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Root of The Middle Way – Session 12
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- Buddhist Classics and Philosophy
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- Rangjung Yeshe Institute - Nepal
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Excerpt
Session 12 challenges conventional thinking about causality and perception and invites students to engage in philosophical and contemplative inquiry to navigate the complexities of Nagarjuna's teachings.
Description
Session 12 delves into Abhidharma’s four conditions for causality. It questions the causal condition’s compatibility with no effectual arising. Students explore the pragmatic utility of this framework, especially in karma discussions. The lecture highlights the difficulty of grasping Nagarjuna’s Middle Way philosophy, blending conventional and ultimate truths. It probes the concept of difference without relying on sameness. Observing conditions for perception are discussed, highlighting the absence of observed conditions when perception is direct.
Related Course Info
- Root of the Middle Way – Mūlamadhyamakakārikā A course on Nagarjuna’s brilliantly sharp reasoning, taught by Dr. Thomas Doctor at the Rangjung Yeshe Institute over a month. For everyone with an interest in the way things really are.
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"To the true teacher who reveals this peace, the complete pacification of constructs, to the perfect Buddha I bow down." The following four stanzas, they are each a refutation of one of the four conditions that were mentioned in stanza two. So now we'll zoom in on that framework for understanding causality, which is advanced in the Abhidharma, where it is said that there are four conditions and no fifth, so all that has a causal power can be included in the framework of the four conditions. Oh, sorry, I haven't logged on.
So is there someone who can explain meanwhile while I open up what the four conditions are, just very briefly, according to the Abhidharma? Or is there anyone who has a question about what those four are? While I open... Okay, Student: "I'll try to at least list them." Yeah, thank you. Student: "Causal condition, that is what we consider the main cause in the process of causation, like the seed in relation to the sprout. Then there's the objective condition, which is specific to the process of cognition, so that is the object of cognition, basically. Then there's the immediately preceding condition, which is the cessation of the preceding moment of mind that produces the next moment of mind, which is the cognitive event, basically, triggered by the objective condition. And then there's the ruling condition, which contains basically everything that is also relevant in the causal process, that is not one of these former three conditions. I've on occasion heard an explanation that, in fact, the ruling condition contains everything in the whole universe that is not an obstruction to the arising of the result and not one of these three." Yeah, I believe that is the Sarvāstivādan account. And then there are other Abhidharma schools that say that's too broad, it has to be more actively, not just non-obstructive. So this is a profound and elaborate framework that is discussed at length in the Abhidharma, the four conditions.
And so we can see this as then responding to an Abhidharma scholar, who says that there's certainly such a thing as conditions. They are a key framework for understanding the nature of reality. And they are explained in these four categories very well, taught by the Buddha. So what more do you want? They are a perfectly coherent, comprehensive and exhaustive account of causality. But then there's a critique of each one of them, and beginning with stanza 7, where it says, "If no existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent phenomena comes into being, how can we speak of effectuating conditions? When this is the case, they do not make sense."
So if there is no arising of a result that is existent, or a result that is non-existent, or a result that is a combination of existent and non-existent, then how can we say that there is a cause of anything? This is the refutation of the first, the causal condition. Basically, as you said, it is that which we consider the main cause for the essence of the object, so to speak. So in the case of the sprout, it is the seed. If it is a rice sprout, it is a rice seed that.. ..that we would consider the effectuating condition or the causal condition. So what would be wrong with an existent phenomenon? And so phenomenon is dharma, translated as phenomenon. But since then, I have always sort of been hesitant about, or unsatisfied with phenomena and phenomenon for dharma. Basically because it doesn't have to be explained that way, but generally the association with the phenomenon is an object. And there is no sense whatsoever about a dharma being specifically an object or a subject or an action. So it is not a very good translation. But it is a quite widespread one, so it is the one I used in the translation here. Since then, I have come to very much like 'factor' as a translation for dharma. So no factor comes into being. A factor is nice because it is neutral, can be all sorts of things, subject, object..
Basically whatever makes a difference somewhere is a factor. It is something to be taken into account and something that belongs in the context. And I think that is a good way of understanding dharma. It is something that is a genuine factor in whichever context it is that we are talking about. So what are the factors that are relevant to this event here? Then we can go on talking about that. But it is very different if we talk about the phenomena in this situation. Then it is like us looking at it and sort of describing what we see. And dharma is not like that. It is just the framework of reality or the components of reality. So I think dharma factor is not so bad. Of course dharma is probably still better. But so far I think factor captures a lot about some of the associations that come with dharma. Of course it is an extremely complex term to translate because Vasubhandu himself says it has these ten distinct meanings, which are really, really distinct from each other. So it is very difficult to.. Again factor is so broad that if you want you can sort of make an effort to include it, to make it relevant to all those ten different contexts. So if no existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent factor comes into being, we could say, how can we speak of effectuating conditions? What would be wrong with saying that an existent factor comes into being? Well it already sounds a little strange to say that the effect that comes into being is an existent effect. Of course we want the effect to be something real, something that is there as an effect. But to say that an existent effect comes into being sounds a little off. And rightly so. If it exists then it doesn't come into being. It already has its own being. So why would it be something that comes into being? So the arising effects. Like if we look at this event and say, so what are the factors and the effects that come into being here? Then we couldn't say that the effects that emerge and come into being here are existent effects because then they would be beyond arising. They would be existent by their own nature. And so they would be beyond, really, beyond anything influenced by causes and conditions. So the very sort of strange ring that it has to say that an existent phenomenon or an existent factor comes into being actually shows us a whole lot about what is wrong with the idea of effects that are essentially real coming into being. If they are real and existent by their own, by their very identity, their very nature, then they couldn't come into being, they couldn't be effects. So there is a contradiction between effect and existent in other words. As strange as it sounds. And what about a non-existent? We could say, okay, it's not an effect when something comes into being, it's still, the effect is still a thing of the future. So it's at the time when the effect emerges, then the effect isn't existent yet. In other words it's non-existent. But again that also sounds a little strange, not quite right to put it in those terms. And rightly so, because if, and we are right in having this reservation, because how could something that really doesn't exist come into being? If non-existent is a correct descriptor of the effect, if that is something that is in the nature of the effect that it does not exist, then no matter how many causes and conditions we would bring together, that would still remain just that, non-existent. Because we have said that effects as they emerge are non-existent. The arising effect does not exist, well, then it doesn't arise. So an effect that exists cannot arise because it already exists. An effect that doesn't exist cannot arise because it does not exist. Then how about both existent and non-existent? We need to do better than that, and we need to find a way of describing the nature of the effect that is more sensitive to its character than just saying existent or non-existent. We have to be able to say something else that probably captures what it is that takes place when an effect comes into being. So if we cannot say that it exists and we cannot say that it does not exist, then we could say perhaps that there is a part of it that is already there, but it is not fully manifest, so it is also to some extent not yet there. But it is not wholly absent, there is something that is coming into being, we can see it with our eyes, yet something is coming into being, so it is not that we have the full product there already either. We can see that too with our own eyes. So how well does that sound? How promising is that as a solution? Probably not very promising at all. Because in the same way as we talked about self and other, arising from self and other in the context of the first stanza, if we say that the effect is both existent and non-existent, at this point we are taking two qualifiers that we have both seen are completely..cannot be applied in any way whatsoever to the effect. Existent effects do not arise, nor do non-existent effects. So by just combining those two, what would we get? It is zero plus zero in terms of accuracy and accounting for the nature of things.
So how can we speak of effectuating conditions, then? How can we at all then speak about causal conditions when this is the case? So the very principle does not make sense, he says. So what do you think about that? Does it make sense? Is this a proper way of looking at the idea of causes that create effects? Causes that are accompanied by other conditions? But it's intuitively a quite compelling way to talk about causality, to say that there are certain things that are really the key cause. Perhaps it is a compelling way, but it could be a compelling and intuitively plausible way to talk about causality, to say that there are certain things that are basically the cause, and then there are other things that just assist in the manifestation of the effect based on that cause. So seed and sprout is a good example, but there are myriads of examples of that. So is this kind of perspective on the arising of effects relevant? Is it relevant to ask about the effect that comes into being, whether it is something that exists, does not exist, or both exists and does not?
Student: "I think this account is very solid from an ultimate perspective, but I was wondering when it comes to a discussion of karma, maybe these four categories become more useful again, in the sense that there are certain karmic actions that kind of seem to be more relevant in producing karmic results than others, and having some kind of breakdown, acknowledging that that is a relative kind of account, that is not actually talking about any inherent existence of the causes or their effects, but simply on the level of conventional experience in terms of the way that karma ripens, perhaps having these four categories once again becomes more useful." Do you think it is particularly about karmic causality that they are useful?
Student: "I am not sure exactly what you are asking." I think that makes all very good sense what you say, but I think it also makes sense, even if we don't talk in particular about karmic ripening, but just causality in general, as we have it in the world also, without any understanding of karma, to say that there are causes, causal factors, and that those give rise to effects seems like a very unavoidable notion to have. Student: "I guess I am not sure I agree, unless you are speaking about the way in which humans, or those who could understand an account like this, would interact with the world. I think that an account like this that claims to be a description of objective reality is actually not useful. I only think it is useful pragmatically for determining how to act." Okay.
Yeah
So, then we are talking about these as merely in terms of whether they are useful or not? I think that is a nice interpretation of Mādhyamaka philosophy, to say like that. It is also a question of what really does that mean? And what do we mean when we say that? It sounds very solid to say for determining correct causes of action. If it is really a tool for determining correct causes of action, it sounds like we are talking about... We have also been saying that there is no arising of effects. So we nonetheless say that this framework of causality is useful for determining correct causes of action. So on the one hand we say there is no arising of effects, and on the other hand we say that there are useful tools for determining correct causes of action. One sounds much more... They don't seem to fit very well together, no? Student: "I think they do. I don't think you need to accept the inherent existence of effects, just like you don't have to accept the inherent existence of causes. Like, both are true on a conventional level for sentient beings.." But the only thing is just what does it mean exactly to be true on the conventional level? Student: "It doesn't mean anything." You are becoming very good. Go out and teach the world. Thank you. Like, very soon when we begin to think about this, and when we study more also and read commentaries now, the idea of two truths becomes very predominant, and it's a very natural and powerful way of thinking about things. But it's also by nature problematic. That's why it's useful, the idea of the two truths. It's because it's not just a solution to our problem, but it's something to keep us on our toes and keep us going. I would say, yeah. Anything else?
It's on already. Student: "You made the connection back to the reasoning in the first verse, and there's something about that that's been bothering me. And I think it came up, I wasn't able to attend the second week, I think it came up in that week, but I didn't feel satisfied by how it was addressed. So, yeah, I just keep coming back to the possibility that cause and effect could be... I feel satisfied with the reasoning that they're not the same, they're not different, and they're not both, but I keep wondering about neither, neither the same, and neither different, and then in this verse, what about the possibility of neither existent or non-existent?" Yeah, this was very reminiscent of that, I thought, no? Stanza 7. So, yeah, maybe you can explain a little more about what it is that makes it... Okay, we say that, and you say that it makes perfect sense to say that cause and effect could not be the same, that there could be no arising of anything, whatever was there on the first occasion would also be what was there on the latter.
But, and you also said that difference of cause and effect does not make sense, because we said that if cause and effect were by nature different from each other, then cause and effect are as different from eachother as are cause and effect and non-cause. So both of those don't, either of them is useless as a description of the nature of cause and effect. So how about combining them, saying that there's something about the cause and something about the effect that is the same, but that is also something that makes them different. And what is it about the... So then we said that this is not, this doesn't give us any superior position at all, because we're taking two things or two potential solutions that we have both, that we have looked at separately and seen that they are completely unsuccessful, that they don't even apply a little bit, that they have zero relevance to the issue that we're trying to explain.
So, we could say zero relevance plus zero relevance, adding those two together is still zero. But then you said there's something that makes you think that this is not quite right still, or maybe you can explain that. Student: "I think I don't know how to think anymore about it. It just feels like logically neither same nor different, like we should account for that in some way." So neither rather than both? Oh, sorry. "Yeah, neither." Yeah, but what is that neither? That's the new crucial thing. So that's our project, to find out if there is a fourth mode of arising. But actually we said already that there couldn't be. "Well, what I recall of the way you responded to that when it came up before is that we thought really hard about whether, and we didn't find anything, but what if we just made a mistake? Like, why can't this be considered now?" Yeah, so that is true. And this we will keep as our project. And so what are our chances of coming to a real conclusion about that, is also a good question. So if we say that, "Ok, we saw from the beginning, we took a lot of time to look at, Ok, is that all anything that arises?" Yes, we would have to say that there is. It seems suddenly like that. It would be crazy to say not. And then we said, is it the case that if something arises, it will either have to be that there's something that determines and influences the manifestation of these things that arise that would be their causes and conditions? Or if that is not the case, no matter how complex those causal factors may be, there are obviously myriads of ways that we could understand such causes and their combinations. But if we say that there aren't any causal factors, then things are random. So we have arrived at two sole options. As soon as we have accepted that things arise, then we have also accepted that either things, the arising of things is somehow influenced and restricted by certain factors.
Or otherwise, if that's not the case, they are utterly random. There's nothing at all that determines their manifestation. So we said that. And then we tried to look at the first option, which seems to be the one that is in tune with our perceptions, our ideas about this world, namely that there are causes and conditions that give rise to something. And then we said, OK, maybe it's a little bit unusual way of looking at it in this way, but does it make sense to say that if there are causes and if there are conditions, we should be able to say whether those two are the same or not, or whether they are different from each other? And we said that, OK, if you want to go there, why not? It seems like an all right question to ask, and it seems one that we should be qualified to give an answer to also.
So it's an innocent and ok question to ask whether cause and effect are the same. But we then quickly dismissed that and said for the reasons that we have again mentioned here, there would be no arising possible if cause and effect are the same, then the effect would be there as the cause as well. The whole idea of causality becomes impossible in that way. And then we looked at the second option and said there cannot be any connection between cause and effect. If causes and effects are by nature different from each other, there's nothing that ties them together.
So we went on with the third alternative. And then we also spent time thinking of ok, are these two same or different? Are they exhaustive categories? And yeah, I mean, we can bring that question up again now. If two things are not the same, are they then different from each other?
Is there any way of thinking of a way that two things could not be the same and yet not different? Apart from this third option that we have also looked at? And it seemed very, very hard to think of something that could be a way of capturing two things that says they are not the same but not different. So we can think two things that are not the same and not different either. It's possible to have that thought, but not much more to say about it. We can think and say those words, but what really would they mean? But basically, we will keep… So what would it be like to come to a real conclusion here? That's what I wanted to say with this long repetition. So what would it be like to come to a place where we're not just very convinced, but still in the process of discovery, and then be at a place where that's no longer the case and we wholly agree, we have no doubt whatsoever? What would it take to get there? What would you say? = Like what would be the difference between now and that future time when…?
Student: "Yeah, I'm not sure. I think I'm just… Yeah, what you said about like you can have that thought, but then sort of what does it mean? I think I'm just stuck there." Right? So, but we would… What to say? Stuck there, yeah. But stuck in the sense that we can't say that's all there is to it. It's just a thought. It's just a set of concepts, but they don't apply to anything. We're not quite comfortable with saying that, except some people are, the gentleman over there.
So what is the difference between being in this situation where we are very… We have learned a whole lot and it's super convincing, but we feel that we have to still keep this… There's still something to be tested, yeah? And then presumably you can also somehow complete the analysis of the Middle Way, that goes with the discourse about the Middle Way, that it's possible to somehow get the point, whatever it may be, that it's possible to reach inside into the great Middle Way, the Prajñāpāramitā insight, and so on. So what would be the difference between where we are at now and that?
So yeah, let's try to keep that with us as well, that question. Somebody that has a question, answer to that? Yeah?
"Andrew, online, do you want to unmute yourself and say something?"
Student: "Yes, can you hear me?" Yes. "Thank you. I just wanted to ask about what seems to be a common way to disarm Nāgārjuna, or what seems to be, to me, like a common route that people both in the class and maybe in the literature also, perhaps are taking to sort of solve the problem that seems to me maybe to be almost instinctual in me as well, which is to maybe come up with some nicer or neater notion of existence or some easier idea of existence or non-existence that seems easier to defeat. It's kind of an inkling I've been having throughout the class in regards to your questions. You know, if we say inherent existence, for example, then in fact it's a lot easier to deal with a lot of Nāgārjuna's problems. But then if you think about, you know, if I analyze my own experience, then I see that actually, if I just think about my own sort of phenomenological ideas about "here is something," then actually I have not gotten rid of Nāgārjuna's problems at all, if that makes sense. And it seems like this may be a problem with the sort of the two truths solution as well. In other words, yes, if we say, well, as long as we make no ontological commitments or whatsoever, whenever we say existence, then we're just fine. When in reality, if we think about, you know, I press a switch in my house when I want the light to turn on, then in fact we have all of Nāgārjuna's problems right back in front of us, regardless of the nice things I said about not making ontological commitments. So it's more of an intuition that we almost, if you know the homunculus fallacy, that we see a little, positing a little man inside of our head to solve the problem of vision, it almost seems like we have an instinctual homunculus solution for Nāgārjuna's problems coming up, where we keep inventing realms where it's easy to get rid of them and he sort of keeps sneaking back in, myself included. So I just wondered if you could offer some, it's been something bothering me continually, especially because I seem to notice the same instinct in myself in wanting to deal with it. I just wanted to raise that." Thank you. Excellent.
I still wanted also to hear a little bit more about the kind of situation that we're in now, at this point in our analysis, and then the idea of having come to the end of it, so that there is no doubt anymore. Like now we are very convinced, perhaps, and if we aren't, then now is the wonderful time to express why we aren't convinced. But it's also possible that we feel in many ways very, very helpless to object, but not convinced. So helpless to object, but not convinced. So what would be the difference between being in this situation of helpless in the face of this kind of analysis, and yet not convinced in our heart of hearts? That's what I wanted to call into question. And then what you described very well.
Something that is really part and parcel
of the exploration of the Middle Way, and the philosophical traditions that have emerged around these teachings. So our natural inclination, and also the philosopher's inclination, is to find a solution.
So a way of accommodating equally our perception of causality, and the baselessness, groundlessness of causes and conditions that we have come face to face with when we explore these teachings. So we would like there to be a way of saying yes to our, to somehow, we cannot deny the way things appear to us, no? We can try to, but it's not a very satisfying way to be. And at the same time we can't deny what appears to us when we look at this either. So we would like of course to be able to combine those two. But it's a bit similar to, like we can ask ourselves, what to say?
So we would like to combine those two, but the difficulty, and we can try to sort of safeguard our expressions and qualify them very carefully, and insist "I have no ontological commitment when I say this." But if there is something that cannot be denied, which is not just emptiness, then if it's not just emptiness, it's not emptiness. So the two truths intrinsically is a very problematic structure. We like to say that they should be confirming one another and inseparable and so on. That is totally true also.
But it is totally true and as a great account of the two truths, as a philosophical system, we don't want to say that they are separate from each other and knowledge of one should highlight the truth of the other.
But it's also possible to not just be a philosopher about these things, but try to think as a good philosopher, presumably does. So what really does this mean? My philosophy is not just about making things fit conceptually, but my philosophy is about understanding the world as it is. So how satisfying is this, what I've just been saying? Is that the solution or is there something deeper? And then I think again we can recollect His Holiness the Dalai Lama's advice and Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche's advice to approach this type of study without separating learning, reflecting and meditating, and in particular acknowledging the way that the two approaches, analytic meditation and the yogi's free rest, and that those can actually very well be combined and should be combined, so that we spend time analyzing. And when we come to a point of what seems insightful, then we allow ourselves to just take the insight and see what it does,
be informed in a very open and wholehearted way in our whole being by the insight, without any expectation about what it might mean or what it should mean, but just try to acknowledge, and then we can continue thinking more about these things. So I think that's what I would say. So at the same time, learning about different ways of understanding the true truths is so rich. It's an unsuccessful device ultimately, the two truths, but it is very, very effective. And it opens so many ways of talking about these things if we begin to use them.
Okay. Thank you. So a friend of mine, he wrote, a friend of mine that I have learned a lot from, he wrote about same and difference, so perhaps I'll bring this up here, since this is what we're talking about. "One of the problems I have with the discussion is the way we talk about difference. By opposing it to sameness, we end up with a concept of difference that is conceptually ruled by the way we think about sameness. Difference becomes sameness of that which is not identical. In other words, the model of thinking about difference is still identity.
So this is very interesting way of putting it. It's a kind of dizzying. So he says the way we talk about difference is not really right, because when we say, okay, difference is not same then the way we think about difference is governed by how we're used to think about sameness. So the difference becomes the sameness of those things that are not the same.
So then he says, we're actually still talking in terms of identity. So I think that's a very interesting observation and I think it's true. But you could also say the same, I think, about identity, that the way we think about identity is the... What did he say? Is the identity of those things that are not the same. So when we say identity, we also are still thinking with the framework of difference. So I think this is a very good way of showing deconstructed and really baseless nature of... except from just these kinds of mutual dependencies between same and difference. So then he says, for me, this raises the question, what would be a concept of difference that is true to the idea of difference? It is continually something that is continually different from itself and does not rely on the vocabulary of sameness for its definition. So that's like what we were talking about before. Is there a way of talking about causality, which is not within this framework? Is it possible to talk about difference in a way that does not depend on sameness, on the framework of sameness, so to speak? So this we can try and think of also, yeah?
It seems, once you begin to look at it in the way we have been doing, then it seems impossible to find a way of having a concept of difference that does not imply sameness. Of course, we can say things again.
We can say that this is the concept of difference that does not rely on the framework of identity. But how much more is there to it than the words? At the same time, words can be and are often very powerful. But do they really capture the way things are?
A concept of difference that is not dependent on sameness. It's hard to imagine, no? So then there is the one concept that came to my mind, is the concept of the ultimate described in terms of seclusion, so like the secluded nature, the rnampa dbenpa. I forget what it's called in Sanskrit. So that's a concept perhaps that is pure difference. It's the ultimate described as that which is wholly different. But again, it's a concept. And if you want, you can criticize that concept too in the same way and say that it is still not free of the framework of identity. So the next verse..
So he says, when this is the case, it does not make sense to speak about causal conditions. Then in number 8, it is explained that with existent phenomena there are no observations whatsoever. How could a phenomena for which there is no observation ever relate to an observation? So this is looking at the observed condition.
So it is that which makes us, we say that the observed condition is something that is only relevant to mental events because here we're talking about the thing that causes our perception. So there must be something there. When I see a flower, there must be something there that makes me see the flower, such as the flower. So however we want to talk about the causes of perception, it's possible to look at, if perception is something that is causally determined and causally restricted, then there must be some things that are the causes for the percepts arising in my mind. So it could be that there is a material world out there that somehow impinges on my senses and I register something mentally, or it could be that the whole world is mental, of a mental nature, and that these objects are just, I think of them as external to consciousness, but actually they are not. Whichever way we talk about things, or if we say that all of reality is a physical reality and the appearance of consciousness is just epiphenomenal and so on, we can still talk about causes for our percepts, presumably. So I don't think we have to stay in the Abhidharma context either, to talk about observed conditions. It's a very powerful concept that we are dealing with, namely the very idea of there being things in the world that can make me have perceptions and experiences of something.
But if the observation, meaning if I already see the flower, then whatever it was that caused my perception of the flower is not there anymore, because I have manifest perception. And if I'm not seeing the flower, then how could there be a cause for my perception of flower? With existent phenomenon, meaning if my visual perception of the object, the flower, is already there, there are no observations, meaning there are no observed conditions. There is nothing that conditions my perception because the perception is manifest. It's not subject to conditions anymore, it's manifest.
In that we are talking just one moment of perception. So if there is that one moment of seeing the thing we are talking about, it's not being conditioned anymore by an object in the world that makes me see things like that. That could be a second moment similar to that afterwards, that's a different thing. It's not that I can't go on seeing flower, that's perfectly possible. But the thing that conditions my present perception of flower cannot be there when I see it already. So in this way there are no observed conditions whatsoever in the case of existent phenomena of consciousness. So how could it be a phenomenon for which there is no observation? How could a phenomenon for which there is no observation, meaning how could this phenomenon that we are talking about then again is the phenomenon of consciousness, perceiving something, visual perception of a flower let's say. But how could a phenomenon for which there is no observation, meaning a moment of consciousness where I don't see flower, be dependent on the flower? So let's think about that today and we will explore that further tomorrow. Also please go over number 7 again and think about what we did there. And then we will get deeper into 8 which is also a verse that invites us to do what we did before. Because it's talking about our immediate perception of things and asking simple questions about our immediate experience. So it's probably a good, very suited for this kind of approach that combines analytic and resting meditation. Okay, thank you very much and see you again. Thank you.
"To the true teacher who reveals this peace, the complete pacification of constructs, to the perfect Buddha I bow down." The following four stanzas, they are each a refutation of one of the four conditions that were mentioned in stanza two. So now we'll zoom in on that framework for understanding causality, which is advanced in the Abhidharma, where it is said that there are four conditions and no fifth, so all that has a causal power can be included in the framework of the four conditions. Oh, sorry, I haven't logged on.
So is there someone who can explain meanwhile while I open up what the four conditions are, just very briefly, according to the Abhidharma? Or is there anyone who has a question about what those four are? While I open... Okay, Student: "I'll try to at least list them." Yeah, thank you. Student: "Causal condition, that is what we consider the main cause in the process of causation, like the seed in relation to the sprout. Then there's the objective condition, which is specific to the process of cognition, so that is the object of cognition, basically. Then there's the immediately preceding condition, which is the cessation of the preceding moment of mind that produces the next moment of mind, which is the cognitive event, basically, triggered by the objective condition. And then there's the ruling condition, which contains basically everything that is also relevant in the causal process, that is not one of these former three conditions. I've on occasion heard an explanation that, in fact, the ruling condition contains everything in the whole universe that is not an obstruction to the arising of the result and not one of these three." Yeah, I believe that is the Sarvāstivādan account. And then there are other Abhidharma schools that say that's too broad, it has to be more actively, not just non-obstructive. So this is a profound and elaborate framework that is discussed at length in the Abhidharma, the four conditions.
And so we can see this as then responding to an Abhidharma scholar, who says that there's certainly such a thing as conditions. They are a key framework for understanding the nature of reality. And they are explained in these four categories very well, taught by the Buddha. So what more do you want? They are a perfectly coherent, comprehensive and exhaustive account of causality. But then there's a critique of each one of them, and beginning with stanza 7, where it says, "If no existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent phenomena comes into being, how can we speak of effectuating conditions? When this is the case, they do not make sense."
So if there is no arising of a result that is existent, or a result that is non-existent, or a result that is a combination of existent and non-existent, then how can we say that there is a cause of anything? This is the refutation of the first, the causal condition. Basically, as you said, it is that which we consider the main cause for the essence of the object, so to speak. So in the case of the sprout, it is the seed. If it is a rice sprout, it is a rice seed that.. ..that we would consider the effectuating condition or the causal condition. So what would be wrong with an existent phenomenon? And so phenomenon is dharma, translated as phenomenon. But since then, I have always sort of been hesitant about, or unsatisfied with phenomena and phenomenon for dharma. Basically because it doesn't have to be explained that way, but generally the association with the phenomenon is an object. And there is no sense whatsoever about a dharma being specifically an object or a subject or an action. So it is not a very good translation. But it is a quite widespread one, so it is the one I used in the translation here. Since then, I have come to very much like 'factor' as a translation for dharma. So no factor comes into being. A factor is nice because it is neutral, can be all sorts of things, subject, object..
Basically whatever makes a difference somewhere is a factor. It is something to be taken into account and something that belongs in the context. And I think that is a good way of understanding dharma. It is something that is a genuine factor in whichever context it is that we are talking about. So what are the factors that are relevant to this event here? Then we can go on talking about that. But it is very different if we talk about the phenomena in this situation. Then it is like us looking at it and sort of describing what we see. And dharma is not like that. It is just the framework of reality or the components of reality. So I think dharma factor is not so bad. Of course dharma is probably still better. But so far I think factor captures a lot about some of the associations that come with dharma. Of course it is an extremely complex term to translate because Vasubhandu himself says it has these ten distinct meanings, which are really, really distinct from each other. So it is very difficult to.. Again factor is so broad that if you want you can sort of make an effort to include it, to make it relevant to all those ten different contexts. So if no existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent factor comes into being, we could say, how can we speak of effectuating conditions? What would be wrong with saying that an existent factor comes into being? Well it already sounds a little strange to say that the effect that comes into being is an existent effect. Of course we want the effect to be something real, something that is there as an effect. But to say that an existent effect comes into being sounds a little off. And rightly so. If it exists then it doesn't come into being. It already has its own being. So why would it be something that comes into being? So the arising effects. Like if we look at this event and say, so what are the factors and the effects that come into being here? Then we couldn't say that the effects that emerge and come into being here are existent effects because then they would be beyond arising. They would be existent by their own nature. And so they would be beyond, really, beyond anything influenced by causes and conditions. So the very sort of strange ring that it has to say that an existent phenomenon or an existent factor comes into being actually shows us a whole lot about what is wrong with the idea of effects that are essentially real coming into being. If they are real and existent by their own, by their very identity, their very nature, then they couldn't come into being, they couldn't be effects. So there is a contradiction between effect and existent in other words. As strange as it sounds. And what about a non-existent? We could say, okay, it's not an effect when something comes into being, it's still, the effect is still a thing of the future. So it's at the time when the effect emerges, then the effect isn't existent yet. In other words it's non-existent. But again that also sounds a little strange, not quite right to put it in those terms. And rightly so, because if, and we are right in having this reservation, because how could something that really doesn't exist come into being? If non-existent is a correct descriptor of the effect, if that is something that is in the nature of the effect that it does not exist, then no matter how many causes and conditions we would bring together, that would still remain just that, non-existent. Because we have said that effects as they emerge are non-existent. The arising effect does not exist, well, then it doesn't arise. So an effect that exists cannot arise because it already exists. An effect that doesn't exist cannot arise because it does not exist. Then how about both existent and non-existent? We need to do better than that, and we need to find a way of describing the nature of the effect that is more sensitive to its character than just saying existent or non-existent. We have to be able to say something else that probably captures what it is that takes place when an effect comes into being. So if we cannot say that it exists and we cannot say that it does not exist, then we could say perhaps that there is a part of it that is already there, but it is not fully manifest, so it is also to some extent not yet there. But it is not wholly absent, there is something that is coming into being, we can see it with our eyes, yet something is coming into being, so it is not that we have the full product there already either. We can see that too with our own eyes. So how well does that sound? How promising is that as a solution? Probably not very promising at all. Because in the same way as we talked about self and other, arising from self and other in the context of the first stanza, if we say that the effect is both existent and non-existent, at this point we are taking two qualifiers that we have both seen are completely..cannot be applied in any way whatsoever to the effect. Existent effects do not arise, nor do non-existent effects. So by just combining those two, what would we get? It is zero plus zero in terms of accuracy and accounting for the nature of things.
So how can we speak of effectuating conditions, then? How can we at all then speak about causal conditions when this is the case? So the very principle does not make sense, he says. So what do you think about that? Does it make sense? Is this a proper way of looking at the idea of causes that create effects? Causes that are accompanied by other conditions? But it's intuitively a quite compelling way to talk about causality, to say that there are certain things that are really the key cause. Perhaps it is a compelling way, but it could be a compelling and intuitively plausible way to talk about causality, to say that there are certain things that are basically the cause, and then there are other things that just assist in the manifestation of the effect based on that cause. So seed and sprout is a good example, but there are myriads of examples of that. So is this kind of perspective on the arising of effects relevant? Is it relevant to ask about the effect that comes into being, whether it is something that exists, does not exist, or both exists and does not?
Student: "I think this account is very solid from an ultimate perspective, but I was wondering when it comes to a discussion of karma, maybe these four categories become more useful again, in the sense that there are certain karmic actions that kind of seem to be more relevant in producing karmic results than others, and having some kind of breakdown, acknowledging that that is a relative kind of account, that is not actually talking about any inherent existence of the causes or their effects, but simply on the level of conventional experience in terms of the way that karma ripens, perhaps having these four categories once again becomes more useful." Do you think it is particularly about karmic causality that they are useful?
Student: "I am not sure exactly what you are asking." I think that makes all very good sense what you say, but I think it also makes sense, even if we don't talk in particular about karmic ripening, but just causality in general, as we have it in the world also, without any understanding of karma, to say that there are causes, causal factors, and that those give rise to effects seems like a very unavoidable notion to have. Student: "I guess I am not sure I agree, unless you are speaking about the way in which humans, or those who could understand an account like this, would interact with the world. I think that an account like this that claims to be a description of objective reality is actually not useful. I only think it is useful pragmatically for determining how to act." Okay.
Yeah
So, then we are talking about these as merely in terms of whether they are useful or not? I think that is a nice interpretation of Mādhyamaka philosophy, to say like that. It is also a question of what really does that mean? And what do we mean when we say that? It sounds very solid to say for determining correct causes of action. If it is really a tool for determining correct causes of action, it sounds like we are talking about... We have also been saying that there is no arising of effects. So we nonetheless say that this framework of causality is useful for determining correct causes of action. So on the one hand we say there is no arising of effects, and on the other hand we say that there are useful tools for determining correct causes of action. One sounds much more... They don't seem to fit very well together, no? Student: "I think they do. I don't think you need to accept the inherent existence of effects, just like you don't have to accept the inherent existence of causes. Like, both are true on a conventional level for sentient beings.." But the only thing is just what does it mean exactly to be true on the conventional level? Student: "It doesn't mean anything." You are becoming very good. Go out and teach the world. Thank you. Like, very soon when we begin to think about this, and when we study more also and read commentaries now, the idea of two truths becomes very predominant, and it's a very natural and powerful way of thinking about things. But it's also by nature problematic. That's why it's useful, the idea of the two truths. It's because it's not just a solution to our problem, but it's something to keep us on our toes and keep us going. I would say, yeah. Anything else?
It's on already. Student: "You made the connection back to the reasoning in the first verse, and there's something about that that's been bothering me. And I think it came up, I wasn't able to attend the second week, I think it came up in that week, but I didn't feel satisfied by how it was addressed. So, yeah, I just keep coming back to the possibility that cause and effect could be... I feel satisfied with the reasoning that they're not the same, they're not different, and they're not both, but I keep wondering about neither, neither the same, and neither different, and then in this verse, what about the possibility of neither existent or non-existent?" Yeah, this was very reminiscent of that, I thought, no? Stanza 7. So, yeah, maybe you can explain a little more about what it is that makes it... Okay, we say that, and you say that it makes perfect sense to say that cause and effect could not be the same, that there could be no arising of anything, whatever was there on the first occasion would also be what was there on the latter.
But, and you also said that difference of cause and effect does not make sense, because we said that if cause and effect were by nature different from each other, then cause and effect are as different from eachother as are cause and effect and non-cause. So both of those don't, either of them is useless as a description of the nature of cause and effect. So how about combining them, saying that there's something about the cause and something about the effect that is the same, but that is also something that makes them different. And what is it about the... So then we said that this is not, this doesn't give us any superior position at all, because we're taking two things or two potential solutions that we have both, that we have looked at separately and seen that they are completely unsuccessful, that they don't even apply a little bit, that they have zero relevance to the issue that we're trying to explain.
So, we could say zero relevance plus zero relevance, adding those two together is still zero. But then you said there's something that makes you think that this is not quite right still, or maybe you can explain that. Student: "I think I don't know how to think anymore about it. It just feels like logically neither same nor different, like we should account for that in some way." So neither rather than both? Oh, sorry. "Yeah, neither." Yeah, but what is that neither? That's the new crucial thing. So that's our project, to find out if there is a fourth mode of arising. But actually we said already that there couldn't be. "Well, what I recall of the way you responded to that when it came up before is that we thought really hard about whether, and we didn't find anything, but what if we just made a mistake? Like, why can't this be considered now?" Yeah, so that is true. And this we will keep as our project. And so what are our chances of coming to a real conclusion about that, is also a good question. So if we say that, "Ok, we saw from the beginning, we took a lot of time to look at, Ok, is that all anything that arises?" Yes, we would have to say that there is. It seems suddenly like that. It would be crazy to say not. And then we said, is it the case that if something arises, it will either have to be that there's something that determines and influences the manifestation of these things that arise that would be their causes and conditions? Or if that is not the case, no matter how complex those causal factors may be, there are obviously myriads of ways that we could understand such causes and their combinations. But if we say that there aren't any causal factors, then things are random. So we have arrived at two sole options. As soon as we have accepted that things arise, then we have also accepted that either things, the arising of things is somehow influenced and restricted by certain factors.
Or otherwise, if that's not the case, they are utterly random. There's nothing at all that determines their manifestation. So we said that. And then we tried to look at the first option, which seems to be the one that is in tune with our perceptions, our ideas about this world, namely that there are causes and conditions that give rise to something. And then we said, OK, maybe it's a little bit unusual way of looking at it in this way, but does it make sense to say that if there are causes and if there are conditions, we should be able to say whether those two are the same or not, or whether they are different from each other? And we said that, OK, if you want to go there, why not? It seems like an all right question to ask, and it seems one that we should be qualified to give an answer to also.
So it's an innocent and ok question to ask whether cause and effect are the same. But we then quickly dismissed that and said for the reasons that we have again mentioned here, there would be no arising possible if cause and effect are the same, then the effect would be there as the cause as well. The whole idea of causality becomes impossible in that way. And then we looked at the second option and said there cannot be any connection between cause and effect. If causes and effects are by nature different from each other, there's nothing that ties them together.
So we went on with the third alternative. And then we also spent time thinking of ok, are these two same or different? Are they exhaustive categories? And yeah, I mean, we can bring that question up again now. If two things are not the same, are they then different from each other?
Is there any way of thinking of a way that two things could not be the same and yet not different? Apart from this third option that we have also looked at? And it seemed very, very hard to think of something that could be a way of capturing two things that says they are not the same but not different. So we can think two things that are not the same and not different either. It's possible to have that thought, but not much more to say about it. We can think and say those words, but what really would they mean? But basically, we will keep… So what would it be like to come to a real conclusion here? That's what I wanted to say with this long repetition. So what would it be like to come to a place where we're not just very convinced, but still in the process of discovery, and then be at a place where that's no longer the case and we wholly agree, we have no doubt whatsoever? What would it take to get there? What would you say? = Like what would be the difference between now and that future time when…?
Student: "Yeah, I'm not sure. I think I'm just… Yeah, what you said about like you can have that thought, but then sort of what does it mean? I think I'm just stuck there." Right? So, but we would… What to say? Stuck there, yeah. But stuck in the sense that we can't say that's all there is to it. It's just a thought. It's just a set of concepts, but they don't apply to anything. We're not quite comfortable with saying that, except some people are, the gentleman over there.
So what is the difference between being in this situation where we are very… We have learned a whole lot and it's super convincing, but we feel that we have to still keep this… There's still something to be tested, yeah? And then presumably you can also somehow complete the analysis of the Middle Way, that goes with the discourse about the Middle Way, that it's possible to somehow get the point, whatever it may be, that it's possible to reach inside into the great Middle Way, the Prajñāpāramitā insight, and so on. So what would be the difference between where we are at now and that?
So yeah, let's try to keep that with us as well, that question. Somebody that has a question, answer to that? Yeah?
"Andrew, online, do you want to unmute yourself and say something?"
Student: "Yes, can you hear me?" Yes. "Thank you. I just wanted to ask about what seems to be a common way to disarm Nāgārjuna, or what seems to be, to me, like a common route that people both in the class and maybe in the literature also, perhaps are taking to sort of solve the problem that seems to me maybe to be almost instinctual in me as well, which is to maybe come up with some nicer or neater notion of existence or some easier idea of existence or non-existence that seems easier to defeat. It's kind of an inkling I've been having throughout the class in regards to your questions. You know, if we say inherent existence, for example, then in fact it's a lot easier to deal with a lot of Nāgārjuna's problems. But then if you think about, you know, if I analyze my own experience, then I see that actually, if I just think about my own sort of phenomenological ideas about "here is something," then actually I have not gotten rid of Nāgārjuna's problems at all, if that makes sense. And it seems like this may be a problem with the sort of the two truths solution as well. In other words, yes, if we say, well, as long as we make no ontological commitments or whatsoever, whenever we say existence, then we're just fine. When in reality, if we think about, you know, I press a switch in my house when I want the light to turn on, then in fact we have all of Nāgārjuna's problems right back in front of us, regardless of the nice things I said about not making ontological commitments. So it's more of an intuition that we almost, if you know the homunculus fallacy, that we see a little, positing a little man inside of our head to solve the problem of vision, it almost seems like we have an instinctual homunculus solution for Nāgārjuna's problems coming up, where we keep inventing realms where it's easy to get rid of them and he sort of keeps sneaking back in, myself included. So I just wondered if you could offer some, it's been something bothering me continually, especially because I seem to notice the same instinct in myself in wanting to deal with it. I just wanted to raise that." Thank you. Excellent.
I still wanted also to hear a little bit more about the kind of situation that we're in now, at this point in our analysis, and then the idea of having come to the end of it, so that there is no doubt anymore. Like now we are very convinced, perhaps, and if we aren't, then now is the wonderful time to express why we aren't convinced. But it's also possible that we feel in many ways very, very helpless to object, but not convinced. So helpless to object, but not convinced. So what would be the difference between being in this situation of helpless in the face of this kind of analysis, and yet not convinced in our heart of hearts? That's what I wanted to call into question. And then what you described very well.
Something that is really part and parcel
of the exploration of the Middle Way, and the philosophical traditions that have emerged around these teachings. So our natural inclination, and also the philosopher's inclination, is to find a solution.
So a way of accommodating equally our perception of causality, and the baselessness, groundlessness of causes and conditions that we have come face to face with when we explore these teachings. So we would like there to be a way of saying yes to our, to somehow, we cannot deny the way things appear to us, no? We can try to, but it's not a very satisfying way to be. And at the same time we can't deny what appears to us when we look at this either. So we would like of course to be able to combine those two. But it's a bit similar to, like we can ask ourselves, what to say?
So we would like to combine those two, but the difficulty, and we can try to sort of safeguard our expressions and qualify them very carefully, and insist "I have no ontological commitment when I say this." But if there is something that cannot be denied, which is not just emptiness, then if it's not just emptiness, it's not emptiness. So the two truths intrinsically is a very problematic structure. We like to say that they should be confirming one another and inseparable and so on. That is totally true also.
But it is totally true and as a great account of the two truths, as a philosophical system, we don't want to say that they are separate from each other and knowledge of one should highlight the truth of the other.
But it's also possible to not just be a philosopher about these things, but try to think as a good philosopher, presumably does. So what really does this mean? My philosophy is not just about making things fit conceptually, but my philosophy is about understanding the world as it is. So how satisfying is this, what I've just been saying? Is that the solution or is there something deeper? And then I think again we can recollect His Holiness the Dalai Lama's advice and Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche's advice to approach this type of study without separating learning, reflecting and meditating, and in particular acknowledging the way that the two approaches, analytic meditation and the yogi's free rest, and that those can actually very well be combined and should be combined, so that we spend time analyzing. And when we come to a point of what seems insightful, then we allow ourselves to just take the insight and see what it does,
be informed in a very open and wholehearted way in our whole being by the insight, without any expectation about what it might mean or what it should mean, but just try to acknowledge, and then we can continue thinking more about these things. So I think that's what I would say. So at the same time, learning about different ways of understanding the true truths is so rich. It's an unsuccessful device ultimately, the two truths, but it is very, very effective. And it opens so many ways of talking about these things if we begin to use them.
Okay. Thank you. So a friend of mine, he wrote, a friend of mine that I have learned a lot from, he wrote about same and difference, so perhaps I'll bring this up here, since this is what we're talking about. "One of the problems I have with the discussion is the way we talk about difference. By opposing it to sameness, we end up with a concept of difference that is conceptually ruled by the way we think about sameness. Difference becomes sameness of that which is not identical. In other words, the model of thinking about difference is still identity.
So this is very interesting way of putting it. It's a kind of dizzying. So he says the way we talk about difference is not really right, because when we say, okay, difference is not same then the way we think about difference is governed by how we're used to think about sameness. So the difference becomes the sameness of those things that are not the same.
So then he says, we're actually still talking in terms of identity. So I think that's a very interesting observation and I think it's true. But you could also say the same, I think, about identity, that the way we think about identity is the... What did he say? Is the identity of those things that are not the same. So when we say identity, we also are still thinking with the framework of difference. So I think this is a very good way of showing deconstructed and really baseless nature of... except from just these kinds of mutual dependencies between same and difference. So then he says, for me, this raises the question, what would be a concept of difference that is true to the idea of difference? It is continually something that is continually different from itself and does not rely on the vocabulary of sameness for its definition. So that's like what we were talking about before. Is there a way of talking about causality, which is not within this framework? Is it possible to talk about difference in a way that does not depend on sameness, on the framework of sameness, so to speak? So this we can try and think of also, yeah?
It seems, once you begin to look at it in the way we have been doing, then it seems impossible to find a way of having a concept of difference that does not imply sameness. Of course, we can say things again.
We can say that this is the concept of difference that does not rely on the framework of identity. But how much more is there to it than the words? At the same time, words can be and are often very powerful. But do they really capture the way things are?
A concept of difference that is not dependent on sameness. It's hard to imagine, no? So then there is the one concept that came to my mind, is the concept of the ultimate described in terms of seclusion, so like the secluded nature, the rnampa dbenpa. I forget what it's called in Sanskrit. So that's a concept perhaps that is pure difference. It's the ultimate described as that which is wholly different. But again, it's a concept. And if you want, you can criticize that concept too in the same way and say that it is still not free of the framework of identity. So the next verse..
So he says, when this is the case, it does not make sense to speak about causal conditions. Then in number 8, it is explained that with existent phenomena there are no observations whatsoever. How could a phenomena for which there is no observation ever relate to an observation? So this is looking at the observed condition.
So it is that which makes us, we say that the observed condition is something that is only relevant to mental events because here we're talking about the thing that causes our perception. So there must be something there. When I see a flower, there must be something there that makes me see the flower, such as the flower. So however we want to talk about the causes of perception, it's possible to look at, if perception is something that is causally determined and causally restricted, then there must be some things that are the causes for the percepts arising in my mind. So it could be that there is a material world out there that somehow impinges on my senses and I register something mentally, or it could be that the whole world is mental, of a mental nature, and that these objects are just, I think of them as external to consciousness, but actually they are not. Whichever way we talk about things, or if we say that all of reality is a physical reality and the appearance of consciousness is just epiphenomenal and so on, we can still talk about causes for our percepts, presumably. So I don't think we have to stay in the Abhidharma context either, to talk about observed conditions. It's a very powerful concept that we are dealing with, namely the very idea of there being things in the world that can make me have perceptions and experiences of something.
But if the observation, meaning if I already see the flower, then whatever it was that caused my perception of the flower is not there anymore, because I have manifest perception. And if I'm not seeing the flower, then how could there be a cause for my perception of flower? With existent phenomenon, meaning if my visual perception of the object, the flower, is already there, there are no observations, meaning there are no observed conditions. There is nothing that conditions my perception because the perception is manifest. It's not subject to conditions anymore, it's manifest.
In that we are talking just one moment of perception. So if there is that one moment of seeing the thing we are talking about, it's not being conditioned anymore by an object in the world that makes me see things like that. That could be a second moment similar to that afterwards, that's a different thing. It's not that I can't go on seeing flower, that's perfectly possible. But the thing that conditions my present perception of flower cannot be there when I see it already. So in this way there are no observed conditions whatsoever in the case of existent phenomena of consciousness. So how could it be a phenomenon for which there is no observation? How could a phenomenon for which there is no observation, meaning how could this phenomenon that we are talking about then again is the phenomenon of consciousness, perceiving something, visual perception of a flower let's say. But how could a phenomenon for which there is no observation, meaning a moment of consciousness where I don't see flower, be dependent on the flower? So let's think about that today and we will explore that further tomorrow. Also please go over number 7 again and think about what we did there. And then we will get deeper into 8 which is also a verse that invites us to do what we did before. Because it's talking about our immediate perception of things and asking simple questions about our immediate experience. So it's probably a good, very suited for this kind of approach that combines analytic and resting meditation. Okay, thank you very much and see you again. Thank you.
17:25
