you talked about, the one moment of seeing a flower that seems like there's something
that is responsible for my experience as an observed condition. I mean it's a pretty good term, it's very intuitive. There's a condition for my perception and I perceive it, and so I have this visual perception, for example. But maybe that is not the case because..
it is explained that with existent phenomena there are no observations whatsoever. So when I have this moment of seeing something like the camera say in front of me, there's this moment when I see the camera. But at the time when that experience is already there, when the perception is present, and after all that's what I'm trying to talk about. I'm trying to talk about a moment of witnessing, perceiving an object. At that moment when it's present, then how can I say that there's something that conditions it? It's already there, no? When an effect is present, then that which produces the effect will have done its job, no?
Otherwise we can't really say that this is cause and effect, no? If the condition's job must have been fulfilled entirely when the real effect is there, is fully present, then how could the condition still play a role? If the condition still has a role to play, it means that the effect is not yet fully manifest, no? And what I'm interested in here is a moment of perception as we have them all the time, no? So I'm not talking about something that is underway to becoming perception or anything like that, no? I'm talking about what we all know from experience and perception, a moment of seeing something. So when I see something like that, how can I say that there is something in the world that conditions, that is the condition for that experience? I can't, no? And on the other hand, when then the condition, let's say there is a condition in the world for, the camera is there and so I'm ready to perceive it, no? But at that time, on the other way around, how could a phenomenon for which there is no observation ever relate to an observation? So how could a moment of consciousness which does not have an observed condition be conditioned by an observed condition? And it seems to leave no option possible for this otherwise extremely natural and beyond plausible account that there are things in the world that serve as conditions for our perceptions, no?
When the perception is there, then how can I say that there is something that is its condition? And when the perception is not there, how can I say that there is something that is its condition? So when is the time for the observed condition to be that, to become an observed condition?
So what do you think? Student: "I guess my question is then what to do with this very seemingly natural and something that I've been so used to, habituated towards, it seems like I don't know what to do with it now.
Yeah, like if I have to come to this class, I have to gather conditions and come, you know? Otherwise, how do I even get to a classroom? So with that, it seems like I have nothing else to do but just to sort of come to peace and rest, just relax about it. I mean, what else can I do?" Yeah, but first of all, that's all very relevant, no? So that's if we think that this makes perfect sense, that actually there can't be observed conditions. Then what to do with that insight or whatever we should call it? That's of course the natural question. But before we get there, is there anyone who feels less convinced about this?
"Luis, do you want to unmute yourself and say something?"
Student: "Can you hear me, Thomas?" Yes, I can, thank you. "I can hear myself as well. Something that came to mind is the notion that the two might be simultaneous and condition each other being simultaneous in the way the example of the two reefs of reed that support each other. So they might be simultaneous, they might be conditioning not in the manner of cause and effect, but in the way of two, I think the word used there is reef or reed that support each other so they don't fall. And then another idea that came to mind is the idea that perception is imagination. So it's not seeing something that caused it but it's projecting something.
That's an idea coming from neuroscience nowadays for example, that perception is a prediction."
The first thing you said was, sorry, you said two things, yeah? Student: "The first one is mind and the object being simultaneous. And even being simultaneous, they condition each other's way of being. And the other one is the idea that perception is a prediction." Yes.
So two things that are each other's condition simultaneously. Like also an example they use is the beams, what are they called, in the roof that's beams, that support each other so that the roof stays a roof. So yeah, that is one is the condition for the support of the other.
But..just how much sense does that really make to say that,
like there is such a thing as a moment of perception, no? So there's a moment of seeing something. If there isn't that, then what is that, no? If there are no, if we can't say that at least there's such a thing as a moment of perception, no? So in that moment of perception, I see something, and so there's the visual perception. But if I say that the thing that I see is the cause of my visual perception, then doesn't that imply that there is some sort of, something has to happen, no? Otherwise I may say that there's the thing I see and then there's me seeing it, my moment, not me seeing it, but my moment of consciousness, whatever we want to say, yeah? If we say that there are those two things in the same moment, aren't we just talking about the same moment then? Aren't we just describing the same moment in different ways? There's the thing that I see and then that's whatever we want to,
however gestures we want to make to sort of show that I see something, yeah? That there's this seeing, many people can get a lot of time, spend a lot of time trying to formulate what that feels like, is like and so on, yeah? Consciousness. But if we say there are moments of perception, and moments of perception must have some content, no? That's why we call it a moment of perception. And then there must be the perceptual quality of it, so there must be some consciousness, something there as well, yeah? But if we're talking about the very same moment, aren't those two equally just ways of describing that moment? It's not really talking about a causal relationship, we're just sort of as if we were looking around in a house and saying, "yeah, there's this and there's that, you know, in the building." So in that building, our moment of consciousness, there are two elements that we can zoom in on, but it's all the same. It's not that one causes the other. If one causes the other, there has to be some sort of process, no? Cause means process, no? So we can call it mutually present cause and effect, but it's not a very satisfying concept, is it?
If cause and effect imply process, then simultaneous cause and effect does not make sense, no? And doesn't cause and effect imply process? Otherwise, what are we talking about? So that's what I would say about the first, and then about, we actually don't see anything, at least not anything of the sort that we think we see, which is common in neuroscience. Not to pretend that I have much understanding of that, but nonetheless, it is frequently explained that the whole structure of consciousness is by no means a reflection of reality, and in fact, completely contrary to the nature of reality.
So in that case, then I guess we can ask the same. So if that is the case, if there's something that, whether we say it's the brain or any other substrate, it could be many, it could be physical, mental, who knows what substrate, beyond the two of them that is somehow responsible, that is the projector or the source of my fantasies. So if that is the case, then also there are no observed conditions. So then in this case, I suppose the neuroscientist and others who have this idea of a substrate which is entirely beyond the fabric of perception, and yeah. That also makes it very difficult to say that we can actually intellectually understand that substrate if it really is utterly beyond the perception, but that's a side issue. But if that is the idea, then it's not possible to say that there are observed conditions. I would say no. Wouldn't you agree? If all of this is fantasy, then.. that doesn't leave any room for observed conditions, no? There's nothing then that causally structures my experience.
Somebody said something? So if that... So is it then the case that now we are in a situation where...
Yeah, we can give up the idea that there are actual things that are responsible for my perceptions? If so, then there are various ways that one can do that, which is what you were getting at. It's not obvious where we then go from there.
I suppose one way, one path that one could take is that which is evinced in these neuroscientific approaches, where there's some idea of profound illusion.
Profound illusion. But then, if this is profound illusion, it's a good question whether we then rightly... What we can rightly say about the substrate that is responsible for this illusion, no? This is something that we can keep as a question on the burner as we proceed, no? If really all of this is hallucination, which is... I think one way of understanding neuroscientific perspectives, we hallucinate, then there's maybe some usefulness of it or whatever. But some are very... Of course there's no unified perspective of cognitive science either, but some go very far in this declaration of the whole realm of perception as being wholly illusory or just sheer hallucination.
And suddenly when we apply an analysis of the kind that we have here, then perhaps it does seem like all of this is hallucination. And then if all of this, the objects that I see and my own perception of it, is something that cannot be explained in terms of causality, then perhaps there's something suspect about appealing to a sense of a substrate that is beyond. Where are we licensed to designate the existence of such a substrate? Think about it now. What we're saying is that there's nothing that... That my sense of there being things that present themselves to my perceptions, such that I can have moments of perception, if that is a baseless notion that I have, then what could be the basis for me subsequently saying that there's some transcendent substrate that is the source of these perceptions? So I think this is something if we ever get there, then in chapter three, which is about perception, then it's something that we will have an opportunity to really zoom in on the relation between the seen and the seer, the process of seeing. I think it's a very... satisfying and rewarding approach to take to these kinds of analysis, to apply it to live perception. This is also what we will see in the next chapter, where the topic is movement, and not just movement as a conceptual structure, but movement as we know it from experience. So here in this chapter on conditions.. because there is this thing with cause and effect that makes it cause and effect related, but also occurring at different times, we are a little bit more abstract in this initial chapter than in the subsequent two, because we're talking about two principles, conditions and their effects, which necessarily aren't simultaneous. So we are a bit more.. the perspective is slightly more abstract than what it will be when concerned with present movement and with present seeing and so on. But here we get a taste of it anyway, in verse eight. Then there's this notion of an immediately preceding condition for consciousness, which is the moment that was there before, the moment of mind that was there before, having to have ceased. So that is one of these four Abhidharmic conditions, which is meant to be an exhaustive summary of all possible conditions. So just like the observed condition, the immediately preceding condition is something that only occurs with consciousness, with moments of mind. And in critique of that principle, then the verse number nine says, "If phenomena have not arisen, cessation makes no sense, hence an immediately preceding condition is untenable. If it has ceased, how could it be a condition?" So the idea is, as we just said, that there is my moment of, again, let's say visual perception now. I see the camera in this moment, but then for me to see the next moment of camera, which will be a little different from the one I had otherwise just now, my present moment of seeing has to cease.
And that itself, that cessation of the perception that was there before, is a condition. Without that, the next moment cannot occur. It's also very plausible and makes good sense. If we talk about a unique moment of experience, then because it's unique and it's a unique moment, then in other words the moment that was there just before must be over before this unique moment can happen. Agree? Unless that has ceased, then there's no chance for that to happen, this unique perception.
But if phenomena have not arisen, so meaning again the phenomena are the factors of cognition, the moment of perception, for example, the moment of visual perception, for example, if that has not yet arisen, then it makes no sense to say that the moment that was there before has ceased. In other words, if my moment of looking at this petal, let's say, of course it is typically in Abhidharma, these moments are very short, and so when I look here I see an object I think that is ongoing, but in fact the perception of an enduring object is something that is imputed on the basis of moments, so very short moments. When I look here I think maybe I can call it a moment of seeing a flower. Abhidharma also has room for that, a moment of seeing a flower, and that can take some time, but there's also this notion of very short, extremely short moments that are like a string, a string of moments one after the other. So if my moment of looking at this petal has not yet, or let's say like this, first I look at this petal here to the left, and then I move slightly to the right and look at another petal. If the moment of looking at the petal to the left is not over yet, then of course the subsequent moment of just for the sake of being able to distinguish them more easily, looking at the next petal, cannot have arisen yet. So if, in other words, the second moment has not yet arisen, it doesn't make sense to say that the original moment of looking at the left petal is over. Very simple. It sounds a little convoluted, but the idea is very, very simple, no?
So therefore it does not make sense to say that the cessation of that moment conditions or creates or contributes to the manifestation of the second moment, no?
And on the other hand, if it has ceased, if that moment is over, then it is no more. And so something that doesn't exist and is gone, how could that serve as a condition for the arising of anything? So either we say that the moment is still there, and in that case it doesn't make sense to say that it has ceased and it's the cessation of it that conditions the arising of the next moment, because it's still there. And on the other hand, if it has ceased, then it's gone and is no more, and how could something that is nothing contribute to the manifestation of anything?
So that is about the immediately preceding condition. And then there's only one left, yeah? And that is the... What is it called now?
Ruling condition, yeah, thank you. The ruling condition, which is defined simply as any form of condition, which is not any of the first three that we have talked about, yeah? So the first was the causal condition, which is what we understand to be the main cause, like the seed in the case of the growth of the sprout, or the perceived... No, that would not be... Yeah, the object that is there to be seen also works as a cause for the production of a moment of consciousness. The next is the observed condition, which is something that then only is relevant to mental events. And there we talk about the percept itself, so to speak, distinguished in that way, which it makes good intuitive sense to say is something that effectuates our perception. And on the other hand we have seen that that actually doesn't make much sense, and perhaps talking about the percept is just another way of talking about the experience itself, the moment, and there's nothing causal about this at all. And then there was the immediately preceding condition that a moment of mind that was there before a given effect must have ceased if that given effect, another moment of mind, has to arise, yeah? So any kind of condition that is not any of these three is yet a condition, and yet something that contributes to the manifestation of the effect, is a ruling condition. So in the case of the seed, obvious things like rich soil, moisture, sunshine, and so on, and time, whatever else needs to be there for the seed to sprout. So all of these many different conditions that are as a whole referred to as the ruling condition, the way the text dismisses them is to say since there is no existence of things that have no nature, saying this occurs because of that would not make any sense. "This occurs because of that" is one of the most classic ways of describing dependent origination. It's the Buddha's own words for what dependent origination is. It's about being, it's precisely these sorts of relationship. You have something present, and by virtue of that being present, something else will come about. If that first thing is not there, the second thing will not be. This is how the Buddha speaks in the Sūtras also, to explain dependent origination, no? But things that have no nature don't exist, he says here. So it could not make any sense to say that this occurs because of that.
Yeah. Doesn't this sound a little too much to say that things that don't have any nature of their own don't exist? And therefore, this statement that because this is, that comes to be, because this exists, that will be, is nonsensical.
In the commentary there is some anticipation of an objection. Someone says that this is not really a good argument, what you're giving there, because it's actually not an argument at all, because if the person you are talking to already believes and understands that things have no nature, and therefore don't exist, then they already agree with the statement that you say. If they don't believe and understand why things have no nature of their own, then they will not accept the evidence that you produce to make your point. So why is it? So what the stanza claims is that the statement "This occurs because of that," is nonsensical. And why? Because things that have no nature don't exist. And so if someone already agrees that things do not exist by virtue of their own nature, then they also agree with this statement, so there's no point in telling it to somebody like that. And on the other hand, if we're talking to someone who does not believe it, then the very part of the argument that you rely on to be the proof or the evidence that leads to the conclusion will not be a valid proof or a valid evidence for someone like that, because that person doesn't accept that things such as this have no nature of their own. But then it is suggested that it still makes good sense to do this, because for someone who has not understood that things have no nature, then that point can be made by pointing to dependent origination,
by noticing how all of these things are dependent on things that are other than themselves, which again depend on other things and so on, infinitely, then it becomes clear that there's nothing that has a nature of its own. If all of this is what it is, in dependence on something else, which again is what it is only in dependence on something else and not by virtue of itself at all, and if that discovery can be made with respect to absolutely everything, so that there's no possible end to this search for a ground, then that's as much as saying that things have no nature of their own. If all what they are is thoroughly dependent on other things, which again are dependent on other things, that again are dependent on other things, again and again and again, infinitely so, without any even hope of finding a ground that can be the basis for this kind of dependent origination, then obviously nothing exists by virtue of itself. And so from that point of view, what really are we saying when we say that "this occurs because of that"? What is "this"? What is "that"?
So in this way there are four verses here, 7 to 10, that each deal with,
that together deal with each of the four conditions.
Then in 11, now we're talking about, again going back to the notion of whether the effect is present in the cause, but from a slightly different angle, it says "In separate conditions and in their gathering, the effect is entirely absent. How could something that does not exist in the conditions ever arise from them?
So now we're thinking not of just cause and effect, but of effect based on a whole matrix of causes and conditions, which we together call the conditions for the arising of the effect. And those conditions have to come together, they have to gather, assemble before we can have the effect occur. So let us try to look at whether it's possible for an effect to be present in such a set of conditions.
There's one effect we say, there's one sprout for example, that grew from a seed, from the moisture, from the rich soil, from the sunshine, from the openness of space and so on. But the effect is not present in those conditions individually. The sprout is definitely not present in the soil, it's not present in the sunshine and so on. If we were to say that it is, then we would have to be able to find it there, but we don't, we clearly don't find the effect in the individual conditions.
And if they are in their gathering, then what is the gathering apart from the individual causes? If we say that there is such a gathering, then we're still left with the same problem of having to be able to notice that the effect is present in the gathering of conditions. And we can't just say that the effect is the gathering of the conditions. That's what we found out already in the first stanza, no? We can't say that they're one and the same. So if we want to keep a notion of the gathering of causes and conditions having somehow the effect within them, then we'll have to say that there is a part of it, a part of these gathered causes and conditions that contains the effect. And then there's something else that doesn't. And then, in other words, now we say that the conditions are part the effect and part conditions. It's not very plausible, yeah?
So in this way, it becomes very difficult to say that the effect is present in the conditions. In fact, we find that it is entirely absent from it. When we look at matters in this way, the gathering of the conditions on an individual basis, we don't find the effect there at all. It's wholly absent. But how could something that does not exist in the conditions ever arise from them? So that's also what we have been considering before in the context of the first stanza.
If an effect is entirely absent in a purported set of conditions, then what makes that suggested set of conditions, 'conditions'? They're just as unrelated to the effect as anything else that we would readily agree are not conditions for the arising of that effect. So if the sprout is not present at all in the seed and in the soil and in the moisture, etc.
Then how can we say that the seed, the soil, the moisture, etc. are any different than stone, fire, whatever else we don't consider a condition for the growth of a sprout?
So in other words, cause and non-cause become equal. If we say that the effect is not present in the conditions, then we have no longer a way of identifying something as the condition for anything because what goes for the purported condition goes also for anything that we refer to as a non-cause.
So if without being present there it were still to arise from conditions, why would it not also arise from that which is not a condition? That is exactly the absurd consequence that comes from this idea that you can have distinct cause and effect. Effect and conditions exist and are different from each other. If that is the suggestion, then how can we make sense of our perception of causal relationships? Anything could then arise based on anything, if this were the case.
The effect may be of its condition's nature, but these conditions have no nature of their own. How could the effect of that which is not an entity itself be of the nature of that which conditions it?
So here we then go back to an idea of effects that are of the nature of the conditions, that there is something that ties them, that the effect is what it is by virtue of its conditions. So the causal power is somehow responsible for the manifestation of the effect.
But what we then refer to as responsible for the character of the effect are themselves things that don't have a nature of their own. That is what we just recognized by seeing that the soil and the moisture and so on also depends itself.. each of these elements depend on other things and ultimately are constructed based on other apparent entities, which again are in just the same way. So how could the effect of that which is not an entity itself, meaning the conditions, we have no grounds for saying that they exist as conditions, that there is something that makes them what they are on their own. Whatever they are is all due to something else, which again is due to something else and so on without any end. So how could the effect of that which is not an entity itself be of the nature of that which conditions it?
So since these conditions don't have a nature of itself, how can we allow ourselves to say that the effect is something that is the carrier of the nature of the conditions? So this chapter 13 is a way of defending the idea of real causal arising by saying that yes, there is real causal arising, because we have causal factors, conditions, which have a certain power, a certain character, a certain constitution, and it's that force or that power of the conditions that transfers and gives rise to the nature of the effect, such that when the effect is present, it is really the nature of the causes that is in there in the effect. But since the causes and conditions themselves have no identity, how could we say that there's something which has achieved identity by virtue of those?
Hence, the effect is not of the nature of its conditions, nor of the nature of that which are not its conditions. So at this point of conclusion, when we look at an effect, then we can now conclude that the effect is not a carrier of the nature of the causes that produced it, but it could not be the carrier of things that are not its causes either. So what kind of effect is that? It cannot feasibly be the carrier of its causes, nor can it be the carrier of what are not its causes, as there is no effect. How could they be conditions as well as non-conditions? So the whole framework of cause, effect, and that which is not cause, just a big question mark. So let's end there. And then tomorrow, try to go through the whole chapter here, and really think where you are at now with this. In two ways, think about intellectually how convincing or not has this been? And probably it is, if it is very convincing, then try to note down carefully why exactly it is so convincing. If it is not convincing at all, then of course you note that down also, but probably a lot of this is also zooming in on the grey zone, where it seems Yes, but... that is exactly where to throw the light of analysis and just observation very clearly. It is where we are in two minds. And so that is very important. That's probably the primary importance at this point, that you think exactly how much sense does this make to me?
Is each and every step in these lines of reason irrefutable? Try to set the bar, what should I say? Ask for much. Is it the case that the first chapter, the 'Analysis of Conditions' in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā presents lines of reason that are completely irrefutable? Or not?
Try and see if you.. tomorrow, does everyone agree that this is completely irrefutable? Let's see, you know? And if you are hesitant to say this, then why? It is maybe a good way of bringing out our sort of lingering doubts. If you say, can I stand up and say "This reasoning is utterly irrefutable," or not? And then if you don't feel confident to do that, then try to think what is it that makes you hesitate? And if you do feel that this is completely irrefutable, then try to think, as we tried also today, where does this then take us and what to say now on the basis of this? Okay, thank you and all the best. Tomorrow we can then begin with chapter two, I suppose.
So we ended with the stanza number 8, right?
Which was about the observed condition.
The idea that there is something that can present itself to the mind such that a moment of consciousness, a moment of cognition arises based on that.
So...
It is perhaps difficult to imagine
the world without that sort of structure, no? Unless there is something in the world that can be noticed in perception. Like... Yeah, any visual form for the moment of visual perception. Something must be there to be seen for us to have a moment of seeing. And the same with the other senses. Is it possible to think of perception, experience, without this sort of structure? What do you think? Like I sit here and look out in the class I think there is something there to see. You are there that I can see and it's because you are there that I can see you.
But is it possible to think of this experience in another way which is not then dependent on observed conditions? It will probably, if anyone has comments, you are welcome. Otherwise it would seem that it is possible to experience differently because arguably that's what we do. Yeah, okay.
Student: "Thanks, Thomas. I'm not sure if I will be clear what I'm trying to say. But I think at this point it seems to... I'm okay to accept that, for instance, if I see that flower, momentarily it changes. So I cannot say it always existed in a way that it doesn't change. However, when I think about this momentariness, in a very small moment, in a split second, it seems still in that moment the perception of that flower is caused by something, by that mental object. But then it yes, and then it stays and then it ceases and then it rises again. So this continuity of momentariness, it seems to be... I'm not convinced that it's not there, this continuity of momentariness." Right. So here we are simply looking at that moment you talked about, the one moment of seeing a flower that seems like there's something
that is responsible for my experience as an observed condition. I mean it's a pretty good term, it's very intuitive. There's a condition for my perception and I perceive it, and so I have this visual perception, for example. But maybe that is not the case because..
it is explained that with existent phenomena there are no observations whatsoever. So when I have this moment of seeing something like the camera say in front of me, there's this moment when I see the camera. But at the time when that experience is already there, when the perception is present, and after all that's what I'm trying to talk about. I'm trying to talk about a moment of witnessing, perceiving an object. At that moment when it's present, then how can I say that there's something that conditions it? It's already there, no? When an effect is present, then that which produces the effect will have done its job, no?
Otherwise we can't really say that this is cause and effect, no? If the condition's job must have been fulfilled entirely when the real effect is there, is fully present, then how could the condition still play a role? If the condition still has a role to play, it means that the effect is not yet fully manifest, no? And what I'm interested in here is a moment of perception as we have them all the time, no? So I'm not talking about something that is underway to becoming perception or anything like that, no? I'm talking about what we all know from experience and perception, a moment of seeing something. So when I see something like that, how can I say that there is something in the world that conditions, that is the condition for that experience? I can't, no? And on the other hand, when then the condition, let's say there is a condition in the world for, the camera is there and so I'm ready to perceive it, no? But at that time, on the other way around, how could a phenomenon for which there is no observation ever relate to an observation? So how could a moment of consciousness which does not have an observed condition be conditioned by an observed condition? And it seems to leave no option possible for this otherwise extremely natural and beyond plausible account that there are things in the world that serve as conditions for our perceptions, no?
When the perception is there, then how can I say that there is something that is its condition? And when the perception is not there, how can I say that there is something that is its condition? So when is the time for the observed condition to be that, to become an observed condition?
So what do you think? Student: "I guess my question is then what to do with this very seemingly natural and something that I've been so used to, habituated towards, it seems like I don't know what to do with it now.
Yeah, like if I have to come to this class, I have to gather conditions and come, you know? Otherwise, how do I even get to a classroom? So with that, it seems like I have nothing else to do but just to sort of come to peace and rest, just relax about it. I mean, what else can I do?" Yeah, but first of all, that's all very relevant, no? So that's if we think that this makes perfect sense, that actually there can't be observed conditions. Then what to do with that insight or whatever we should call it? That's of course the natural question. But before we get there, is there anyone who feels less convinced about this?
"Luis, do you want to unmute yourself and say something?"
Student: "Can you hear me, Thomas?" Yes, I can, thank you. "I can hear myself as well. Something that came to mind is the notion that the two might be simultaneous and condition each other being simultaneous in the way the example of the two reefs of reed that support each other. So they might be simultaneous, they might be conditioning not in the manner of cause and effect, but in the way of two, I think the word used there is reef or reed that support each other so they don't fall. And then another idea that came to mind is the idea that perception is imagination. So it's not seeing something that caused it but it's projecting something.
That's an idea coming from neuroscience nowadays for example, that perception is a prediction."
The first thing you said was, sorry, you said two things, yeah? Student: "The first one is mind and the object being simultaneous. And even being simultaneous, they condition each other's way of being. And the other one is the idea that perception is a prediction." Yes.
So two things that are each other's condition simultaneously. Like also an example they use is the beams, what are they called, in the roof that's beams, that support each other so that the roof stays a roof. So yeah, that is one is the condition for the support of the other.
But..just how much sense does that really make to say that,
like there is such a thing as a moment of perception, no? So there's a moment of seeing something. If there isn't that, then what is that, no? If there are no, if we can't say that at least there's such a thing as a moment of perception, no? So in that moment of perception, I see something, and so there's the visual perception. But if I say that the thing that I see is the cause of my visual perception, then doesn't that imply that there is some sort of, something has to happen, no? Otherwise I may say that there's the thing I see and then there's me seeing it, my moment, not me seeing it, but my moment of consciousness, whatever we want to say, yeah? If we say that there are those two things in the same moment, aren't we just talking about the same moment then? Aren't we just describing the same moment in different ways? There's the thing that I see and then that's whatever we want to,
however gestures we want to make to sort of show that I see something, yeah? That there's this seeing, many people can get a lot of time, spend a lot of time trying to formulate what that feels like, is like and so on, yeah? Consciousness. But if we say there are moments of perception, and moments of perception must have some content, no? That's why we call it a moment of perception. And then there must be the perceptual quality of it, so there must be some consciousness, something there as well, yeah? But if we're talking about the very same moment, aren't those two equally just ways of describing that moment? It's not really talking about a causal relationship, we're just sort of as if we were looking around in a house and saying, "yeah, there's this and there's that, you know, in the building." So in that building, our moment of consciousness, there are two elements that we can zoom in on, but it's all the same. It's not that one causes the other. If one causes the other, there has to be some sort of process, no? Cause means process, no? So we can call it mutually present cause and effect, but it's not a very satisfying concept, is it?
If cause and effect imply process, then simultaneous cause and effect does not make sense, no? And doesn't cause and effect imply process? Otherwise, what are we talking about? So that's what I would say about the first, and then about, we actually don't see anything, at least not anything of the sort that we think we see, which is common in neuroscience. Not to pretend that I have much understanding of that, but nonetheless, it is frequently explained that the whole structure of consciousness is by no means a reflection of reality, and in fact, completely contrary to the nature of reality.
So in that case, then I guess we can ask the same. So if that is the case, if there's something that, whether we say it's the brain or any other substrate, it could be many, it could be physical, mental, who knows what substrate, beyond the two of them that is somehow responsible, that is the projector or the source of my fantasies. So if that is the case, then also there are no observed conditions. So then in this case, I suppose the neuroscientist and others who have this idea of a substrate which is entirely beyond the fabric of perception, and yeah. That also makes it very difficult to say that we can actually intellectually understand that substrate if it really is utterly beyond the perception, but that's a side issue. But if that is the idea, then it's not possible to say that there are observed conditions. I would say no. Wouldn't you agree? If all of this is fantasy, then.. that doesn't leave any room for observed conditions, no? There's nothing then that causally structures my experience.
Somebody said something? So if that... So is it then the case that now we are in a situation where...
Yeah, we can give up the idea that there are actual things that are responsible for my perceptions? If so, then there are various ways that one can do that, which is what you were getting at. It's not obvious where we then go from there.
I suppose one way, one path that one could take is that which is evinced in these neuroscientific approaches, where there's some idea of profound illusion.
Profound illusion. But then, if this is profound illusion, it's a good question whether we then rightly... What we can rightly say about the substrate that is responsible for this illusion, no? This is something that we can keep as a question on the burner as we proceed, no? If really all of this is hallucination, which is... I think one way of understanding neuroscientific perspectives, we hallucinate, then there's maybe some usefulness of it or whatever. But some are very... Of course there's no unified perspective of cognitive science either, but some go very far in this declaration of the whole realm of perception as being wholly illusory or just sheer hallucination.
And suddenly when we apply an analysis of the kind that we have here, then perhaps it does seem like all of this is hallucination. And then if all of this, the objects that I see and my own perception of it, is something that cannot be explained in terms of causality, then perhaps there's something suspect about appealing to a sense of a substrate that is beyond. Where are we licensed to designate the existence of such a substrate? Think about it now. What we're saying is that there's nothing that... That my sense of there being things that present themselves to my perceptions, such that I can have moments of perception, if that is a baseless notion that I have, then what could be the basis for me subsequently saying that there's some transcendent substrate that is the source of these perceptions? So I think this is something if we ever get there, then in chapter three, which is about perception, then it's something that we will have an opportunity to really zoom in on the relation between the seen and the seer, the process of seeing. I think it's a very... satisfying and rewarding approach to take to these kinds of analysis, to apply it to live perception. This is also what we will see in the next chapter, where the topic is movement, and not just movement as a conceptual structure, but movement as we know it from experience. So here in this chapter on conditions.. because there is this thing with cause and effect that makes it cause and effect related, but also occurring at different times, we are a little bit more abstract in this initial chapter than in the subsequent two, because we're talking about two principles, conditions and their effects, which necessarily aren't simultaneous. So we are a bit more.. the perspective is slightly more abstract than what it will be when concerned with present movement and with present seeing and so on. But here we get a taste of it anyway, in verse eight. Then there's this notion of an immediately preceding condition for consciousness, which is the moment that was there before, the moment of mind that was there before, having to have ceased. So that is one of these four Abhidharmic conditions, which is meant to be an exhaustive summary of all possible conditions. So just like the observed condition, the immediately preceding condition is something that only occurs with consciousness, with moments of mind. And in critique of that principle, then the verse number nine says, "If phenomena have not arisen, cessation makes no sense, hence an immediately preceding condition is untenable. If it has ceased, how could it be a condition?" So the idea is, as we just said, that there is my moment of, again, let's say visual perception now. I see the camera in this moment, but then for me to see the next moment of camera, which will be a little different from the one I had otherwise just now, my present moment of seeing has to cease.
And that itself, that cessation of the perception that was there before, is a condition. Without that, the next moment cannot occur. It's also very plausible and makes good sense. If we talk about a unique moment of experience, then because it's unique and it's a unique moment, then in other words the moment that was there just before must be over before this unique moment can happen. Agree? Unless that has ceased, then there's no chance for that to happen, this unique perception.
But if phenomena have not arisen, so meaning again the phenomena are the factors of cognition, the moment of perception, for example, the moment of visual perception, for example, if that has not yet arisen, then it makes no sense to say that the moment that was there before has ceased. In other words, if my moment of looking at this petal, let's say, of course it is typically in Abhidharma, these moments are very short, and so when I look here I see an object I think that is ongoing, but in fact the perception of an enduring object is something that is imputed on the basis of moments, so very short moments. When I look here I think maybe I can call it a moment of seeing a flower. Abhidharma also has room for that, a moment of seeing a flower, and that can take some time, but there's also this notion of very short, extremely short moments that are like a string, a string of moments one after the other. So if my moment of looking at this petal has not yet, or let's say like this, first I look at this petal here to the left, and then I move slightly to the right and look at another petal. If the moment of looking at the petal to the left is not over yet, then of course the subsequent moment of just for the sake of being able to distinguish them more easily, looking at the next petal, cannot have arisen yet. So if, in other words, the second moment has not yet arisen, it doesn't make sense to say that the original moment of looking at the left petal is over. Very simple. It sounds a little convoluted, but the idea is very, very simple, no?
So therefore it does not make sense to say that the cessation of that moment conditions or creates or contributes to the manifestation of the second moment, no?
And on the other hand, if it has ceased, if that moment is over, then it is no more. And so something that doesn't exist and is gone, how could that serve as a condition for the arising of anything? So either we say that the moment is still there, and in that case it doesn't make sense to say that it has ceased and it's the cessation of it that conditions the arising of the next moment, because it's still there. And on the other hand, if it has ceased, then it's gone and is no more, and how could something that is nothing contribute to the manifestation of anything?
So that is about the immediately preceding condition. And then there's only one left, yeah? And that is the... What is it called now?
Ruling condition, yeah, thank you. The ruling condition, which is defined simply as any form of condition, which is not any of the first three that we have talked about, yeah? So the first was the causal condition, which is what we understand to be the main cause, like the seed in the case of the growth of the sprout, or the perceived... No, that would not be... Yeah, the object that is there to be seen also works as a cause for the production of a moment of consciousness. The next is the observed condition, which is something that then only is relevant to mental events. And there we talk about the percept itself, so to speak, distinguished in that way, which it makes good intuitive sense to say is something that effectuates our perception. And on the other hand we have seen that that actually doesn't make much sense, and perhaps talking about the percept is just another way of talking about the experience itself, the moment, and there's nothing causal about this at all. And then there was the immediately preceding condition that a moment of mind that was there before a given effect must have ceased if that given effect, another moment of mind, has to arise, yeah? So any kind of condition that is not any of these three is yet a condition, and yet something that contributes to the manifestation of the effect, is a ruling condition. So in the case of the seed, obvious things like rich soil, moisture, sunshine, and so on, and time, whatever else needs to be there for the seed to sprout. So all of these many different conditions that are as a whole referred to as the ruling condition, the way the text dismisses them is to say since there is no existence of things that have no nature, saying this occurs because of that would not make any sense. "This occurs because of that" is one of the most classic ways of describing dependent origination. It's the Buddha's own words for what dependent origination is. It's about being, it's precisely these sorts of relationship. You have something present, and by virtue of that being present, something else will come about. If that first thing is not there, the second thing will not be. This is how the Buddha speaks in the Sūtras also, to explain dependent origination, no? But things that have no nature don't exist, he says here. So it could not make any sense to say that this occurs because of that.
Yeah. Doesn't this sound a little too much to say that things that don't have any nature of their own don't exist? And therefore, this statement that because this is, that comes to be, because this exists, that will be, is nonsensical.
In the commentary there is some anticipation of an objection. Someone says that this is not really a good argument, what you're giving there, because it's actually not an argument at all, because if the person you are talking to already believes and understands that things have no nature, and therefore don't exist, then they already agree with the statement that you say. If they don't believe and understand why things have no nature of their own, then they will not accept the evidence that you produce to make your point. So why is it? So what the stanza claims is that the statement "This occurs because of that," is nonsensical. And why? Because things that have no nature don't exist. And so if someone already agrees that things do not exist by virtue of their own nature, then they also agree with this statement, so there's no point in telling it to somebody like that. And on the other hand, if we're talking to someone who does not believe it, then the very part of the argument that you rely on to be the proof or the evidence that leads to the conclusion will not be a valid proof or a valid evidence for someone like that, because that person doesn't accept that things such as this have no nature of their own. But then it is suggested that it still makes good sense to do this, because for someone who has not understood that things have no nature, then that point can be made by pointing to dependent origination,
by noticing how all of these things are dependent on things that are other than themselves, which again depend on other things and so on, infinitely, then it becomes clear that there's nothing that has a nature of its own. If all of this is what it is, in dependence on something else, which again is what it is only in dependence on something else and not by virtue of itself at all, and if that discovery can be made with respect to absolutely everything, so that there's no possible end to this search for a ground, then that's as much as saying that things have no nature of their own. If all what they are is thoroughly dependent on other things, which again are dependent on other things, that again are dependent on other things, again and again and again, infinitely so, without any even hope of finding a ground that can be the basis for this kind of dependent origination, then obviously nothing exists by virtue of itself. And so from that point of view, what really are we saying when we say that "this occurs because of that"? What is "this"? What is "that"?
So in this way there are four verses here, 7 to 10, that each deal with,
that together deal with each of the four conditions.
Then in 11, now we're talking about, again going back to the notion of whether the effect is present in the cause, but from a slightly different angle, it says "In separate conditions and in their gathering, the effect is entirely absent. How could something that does not exist in the conditions ever arise from them?
So now we're thinking not of just cause and effect, but of effect based on a whole matrix of causes and conditions, which we together call the conditions for the arising of the effect. And those conditions have to come together, they have to gather, assemble before we can have the effect occur. So let us try to look at whether it's possible for an effect to be present in such a set of conditions.
There's one effect we say, there's one sprout for example, that grew from a seed, from the moisture, from the rich soil, from the sunshine, from the openness of space and so on. But the effect is not present in those conditions individually. The sprout is definitely not present in the soil, it's not present in the sunshine and so on. If we were to say that it is, then we would have to be able to find it there, but we don't, we clearly don't find the effect in the individual conditions.
And if they are in their gathering, then what is the gathering apart from the individual causes? If we say that there is such a gathering, then we're still left with the same problem of having to be able to notice that the effect is present in the gathering of conditions. And we can't just say that the effect is the gathering of the conditions. That's what we found out already in the first stanza, no? We can't say that they're one and the same. So if we want to keep a notion of the gathering of causes and conditions having somehow the effect within them, then we'll have to say that there is a part of it, a part of these gathered causes and conditions that contains the effect. And then there's something else that doesn't. And then, in other words, now we say that the conditions are part the effect and part conditions. It's not very plausible, yeah?
So in this way, it becomes very difficult to say that the effect is present in the conditions. In fact, we find that it is entirely absent from it. When we look at matters in this way, the gathering of the conditions on an individual basis, we don't find the effect there at all. It's wholly absent. But how could something that does not exist in the conditions ever arise from them? So that's also what we have been considering before in the context of the first stanza.
If an effect is entirely absent in a purported set of conditions, then what makes that suggested set of conditions, 'conditions'? They're just as unrelated to the effect as anything else that we would readily agree are not conditions for the arising of that effect. So if the sprout is not present at all in the seed and in the soil and in the moisture, etc.
Then how can we say that the seed, the soil, the moisture, etc. are any different than stone, fire, whatever else we don't consider a condition for the growth of a sprout?
So in other words, cause and non-cause become equal. If we say that the effect is not present in the conditions, then we have no longer a way of identifying something as the condition for anything because what goes for the purported condition goes also for anything that we refer to as a non-cause.
So if without being present there it were still to arise from conditions, why would it not also arise from that which is not a condition? That is exactly the absurd consequence that comes from this idea that you can have distinct cause and effect. Effect and conditions exist and are different from each other. If that is the suggestion, then how can we make sense of our perception of causal relationships? Anything could then arise based on anything, if this were the case.
The effect may be of its condition's nature, but these conditions have no nature of their own. How could the effect of that which is not an entity itself be of the nature of that which conditions it?
So here we then go back to an idea of effects that are of the nature of the conditions, that there is something that ties them, that the effect is what it is by virtue of its conditions. So the causal power is somehow responsible for the manifestation of the effect.
But what we then refer to as responsible for the character of the effect are themselves things that don't have a nature of their own. That is what we just recognized by seeing that the soil and the moisture and so on also depends itself.. each of these elements depend on other things and ultimately are constructed based on other apparent entities, which again are in just the same way. So how could the effect of that which is not an entity itself, meaning the conditions, we have no grounds for saying that they exist as conditions, that there is something that makes them what they are on their own. Whatever they are is all due to something else, which again is due to something else and so on without any end. So how could the effect of that which is not an entity itself be of the nature of that which conditions it?
So since these conditions don't have a nature of itself, how can we allow ourselves to say that the effect is something that is the carrier of the nature of the conditions? So this chapter 13 is a way of defending the idea of real causal arising by saying that yes, there is real causal arising, because we have causal factors, conditions, which have a certain power, a certain character, a certain constitution, and it's that force or that power of the conditions that transfers and gives rise to the nature of the effect, such that when the effect is present, it is really the nature of the causes that is in there in the effect. But since the causes and conditions themselves have no identity, how could we say that there's something which has achieved identity by virtue of those?
Hence, the effect is not of the nature of its conditions, nor of the nature of that which are not its conditions. So at this point of conclusion, when we look at an effect, then we can now conclude that the effect is not a carrier of the nature of the causes that produced it, but it could not be the carrier of things that are not its causes either. So what kind of effect is that? It cannot feasibly be the carrier of its causes, nor can it be the carrier of what are not its causes, as there is no effect. How could they be conditions as well as non-conditions? So the whole framework of cause, effect, and that which is not cause, just a big question mark. So let's end there. And then tomorrow, try to go through the whole chapter here, and really think where you are at now with this. In two ways, think about intellectually how convincing or not has this been? And probably it is, if it is very convincing, then try to note down carefully why exactly it is so convincing. If it is not convincing at all, then of course you note that down also, but probably a lot of this is also zooming in on the grey zone, where it seems Yes, but... that is exactly where to throw the light of analysis and just observation very clearly. It is where we are in two minds. And so that is very important. That's probably the primary importance at this point, that you think exactly how much sense does this make to me?
Is each and every step in these lines of reason irrefutable? Try to set the bar, what should I say? Ask for much. Is it the case that the first chapter, the 'Analysis of Conditions' in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā presents lines of reason that are completely irrefutable? Or not?
Try and see if you.. tomorrow, does everyone agree that this is completely irrefutable? Let's see, you know? And if you are hesitant to say this, then why? It is maybe a good way of bringing out our sort of lingering doubts. If you say, can I stand up and say "This reasoning is utterly irrefutable," or not? And then if you don't feel confident to do that, then try to think what is it that makes you hesitate? And if you do feel that this is completely irrefutable, then try to think, as we tried also today, where does this then take us and what to say now on the basis of this? Okay, thank you and all the best. Tomorrow we can then begin with chapter two, I suppose.
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