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Root of The Middle Way – Session 23

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  • Buddhist Classics and Philosophy
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  • Rangjung Yeshe Institute - Nepal
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In session 23, Thomas discusses Mādhyamaka philosophy's profound insights, interdependence of causal and resultant forms.

In session 23,  Chapter Three is explored, noting its similarities with Chapter Two. The discussion touches on the luminous aspect of the mind and the significance of these insights in philosophy and personal experience. The upcoming chapter focuses on the relationship between causal and resultant forms, drawing parallels to contemporary philosophy and science. The lecture ends with insights into the interdependence of causal and resultant forms, highlighting the limitations of grounding everything in physical reality.

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Let's begin, yeah? "That which originates dependently, does not cease and does not arise, is not annihilated and is not permanent, does not come and does not go, is not different and not the same. To the true teacher who reveals this peace, the complete pacification of constructs, to the perfect Buddha I bow down." So yesterday we completed Chapter Three and so we begin with Four today. Are there any reflections or concerns about Chapter Three before we begin?
Yes.
Student: "I guess this is an obvious question but a lot of the arguments in Chapter Three are very similar to Chapter Two, aren't they? In terms of the agent and the act, etc. So I just wondered why, if Nāgārjuna keeps using the same arguments, why does he have to...
Why does he have to critique the act of seeing if that argument has already been covered in coming and going? So it's kind of the same thing but using something else. So why to continue? Does that make sense? Maybe you've already covered that or said something about it." No, no, I've thought about it but that doesn't make sense. "Yeah, I mean it's sort of, in some ways it feels quite repetitive." So do you have a suggestion yourself? "Well I suppose because, I guess because we really grasp or we kind of reify or the act of seeing seems very real and we grasp to objects of sight or objects of our perception. So maybe those habits need to be in some way critiqued or refuted so that we can let go of that grasping to objects within our perception, whether they're hearing, spelling, whatever it is. It's just like another rug being pulled out." Yeah
Yeah it's a good question of course. Any sort of careful reader, student will think about this, what is the purpose? And in one way, just one argument of this kind, no? It is not that there's something else being shown really, no, is it? Of course in Chapter Two we have where there's explicit reference to arguments that were made before, yeah? And I think it's easy to fail to acknowledge the sort of general applicability of these things, no? So similar to what you were saying, sort of our tendency is to think that okay this is one thing and then there's something else that comes next, yeah? So in one way what would be the natural thing to do after, I don't know, Chapter One? Like what would be the natural next step? Once any of these arguments have been delivered then yeah, what would you say? If you were Nāgārjuna then what would you write next, so to speak? Or what would you do next?
Student: "After chapter one?" Yeah I'll say any of the, like the argument in the first stanza is not an argument, not but they say a position that is presented, no? Not from self, not from other, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does ever anything arise. So once that argument that is behind, once the argument that is behind that first stanza has been explained then what to do next? You can say perhaps also then whatever happens next is going to be, yeah, why? Like you could say, you know what I mean? "Well it sort of deconstructed my solidity or reifying of the world and I find like the argument of coming and going, and the argument of seeing that things are empty through the argument of dependent origination is very convincing actually. But then Chapter Three seems to be using the same kinds of arguments so I'm kind of wondering well why are we doing this again? But as I was saying, you know, that the objects of our perception and our perceptions seem so real that perhaps that rug has to be pulled out." I don't know if it has to, no? But apparently he thinks there's a reason for going on, yeah? And you could say after the first argument that is behind the first stanza then also there's no, I mean, why would you think that there's real movement then if nothing arises? Then how could there be movement, no?
But it does continue and I think that emptiness which is, what to say.. okay, yeah, so let's try and think about it like that. So it's helpful to hear it from certain different sides, yeah? But is the emptiness that we understand is that different and do we get like a different understanding?
When we do that I'm thinking like sort of from our own perspective, yeah? And of course we have some feeling already but now we're also becoming used to thinking a little closer, like this is one of the things that are easy to say, you know, and we can all agree, yeah? Okay, it was shown first in the first chapter in terms of this argument of the vajra splinter, whatever we call it. And then there's a slightly different argument which also shows that but it gets at the same issue in a slightly different way. So that's helpful. That's just sort of normal conversation, no, and we can all agree. But is there actually something different that we see in Chapter Two apart from what we saw in Chapter One?
"I think it's the same but we're coming from it from a different way and it seems like the whole of all the chapters are every time there's an objection you say, "Yes but.." Yes but well, you know, like for example what about the example of fire? Fire burns and it burns itself and it also burns other things, you know? So there's always an objection. So it seems to me that, I can't remember what your question was now, but there's always a kind of a 'yes, but' and that you might be convinced but not wholly convinced. So Nāgārjuna has to continue to take the rugs out to sort of just to puncture your objectifying or solidifying reality all the time. So it has to kind of continue I suppose right the way through the 27 chapters so there's absolutely nothing left." Yeah, I think this is my tendency at least, no? To say "Yes, but.."
So then if there's an issue there has to be something that deals with it also, no? I don't know how helpful it is what I'm saying now but it's a very interesting question, why, what is this actually about, no? Once it has been shown once, why isn't that enough? And it probably has something to do with what it is that's being shown. It's not just one thing, like we have talked about many times also, it's not something you can just tick off and say, "Okay now I understood it." Right? It's something much deeper than and much more relevant to our lives than something that is of that kind. Now I've learned that I got the points and then there's no need to repeat it, no? So instead this is, yeah it's different. Anybody else have some?
Student: "Thomas, can you hear?" Yeah, there's just somebody who started a few seconds before you and you will be right after, okay?
Student: "To be honest I think this chapter about the wangpo, the perceptions, the sensory perceptions, kind of a little bit hit home in a sense because it just, there is a coincidence, maybe not a coincidence, a few days ago I was hearing a lecture from one of, from my Zen painting teacher and he was talking about this Zen teaching that which is probably can be taken as instruction as well rather than a conclusion. Like first there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, but then in the end there is a mountain. So because for me this sensory, this outer world has so much pulling and it is the eye, the eye is looking all the time and the ear is distracted by sounds all the time. But then at first, right, there is a mountain that I think it's really there, but with this type of reasoning we're going through, there is no, I cannot find a substantially existing mountain. I mean where is it? It cannot be found. But then in the end the mountain appears as if in a sense that within this non-existence there can be quality. There can be compassion, there can be love, there can be quality that exists. So it's not a void. I'm not sure that makes sense or not, but it's just for some reason that just connected everything that we've been doing so far. And yesterday you were saying that is the eye or the person or the one body faculty, is it intrinsically seeing? Right. That's just such a.. it just hit home for me. Like the question, like what, it's not like it's nothing is there. And then you're saying how everything that I do, every little thoughts that I have, every facial expression I show, it will have some tremendous, what do you call that, repercussion to it. So it's almost hard to describe, but therefore when I hear that from the painting master, when he said first there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, no mountain, but then in the end there is a mountain. It just sort of hit home. So I think to this chapter it definitely did something to my personal experience."
So I think there is also a good case then for saying that it is, it's a real fine example of how philosophy and contemplation and meditation are not different, because it really introduces us to whatever we want to call it, in a continuous way and from many different angles. Just like when you practice something, then when you practice something it's precisely the situation. You don't just need to get it and then that's it. Now you are an expert, no? Like you have to apply that knowledge or feel that knowledge in the things that you do to really..otherwise it's not training. So the treatise really progresses like a training program in many ways. Then we can still ask the question, so is it something different that we understand when we understand emptiness the first time in the sense that we feel the first argument actually is irrefutable and we have this sense of not being able to find a ground for any of our beliefs? So if there's any one of you who doesn't recognize that experience, then, or that sense of situation, context, then you're very welcome to say also why you haven't been in that situation yet through thinking of these things, no? But otherwise what is it that is different about first time understanding emptiness in that way and then the other, like as we train, what is it that we then get to understand differently? Because that then says something.. it's a little much to say that, "yeah, I understood emptiness," right? When this was presented I understood emptiness. But at the same time, was it.. if we fail to find any ground for all of this, then these appearances being by nature emptiness would seem to be a conclusion that we could draw at that point. And that conclusion would also be applicable to all the subsequent instances of insight. So what would we like to say is the first? Is it still different all the time? Like is it a different kind of emptiness that we understand whenever we understand? I totally appreciate and recognize what you are talking about, I think we all do. And precisely because it is so recognizable and characteristic of what it's like to contemplate these things, then we can also ask ourselves that question. When we have that feeling that now I see it better, what is it that we see better?
Because.. yeah there are people there, I'm sorry, yeah. Because if there really is something that we see better, then emptiness is many different things, yeah?
And if emptiness is many different things, then then emptiness is just like all other things, yeah? So this is something we can think about also, yeah? Like it's a very, another piece of compelling conceptual story, and it's a very important one obviously to feel that there's progress and I see it better now, I have a clearer perception, I've got something that previously wasn't there. But what really do we mean? We can ask also in terms of these insight stories, we can ask the same questions as we asked about going and coming, no? So what is it really that made me say this, yeah? Yeah, then there are a few other questions online. Yeah, I think we have Luis, then Laurent, and then Ute.
Student: "I have one point from Chapter Three which is almost the same as Chapter Two that I quite can't question whether it's there or not. You said for example that we can say that there is no past and future seen, of course because it's not there. But then apart from these two no.. I'm trying to quote what I wrote here. Apart from these two, no present seeing to be identified either. And then on Chapter Two, verse 15, there is also refutation of standing still, but on these occasions when we were talking about a present event, but not a movement, not arising, not a process, like the present not walking or the present event of sight, I find it harder to question it." Yeah, so that... Maybe question the structure of it divided into agent, action, then we refuted it, it doesn't make sense the narrative, but then just the plain present event, that's a harder one for me." Yeah, yeah, yeah, that's a good point, and that could also be a good reason for then spending time talking about sight, no? And precisely with the help of the same argument. That would be then very relevant to do that, if we are now dealing with something, the event of seeing, because it makes more... It sounds better also to say the event of seeing rather than the action of seeing, yeah? It doesn't sound so correct, no? So because it doesn't, and because the argument is still applicable, then we could easily overlook that and think that this is different, no? And although we may say that sight is like a... Seeing something is just an event and there's not really any process in that. If we say it's just an event, is it a processual event? It probably is, no? And if there's a process, there's activity of some sort, no? Otherwise if there's no... If by event we mean something static, then that doesn't make sense either, no? So as soon as there is process and activity, then it also makes sense to... For sure, I think that I am someone who is capable of seeing, and that I can do things to see such and such. So it's something that we... Seeing is something that we structure within a framework of action, no? There's the means of seeing, then there's the seer and that which is seen, yeah? And because that is the case, then this is also all what has been said about walker, walking, and the path traversed is also applicable to seeing. Does that make sense? So that would be, Luis, what you say, a very good sort of explanation of why also just conceptually in rational terms, in terms of the logical progression of the treatise, that it would make sense to speak of seeing after movement, the critique of movement in the second chapter, and in particular why it would make sense to repeat rather than add something new. Because it's different to understand that something that didn't seem... That seemed to be a different situation actually isn't than just being served a new argument, no? Thank you. And then there were others also or... Student: "Yes I was just wondering, I keep on stumbling over this stanza 22 of the second chapter: "The one who goes does not engage in the going that characterizes him as someone who goes, because there is no one who goes before going." full stop, "Someone goes somewhere." Right. Just a minute. And what makes you stumble on that? "Well the last line is separate, right? "Because there is no one who goes before going," full stop, "someone goes somewhere." And I was thinking it should be no one goes somewhere, but actually..." One way of understanding the last sentence is that it says, for there to be an act of going there has to be someone first who can begin to go. Someone goes somewhere. The one who goes does not engage in the going that characterizes him as someone who goes, because there is no one who goes before going.
So the walker does not engage in that type of walking that makes him a walker. Like we talked about the act of walking and then it being performed by someone and that someone having to be the walker. That walking that qualifies him as the walker...
That walking that qualifies him as the walker could not be the same as the one that he engages in, because in that case... Let me just see what the commentary, how it explains it.
Yeah, so the way the commentary explains it is like this. The one who goes does not engage in the going that characterizes him as someone who goes because...
because before you can initiate an act of going, there has to be someone there to do it. So it's not that... The way this commentary explains it is a bit jumping from...
The one who goes does not engage in the going that characterizes him as someone who goes. This we understand, yeah? The walker could not engage in that. "Yes." Because there's no one who goes before going, meaning then.. I see why you're hesitating about this stanza 22. Because in that case there would be... We can say it like that perhaps, no? Because in that case there would be no one who goes before going. There would be no...
For the one who goes to engage in the very act that qualifies him as the agent of going, he would have to be present as such. We would then say that there is a non-walker first who is present as someone who then engages in the action that qualifies him as the agent of walking.
And then someone goes somewhere means there has to be someone qualified as a walker in order to be able to engage in an act of walking. And the commentary says just like a potter needs to be present before he can make pots, there has to be a walker who can begin to walk. We can read what the commentary says. "When someone who goes performs the act of going, is this act then the same as the one that characterizes him or her as someone who goes, or is it different?" That is the question that is under consideration in this stanza. When an agent, a walker, walks on a path, is that walking on the path then identical with the walking that the agent performs in order to be an agent or is it different? And then it says, "First Devadatta, if we think that Devadatta is the one who goes on the path, he does not engage in the act of going that characterizes him as someone who goes. That is the going that qualifies him for the label 'someone who goes.'" And why? "A Potter can make pots because he exists prior to the pot that he makes. So likewise, if a given agent of going were to exist prior to the act of going that characterizes him or her as such, then that previously existent individual could perform the act of going to a given location such as a town or a city." And so the fourth line in this stanza shows the argument's entailment, someone goes somewhere. Like, for there to be someone who goes, there has to be someone who goes somewhere. And the third line is the evidence: "The agent of going does not exist as an agent of going prior to the act of going that qualifies him or her as such an agent." So because the agent does not exist in this way, he cannot engage in the act of going that qualifies him as the walker. So it sounds a little convoluted, but I guess it's pretty clear what is being said. Like for someone to engage, the basic question being when a walker walks on the path, is the kind of walking that qualifies the walker as the walker, a walking that is distinct from the walking that is performed on the path? Or is it the very same?
It couldn't be the act of walking that the agent engages in couldn't be the same as the one that characterizes him or her as the agent of walking, because in that case there would be nobody there to initiate the action. There's the act of walking and then there's an agent who performs the act of walking. That agent is qualified by an activity, walking. Is that activity, walking, that qualifies the agent as the walker the very same activity as the agent performs when walking on the path? Or is it a distinct type of walking? It couldn't be that the agent engages in the act of walking that qualifies him as such, because since that action is the one that makes him an agent, he cannot by definition exist prior to that action. And if he doesn't exist prior to that action, then he cannot initiate it, just like a potter cannot begin to make pots unless indeed he is there first and decides, okay now it's time to make some pots. Is that clear then? "Yes, thank you very much." Thanks.
"Laurent, did you have a question online?"
Student: "I was thinking that this process is an analytical process and we use our mind which is confused at the beginning. For me it's like it brings an experience of emptiness, but it's just an experience, it's not a realization which is stable. I see my tendencies to grasp, so of course I can have a glimpse of one aspect of my daily life or situation, but it's a training I need to apply in every situation of my life to really completely purify my tendencies to grasp. And as I'm using my mind which is confused from the beginning, I was thinking to the difference when you have this transference of blessing, what you were also saying, it's like the big jump, if you have really total confidence to a master and you are fully brought to the emptiness and you can really settle in it and stay, of course it's different, but when I use this mind which is confused, I need to train again and again and to purify my tendencies. And it brings also to me this notion of, in this text he doesn't speak of the luminous aspect of the mind. Am I right or not? When I see you speaking or explaining it, I see you smiling with joy which seems to be the luminous aspect, but the text itself I don't see the luminous aspect in it. And sometimes they say also you have to study together the Gyu Lama because Gyu Lama brings in the luminous aspect. And sorry I have another question also Thomas, where is it in the Choying Dzo, where is its place between these two texts?" Where is the relation? "Yeah, the Choying Dzo, from Longchenpa.
So first it was about that we need to train, right? And that makes very good sense, no? And at the same time that we need to train is convention. It's not the ultimate truth that we need to train. Of course that's why we need to train.
And then there's about the luminous aspect.. So I think just the way that it progresses also... with Mādhyamaka it's easy to get to think in terms of nothing, but at the same time it's also clear that that's a sidetrack or a sort of misunderstanding really. It can be.. to say that all of this seems to be there, but when I examine I don't find anything. "Don't find anything" sounds a lot like nothing. So in that sense the understanding of nothing is useful because it's something that we didn't acknowledge before. But it's not that we then reach a conclusion about all of this being nothing, of course. That would be yet another extreme. If there's nothing that exists then there's nothing that doesn't exist either. That's pretty clear. So how could all of this be nothing? But what we can understand through this analysis is that yes, it doesn't exist and it does not not exist. And that is perhaps a way of acknowledging the luminosity of the mind or the unity of the two truths; the unity of appearance and emptiness is in many ways is not.. unless you want it to be different, then it's not any different from the luminosity of the mind. Would the luminosity of the mind be anything else than the unity of emptiness and appearance? Probably not, no. So it's just the term does not appear here but it's all about the luminosity, no? Because if it's not then it becomes like a negation. That is clearly not the intent. And then, so what would you say about Choying Dzo MūlaMādhyamaka, Laurent, yourself?
He pushed the..in Choying Dzo I think he pushed the button farther.
I don't know how to put it in words because he said "rigpa" and also the expression of "rigpa", everything is just the expression of "rigpa". I don't know I forgot the name in..." In Choying Dzo you don't really have much in terms of arguments. There's much more argument here, no, but you can say that what is said in Choying Dzo makes perfect sense in terms of this treatise, no? And otherwise perhaps it does not make so much sense. To really say that the teaching of the Choying Dzo is true may be difficult unless we can explain some of this stuff, no?
So I think that's what I would say about that.
And should we then begin the analysis of the aggregates?
That is a chapter on the aggregates, the five aggregates: form, feeling, perception, formation and consciousness. But it is a chapter that considers, that looks at form primarily, so the physical world. And that's interesting from our contemporary perspective because so much of modern philosophical and scientific perspectives are formulated within a sort of physicalist context. So that makes it extra relevant I think to the contemporary scenario. Because it's about form and the cause of form, yes? So according to Abhidharma there are causal forms and resultant forms. The causal forms are the particles of the four elements: earth, water, fire and wind. And they then combine in different ways in order to produce the resultant forms which are the sights that we can see, the sounds that we can hear, the smells that we can smell, the tastes that we can have, and that which we can touch. So those fields of engagement with the senses, with the five senses...
And it's also the faculties, the constitution of the physical faculties like the eye faculty, which is not according to Abhidharma my eyeball or something like that, it's something much more subtle and very light and sort of buoyant form that is the faculty by means of which I can see. And the same with the ear, there's an explanation for each of the faculties, right? But they're made of particles too and the combination of particles. So in other words we have a physical reality that is the reason that I can see things because those.. the particles of the four elements, they combine in different ways that then makes it possible for me to see things with my eyes, to hear things with my ears. And each of those things that I.. these fields of perception are different. I can't use my eye to hear things, right? No matter how sharp my eyes are I can't see sounds. No matter how keen my ears are they don't help me to see the objects of these faculties and the spheres of engagement of these faculties are distinct.
So that is the framework that we are considering now, that there is a manifest world, physical world that is the product of these particles. So in many ways I think this can be seen
quite like the way from a scientific point of view we might talk about atoms and subatomic particles which combine in various ways. So that's why things are the way they are. It's because of the physical reality and then these physical forms are just products one way or the other of the physical reality. Of course this is something that people spend a great, just how this is possible is something that is of course still an open question and this whole issue of emergence is meant to explain how such a thing is possible. How can there be subatomic and atomic particles which are just that and yet they are the basis for something that is not at all.. doesn't come across at least as atomic particles.
But then.. so how much sense in other words does it make to think in terms of components of physical reality that can support through their interactions, all of this? So that we have something that really is the basis for these appearances. Then how real these appearances are, we can bracket that issue but there's something that is the basis for them, namely these physical components. And here just as in science they're talking about particles, of course here it's just four particles of earth, water, fire, and wind but nonetheless it's a reality, a solid reality of particles. So that chapter begins with Apart from the cause of form, form is not observed." And then "Likewise aside from so-called form, no cause of form can be observed either."
So wherever we then look in the world, all of what we see is.. all of what we see, the resultant forms are actually just that, they are the products of the causal forms. That's why we say that there's a cause and effect relationship between the two, it's that what we then see there is actually the causal forms, if you want to say what is. And if not, if it were possible to observe a form that is not the causal forms, then that form would be independent of causal form. If it is, again we can remember how we analyzed other in Chapter One. If the manifestation of the resultant form is something other than the causal form, then that resultant form is separate from its cause. It has no, it is distinct from its cause and so there's no basis for actually speaking about those two as cause and effect. So precisely because there is a dependence between, an alleged dependence between the causal forms and the resultant forms, that's why we can say that those two are not distinct from each other either. If they were distinct there could be no dependence. And if apart from.. if aside...
If we could see if it was possible to have causal forms that are just that but not resultant forms, then we would have a cause without effect.
So this is very interesting to think about in terms of theories about atomic reality. What is it actually that we say then? It tells us something about the ontological status of atoms, that we cannot have one without the other. The subtle reality and the cause manifestation only become compelling if they depend on each other and if they depend on each other they're not distinct and if they're not distinct and also not the same then they are just merely apparent dependent ordination. So that would actually take us already there to the.. any move to say that this is grounded in and explained by a physical reality comes to an end right there. We can use our apparatus of a.. with respect to a physical reality, we can use that in order to understand better what this is and what we can do with all of this. But there's nothing, there's no.. it is impossible to truly reduce this to these atomic particles.
Because we want to say that they.. because it just, if it were possible to have atomic particles that are not, that are just that but don't perform the causal function then that would be the same as saying we have a cause without an effect. And because they always perform that function then there's a dependent relation between the two. When there's a dependent relation there's no identity and no real difference either without real identity or shared identity and without substantial difference then the atomic reality and this level of reality are on the same level of reality. They are.. none is more real and has more explanatory value than the other. That must be the conclusion to draw. And so this is related also to what we talked about yesterday about dream and reality in the same way we can talk about the explanatory frameworks that we have in physics for example, and then what we experience. Those two.. the entities that exist according to the explanatory framework and the things that we like to think of as existent in terms of this experience of the world, if they really are what they purport to be, if the explanatory framework actually is an explanatory framework for this, then the implication is for it at all to work as an explanatory framework, it couldn't be.. the entities that it refers to couldn't be any more real than this. That's quite something. For the very idea to work, the foundationalist character of this is impossible. Any truly foundationalist move is bound to fail. Of course this is not to say that physics doesn't explain and cannot help us do amazing things. That would be impossible to argue. And why would anyone try to do it? But for that to happen, then it could only be the case that the entities posited by physics are no more real than any of this.
That's amazing.
And that's again like the two truths are then clearly not in conflict with each other. It's because of that emptiness of intrinsic existence, the entities posited by physics do not exist intrinsically. That's why they can work as very, very useful constructs in terms of explaining these things that we encounter in our lives and doing truly amazing things by referring to and acting on such entities.
So then in verse 2 it says, "If there were.. If there were form apart from its causes, it would follow that form has no cause." As we talked about. If there was any of this that wouldn't be the causal forms, then this would be an effect that has no cause. Like we want to say that this is made of something and particles, whatever we want to say. But if there's a way that we can rightly say that this is not those causes, then what we're talking about is then an effect that has no cause.
So this table is made of particles. If there's any way that I would.. if this table is made of particles, were I to say that there's any way in which this table exists as something else than particles, then I'm concerned at that point with an effect that has no cause. And there are no such effects, no? Effects are effects because they have causes.
Yet there are no objects at all that do not have causes. Could there be objects that have no causes? No causes at all?
Yeah. "Chime online, did you have a question or share?"
Student: "Hello, can you hear me?" Yeah.
"A few days ago, Thomas, you talked about the two extreme traps that the Mādhyamaka students are, I feel as though they can be trapped in. So I was thinking, I was not sure about what you really meant when you said that if you could somehow find a time to shed a light on that, that would be great for me. Thank you, this is my question, Thomas." A little hard for me to hear, but... "You talked about the two traps, the extreme traps that the Mādhyamaka philosophical students are trapped in. So if you could shed some light, because I wasn't sure about those, we should find some time maybe down the line. Thank you." Yeah, thank you. So what I had in mind was just remaining baffled is one extreme you could say, you know, like be mystified by emptiness. How could it be? And that's all where we get to only that.
How come it seems so real and then when I examine, then all of this seems baseless. Man, I don't know. That is one sort of dead end, no? It's an unavoidable situation, but it's not anywhere to stay, no? It's not.. there's nothing.. unless that then fuels something else, then there's no value to that, no? And the other extreme would be to say, okay, I understand now emptiness. It's, yeah, it follows logically that whenever I investigate all of this, then it's found to be empty. So whereas in the first case, we would be like overwhelmed by that and think, but what, how can I then make sense of anything? And now it's like, yeah, and so I can make sense of everything just as well as before. And it's just this little thing that most people are not aware of, but I know that. So, fine. Then in the first case, we get stuck and nothing really happens. We just sit there and wonder. And in the second case, we think we have figured it out and understood, but then the way we think about everything, ourselves, each other and the world is maybe not very different. It's just that we have a special little story to tell in special situations when people ask special questions. Other than that, we are all just the same as ever. So rather than that, to allow oneself to be informed by the fact of emptiness in, in perhaps that way that is suggested by His Holiness and also that Chokyi Nyima reminded us about by shifting between analysis and the yogic approach in that way to, yeah, also really move on that path that we began to talk about in the beginning. That there's an actual training. It's a practical process and not just a matter of of being blown away and on the one hand and then coming up with some sort of formula that is meant to take care of it. Thank you. And then we continue with, at stanza 3 in the fourth chapter tomorrow.
And maybe, oops, think about that science thing and physics and does that really make sense? Are we making too grand proclamations? There's something called emergence, no? Which is a very sophisticated way of talking about these relationships between the physical components that give rise to something which is actually not just that, yeah? So there's a whole.. so maybe we can think about that and talk more about it.
Let's begin, yeah? "That which originates dependently, does not cease and does not arise, is not annihilated and is not permanent, does not come and does not go, is not different and not the same. To the true teacher who reveals this peace, the complete pacification of constructs, to the perfect Buddha I bow down." So yesterday we completed Chapter Three and so we begin with Four today. Are there any reflections or concerns about Chapter Three before we begin?
Yes.
Student: "I guess this is an obvious question but a lot of the arguments in Chapter Three are very similar to Chapter Two, aren't they? In terms of the agent and the act, etc. So I just wondered why, if Nāgārjuna keeps using the same arguments, why does he have to...
Why does he have to critique the act of seeing if that argument has already been covered in coming and going? So it's kind of the same thing but using something else. So why to continue? Does that make sense? Maybe you've already covered that or said something about it." No, no, I've thought about it but that doesn't make sense. "Yeah, I mean it's sort of, in some ways it feels quite repetitive." So do you have a suggestion yourself? "Well I suppose because, I guess because we really grasp or we kind of reify or the act of seeing seems very real and we grasp to objects of sight or objects of our perception. So maybe those habits need to be in some way critiqued or refuted so that we can let go of that grasping to objects within our perception, whether they're hearing, spelling, whatever it is. It's just like another rug being pulled out." Yeah
Yeah it's a good question of course. Any sort of careful reader, student will think about this, what is the purpose? And in one way, just one argument of this kind, no? It is not that there's something else being shown really, no, is it? Of course in Chapter Two we have where there's explicit reference to arguments that were made before, yeah? And I think it's easy to fail to acknowledge the sort of general applicability of these things, no? So similar to what you were saying, sort of our tendency is to think that okay this is one thing and then there's something else that comes next, yeah? So in one way what would be the natural thing to do after, I don't know, Chapter One? Like what would be the natural next step? Once any of these arguments have been delivered then yeah, what would you say? If you were Nāgārjuna then what would you write next, so to speak? Or what would you do next?
Student: "After chapter one?" Yeah I'll say any of the, like the argument in the first stanza is not an argument, not but they say a position that is presented, no? Not from self, not from other, not from both and not uncaused, nowhere does ever anything arise. So once that argument that is behind, once the argument that is behind that first stanza has been explained then what to do next? You can say perhaps also then whatever happens next is going to be, yeah, why? Like you could say, you know what I mean? "Well it sort of deconstructed my solidity or reifying of the world and I find like the argument of coming and going, and the argument of seeing that things are empty through the argument of dependent origination is very convincing actually. But then Chapter Three seems to be using the same kinds of arguments so I'm kind of wondering well why are we doing this again? But as I was saying, you know, that the objects of our perception and our perceptions seem so real that perhaps that rug has to be pulled out." I don't know if it has to, no? But apparently he thinks there's a reason for going on, yeah? And you could say after the first argument that is behind the first stanza then also there's no, I mean, why would you think that there's real movement then if nothing arises? Then how could there be movement, no?
But it does continue and I think that emptiness which is, what to say.. okay, yeah, so let's try and think about it like that. So it's helpful to hear it from certain different sides, yeah? But is the emptiness that we understand is that different and do we get like a different understanding?
When we do that I'm thinking like sort of from our own perspective, yeah? And of course we have some feeling already but now we're also becoming used to thinking a little closer, like this is one of the things that are easy to say, you know, and we can all agree, yeah? Okay, it was shown first in the first chapter in terms of this argument of the vajra splinter, whatever we call it. And then there's a slightly different argument which also shows that but it gets at the same issue in a slightly different way. So that's helpful. That's just sort of normal conversation, no, and we can all agree. But is there actually something different that we see in Chapter Two apart from what we saw in Chapter One?
"I think it's the same but we're coming from it from a different way and it seems like the whole of all the chapters are every time there's an objection you say, "Yes but.." Yes but well, you know, like for example what about the example of fire? Fire burns and it burns itself and it also burns other things, you know? So there's always an objection. So it seems to me that, I can't remember what your question was now, but there's always a kind of a 'yes, but' and that you might be convinced but not wholly convinced. So Nāgārjuna has to continue to take the rugs out to sort of just to puncture your objectifying or solidifying reality all the time. So it has to kind of continue I suppose right the way through the 27 chapters so there's absolutely nothing left." Yeah, I think this is my tendency at least, no? To say "Yes, but.."
So then if there's an issue there has to be something that deals with it also, no? I don't know how helpful it is what I'm saying now but it's a very interesting question, why, what is this actually about, no? Once it has been shown once, why isn't that enough? And it probably has something to do with what it is that's being shown. It's not just one thing, like we have talked about many times also, it's not something you can just tick off and say, "Okay now I understood it." Right? It's something much deeper than and much more relevant to our lives than something that is of that kind. Now I've learned that I got the points and then there's no need to repeat it, no? So instead this is, yeah it's different. Anybody else have some?
Student: "Thomas, can you hear?" Yeah, there's just somebody who started a few seconds before you and you will be right after, okay?
Student: "To be honest I think this chapter about the wangpo, the perceptions, the sensory perceptions, kind of a little bit hit home in a sense because it just, there is a coincidence, maybe not a coincidence, a few days ago I was hearing a lecture from one of, from my Zen painting teacher and he was talking about this Zen teaching that which is probably can be taken as instruction as well rather than a conclusion. Like first there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, but then in the end there is a mountain. So because for me this sensory, this outer world has so much pulling and it is the eye, the eye is looking all the time and the ear is distracted by sounds all the time. But then at first, right, there is a mountain that I think it's really there, but with this type of reasoning we're going through, there is no, I cannot find a substantially existing mountain. I mean where is it? It cannot be found. But then in the end the mountain appears as if in a sense that within this non-existence there can be quality. There can be compassion, there can be love, there can be quality that exists. So it's not a void. I'm not sure that makes sense or not, but it's just for some reason that just connected everything that we've been doing so far. And yesterday you were saying that is the eye or the person or the one body faculty, is it intrinsically seeing? Right. That's just such a.. it just hit home for me. Like the question, like what, it's not like it's nothing is there. And then you're saying how everything that I do, every little thoughts that I have, every facial expression I show, it will have some tremendous, what do you call that, repercussion to it. So it's almost hard to describe, but therefore when I hear that from the painting master, when he said first there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, no mountain, but then in the end there is a mountain. It just sort of hit home. So I think to this chapter it definitely did something to my personal experience."
So I think there is also a good case then for saying that it is, it's a real fine example of how philosophy and contemplation and meditation are not different, because it really introduces us to whatever we want to call it, in a continuous way and from many different angles. Just like when you practice something, then when you practice something it's precisely the situation. You don't just need to get it and then that's it. Now you are an expert, no? Like you have to apply that knowledge or feel that knowledge in the things that you do to really..otherwise it's not training. So the treatise really progresses like a training program in many ways. Then we can still ask the question, so is it something different that we understand when we understand emptiness the first time in the sense that we feel the first argument actually is irrefutable and we have this sense of not being able to find a ground for any of our beliefs? So if there's any one of you who doesn't recognize that experience, then, or that sense of situation, context, then you're very welcome to say also why you haven't been in that situation yet through thinking of these things, no? But otherwise what is it that is different about first time understanding emptiness in that way and then the other, like as we train, what is it that we then get to understand differently? Because that then says something.. it's a little much to say that, "yeah, I understood emptiness," right? When this was presented I understood emptiness. But at the same time, was it.. if we fail to find any ground for all of this, then these appearances being by nature emptiness would seem to be a conclusion that we could draw at that point. And that conclusion would also be applicable to all the subsequent instances of insight. So what would we like to say is the first? Is it still different all the time? Like is it a different kind of emptiness that we understand whenever we understand? I totally appreciate and recognize what you are talking about, I think we all do. And precisely because it is so recognizable and characteristic of what it's like to contemplate these things, then we can also ask ourselves that question. When we have that feeling that now I see it better, what is it that we see better?
Because.. yeah there are people there, I'm sorry, yeah. Because if there really is something that we see better, then emptiness is many different things, yeah?
And if emptiness is many different things, then then emptiness is just like all other things, yeah? So this is something we can think about also, yeah? Like it's a very, another piece of compelling conceptual story, and it's a very important one obviously to feel that there's progress and I see it better now, I have a clearer perception, I've got something that previously wasn't there. But what really do we mean? We can ask also in terms of these insight stories, we can ask the same questions as we asked about going and coming, no? So what is it really that made me say this, yeah? Yeah, then there are a few other questions online. Yeah, I think we have Luis, then Laurent, and then Ute.
Student: "I have one point from Chapter Three which is almost the same as Chapter Two that I quite can't question whether it's there or not. You said for example that we can say that there is no past and future seen, of course because it's not there. But then apart from these two no.. I'm trying to quote what I wrote here. Apart from these two, no present seeing to be identified either. And then on Chapter Two, verse 15, there is also refutation of standing still, but on these occasions when we were talking about a present event, but not a movement, not arising, not a process, like the present not walking or the present event of sight, I find it harder to question it." Yeah, so that... Maybe question the structure of it divided into agent, action, then we refuted it, it doesn't make sense the narrative, but then just the plain present event, that's a harder one for me." Yeah, yeah, yeah, that's a good point, and that could also be a good reason for then spending time talking about sight, no? And precisely with the help of the same argument. That would be then very relevant to do that, if we are now dealing with something, the event of seeing, because it makes more... It sounds better also to say the event of seeing rather than the action of seeing, yeah? It doesn't sound so correct, no? So because it doesn't, and because the argument is still applicable, then we could easily overlook that and think that this is different, no? And although we may say that sight is like a... Seeing something is just an event and there's not really any process in that. If we say it's just an event, is it a processual event? It probably is, no? And if there's a process, there's activity of some sort, no? Otherwise if there's no... If by event we mean something static, then that doesn't make sense either, no? So as soon as there is process and activity, then it also makes sense to... For sure, I think that I am someone who is capable of seeing, and that I can do things to see such and such. So it's something that we... Seeing is something that we structure within a framework of action, no? There's the means of seeing, then there's the seer and that which is seen, yeah? And because that is the case, then this is also all what has been said about walker, walking, and the path traversed is also applicable to seeing. Does that make sense? So that would be, Luis, what you say, a very good sort of explanation of why also just conceptually in rational terms, in terms of the logical progression of the treatise, that it would make sense to speak of seeing after movement, the critique of movement in the second chapter, and in particular why it would make sense to repeat rather than add something new. Because it's different to understand that something that didn't seem... That seemed to be a different situation actually isn't than just being served a new argument, no? Thank you. And then there were others also or... Student: "Yes I was just wondering, I keep on stumbling over this stanza 22 of the second chapter: "The one who goes does not engage in the going that characterizes him as someone who goes, because there is no one who goes before going." full stop, "Someone goes somewhere." Right. Just a minute. And what makes you stumble on that? "Well the last line is separate, right? "Because there is no one who goes before going," full stop, "someone goes somewhere." And I was thinking it should be no one goes somewhere, but actually..." One way of understanding the last sentence is that it says, for there to be an act of going there has to be someone first who can begin to go. Someone goes somewhere. The one who goes does not engage in the going that characterizes him as someone who goes, because there is no one who goes before going.
So the walker does not engage in that type of walking that makes him a walker. Like we talked about the act of walking and then it being performed by someone and that someone having to be the walker. That walking that qualifies him as the walker...
That walking that qualifies him as the walker could not be the same as the one that he engages in, because in that case... Let me just see what the commentary, how it explains it.
Yeah, so the way the commentary explains it is like this. The one who goes does not engage in the going that characterizes him as someone who goes because...
because before you can initiate an act of going, there has to be someone there to do it. So it's not that... The way this commentary explains it is a bit jumping from...
The one who goes does not engage in the going that characterizes him as someone who goes. This we understand, yeah? The walker could not engage in that. "Yes." Because there's no one who goes before going, meaning then.. I see why you're hesitating about this stanza 22. Because in that case there would be... We can say it like that perhaps, no? Because in that case there would be no one who goes before going. There would be no...
For the one who goes to engage in the very act that qualifies him as the agent of going, he would have to be present as such. We would then say that there is a non-walker first who is present as someone who then engages in the action that qualifies him as the agent of walking.
And then someone goes somewhere means there has to be someone qualified as a walker in order to be able to engage in an act of walking. And the commentary says just like a potter needs to be present before he can make pots, there has to be a walker who can begin to walk. We can read what the commentary says. "When someone who goes performs the act of going, is this act then the same as the one that characterizes him or her as someone who goes, or is it different?" That is the question that is under consideration in this stanza. When an agent, a walker, walks on a path, is that walking on the path then identical with the walking that the agent performs in order to be an agent or is it different? And then it says, "First Devadatta, if we think that Devadatta is the one who goes on the path, he does not engage in the act of going that characterizes him as someone who goes. That is the going that qualifies him for the label 'someone who goes.'" And why? "A Potter can make pots because he exists prior to the pot that he makes. So likewise, if a given agent of going were to exist prior to the act of going that characterizes him or her as such, then that previously existent individual could perform the act of going to a given location such as a town or a city." And so the fourth line in this stanza shows the argument's entailment, someone goes somewhere. Like, for there to be someone who goes, there has to be someone who goes somewhere. And the third line is the evidence: "The agent of going does not exist as an agent of going prior to the act of going that qualifies him or her as such an agent." So because the agent does not exist in this way, he cannot engage in the act of going that qualifies him as the walker. So it sounds a little convoluted, but I guess it's pretty clear what is being said. Like for someone to engage, the basic question being when a walker walks on the path, is the kind of walking that qualifies the walker as the walker, a walking that is distinct from the walking that is performed on the path? Or is it the very same?
It couldn't be the act of walking that the agent engages in couldn't be the same as the one that characterizes him or her as the agent of walking, because in that case there would be nobody there to initiate the action. There's the act of walking and then there's an agent who performs the act of walking. That agent is qualified by an activity, walking. Is that activity, walking, that qualifies the agent as the walker the very same activity as the agent performs when walking on the path? Or is it a distinct type of walking? It couldn't be that the agent engages in the act of walking that qualifies him as such, because since that action is the one that makes him an agent, he cannot by definition exist prior to that action. And if he doesn't exist prior to that action, then he cannot initiate it, just like a potter cannot begin to make pots unless indeed he is there first and decides, okay now it's time to make some pots. Is that clear then? "Yes, thank you very much." Thanks.
"Laurent, did you have a question online?"
Student: "I was thinking that this process is an analytical process and we use our mind which is confused at the beginning. For me it's like it brings an experience of emptiness, but it's just an experience, it's not a realization which is stable. I see my tendencies to grasp, so of course I can have a glimpse of one aspect of my daily life or situation, but it's a training I need to apply in every situation of my life to really completely purify my tendencies to grasp. And as I'm using my mind which is confused from the beginning, I was thinking to the difference when you have this transference of blessing, what you were also saying, it's like the big jump, if you have really total confidence to a master and you are fully brought to the emptiness and you can really settle in it and stay, of course it's different, but when I use this mind which is confused, I need to train again and again and to purify my tendencies. And it brings also to me this notion of, in this text he doesn't speak of the luminous aspect of the mind. Am I right or not? When I see you speaking or explaining it, I see you smiling with joy which seems to be the luminous aspect, but the text itself I don't see the luminous aspect in it. And sometimes they say also you have to study together the Gyu Lama because Gyu Lama brings in the luminous aspect. And sorry I have another question also Thomas, where is it in the Choying Dzo, where is its place between these two texts?" Where is the relation? "Yeah, the Choying Dzo, from Longchenpa.
So first it was about that we need to train, right? And that makes very good sense, no? And at the same time that we need to train is convention. It's not the ultimate truth that we need to train. Of course that's why we need to train.
And then there's about the luminous aspect.. So I think just the way that it progresses also... with Mādhyamaka it's easy to get to think in terms of nothing, but at the same time it's also clear that that's a sidetrack or a sort of misunderstanding really. It can be.. to say that all of this seems to be there, but when I examine I don't find anything. "Don't find anything" sounds a lot like nothing. So in that sense the understanding of nothing is useful because it's something that we didn't acknowledge before. But it's not that we then reach a conclusion about all of this being nothing, of course. That would be yet another extreme. If there's nothing that exists then there's nothing that doesn't exist either. That's pretty clear. So how could all of this be nothing? But what we can understand through this analysis is that yes, it doesn't exist and it does not not exist. And that is perhaps a way of acknowledging the luminosity of the mind or the unity of the two truths; the unity of appearance and emptiness is in many ways is not.. unless you want it to be different, then it's not any different from the luminosity of the mind. Would the luminosity of the mind be anything else than the unity of emptiness and appearance? Probably not, no. So it's just the term does not appear here but it's all about the luminosity, no? Because if it's not then it becomes like a negation. That is clearly not the intent. And then, so what would you say about Choying Dzo MūlaMādhyamaka, Laurent, yourself?
He pushed the..in Choying Dzo I think he pushed the button farther.
I don't know how to put it in words because he said "rigpa" and also the expression of "rigpa", everything is just the expression of "rigpa". I don't know I forgot the name in..." In Choying Dzo you don't really have much in terms of arguments. There's much more argument here, no, but you can say that what is said in Choying Dzo makes perfect sense in terms of this treatise, no? And otherwise perhaps it does not make so much sense. To really say that the teaching of the Choying Dzo is true may be difficult unless we can explain some of this stuff, no?
So I think that's what I would say about that.
And should we then begin the analysis of the aggregates?
That is a chapter on the aggregates, the five aggregates: form, feeling, perception, formation and consciousness. But it is a chapter that considers, that looks at form primarily, so the physical world. And that's interesting from our contemporary perspective because so much of modern philosophical and scientific perspectives are formulated within a sort of physicalist context. So that makes it extra relevant I think to the contemporary scenario. Because it's about form and the cause of form, yes? So according to Abhidharma there are causal forms and resultant forms. The causal forms are the particles of the four elements: earth, water, fire and wind. And they then combine in different ways in order to produce the resultant forms which are the sights that we can see, the sounds that we can hear, the smells that we can smell, the tastes that we can have, and that which we can touch. So those fields of engagement with the senses, with the five senses...
And it's also the faculties, the constitution of the physical faculties like the eye faculty, which is not according to Abhidharma my eyeball or something like that, it's something much more subtle and very light and sort of buoyant form that is the faculty by means of which I can see. And the same with the ear, there's an explanation for each of the faculties, right? But they're made of particles too and the combination of particles. So in other words we have a physical reality that is the reason that I can see things because those.. the particles of the four elements, they combine in different ways that then makes it possible for me to see things with my eyes, to hear things with my ears. And each of those things that I.. these fields of perception are different. I can't use my eye to hear things, right? No matter how sharp my eyes are I can't see sounds. No matter how keen my ears are they don't help me to see the objects of these faculties and the spheres of engagement of these faculties are distinct.
So that is the framework that we are considering now, that there is a manifest world, physical world that is the product of these particles. So in many ways I think this can be seen
quite like the way from a scientific point of view we might talk about atoms and subatomic particles which combine in various ways. So that's why things are the way they are. It's because of the physical reality and then these physical forms are just products one way or the other of the physical reality. Of course this is something that people spend a great, just how this is possible is something that is of course still an open question and this whole issue of emergence is meant to explain how such a thing is possible. How can there be subatomic and atomic particles which are just that and yet they are the basis for something that is not at all.. doesn't come across at least as atomic particles.
But then.. so how much sense in other words does it make to think in terms of components of physical reality that can support through their interactions, all of this? So that we have something that really is the basis for these appearances. Then how real these appearances are, we can bracket that issue but there's something that is the basis for them, namely these physical components. And here just as in science they're talking about particles, of course here it's just four particles of earth, water, fire, and wind but nonetheless it's a reality, a solid reality of particles. So that chapter begins with Apart from the cause of form, form is not observed." And then "Likewise aside from so-called form, no cause of form can be observed either."
So wherever we then look in the world, all of what we see is.. all of what we see, the resultant forms are actually just that, they are the products of the causal forms. That's why we say that there's a cause and effect relationship between the two, it's that what we then see there is actually the causal forms, if you want to say what is. And if not, if it were possible to observe a form that is not the causal forms, then that form would be independent of causal form. If it is, again we can remember how we analyzed other in Chapter One. If the manifestation of the resultant form is something other than the causal form, then that resultant form is separate from its cause. It has no, it is distinct from its cause and so there's no basis for actually speaking about those two as cause and effect. So precisely because there is a dependence between, an alleged dependence between the causal forms and the resultant forms, that's why we can say that those two are not distinct from each other either. If they were distinct there could be no dependence. And if apart from.. if aside...
If we could see if it was possible to have causal forms that are just that but not resultant forms, then we would have a cause without effect.
So this is very interesting to think about in terms of theories about atomic reality. What is it actually that we say then? It tells us something about the ontological status of atoms, that we cannot have one without the other. The subtle reality and the cause manifestation only become compelling if they depend on each other and if they depend on each other they're not distinct and if they're not distinct and also not the same then they are just merely apparent dependent ordination. So that would actually take us already there to the.. any move to say that this is grounded in and explained by a physical reality comes to an end right there. We can use our apparatus of a.. with respect to a physical reality, we can use that in order to understand better what this is and what we can do with all of this. But there's nothing, there's no.. it is impossible to truly reduce this to these atomic particles.
Because we want to say that they.. because it just, if it were possible to have atomic particles that are not, that are just that but don't perform the causal function then that would be the same as saying we have a cause without an effect. And because they always perform that function then there's a dependent relation between the two. When there's a dependent relation there's no identity and no real difference either without real identity or shared identity and without substantial difference then the atomic reality and this level of reality are on the same level of reality. They are.. none is more real and has more explanatory value than the other. That must be the conclusion to draw. And so this is related also to what we talked about yesterday about dream and reality in the same way we can talk about the explanatory frameworks that we have in physics for example, and then what we experience. Those two.. the entities that exist according to the explanatory framework and the things that we like to think of as existent in terms of this experience of the world, if they really are what they purport to be, if the explanatory framework actually is an explanatory framework for this, then the implication is for it at all to work as an explanatory framework, it couldn't be.. the entities that it refers to couldn't be any more real than this. That's quite something. For the very idea to work, the foundationalist character of this is impossible. Any truly foundationalist move is bound to fail. Of course this is not to say that physics doesn't explain and cannot help us do amazing things. That would be impossible to argue. And why would anyone try to do it? But for that to happen, then it could only be the case that the entities posited by physics are no more real than any of this.
That's amazing.
And that's again like the two truths are then clearly not in conflict with each other. It's because of that emptiness of intrinsic existence, the entities posited by physics do not exist intrinsically. That's why they can work as very, very useful constructs in terms of explaining these things that we encounter in our lives and doing truly amazing things by referring to and acting on such entities.
So then in verse 2 it says, "If there were.. If there were form apart from its causes, it would follow that form has no cause." As we talked about. If there was any of this that wouldn't be the causal forms, then this would be an effect that has no cause. Like we want to say that this is made of something and particles, whatever we want to say. But if there's a way that we can rightly say that this is not those causes, then what we're talking about is then an effect that has no cause.
So this table is made of particles. If there's any way that I would.. if this table is made of particles, were I to say that there's any way in which this table exists as something else than particles, then I'm concerned at that point with an effect that has no cause. And there are no such effects, no? Effects are effects because they have causes.
Yet there are no objects at all that do not have causes. Could there be objects that have no causes? No causes at all?
Yeah. "Chime online, did you have a question or share?"
Student: "Hello, can you hear me?" Yeah.
"A few days ago, Thomas, you talked about the two extreme traps that the Mādhyamaka students are, I feel as though they can be trapped in. So I was thinking, I was not sure about what you really meant when you said that if you could somehow find a time to shed a light on that, that would be great for me. Thank you, this is my question, Thomas." A little hard for me to hear, but... "You talked about the two traps, the extreme traps that the Mādhyamaka philosophical students are trapped in. So if you could shed some light, because I wasn't sure about those, we should find some time maybe down the line. Thank you." Yeah, thank you. So what I had in mind was just remaining baffled is one extreme you could say, you know, like be mystified by emptiness. How could it be? And that's all where we get to only that.
How come it seems so real and then when I examine, then all of this seems baseless. Man, I don't know. That is one sort of dead end, no? It's an unavoidable situation, but it's not anywhere to stay, no? It's not.. there's nothing.. unless that then fuels something else, then there's no value to that, no? And the other extreme would be to say, okay, I understand now emptiness. It's, yeah, it follows logically that whenever I investigate all of this, then it's found to be empty. So whereas in the first case, we would be like overwhelmed by that and think, but what, how can I then make sense of anything? And now it's like, yeah, and so I can make sense of everything just as well as before. And it's just this little thing that most people are not aware of, but I know that. So, fine. Then in the first case, we get stuck and nothing really happens. We just sit there and wonder. And in the second case, we think we have figured it out and understood, but then the way we think about everything, ourselves, each other and the world is maybe not very different. It's just that we have a special little story to tell in special situations when people ask special questions. Other than that, we are all just the same as ever. So rather than that, to allow oneself to be informed by the fact of emptiness in, in perhaps that way that is suggested by His Holiness and also that Chokyi Nyima reminded us about by shifting between analysis and the yogic approach in that way to, yeah, also really move on that path that we began to talk about in the beginning. That there's an actual training. It's a practical process and not just a matter of of being blown away and on the one hand and then coming up with some sort of formula that is meant to take care of it. Thank you. And then we continue with, at stanza 3 in the fourth chapter tomorrow.
And maybe, oops, think about that science thing and physics and does that really make sense? Are we making too grand proclamations? There's something called emergence, no? Which is a very sophisticated way of talking about these relationships between the physical components that give rise to something which is actually not just that, yeah? So there's a whole.. so maybe we can think about that and talk more about it.
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