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Root of The Middle Way – Session 10

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  • Buddhist Classics and Philosophy
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  • Rangjung Yeshe Institute - Nepal
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Session 10 explores the idea that nothing ever arises from itself, another, both, or uncaused. The discussion questions the conventional distinctions between causes and effects.

Session 10 delves into complex Buddhist philosophical concepts related to causality and conditions. It explores the idea that nothing ever arises from itself, another, both, or uncaused. The discussion questions the conventional distinctions between causes and effects. The lecture introduces the four-condition framework from the Abhidharma tradition and discusses its practical implications, emphasizing the subjective nature of understanding.  The discourse also examines actions, conditions, and their interrelationship in Buddhist philosophy, emphasizing the importance of combining analytic meditation with philosophical reflection. The conventional view of causality and conditions is challenged, leaving students with open questions about reality and causality in Buddhism.

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Let's begin with the homage. "That which originates dependently does not cease and does not arise, is not annihilated and is not permanent, does not come and does not go, is not different and not the same. To the true teacher who reveals this peace, the complete pacification of constructs, To the perfect Buddha I bow down." I suppose we have been through verse one now, yeah? So at this point of having considered the first stanza in some detail,
what is your present understanding of this and your present opinion about the thesis that is presented? That not from itself, not from another, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise. Is there someone who thinks that it's perfectly clear? This is a perfectly reasonable and rational statement to make? Or is there someone who thinks it's not, that there is something perhaps seriously wrong with it? And also those who feel that there are certain things to go for this statement but there are also some problems. It would be nice to hear what you think at this point.
Student: "So I'm not entirely convinced yet about the refuting of the third option." Okay. "Because I don't, I think that the argument that same doesn't work, different doesn't work, so the third option is ruled out. I feel like the argument doesn't really apply to them combined because I think we're ruling out one thing, we're ruling out the other thing and then we're saying well then let's not consider it further what happens if we mix them? Because the argument for combination I think is what we were saying, I don't know if there is, if we say that the cause isn't the same as the effect, we could say that we rule that out so they're not the same. But coffee grounds are not the same as coffee, right? They're also not entirely different but undeniably in how things appear we can see that coffee comes from coffee grounds when conditions are right. So I don't get entirely how that third option is refuted yet." Yeah, thank you.
So the problem comes because of the way we dismiss the first option and the second option. It's because we find them both completely baseless. If they're completely baseless then it's like adding zero plus zero. You don't get any further. Another thing is that it's perfectly reasonable to say what you said about making coffee. That you have some substance there that is necessary for making coffee but that is not coffee yet it's required for it. So it's not entirely different and not entirely the same either. That's a perfectly normal and in the world meaningful statement to make. But what we're trying to do is examine what is this world? Is it really as it seems? And then we find to our surprise probably,
not only that the...
It's not that we come to think that, "oh yes there's certainly so much more to understand and so many things are beyond me." It's the very stuff that we make our opinions with that we find to be useless. And that's why the both option doesn't work. So there's the seeming whatever we want to call this. And then there's the question is it really so? And when we ask that question we find arguably no basis whatsoever for these appearances. Or if we want to call them these appearances for this. Because one way of describing what I experience is to say that I feel that something is taking place and I feel that and think and believe that what takes place is something that happens. Not just totally chaotically and randomly. But it's something that I can figure out to some extent in terms of causal relations. And it seems to be that that's just how the world is. And it seems that everyone agrees with me about that basic perspective.
So since that is a relevant description of my perception of the world then it becomes also relevant to ask okay if there are these apparent causes and conditions, What can we say about them? Could we say that they are one and the same? No we can't. Not at all. Because if cause and effect were the same they couldn't be cause and effect.
Complete identical nature of cause and effect cancels the very idea of cause and effect. Can we then say that they are different? No we can't. Because the very idea of difference makes the notion of cause and effect impossible. If these things were just different from each other and that would be the case about all things, not just cause and effect, but also cause and what is not. But also the effect and what is not a cause. So we say if cause and effect were different, then that difference between cause and effect would be raw difference in the same way as the difference between the effect and something that isn't the cause of that effect. So difference would be the case everywhere. So how could there be causal relationships? And it's because we fail to find just a tiny bit of reason and a tiny bit of grounds when we examine same and different with respect to cause and effect. That's why it doesn't help to bring them together. So they have this traditional example that if you have a single grain of sand, and when you turn that grain of sand or if you try to squeeze it, it doesn't give any oil. So why would it help to bring a ton of sand together and then try to churn it? Would we get any more oil out of that? If there would be just a little bit of oil, like mostly stuff that had nothing to do with oil in that sand grain, then it would make sense to bring a whole lot and then we could slowly get going by bringing a lot together. But if it's just void of what we need, then it doesn't help to just accumulate.
Student: "Because the way that I'm thinking of it is more like similar. So there's same which is exactly the same. There's different which is entirely different. But then there's similar which is the combination of something that's kind of same, kind of different. But not entirely either. But similar is a different thing. It's not same, it's not different, it's its own thing." But then you can also say, so everything is similar. That's the problem with similar. There's nothing that isn't similar to something else in some way. Student: "No, I mean if I have a mango seed and then I get a mango tree, there's a similarity. With a mango seed and a banana tree, what's the same?" Oh, tree, right. Actually, as Joanne told me years ago, a banana tree is not a tree. I forget what it's called. But it's, yeah. Anyways. So that's.. but not only examples of that kind, really anything that we can come up with has some similarity to whatever else we can possibly think of and imagine. At least in terms of being something we can possibly think of and imagine. Or possibly perceive, whatever it is that.. But at the same time, what this tells us is that we..
so then we begin to get perhaps a sense of dependent origination. That it's not because there are actually these things. That we can have the perceptions that we have, that we can have the ideas that we have. It's because everything depends, yeah? And when everything depends, there's no way of getting to the ground of it. So you have a very nice explanation of how to make a cup of coffee. And you use all the right concepts. But when you focus on, look closer at every step in what you say, the whole appearance of reason falls apart.
Would you agree about that? So that's, I mean you don't have to answer right now. But think carefully. Would you agree that we have the appearance of whatever we want to call it? And there's something that seems really undeniable, no? And we are very accustomed to using terms and concepts about these appearances in ways that seem really very natural and useful. To the extent that just saying, to the extent that the prospects of giving up those concepts seems impossible. And yet, when we examine what it is that we say, what it is that we propose, tell ourselves, every single bit of it is completely unfounded in anything.
So that's something to consider at this point.
If it doesn't seem like that, then why? If we can't agree wholeheartedly with this statement at this point, then why is that? So try to zoom in on what it is that makes you hesitate to say, yes indeed.
Yes, please.
Student: "Maybe what Meredith is saying could be understood the other way around, that it's not like a combination of self and other bringing the result, but that it's neither same nor other bringing the result. Like, I guess we are all agreeing that coffee and the bean is not the same. So that is excluded. And also we are agreeing that coffee and bean are not other because we cannot compare them because they exist in different times. So therefore we would end up sort of with a fourth option that bean and coffee are neither same nor different, but still there is not the randomness because the tea leaf doesn't produce the coffee. So maybe you are saying that it's arising of neither same nor different, but not in a random fashion. So there is some order or it's not a complete chaos." Right. That's very interesting. So we can… Then we remember at the beginning we asked ourselves, "is it the case that all options of real arising is captured within these three alternatives?" And we said yes, because we couldn't come up with any intelligible way of saying that there would be a neither self nor other option. So if we want to say that the arising of cause and effect is neither in terms of sameness nor in terms of difference, it couldn't be an actual alternative, it it couldn't be an account of real arising, because we spent a good deal of time trying to think of whether there could be a fourth option of causal arising. And we really came empty handed back from that kind of search. So it can't be an account of arising nonetheless, but at the same time the homage says is not different and not the same. That which originates dependently is not different and is not the same. So like Mabja says,
"Emptiness in relative terms is called dependent origination." So dependent origination without sameness and difference. But is that real arising? Is that real cause and real effect? Student: "Yeah, I think if you analyze it's not real arising, but still maybe I'm wondering what is the connection really? Why a coffee bean can in a sort of mystical way create a coffee, but why a tea leaf doesn't have that potential? How would Nāgārjuna respond to that or how you are responding?"
How would you respond to it? "I don't know, maybe just it's observable and let's leave it at that." At the same time of course we can say many things. Just take a look at the coffee bean, it's really different from tea leaf and you smell it and stuff like that. No, the tea leaf is not going to give me any coffee, but yeah, the coffee bean looks quite promising. So there are many ways of dealing with this on a practical level that makes good sense on a practical level. But why is it really like that? "Yeah, but what you just said is like the similar thing to coffee bean is more similar to coffee than the tea leaf." Yeah, sure, definitely. But so we just agreed about something, no? But what did we agree about? We can just repeat what we said, no? We can repeat the sentences, try to think the same things. But that question, why? Is it really like that? Do we have any sort of promising way that we can go to get further at why it's really the case that a coffee bean makes coffee and not a tea leaf? What at all does it mean to say really?
And we want to say really, no? If we can't talk about really, if we really can't talk about really, no? Then there's something wrong, no?
"No, there's one from online." Okay, thank you. "John, can you speak?" Student: "Can you hear me?" Yes. Can I just quickly start? "I wonder whether is it helpful to think of different functions. Coffee and tea have different functions. So if, I'm just thinking if I was a stray cat, right? I'm looking at Thomas, hope he feeds me, so there is Thomas' function. So if Nāgārjuna comes along, it's not that useful for the cat because..."
So I'm sorry, nobody brought by accident on purpose a charger for a computer like mine. Otherwise I'll just switch it off. "Which one do you have?" Macbook Pro. "Is there a charger?" Probably. I thought I had it fully charged and then not at all. Thank you so much.

Yeah, there's also one here.
Student: "Actually I have a thought." Thank you. "I have a thought. So I was thinking, if you think of coffee..." Oh sorry, I didn't, the communication got lost. [name] in Singapore can you speak?
Maybe the question was about function, that we have different functions or things have different functions.
Student: "To shift a bit from our perception to that of a stray cat. Hopefully that's helpful. From the view of a stray cat, looking at beings, maybe a Buddha and a ghost is not so helpful because they don't have the ability or the function to feed the stray cat. I don't know, because I appreciate what we are doing these few weeks, but it comes back to whether Thomas exists or not. So for the cat, if Thomas has the function of feeding the stray cat, Thomas exists. But from the view of the stray cat, well Nāgārjuna may not exist in that sense. Sorry if it confused you. Thank you." Thank you. I think what you say is at the same sort of practical level, that we can all agree that our understanding of each other depends on who we are. And it certainly depends on our faculties, which kind of organism, being we are, what we can see and understand about each other, what we end up seeing and understanding about each other. But the same and different problem, when examining why is it that I see the cat as a cat? Or whatever we might ask ourselves. Then any kind of causal account can only be at this sort of immediate level of not having examined things in this way at all. Because the moment we ask, so my relation with the cat that I see, is it one of seeing something that is different from myself or something that is the same as myself? The whole framework is gone.
Student: "I just had an opinion about the coffee bean that you can grow coffee and compare to a banana plant. I think there is a certain essence that the seed brings about a coffee plant versus a banana plant. However, I think it negates the idea of a sameness because plants and human beings also share 28% of genes. So there is a sameness. But I think the power of the essence of why a coffee seed produces a coffee tree is because there is an essence that is like coffee. But then that is much more on a surface level, I think. Like a gross level." It is a gross level in this context, no? But otherwise it is called Buddhist philosophy. That is something many of us respect profoundly.
Perhaps this is a good point to go further into the Analysis of Conditions. Because the rest of the chapter really addresses this perception. That there are these causal and resultant entities and they connect with each other, but they have their own essence also, which makes them unique and uniquely capable of producing whatever they produce. And so they are also by their very nature distinct from each other. And in chapter, in verse number 2, we have then the statement of a framework of four conditions, as you have it in Buddhist Abhidharma, right? That all kinds of causes can be described as four types of conditions. So in the Abhidharma there is this way of enumerating the
various types of cause that we come across in the world. Or anywhere in the world, on the path and so on. So the first is the, so they are called, there are four conditions: causal, objective, immediately preceding and likewise the ruling. There is no fifth condition. So just four. Again it is a very exhaustive and clear cut set of categories. And how is that? Well, the first kind of condition is the causal condition, which is whatever it is that we identify as the primary cause. Like when we talk about a sprout that grows from what? It grows from a seed. We know very well that there are many other things that are necessary for that sprout to grow, but we nevertheless identify a main cause, which is the seed. So that is what is meant by a causal condition. It is that sort of thing. So I guess, I don't know, the coffee bean for coffee perhaps? If we consider the water a cooperating condition. So then there is something called the objective condition. An objective condition is something that only is the case with respect to mental events. So objective conditions have nothing to do with the physical reality, but when there is cognition, then there are these objects that we perceive and make us then think and feel and understand in various ways. So that is called an objective condition. The things that we see and the things that in this way make us have a moment of consciousness of a particular kind. That's called the objective condition. The next, the immediately preceding condition, this is also something that only is relevant in terms of mental events. So the immediately preceding condition is precisely the moment of cognition that was before the present one. And it's the demise of that. So for me to have a perception of this, what is a good example of that? For me to have a perception of this cup, as it is right now in this present moment, then whatever I was perceiving in the moment just before, and we're talking subtle moments, whatever I was perceiving in the moment just before will have to be gone. Otherwise I would still be perceiving what I saw before and not this cup. So there is a condition for conscious events or mental events, cognitive events, that takes the form of the cessation of the moment of cognition that was just before. So objective conditions are the objects, the immediately preceding condition is the moment of cognition that was just before that which we experience now. So those two conditions that are the case with respect to all mental events, all moments of consciousness,
but they are exclusively relevant with respect to mental events.
And there must be some debate about whether there are certain moments of cognition that don't have this, but basically the idea is that this is the case with respect to all moments of consciousness.
So likewise there is the ruling condition, and the ruling condition is defined as any cooperating condition for the arising of a certain effect which is none of the first three. So it's not the main course, it's also not the objective condition, and it's also not the immediately preceding condition, but whatever else there may be. So if it's, for example, we see, it is my, we're talking about the event of me perceiving this cup: then the causal condition would be, for example, my eye, that would be like a natural way of identifying the causal condition, and then the objective condition is that object out here that I can see, and the immediately preceding condition is the cessation of whatever my consciousness was in the moment before that, and then anything that contributes to that,
that contributes otherwise, like the rest of my body, for example, that is required for my consciousness being there together with my body for my eye to be able to see. So that would be one way of coming up with an example of the ruling conditions. But there are many, it's also the light in the room, some say that it's the space as well, like that. So those are, this is the framework that Buddhist Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma presents for..
for talking about causes, naming them conditions. And there's no fifth condition, there's no.. typically we would say that there's no fifth condition such as the Almighty who is responsible for something. So that's a statement of the view of the opposition, really. So now this framework will be refuted, and it begins in number three, where it said that the nature of things is not in conditions and so forth. If there is no thing itself, how could there be anything other?
So the nature of things, meaning the nature of the effects, they are not in the conditions, like if we talk again about seed and sprout, then the sprout is not there in the condition, no? In the causal condition, for example, the seed. The nature of things, what is meant by the nature of things, it's whatever makes something what it is. That's its nature. So that which makes the effect what it is, is not present in the cause, right? That couldn't be the case, because then we would have the problem that we saw with the first alternative, the first option with respect to causal arising. If the very nature, that which makes the effect the effect, was present in the cause, then there would be no cause and effect.
So if there is no thing itself, if then the cause is not present in the conditions, then how can we say that cause and effect are different from each other? What is the reference point that allows us to say that the sprout and the seed are different? Also, how could the cause, which then is devoid of the effect, we say that the very nature of the effect, that which makes the effect what it is, is not in the cause. If it's not in the cause, then how could we expect that this cause could serve as a cause for it, if it is devoid of the effect?
That would make it as, something that is void of a certain effect is a non-cause, no? It's that which is not the cause of something.
If we look at seed and sprout and say, just take a look at the seed and we notice that no, the nature of the effect, the sprout, is not there in the seed. Then, if it's not there in the seed, why is the seed capable of producing the effect? Why it is then just as devoid of the effect as we would find it if we took a piece of charcoal and examined it? And we said, no, the nature of the effect, the sprout, is not present there. It's the same analysis we find.
If there is no presence there, there's no connection. What would be the point of contact between, that's another way of looking at it, what would be the point of contact between an effect and a cause that has nothing of the effect in it?
So what do you think about that? We have already, what we're doing now is to look at the same issue we could say, no? It's an expansion on what was stated in the first stanza and what we have spent time thinking about in the first stanza. There's now an expansion on this, yeah? Here with special reference to the idea that cause and effect are different from each other. So we can look at the cause and we find that the nature of the effect is not there. Let's take a look at the seed. No, there's no sprout there. In other words, that which makes the sprout the sprout is not in the seed. Now we can also take a piece of charcoal and we can make the exact same observation. No, that which makes the effect the effect, that which makes the sprout the sprout is not present there. So at this point cause and non-cause, cause are completely equal.
Try to think about that, no? Any response at this point we can briefly consider?
Student: "So I would say that the physical framework of both the seed and the sprout are the same, even though it doesn't seem that way. Going back to the example before, coffee beans have certain relative characteristics that produce relative results. Same with tea leaves and tea, but on a level past direct conceptual experience everything has the same origin. For example, even though coffee may seem like a drinkable substance, it's just atoms, just like an airplane. Therefore a coffee bean and an airplane are actually the same thing. They just seem different through our conceptual perception. So even though it seems that a coffee bean produces coffee and a tea leaf produces tea, they're not actually producing anything that is separate from any other object because all objects are the same source. So I guess I would say the same thing about a seed and a sprout, the same physical framework, I guess atoms, so they're not separate at all." That seems like a classic version of the first option, that things appear different, but really they're not at all. So did you think that.. so when you hear this argument that the nature of things is not in conditions, the nature of resultant entities is not present in their conditions, and if they aren't, then how can we say that there is arising from things that are other? How can we return to the idea of different causes and effects and say, well these are different, but yet one gives rise to the other? So when you hear that, you say "yes, that's true, that's incorrect, in fact causes and effects are not different, they are the same." Student: "I'm talking more about physical causes, not emotional causes or karmic causes, but I would say that they're the same." All objects is like, so that would be the first alternative.
Then we basically give up the idea of difference, we give up the idea of causality also. So it's another way of saying there are no causes and conditions. It's just an appearance. So if that's what you say, then yeah, there are no causes and conditions, it's just an appearance. Perhaps we could imagine hearing Nāgārjuna say that to someone also.
But whether that can be regarded as a position, as a framework for philosophy, that's a different issue.
What do you think about the truth value of what you say there, so to speak? Things that seem to be causes and conditions, but actually there's no difference whatsoever. How much truth do you ascribe to that statement?
Student: "I would say that it's pretty true." Pretty true is… That's similar again, yeah? Everything is pretty true also. To the extent that there's something true about anything, even the worst lie has some truth to it.
Yeah, okay. Student: "That's all, I mean." Yeah, sure, thank you.
So either we could see this as a point of being in agreement with the statement in the homage, that which originates dependently does not arise and does not cease. And then it's just how much sense, how much do I agree here? What's the character of my commitment to that statement? That becomes very interesting to explore. And it's also something that we can explore in our meditation practice, when we contemplate and then sort of without recognizing that this is important to become clear about. Like when I say this and when I say, "Yes, I agree, whatever arises dependently does not cease and does not arise." Then I agree and I agree in this and this way. It could be that I say, "Yeah, I think about it and there's some argument that I can't really defeat, so I have to agree and that's it." So it's possible that one could leave it at that and then learn something more and something slightly different and so on. And we could even become scholars of the Mādhyamaka, but without really paying all that much attention.
So what Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche and what the Dalai Lama were encouraging us to do, is to combine analytic meditation with this rest. So whenever we come to some understanding, like what you express, that the appearance of distinct causes and conditions is illusory. And then whether we want to say it's all the same or just say that ultimately it's not the case that there are causes and conditions, whichever way, that doesn't matter all that much. But when we have come to that kind of conclusion, then try to acknowledge it. And you could say you acknowledge it by saying, "I can't refute it, so now I want to use that for my further philosophical work." Or you can say, "I want to use it in my discussions with others when I write my next book," and so on. That's one way of acknowledging it, but there are other ways too. We can acknowledge this experientially as well. Try to just see the world with eyes that are informed by this kind of understanding, so to speak. So that's, I think, what they were encouraging us to do. And then by the nature of it, if we want to be real philosophers of Mādhyamaka, have that kind of aspiration, then we will have to go about it that way, because the key issue is precisely this. It's the issue of appearance and reality. And if we don't really allow ourselves to accommodate that as far as we can, then of course our philosophical explorations will also be shallow. So it shows, I think, very clearly why there is this natural relation between learning, reflecting and meditating. It's a feedback loop.
And it's not the case in so many other fields that we can learn and study that there is such a feedback loop. But here there is, undeniably, and unless we acknowledge that, then our investigations of Mādhyamaka will be really superficial. And that's kind of ironic, if we are superficial about Mādhyamaka, then when will we be more genuine?
So then there's another option that is considered. Actions do not have conditions, yet there are no actions without conditions.
So this is considering a notion of there being conditions and then effects, and then something that connects them. Like in Singapore you talked about function. So it's similar to function, there's a certain function that the cause has which makes it produce the effect. So in some Abhidharma contexts those have distinct ontological status, the effect, the action and the effect. But it's a very natural idea as well, to think that there are functions that are produced somehow by conditions.
That's the end of my battery. Let me see. So if actions...
How is it the last two lines? Now I can't see the text. So like a good scholar would not need to have the text right in front of him or herself. Sometimes it helps. Sometimes it helps. Thank you. "Here's your.. and just scroll up down to the..." Thank you so much.


So when the action is performed, when the function is carried out then the condition for that could not be present. Because now it's already working. The condition is that which is meant to spark the function, set it in motion. So when the action is already ongoing, then there are no conditions. But at the same time an action has to be an action that is conditioned. Otherwise the action would be just again some kind of random activity that was not restricted and confined in any way at all. Completely unpredictable activity. And that's the opposite of the kind of action that we are looking for here, which is the function of producing a particular effect. So when that function, let's say that there is such a function, let's say that there is such an action, is present, there couldn't be the condition for it. And yet the very idea of an action that brings about the maturation of an effect implies that it is conditioned. So without an action there are no conditions and yet no conditions are involved in an action. So if the conditions would be... So we need an action to have conditions, but if the conditions would then be involved in the action, then how could it be so? The condition could be involved in an action that is already taking place? That doesn't make sense as we just said, no? If it's already taking place, then the very role that the condition is meant to play has already been fulfilled. So it couldn't be that the conditions, they are involved in manifest actions. So how about then unmanifest actions or actions that have not yet arisen? How could a condition be involved in something that doesn't exist? Yet, of course, but nonetheless. How could a condition have anything to do with something that isn't there?
The idea of an action engaging in something that doesn't exist is useless, no? And what, apart from actions that are there or not there, could a condition have any interference with? What would that be? Not there and also not not there? Is there such a thing? Not really, no? Meaning, certainly not when we examine things and yet perhaps we could say that there and not there, that goes for anything that we can consider, like you suggested in the beginning. That this sense of neither is okay at this point if it's just a way of expressing our understanding that when I look for justifications for this, when I look for grounds for this, I don't find a shadow of justification, a shadow of grounding. But still, something seems to be here, I have to say, so also with the action it's there and not there, and so with the whole world. And at that point there's no difference between dream and being awake, there's no difference between optical illusion and physical reality. Everything is on the same level as of there and not there. So whether that is something we can accept, stomach, use is a different question. So in other words, without an action there are no conditions,
without an action there are no conditions. Yes, I read it wrongly, but without an action there are no conditions, that would mean that conditions are called conditions because of this function that they have. It's because of their ability to produce this action that ripens the effect that they're called conditions, and yet no conditions are involved in an action. So the conditions require actions for them to be conditions, but what kind of action could a condition be involved in? It couldn't be involved in an action that is already manifest, then its role has already been played out. It couldn't be involved in an action that is yet to be carried out, because such a thing is a thing of the future, and so not here in the present. How could it be involved in something that doesn't exist? And apart from what exists and what doesn't exist, what type of action could there be for a condition to be involved in? So no conditions are involved in an action. So try to think of these three, of where we are at in terms of the thesis that was voiced in first stanza, and then go through these three stanzas, see if you can remember the lines of reason that lay behind, and of course that's also a matter of interpretation, so if you do have access to a commentary you're very welcome to read it also, you'll probably find it useful, but otherwise your notes and so on, whatever you have, try to when you are at home go through the verses again, remember the reasoning and reflect is there nonetheless a way of saving the idea of causes and conditions becoming connected through certain causal functions that things can have? Which as we started out considering is a very natural belief to have, that conditions, that's a thing, and then those conditions perform their function, there's a certain activity that is associated with those conditions, and it's when that activity, that function is carried out, that the effect comes to be. So here we have been.. finally in four, we have been refuting that in a certain way, so please try and recollect, reflect and take to heart, as they say, and see where we are at when we then meet again on Monday I suppose. Thank you.
Let's begin with the homage. "That which originates dependently does not cease and does not arise, is not annihilated and is not permanent, does not come and does not go, is not different and not the same. To the true teacher who reveals this peace, the complete pacification of constructs, To the perfect Buddha I bow down." I suppose we have been through verse one now, yeah? So at this point of having considered the first stanza in some detail,
what is your present understanding of this and your present opinion about the thesis that is presented? That not from itself, not from another, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does anything ever arise. Is there someone who thinks that it's perfectly clear? This is a perfectly reasonable and rational statement to make? Or is there someone who thinks it's not, that there is something perhaps seriously wrong with it? And also those who feel that there are certain things to go for this statement but there are also some problems. It would be nice to hear what you think at this point.
Student: "So I'm not entirely convinced yet about the refuting of the third option." Okay. "Because I don't, I think that the argument that same doesn't work, different doesn't work, so the third option is ruled out. I feel like the argument doesn't really apply to them combined because I think we're ruling out one thing, we're ruling out the other thing and then we're saying well then let's not consider it further what happens if we mix them? Because the argument for combination I think is what we were saying, I don't know if there is, if we say that the cause isn't the same as the effect, we could say that we rule that out so they're not the same. But coffee grounds are not the same as coffee, right? They're also not entirely different but undeniably in how things appear we can see that coffee comes from coffee grounds when conditions are right. So I don't get entirely how that third option is refuted yet." Yeah, thank you.
So the problem comes because of the way we dismiss the first option and the second option. It's because we find them both completely baseless. If they're completely baseless then it's like adding zero plus zero. You don't get any further. Another thing is that it's perfectly reasonable to say what you said about making coffee. That you have some substance there that is necessary for making coffee but that is not coffee yet it's required for it. So it's not entirely different and not entirely the same either. That's a perfectly normal and in the world meaningful statement to make. But what we're trying to do is examine what is this world? Is it really as it seems? And then we find to our surprise probably,
not only that the...
It's not that we come to think that, "oh yes there's certainly so much more to understand and so many things are beyond me." It's the very stuff that we make our opinions with that we find to be useless. And that's why the both option doesn't work. So there's the seeming whatever we want to call this. And then there's the question is it really so? And when we ask that question we find arguably no basis whatsoever for these appearances. Or if we want to call them these appearances for this. Because one way of describing what I experience is to say that I feel that something is taking place and I feel that and think and believe that what takes place is something that happens. Not just totally chaotically and randomly. But it's something that I can figure out to some extent in terms of causal relations. And it seems to be that that's just how the world is. And it seems that everyone agrees with me about that basic perspective.
So since that is a relevant description of my perception of the world then it becomes also relevant to ask okay if there are these apparent causes and conditions, What can we say about them? Could we say that they are one and the same? No we can't. Not at all. Because if cause and effect were the same they couldn't be cause and effect.
Complete identical nature of cause and effect cancels the very idea of cause and effect. Can we then say that they are different? No we can't. Because the very idea of difference makes the notion of cause and effect impossible. If these things were just different from each other and that would be the case about all things, not just cause and effect, but also cause and what is not. But also the effect and what is not a cause. So we say if cause and effect were different, then that difference between cause and effect would be raw difference in the same way as the difference between the effect and something that isn't the cause of that effect. So difference would be the case everywhere. So how could there be causal relationships? And it's because we fail to find just a tiny bit of reason and a tiny bit of grounds when we examine same and different with respect to cause and effect. That's why it doesn't help to bring them together. So they have this traditional example that if you have a single grain of sand, and when you turn that grain of sand or if you try to squeeze it, it doesn't give any oil. So why would it help to bring a ton of sand together and then try to churn it? Would we get any more oil out of that? If there would be just a little bit of oil, like mostly stuff that had nothing to do with oil in that sand grain, then it would make sense to bring a whole lot and then we could slowly get going by bringing a lot together. But if it's just void of what we need, then it doesn't help to just accumulate.
Student: "Because the way that I'm thinking of it is more like similar. So there's same which is exactly the same. There's different which is entirely different. But then there's similar which is the combination of something that's kind of same, kind of different. But not entirely either. But similar is a different thing. It's not same, it's not different, it's its own thing." But then you can also say, so everything is similar. That's the problem with similar. There's nothing that isn't similar to something else in some way. Student: "No, I mean if I have a mango seed and then I get a mango tree, there's a similarity. With a mango seed and a banana tree, what's the same?" Oh, tree, right. Actually, as Joanne told me years ago, a banana tree is not a tree. I forget what it's called. But it's, yeah. Anyways. So that's.. but not only examples of that kind, really anything that we can come up with has some similarity to whatever else we can possibly think of and imagine. At least in terms of being something we can possibly think of and imagine. Or possibly perceive, whatever it is that.. But at the same time, what this tells us is that we..
so then we begin to get perhaps a sense of dependent origination. That it's not because there are actually these things. That we can have the perceptions that we have, that we can have the ideas that we have. It's because everything depends, yeah? And when everything depends, there's no way of getting to the ground of it. So you have a very nice explanation of how to make a cup of coffee. And you use all the right concepts. But when you focus on, look closer at every step in what you say, the whole appearance of reason falls apart.
Would you agree about that? So that's, I mean you don't have to answer right now. But think carefully. Would you agree that we have the appearance of whatever we want to call it? And there's something that seems really undeniable, no? And we are very accustomed to using terms and concepts about these appearances in ways that seem really very natural and useful. To the extent that just saying, to the extent that the prospects of giving up those concepts seems impossible. And yet, when we examine what it is that we say, what it is that we propose, tell ourselves, every single bit of it is completely unfounded in anything.
So that's something to consider at this point.
If it doesn't seem like that, then why? If we can't agree wholeheartedly with this statement at this point, then why is that? So try to zoom in on what it is that makes you hesitate to say, yes indeed.
Yes, please.
Student: "Maybe what Meredith is saying could be understood the other way around, that it's not like a combination of self and other bringing the result, but that it's neither same nor other bringing the result. Like, I guess we are all agreeing that coffee and the bean is not the same. So that is excluded. And also we are agreeing that coffee and bean are not other because we cannot compare them because they exist in different times. So therefore we would end up sort of with a fourth option that bean and coffee are neither same nor different, but still there is not the randomness because the tea leaf doesn't produce the coffee. So maybe you are saying that it's arising of neither same nor different, but not in a random fashion. So there is some order or it's not a complete chaos." Right. That's very interesting. So we can… Then we remember at the beginning we asked ourselves, "is it the case that all options of real arising is captured within these three alternatives?" And we said yes, because we couldn't come up with any intelligible way of saying that there would be a neither self nor other option. So if we want to say that the arising of cause and effect is neither in terms of sameness nor in terms of difference, it couldn't be an actual alternative, it it couldn't be an account of real arising, because we spent a good deal of time trying to think of whether there could be a fourth option of causal arising. And we really came empty handed back from that kind of search. So it can't be an account of arising nonetheless, but at the same time the homage says is not different and not the same. That which originates dependently is not different and is not the same. So like Mabja says,
"Emptiness in relative terms is called dependent origination." So dependent origination without sameness and difference. But is that real arising? Is that real cause and real effect? Student: "Yeah, I think if you analyze it's not real arising, but still maybe I'm wondering what is the connection really? Why a coffee bean can in a sort of mystical way create a coffee, but why a tea leaf doesn't have that potential? How would Nāgārjuna respond to that or how you are responding?"
How would you respond to it? "I don't know, maybe just it's observable and let's leave it at that." At the same time of course we can say many things. Just take a look at the coffee bean, it's really different from tea leaf and you smell it and stuff like that. No, the tea leaf is not going to give me any coffee, but yeah, the coffee bean looks quite promising. So there are many ways of dealing with this on a practical level that makes good sense on a practical level. But why is it really like that? "Yeah, but what you just said is like the similar thing to coffee bean is more similar to coffee than the tea leaf." Yeah, sure, definitely. But so we just agreed about something, no? But what did we agree about? We can just repeat what we said, no? We can repeat the sentences, try to think the same things. But that question, why? Is it really like that? Do we have any sort of promising way that we can go to get further at why it's really the case that a coffee bean makes coffee and not a tea leaf? What at all does it mean to say really?
And we want to say really, no? If we can't talk about really, if we really can't talk about really, no? Then there's something wrong, no?
"No, there's one from online." Okay, thank you. "John, can you speak?" Student: "Can you hear me?" Yes. Can I just quickly start? "I wonder whether is it helpful to think of different functions. Coffee and tea have different functions. So if, I'm just thinking if I was a stray cat, right? I'm looking at Thomas, hope he feeds me, so there is Thomas' function. So if Nāgārjuna comes along, it's not that useful for the cat because..."
So I'm sorry, nobody brought by accident on purpose a charger for a computer like mine. Otherwise I'll just switch it off. "Which one do you have?" Macbook Pro. "Is there a charger?" Probably. I thought I had it fully charged and then not at all. Thank you so much.

Yeah, there's also one here.
Student: "Actually I have a thought." Thank you. "I have a thought. So I was thinking, if you think of coffee..." Oh sorry, I didn't, the communication got lost. [name] in Singapore can you speak?
Maybe the question was about function, that we have different functions or things have different functions.
Student: "To shift a bit from our perception to that of a stray cat. Hopefully that's helpful. From the view of a stray cat, looking at beings, maybe a Buddha and a ghost is not so helpful because they don't have the ability or the function to feed the stray cat. I don't know, because I appreciate what we are doing these few weeks, but it comes back to whether Thomas exists or not. So for the cat, if Thomas has the function of feeding the stray cat, Thomas exists. But from the view of the stray cat, well Nāgārjuna may not exist in that sense. Sorry if it confused you. Thank you." Thank you. I think what you say is at the same sort of practical level, that we can all agree that our understanding of each other depends on who we are. And it certainly depends on our faculties, which kind of organism, being we are, what we can see and understand about each other, what we end up seeing and understanding about each other. But the same and different problem, when examining why is it that I see the cat as a cat? Or whatever we might ask ourselves. Then any kind of causal account can only be at this sort of immediate level of not having examined things in this way at all. Because the moment we ask, so my relation with the cat that I see, is it one of seeing something that is different from myself or something that is the same as myself? The whole framework is gone.
Student: "I just had an opinion about the coffee bean that you can grow coffee and compare to a banana plant. I think there is a certain essence that the seed brings about a coffee plant versus a banana plant. However, I think it negates the idea of a sameness because plants and human beings also share 28% of genes. So there is a sameness. But I think the power of the essence of why a coffee seed produces a coffee tree is because there is an essence that is like coffee. But then that is much more on a surface level, I think. Like a gross level." It is a gross level in this context, no? But otherwise it is called Buddhist philosophy. That is something many of us respect profoundly.
Perhaps this is a good point to go further into the Analysis of Conditions. Because the rest of the chapter really addresses this perception. That there are these causal and resultant entities and they connect with each other, but they have their own essence also, which makes them unique and uniquely capable of producing whatever they produce. And so they are also by their very nature distinct from each other. And in chapter, in verse number 2, we have then the statement of a framework of four conditions, as you have it in Buddhist Abhidharma, right? That all kinds of causes can be described as four types of conditions. So in the Abhidharma there is this way of enumerating the
various types of cause that we come across in the world. Or anywhere in the world, on the path and so on. So the first is the, so they are called, there are four conditions: causal, objective, immediately preceding and likewise the ruling. There is no fifth condition. So just four. Again it is a very exhaustive and clear cut set of categories. And how is that? Well, the first kind of condition is the causal condition, which is whatever it is that we identify as the primary cause. Like when we talk about a sprout that grows from what? It grows from a seed. We know very well that there are many other things that are necessary for that sprout to grow, but we nevertheless identify a main cause, which is the seed. So that is what is meant by a causal condition. It is that sort of thing. So I guess, I don't know, the coffee bean for coffee perhaps? If we consider the water a cooperating condition. So then there is something called the objective condition. An objective condition is something that only is the case with respect to mental events. So objective conditions have nothing to do with the physical reality, but when there is cognition, then there are these objects that we perceive and make us then think and feel and understand in various ways. So that is called an objective condition. The things that we see and the things that in this way make us have a moment of consciousness of a particular kind. That's called the objective condition. The next, the immediately preceding condition, this is also something that only is relevant in terms of mental events. So the immediately preceding condition is precisely the moment of cognition that was before the present one. And it's the demise of that. So for me to have a perception of this, what is a good example of that? For me to have a perception of this cup, as it is right now in this present moment, then whatever I was perceiving in the moment just before, and we're talking subtle moments, whatever I was perceiving in the moment just before will have to be gone. Otherwise I would still be perceiving what I saw before and not this cup. So there is a condition for conscious events or mental events, cognitive events, that takes the form of the cessation of the moment of cognition that was just before. So objective conditions are the objects, the immediately preceding condition is the moment of cognition that was just before that which we experience now. So those two conditions that are the case with respect to all mental events, all moments of consciousness,
but they are exclusively relevant with respect to mental events.
And there must be some debate about whether there are certain moments of cognition that don't have this, but basically the idea is that this is the case with respect to all moments of consciousness.
So likewise there is the ruling condition, and the ruling condition is defined as any cooperating condition for the arising of a certain effect which is none of the first three. So it's not the main course, it's also not the objective condition, and it's also not the immediately preceding condition, but whatever else there may be. So if it's, for example, we see, it is my, we're talking about the event of me perceiving this cup: then the causal condition would be, for example, my eye, that would be like a natural way of identifying the causal condition, and then the objective condition is that object out here that I can see, and the immediately preceding condition is the cessation of whatever my consciousness was in the moment before that, and then anything that contributes to that,
that contributes otherwise, like the rest of my body, for example, that is required for my consciousness being there together with my body for my eye to be able to see. So that would be one way of coming up with an example of the ruling conditions. But there are many, it's also the light in the room, some say that it's the space as well, like that. So those are, this is the framework that Buddhist Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma presents for..
for talking about causes, naming them conditions. And there's no fifth condition, there's no.. typically we would say that there's no fifth condition such as the Almighty who is responsible for something. So that's a statement of the view of the opposition, really. So now this framework will be refuted, and it begins in number three, where it said that the nature of things is not in conditions and so forth. If there is no thing itself, how could there be anything other?
So the nature of things, meaning the nature of the effects, they are not in the conditions, like if we talk again about seed and sprout, then the sprout is not there in the condition, no? In the causal condition, for example, the seed. The nature of things, what is meant by the nature of things, it's whatever makes something what it is. That's its nature. So that which makes the effect what it is, is not present in the cause, right? That couldn't be the case, because then we would have the problem that we saw with the first alternative, the first option with respect to causal arising. If the very nature, that which makes the effect the effect, was present in the cause, then there would be no cause and effect.
So if there is no thing itself, if then the cause is not present in the conditions, then how can we say that cause and effect are different from each other? What is the reference point that allows us to say that the sprout and the seed are different? Also, how could the cause, which then is devoid of the effect, we say that the very nature of the effect, that which makes the effect what it is, is not in the cause. If it's not in the cause, then how could we expect that this cause could serve as a cause for it, if it is devoid of the effect?
That would make it as, something that is void of a certain effect is a non-cause, no? It's that which is not the cause of something.
If we look at seed and sprout and say, just take a look at the seed and we notice that no, the nature of the effect, the sprout, is not there in the seed. Then, if it's not there in the seed, why is the seed capable of producing the effect? Why it is then just as devoid of the effect as we would find it if we took a piece of charcoal and examined it? And we said, no, the nature of the effect, the sprout, is not present there. It's the same analysis we find.
If there is no presence there, there's no connection. What would be the point of contact between, that's another way of looking at it, what would be the point of contact between an effect and a cause that has nothing of the effect in it?
So what do you think about that? We have already, what we're doing now is to look at the same issue we could say, no? It's an expansion on what was stated in the first stanza and what we have spent time thinking about in the first stanza. There's now an expansion on this, yeah? Here with special reference to the idea that cause and effect are different from each other. So we can look at the cause and we find that the nature of the effect is not there. Let's take a look at the seed. No, there's no sprout there. In other words, that which makes the sprout the sprout is not in the seed. Now we can also take a piece of charcoal and we can make the exact same observation. No, that which makes the effect the effect, that which makes the sprout the sprout is not present there. So at this point cause and non-cause, cause are completely equal.
Try to think about that, no? Any response at this point we can briefly consider?
Student: "So I would say that the physical framework of both the seed and the sprout are the same, even though it doesn't seem that way. Going back to the example before, coffee beans have certain relative characteristics that produce relative results. Same with tea leaves and tea, but on a level past direct conceptual experience everything has the same origin. For example, even though coffee may seem like a drinkable substance, it's just atoms, just like an airplane. Therefore a coffee bean and an airplane are actually the same thing. They just seem different through our conceptual perception. So even though it seems that a coffee bean produces coffee and a tea leaf produces tea, they're not actually producing anything that is separate from any other object because all objects are the same source. So I guess I would say the same thing about a seed and a sprout, the same physical framework, I guess atoms, so they're not separate at all." That seems like a classic version of the first option, that things appear different, but really they're not at all. So did you think that.. so when you hear this argument that the nature of things is not in conditions, the nature of resultant entities is not present in their conditions, and if they aren't, then how can we say that there is arising from things that are other? How can we return to the idea of different causes and effects and say, well these are different, but yet one gives rise to the other? So when you hear that, you say "yes, that's true, that's incorrect, in fact causes and effects are not different, they are the same." Student: "I'm talking more about physical causes, not emotional causes or karmic causes, but I would say that they're the same." All objects is like, so that would be the first alternative.
Then we basically give up the idea of difference, we give up the idea of causality also. So it's another way of saying there are no causes and conditions. It's just an appearance. So if that's what you say, then yeah, there are no causes and conditions, it's just an appearance. Perhaps we could imagine hearing Nāgārjuna say that to someone also.
But whether that can be regarded as a position, as a framework for philosophy, that's a different issue.
What do you think about the truth value of what you say there, so to speak? Things that seem to be causes and conditions, but actually there's no difference whatsoever. How much truth do you ascribe to that statement?
Student: "I would say that it's pretty true." Pretty true is… That's similar again, yeah? Everything is pretty true also. To the extent that there's something true about anything, even the worst lie has some truth to it.
Yeah, okay. Student: "That's all, I mean." Yeah, sure, thank you.
So either we could see this as a point of being in agreement with the statement in the homage, that which originates dependently does not arise and does not cease. And then it's just how much sense, how much do I agree here? What's the character of my commitment to that statement? That becomes very interesting to explore. And it's also something that we can explore in our meditation practice, when we contemplate and then sort of without recognizing that this is important to become clear about. Like when I say this and when I say, "Yes, I agree, whatever arises dependently does not cease and does not arise." Then I agree and I agree in this and this way. It could be that I say, "Yeah, I think about it and there's some argument that I can't really defeat, so I have to agree and that's it." So it's possible that one could leave it at that and then learn something more and something slightly different and so on. And we could even become scholars of the Mādhyamaka, but without really paying all that much attention.
So what Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche and what the Dalai Lama were encouraging us to do, is to combine analytic meditation with this rest. So whenever we come to some understanding, like what you express, that the appearance of distinct causes and conditions is illusory. And then whether we want to say it's all the same or just say that ultimately it's not the case that there are causes and conditions, whichever way, that doesn't matter all that much. But when we have come to that kind of conclusion, then try to acknowledge it. And you could say you acknowledge it by saying, "I can't refute it, so now I want to use that for my further philosophical work." Or you can say, "I want to use it in my discussions with others when I write my next book," and so on. That's one way of acknowledging it, but there are other ways too. We can acknowledge this experientially as well. Try to just see the world with eyes that are informed by this kind of understanding, so to speak. So that's, I think, what they were encouraging us to do. And then by the nature of it, if we want to be real philosophers of Mādhyamaka, have that kind of aspiration, then we will have to go about it that way, because the key issue is precisely this. It's the issue of appearance and reality. And if we don't really allow ourselves to accommodate that as far as we can, then of course our philosophical explorations will also be shallow. So it shows, I think, very clearly why there is this natural relation between learning, reflecting and meditating. It's a feedback loop.
And it's not the case in so many other fields that we can learn and study that there is such a feedback loop. But here there is, undeniably, and unless we acknowledge that, then our investigations of Mādhyamaka will be really superficial. And that's kind of ironic, if we are superficial about Mādhyamaka, then when will we be more genuine?
So then there's another option that is considered. Actions do not have conditions, yet there are no actions without conditions.
So this is considering a notion of there being conditions and then effects, and then something that connects them. Like in Singapore you talked about function. So it's similar to function, there's a certain function that the cause has which makes it produce the effect. So in some Abhidharma contexts those have distinct ontological status, the effect, the action and the effect. But it's a very natural idea as well, to think that there are functions that are produced somehow by conditions.
That's the end of my battery. Let me see. So if actions...
How is it the last two lines? Now I can't see the text. So like a good scholar would not need to have the text right in front of him or herself. Sometimes it helps. Sometimes it helps. Thank you. "Here's your.. and just scroll up down to the..." Thank you so much.


So when the action is performed, when the function is carried out then the condition for that could not be present. Because now it's already working. The condition is that which is meant to spark the function, set it in motion. So when the action is already ongoing, then there are no conditions. But at the same time an action has to be an action that is conditioned. Otherwise the action would be just again some kind of random activity that was not restricted and confined in any way at all. Completely unpredictable activity. And that's the opposite of the kind of action that we are looking for here, which is the function of producing a particular effect. So when that function, let's say that there is such a function, let's say that there is such an action, is present, there couldn't be the condition for it. And yet the very idea of an action that brings about the maturation of an effect implies that it is conditioned. So without an action there are no conditions and yet no conditions are involved in an action. So if the conditions would be... So we need an action to have conditions, but if the conditions would then be involved in the action, then how could it be so? The condition could be involved in an action that is already taking place? That doesn't make sense as we just said, no? If it's already taking place, then the very role that the condition is meant to play has already been fulfilled. So it couldn't be that the conditions, they are involved in manifest actions. So how about then unmanifest actions or actions that have not yet arisen? How could a condition be involved in something that doesn't exist? Yet, of course, but nonetheless. How could a condition have anything to do with something that isn't there?
The idea of an action engaging in something that doesn't exist is useless, no? And what, apart from actions that are there or not there, could a condition have any interference with? What would that be? Not there and also not not there? Is there such a thing? Not really, no? Meaning, certainly not when we examine things and yet perhaps we could say that there and not there, that goes for anything that we can consider, like you suggested in the beginning. That this sense of neither is okay at this point if it's just a way of expressing our understanding that when I look for justifications for this, when I look for grounds for this, I don't find a shadow of justification, a shadow of grounding. But still, something seems to be here, I have to say, so also with the action it's there and not there, and so with the whole world. And at that point there's no difference between dream and being awake, there's no difference between optical illusion and physical reality. Everything is on the same level as of there and not there. So whether that is something we can accept, stomach, use is a different question. So in other words, without an action there are no conditions,
without an action there are no conditions. Yes, I read it wrongly, but without an action there are no conditions, that would mean that conditions are called conditions because of this function that they have. It's because of their ability to produce this action that ripens the effect that they're called conditions, and yet no conditions are involved in an action. So the conditions require actions for them to be conditions, but what kind of action could a condition be involved in? It couldn't be involved in an action that is already manifest, then its role has already been played out. It couldn't be involved in an action that is yet to be carried out, because such a thing is a thing of the future, and so not here in the present. How could it be involved in something that doesn't exist? And apart from what exists and what doesn't exist, what type of action could there be for a condition to be involved in? So no conditions are involved in an action. So try to think of these three, of where we are at in terms of the thesis that was voiced in first stanza, and then go through these three stanzas, see if you can remember the lines of reason that lay behind, and of course that's also a matter of interpretation, so if you do have access to a commentary you're very welcome to read it also, you'll probably find it useful, but otherwise your notes and so on, whatever you have, try to when you are at home go through the verses again, remember the reasoning and reflect is there nonetheless a way of saving the idea of causes and conditions becoming connected through certain causal functions that things can have? Which as we started out considering is a very natural belief to have, that conditions, that's a thing, and then those conditions perform their function, there's a certain activity that is associated with those conditions, and it's when that activity, that function is carried out, that the effect comes to be. So here we have been.. finally in four, we have been refuting that in a certain way, so please try and recollect, reflect and take to heart, as they say, and see where we are at when we then meet again on Monday I suppose. Thank you.
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