Details
Root of The Middle Way – Session 25
Teachers:
Collection:
- Buddhist Classics and Philosophy
Location:
- Rangjung Yeshe Institute - Nepal
Features:
- Subtitles ,
- Transcripts
Excerpt
The lecture challenges the distinction between things and their characteristics and questions the co-existence of these elements.
Description
In Session 25 we explore the concept of things and their characteristics, particularly focusing on the element of space. The discussion raises questions about the nature of characteristics, whether they are intrinsic or subject to perception. It also delves into topics like Schrödinger’s cat and the existence of natural laws like gravity. The conclusion emphasizes that the absence of characteristics does not imply non-existence and invites reflection on why humans rely on characteristics to make sense of the world.
Related Course Info
- Root of the Middle Way – Mūlamadhyamakakārikā A course on Nagarjuna’s brilliantly sharp reasoning, taught by Dr. Thomas Doctor at the Rangjung Yeshe Institute over a month. For everyone with an interest in the way things really are.
Video
Audio
"That which originates
dependently does not
cease and does not
arise, is not annihilated
and is not permanent,
does not come and
does not go, is not different
and not the same.
To the true teacher who reveals this peace,
the complete pacification of constructs,
to the perfect Buddha I bow down."
So today we continue with Chapter Five, which is the "Analysis of the Elements." And as we know the example that we're looking at in particular is space as one of these elements that constitute, that contribute to the construction of a person. So the way that the chapter progresses is in terms of looking at the idea of things and then the characteristics of things, which is of course a framework that we're used to operating with. There are certain things that are in certain ways, in certain important ways, so that they actually characterize the thing in question. There's something that makes a table a table, there's something that makes a house a house, a mountain a mountain and so on. Everything has its own characteristics. Of course we can discuss what those characteristics are, but the idea that things exist and that and that if they exist, there's something that characterizes them is perhaps an unavoidable assumption if we have to think and make sense of things in a way that just remotely resembles what we're used to or what you think. Let's perhaps first before we plunge into the further arguments of this chapter think about that. Is this.. how fundamental is this to think in terms of things and then the characteristics of things? Yeah, what do you think about that?
Is it something that we have to do or is it possible to think of things in a way that does not set us up for the kind of trouble that we are getting into otherwise in this chapter?
Student: "I was pondering about this on Friday and I'm just thinking of this example of water and how water represents itself to those six types of beings. So I think given that example, it seems that characteristics as we perceive them as humans may not stand and are not intrinsic when compared to the other beings. So I'm just wondering how to reconcile that with this?" Yeah, that's a very good observation. And...
Let's see that.
So one thing is that characteristics change and that our understanding rather perhaps of characteristics change.
What this chapter is analyzing is something deeper than.. it's not sort of problematizing characteristics that are set in stone, but the very idea of characteristics there is something that makes things what they are. And then of course the example that you mentioned is a very important one and exactly what it means is very much a contested issue. If we can say that here's a cup of water and if we invite representatives of the six classes of sentient beings to take a look at what we see as water, then what do they see? What would they say? What would they say is characteristic about this?
And of course the example, if that happens, if someone, a member of each of the six classes of sentient beings takes a look at what we see as a cup of water, then they will see very different things, just as you said. Like a fish may see a home and a starving spirit will see something repulsive that can barely be drunk, if at all. And beings in hell will see liquid metal or something like that. And gods will see something divine like ambrosia to drink, so what is it really that they look at? And there are many different accounts, like philosophical positions taken with respect to that issue. So what can we then say? Is there actually something in common that sentient beings look at or is there not? What is the conclusion to be had based on this example, which is an example from scripture? And it also makes good sense if you have radically different faculties, of course what you see is going to be radically different. This is also something which is thought widely about and deeply about in contemporary philosophy, you know? What are the implications of that? How commensurable are our worlds, if at all?
So that is a deep philosophical issue and it's clearly very related to what is under analysis here. But perhaps you could also say that what this chapter gets at is a structure that even is prerequisite for being able to think about that example. Because you could also say that okay, there is something, whichever way we might want to classify it philosophically, which is the basis for these appearances, distinct appearances. So in that case it would be something that is characterized as being that, being a thing that can contribute to very distinct perceptions in the minds and mind streams of distinct sentient beings. So in one way it's the same as saying water is fluid and liquid, that's what characterizes water, wetness and so on. And saying things are such that they give rise in the minds of different sentient beings to radically different perceptions. Yeah? Does that make sense? So that shows very nicely I think just how deep this structuring of the world is in us, that there are things and those things are in a certain way. It seems very natural and sort of unavoidable to think in those terms. But then again as we're used to Nāgārjuna says, "Is it really so?" No matter how natural and unquestionable the relevance of whichever framework it is that we're looking at may seem to be, he nevertheless says, "Okay, so you think, but is it really so?" And that's what the chapter is about exploring then. Any other comments about the framework that is under analysis here? Meaning, yeah, as we just said, that there are things and those things for them to be there have to be in a certain characteristic way. That there are things with characteristics. Is it possible to think in any other way and still make sense of the world? And again we can say if we think that's not the case and if we then can't make sense of things and their characteristics after having done a few of these verses, then we are in a very difficult situation, no? If we think, A) it is not possible to make sense of the world unless we have access to the idea of things and things that have characteristics, and then B) when I examine the idea of things with characteristics, I find no basis for it. If we end up thinking like that, then we are in a situation where by our own lights we are no longer able to make sense of the world. So that seems to be what is at stake here, no?
And we started already with the first two verses, and maybe we can just run over them one more time.
The first stanza says, "Before the characteristics of space, there is no space whatsoever. If it existed before its characteristics, it would follow that it has no characteristics," or that it had no characteristics. So before the characteristics of space, traditionally the characteristic of space is openness, the open, accommodating quality that allow for things to occur. That space is space. It's just this accommodating factor. If there was no space in this room, then we would not be able to move about. It's because there is this openness, that it's possible to do all the things that we're doing right now in here. We can sit here, I can speak, and so on. It's all by virtue of there being space in here. So there is something, it's called space, and that space has its particular characteristic, namely that it allows for things like this to happen by not impeding, not hindering. It's the sort of non-hindering quality, which is space. But before the characteristics of space, it is then clear that there is no space either. Before there is this accommodating quality that is characteristic of space, there is no space. Otherwise, it would follow that the kind of space we're talking about is not accommodating and does not allow for the occurrence of things, and that would not be space then. So "Before the characteristic of space, there is no space whatsoever." "Something without characteristics does not exist anywhere at all." That's what we were contemplating a bit before. Since this is how it is, since, for example, there is no space whatsoever before the characteristics of space, then how could we possibly say that there exists things without characteristics? If something exists, it has a certain something that characterizes it as that particular thing.
Even if we say that it exists without characteristics, then that becomes the characteristic, no? It's that thing which exists uncharacterized or something like that. "Since there is no thing without characteristics, to what do the characteristics apply?" So since there never is an occasion at which we can access something that has no characteristics, how can we make sense of this idea that we have that there are things and then the characteristics? How is that possible? How could we possibly get that idea? Since there are no things without characteristics, then why do we think in this way, separating the thing and then its characteristics? Perhaps if we can understand that, we have understood a lot about dependent origination. If we can understand how on earth could we think that there are things and then characteristics, since we never have anything that exists without characteristics. In other words, since there's never a time or place or occasion at which we can say, "Okay, here's a thing. Now those are its characteristics." That sort of distinction can never be made in any substantial way. Because the thing that we notice is not separate in any way at all from its characteristics. It doesn't have any existence in the absence of those characteristics. So what do the characteristics apply to? What is it that we talk about when we say this and this is characterized by such and such?
"Characteristics do not apply to what has them, nor do they..." That's in stanza 3 then, yeah? "Nor do they apply to what does not have them."
If we then say that things always have characteristics, then the idea that there are characteristics that apply to something is not accurate, right? It's not an accurate observation about the way things are, because if the thing in question... If we're looking at something that is already characterized as a pair of glasses, then..
If by nature this thing is characterized already as a pair of glasses, then what are the characteristics that we would like to associate with them? There's then no difference whatsoever between this and the characteristics. So the idea of having something that... A set of characteristics that capture what this is and that in this way really apply to what this is, is a baseless idea. If we assume that things already come with characteristics, then what are we talking about when we say that they have such and such characteristics and those characteristics apply to them? Once you understood them, you will understand what the thing is. That's also the idea of characteristics, no? Characteristics are the features that really capture what the thing in question is. So once you get the characteristics, you know what the thing is. And if you don't know what characterizes it, you don't really know what the thing is either. But what basis can we find for that idea if they already have characteristics?
"Characteristics do not apply to something other than..." So nor do they apply to what does not have them, and that's what we just talked about. If something has no characteristics, it's not possible to say that there's something for characteristics to apply to. So whether we talk about something that comes ready-made, so to speak, with characteristics, or whether we talk about something that exists in the absence of characteristics, there's nothing with which we can associate characteristics. And then finally, "Neither do characteristics apply to something other than what does or does not have them." What would it be for something to both have and have characteristics, or for something to be something that is neither characterized nor not characterized?
Either something bears characteristics or it does not, no, seemingly? Otherwise what would it mean for something to be both characterized and not characterized, or neither? So let's try to think a little bit more about that. Why couldn't it be the case that this is a pair of glasses, it has certain characteristics, and I can come to understand those, I can communicate those to you, and in this way there are different characteristics. There is a set of characteristics that can be conveyed and understood, and once we understand them then we understand what this is. What is so problematic about that, if at all? It was said that if this is something that already has these characteristics, then what is it that, what are the characteristics that I am applying to them?
Isn't this a sort of artificial way of thinking about things, a forced way of thinking?
If not, then try and formulate why it would not be? Why something that has characteristics already cannot be said to have characteristics that applies to it?
Student: "Thank you Thomas. Can something.. so we're saying, you know, looks like now this verse between characteristics and the thing itself, there is a temporal relationship and we think that doesn't, we cannot establish, but can something just come with, like co-exist, can a thing just co-exist at the same time with its characteristics? Like I don't know, if you say like the mind, like the mind it's innately or from the beginning it's self-aware and clear, can a thing just come without having to say who comes first?" Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's a great question. And I guess it's in the next chapter, yeah, co-existence is under analysis, yeah.
But basically for something, and this of course is a wonderful example to look at, no? The mind is supposed to have certain characteristics, no?
Otherwise what are we talking about when we talk about mind?
Then.. those characteristics, and space is also a good example also for understanding mind. The Buddha says that if our understanding the nature of things, space is one of the, if not the best example, yeah? Because it's something that we are very comfortable with talking about, space. We feel intuitively that we know what it is and that we see space as the Buddha says. People widely proclaim that they see space, but then he says, "but examine here the meaning, how do you see space?" So it's a very profound example that is under analysis here also in the chapter, no? But then you're saying, so couldn't it just be that things and their characteristics co-exist, yeah? But then what is this co-existence in terms of? Is there really something that has characteristics? In that case, the characteristics and the thing in question would have to be different, no? If there really is something that really has characteristics, then that thing and its characteristics can't be one and the same, no? But if they are one and the same, then there's nothing that has characteristics really, right?
And if there is nothing that has characteristics, then what are we talking about when we speak of the characteristics of things, yeah?
But it's very much like how you say, you know, we feel that the things come with characteristics, no? I mean, that's at least my impression, yeah? They are out there and they have characteristics, but yeah, I've already said it in a way that now we know cannot be sustained, no? They are out there and they have characteristics. No, they're not.
They couldn't be out there with characteristics, right? Because then the characteristics and them would have to be different and we can see very quickly and very clearly that they aren't, that they couldn't be different. So what are we talking about? What do we think when we say this, yeah? Why do we think the way we think?
What has made it such that now we all think in this way? When we can clearly see that there's no basis for that type of idea?
If there is a mystery, you know, then that is a good candidate for the status of mystery, you know? Why do we all agree that this kind of thinking is necessary and natural? And presumably we also agree that there's no basis for it and that that baselessness can be recognized very quickly and very clearly.
Any feedback is welcome, of course.
Student: "So it's not possible that the things could actually completely be the characteristics?" Well if it means that characteristics and the thing that is characterized are just two names for the same thing, then what are we talking about? Why is it helpful to know characteristics?
I don't know what the characteristics of sunglasses are, but there must be some pretty okay characteristics. Two lenses and two of these guys, for example, make a part of what characterizes a pair of sunglasses. But if the sunglasses and those characteristics, if they really just refer to one and the same thing, what is it that I'm doing when I talk about the characteristics? What is it I'm feeling when I feel that I understand better because I was able to talk about characteristics? Why is it we get a sense that now we know better what we're talking about because you and I talk about characteristics? Why can't I just say sunglasses and that's all? "Maybe something like, it's hard to express with one word, like I'm just thinking of fire, like if it's hot you can become warm by standing next to it, but you could also burn yourself and injure yourself. So there's kind of related things that you kind of need to talk about, but I'm not sure if they're really separate." Yeah, they're not really separate. Nāgārjuna would agree, no, that's why he praises the Buddha in the beginning for saying that dependent origination, whatever arises dependently, is not separate and not different. So now when we understand that and when we agree, then why do we agree? How do we agree? Is it just something that we have learned to say yes to? Or what?
Do we.. just we have learned to say that dependent origination is profound and most other people who haven't done the same kind of brain work that we have, they will say that it sounds banal or weird or something like that, but us, we can nod and sort of say, "no, no, no, it's very profound." Is that what it's about? Then it's hard to think why it would have.. knowledge of dependent origination would be such a big deal, no? If this would be what it comes down to.
Yeah? Student: "I'm still not convinced about the separation of a thing from its characteristics that it's.. that the thing is only existent in its characteristics and therefore it's non-existent." Sorry? You're not convinced that...? "I'm not convinced that a thing does not exist because of its.. it's only characterized by its characteristics. My question to you is about Schrödinger's cat, right? So with Schrödinger's cat, we don't know if the cat is alive or dead, right? But we know that we've placed a cat in the box, right? And so how can we say that the cat does not exist because its characteristics are at that time uncertain, right? So it's still.. I've still put something in that box despite me not knowing its characteristics. Its characteristics at that point are completely undefined." Yes. So that's similar to what you were mentioning also, no? The example from scripture. This is an example from quantum mechanics, no? In that case we could still say that there's something in there that has no.. I mean the implications of that also is I think what exactly they are, I think quantum physicists would also be able to disagree quite a bit about, yeah, the difference. But in any case, perhaps we could say without sort of prematurely closing any particular line of interpretation, we could say that at that point when we put the cat in the box, then there's something in there that has.. of which the characteristics aren't certain. So it's characteristically so. It's characteristically something that, of which the characteristics aren't certain. So similar to, should we call it water or what, which we all look at, me and representatives of the other classes of sentient beings, and we see radically different things, yeah? That which we look at is something that is, that characteristically gives rise to these six distinct perceptions. And you could perhaps say, I mean, this is certainly not my field of expertise, but you could perhaps still say that there's something which characteristically can be either a dead cat or a live cat in there. And just like the scriptural example can be used to show that therefore there is no thing there, in and of itself, that exists in any definite way by itself, but only in relation, not just in relation to other minds. It's not that there's something amazing about each of our individual subjective minds, but just because of dependent origination, the whole matrix of dependent origination, different minds see different things and different occasions present different results. So in the same way, you could also, I think, very well take that experiment with the cat as an example to show that at least you could use it in that way to say that hence this is good evidence of the fact that nothing exists intrinsically, but in dependence only. I mean, this has been done before by many no? But to say that quantum mechanics has this kind of potential for an alignment with many kinds of philosophies, such as Buddhist philosophy. And then when we begin to talk like that, then there are all sorts of bells and red lights that begin to go off in various quarters, and others will love it and so on, but that's a whole different issue.
Student: "My question is, yeah, but still in this Schrödinger's cat example, we still know there is a cat, and likewise with the water, it feels like all sentient beings perceive it also as something like moist and wet, you know?" No, not necessarily. "Is it not?" I mean, it's because, what is it? This is also one of the classic arguments. I guess some people say that, yeah, actually. So it's not that you are alone, yeah, but... "It's not that hell beings see it as a mountain suddenly or the fishes see it as a radio, but everything is like a liquid thing, sort of. Like with the cat, it's also like..." But okay, if that was really the case, then what about... I mean, then that means you have found the sort of transcendental character of things, no? There are certain things that no matter who you are, you're going to see it as liquid, no? I think it would be very difficult to carry through this kind of analysis, no? Come into the experience with the Mūlamadhyamaka with that idea that things, okay, to us it looks like something I can drink for others and so on and so on, but it's always something that can be... That is liquid, yeah? "I'm not on the side of trying to establish..." No, no, I'm not. "It's intrinsically liquid, but still I think a couple of years ago some of us, we discussed about it, why... But it is sort of striking the obvious that these are all liquid, you know? So like the cat, it's still a cat, you know?" Yeah, so it's very interesting to now go back to this kind of very juicy example, no?
So if that is what we get from that example with the six classes of sentient beings, yeah? I mean, whether that is what we have to get from it is a different issue, yeah? But if it is, then we have really found the thing and that which is the bearer of its... and that which is its characteristic, yeah? Because now we know that in the world there are things which human beings call 'water,' and yet if you belong to any of the other classes of sentient beings, you will see it in one of five alternative ways, yeah?
So then we have a really solid idea of bearers of characteristics and characteristics, and then it makes very good sense to ask precisely the questions that are being asked here, no? What is that thing, yeah? It's a wonderful analysis then to do, no? If we have looked at this example of the six classes of sentient beings looking at something that they say is water, ambrosia, et cetera, yeah? Then what is the bearer of the characteristics? And there couldn't be something which is not that, yeah? And if we say that it's something that is characteristically liquid, then it exists already with that characteristics. What do the... What does the characteristic then apply to? When I say 'liquid,' then what is it I'm talking about that's distinct from the thing itself, yeah? And if those two are not distinguishable, if they're just one and the same, how should it be possible for something like that, which is intrinsically liquidity, to appear in different ways, yeah? In the minds of different beings? This would go against the very idea of dependent origination.
What is... There are many ways of getting deeper into that. In my mind, it seems like really missing the point, no? If we say that there's something there which has very rudimentary characteristics, which can then be elaborated upon by different sentient beings, yeah? But it is a venerable position to take, I think, so. Student: "I think if you could take it a step further, though, if you would talk about gravitational force, physical properties, where as a... I guess maybe if you're thinking about it for the Hungry Ghost, it might be different now that I'm thinking about it." Sorry? "I don't know. I was just thinking about gravitational force and how it's going to act on everything the same. Gravitational force is going to act on a fish the same way it's going to act on me. The same way like properties of physics don't discriminate between beings that we can see and know. I mean, you could argue that, well, maybe hungry ghosts aren't subject to gravitational forces. But because we haven't directly experienced hungry ghosts in this realm, we can't for say sure that it does or does not. So we could only say that of the classes of beings that we have encountered, nothing escapes gravitational force, right? And so how could we say that gravitational force does not exist? Or I mean space, we're talking about space. That's a good example. Like fish, a fish is going to experience that there is... It may not like the space. I like space. Fish may not like space because there's no water. But that's not to say that it won't experience, that it won't, that it doesn't have the same open quality. But I think gravitational force might, like physical forces might be a better example because we've shown that it acts on all things independently. You know, like gravitational force isn't like being experienced differently by the fish than by me." That's also a very interesting example, yeah? Like natural laws. So if natural laws exist with characteristics,
yeah, if they exist with characteristics, like I don't know what would be a good definition, characterization of gravity, gravitational force? But I'm sure that we can quickly find some. So if there's something that exists with those characteristics, what is it that exists and has those? Or otherwise, if it's just that we look at certain things and then we end up thinking, here's an example of gravity, but in fact there's nothing, no such thing as gravity as such, that is very different. And perhaps that would be like being a Buddhist scientist maybe or something like that, yeah? If we have to think in those terms, no, but it would be a way of perhaps, of acknowledging dependent origination and still making use very well, perhaps brilliantly so, of the notion of gravity. It's to say, okay, we have something that is called the natural law of gravity and it applies in these and these circumstances. And all what I say about that, there's no such thing as gravity as such to which those descriptions apply. That might perhaps open, like scientists and physicists, I think in particular, are often encouraged not to buy into intuitively plausible scenario, but instead be open for something that is completely counterintuitive. So perhaps it is helpful if that is what we're trying to do, to be really able to think outside of the box, it is perhaps helpful to recognize that as we talk about gravitational force, we can talk about it very well, just like we can talk about my sunglasses and what characterizes those. We can also, if we are smart enough to do it, we can talk about gravitational force and what it is and what it does, at the same time knowing that there is no gravitational force that has such characteristics. Perhaps that could be very helpful as a practice for a serious physicist who is not just going to accept whatever framework is given and whatever seems intuitively plausible from her or his immediate perspective. But it's not necessarily a big deal either, because the physicist can also just think this is just something that I have to factor in, that under certain considerations, then the idea of such a thing as gravity that has characteristics falls apart. And then onto something new, just like the rest of us. So there's a possibility for completely sliding along without gaining much from it, except becoming a little bit smarter and being able to look a little bit more sophisticated. But it's also possible, I think it would follow, that it is possible to assume less in one's next experiment in physics.
But what these examples show is that things and their characteristics is something that go really, really deep. It's something that we use on a day-to-day level, and it's also what really supports
worldviews and scientific practices and so on.
"If characteristics have.." that is 4, "no application, it makes no sense that there should be bearers of them." So unless we can say that, as we tried to before, say that there are things to which characteristics apply, then the implication is that characteristics have no application. They don't apply to anything. And if the characteristics don't apply to anything, then what's the point of talking about characteristics? Characteristics without application are by default or by definition meaningless and useless, no? "If the bearers of characteristics are unreasonable, their characteristics cannot exist either." So if we cannot make sense of the bearer of characteristics, that's in a similar line as what was just said, then characteristics cannot exist. So unless we can meaningfully talk about something that has characteristics, then there's no recourse for us to say that characteristics exist. And then there's a conclusion in the first two lines of stanza 5. "Therefore, the bearers of characteristics do not exist, and characteristics themselves have no existence either." If we cannot find a place for bearers of characteristics that exist either with, either characterized or uncharacterized, then what is it that the characteristics apply to? If the characteristics don't apply to anything, then there are no characteristics. So therefore, the bearers of characteristics have no existence, and characteristics themselves have no existence. And "Yet," in C and D of stanza 5, "aside from bearers and characteristics, there are no entities." There is nothing apart from things and their characteristics. What should that be? What could that possibly be which isn't something or something that characterizes something? Something that makes something what it is?
So looking at characteristics we find, and bearers of characteristics, we find no bearers of characteristics, whether we say that they already come with their characteristics or whether we say that they exist without characteristics. Without bearers of characteristics, there are no characteristics. And then the application, the further conclusion that follows from that is that we now have no way of actually talking about the existence of anything at all. Because anything, whatever it might be, for it to be that, would have to be something that characterizes it, something that makes it what it is.
Then in the first two lines of 6 it says, "If there is is no entity, of what would there be no entity?" Meaning, so this is according to the commentaries, this is responding to a notion that's of space then that is really not an entity. So at this point if we're just talking about space and the characteristics of space up until this point, without any of the very vast implications that we have considered, if we're just strictly speaking talking about space, then it could be that at this point someone would say, "Well, space actually doesn't exist. It's not something that exists, it's a construct made in dependence on things that do exist, but it's just absence and absence doesn't exist." But then the verse here says, "If there is..." So that would in Buddhist philosophy that is like a Sautrāntika perspective, no? Who don't accept the substantial existence of unconditioned factors such as space, and say that it instead is something that has merely imputational existence, something that is imputed on the basis of something else. But if there are no entities, which is the upshot of what we have been saying, there are no things either with or without characteristics, so therefore if there are no things, then what do we talk about when we say that space is a non-entity? For that kind of description to make sense, it has to make sense to talk about entity in some fashion. But what we have now found is that entity doesn't apply to anything at all. 'Thing' and what makes the 'thing' what it is, the thing and its characteristics. We have seen that neither of those is founded on anything in reality. And therefore if there are no entities, what do I mean when I say non-entity or nothing? So this is also an important thing to keep in mind in general of course when we do this kind of Mādhyamaka analysis, because as we have talked about several times, it is easy to get the sense that there is a negative conclusion, emptiness as some sort of negation, etc., which is to be made by going through the analysis. But if there are no entities, if there are no things, then what do I mean by the emptiness of things? So emptiness does not mean non-existence or nothingness or non-entity. That is a point that is repeatedly made, but it's easy to overlook in the heat of the battle, sort of, no?
And then maybe let's wait with this subjective apprehension of space. That's also about the mind that you brought up before. There are just a couple of minutes left. Let's start there tomorrow. And if you have any remarks before we conclude, you're welcome.
So I think it would be interesting to think until tomorrow a little further about this question of, if this is the case now, if we can so quickly and decisively see that there are no things that have characteristics, then.. then why is it that we think this kind of framework is indispensable for making sense of anything? What made us think like that?
And also what do we do now? There's a framework that we find indispensable for making sense of anything. And now it seems that we have to dispense with it insofar as when we look at the the two principles, the thing and its characteristics, we find no basis for it. So what is all this in other words? Is the question for tomorrow. So try to note that and see where you are at and so on. And then we will resume tomorrow with the...
talking about that which is the subject of all of this. And whether it's possible to, by pointing to the subject, to then by that way be able to posit certain things that exist and others that don't exist. Okay, thank you very much.
So today we continue with Chapter Five, which is the "Analysis of the Elements." And as we know the example that we're looking at in particular is space as one of these elements that constitute, that contribute to the construction of a person. So the way that the chapter progresses is in terms of looking at the idea of things and then the characteristics of things, which is of course a framework that we're used to operating with. There are certain things that are in certain ways, in certain important ways, so that they actually characterize the thing in question. There's something that makes a table a table, there's something that makes a house a house, a mountain a mountain and so on. Everything has its own characteristics. Of course we can discuss what those characteristics are, but the idea that things exist and that and that if they exist, there's something that characterizes them is perhaps an unavoidable assumption if we have to think and make sense of things in a way that just remotely resembles what we're used to or what you think. Let's perhaps first before we plunge into the further arguments of this chapter think about that. Is this.. how fundamental is this to think in terms of things and then the characteristics of things? Yeah, what do you think about that?
Is it something that we have to do or is it possible to think of things in a way that does not set us up for the kind of trouble that we are getting into otherwise in this chapter?
Student: "I was pondering about this on Friday and I'm just thinking of this example of water and how water represents itself to those six types of beings. So I think given that example, it seems that characteristics as we perceive them as humans may not stand and are not intrinsic when compared to the other beings. So I'm just wondering how to reconcile that with this?" Yeah, that's a very good observation. And...
Let's see that.
So one thing is that characteristics change and that our understanding rather perhaps of characteristics change.
What this chapter is analyzing is something deeper than.. it's not sort of problematizing characteristics that are set in stone, but the very idea of characteristics there is something that makes things what they are. And then of course the example that you mentioned is a very important one and exactly what it means is very much a contested issue. If we can say that here's a cup of water and if we invite representatives of the six classes of sentient beings to take a look at what we see as water, then what do they see? What would they say? What would they say is characteristic about this?
And of course the example, if that happens, if someone, a member of each of the six classes of sentient beings takes a look at what we see as a cup of water, then they will see very different things, just as you said. Like a fish may see a home and a starving spirit will see something repulsive that can barely be drunk, if at all. And beings in hell will see liquid metal or something like that. And gods will see something divine like ambrosia to drink, so what is it really that they look at? And there are many different accounts, like philosophical positions taken with respect to that issue. So what can we then say? Is there actually something in common that sentient beings look at or is there not? What is the conclusion to be had based on this example, which is an example from scripture? And it also makes good sense if you have radically different faculties, of course what you see is going to be radically different. This is also something which is thought widely about and deeply about in contemporary philosophy, you know? What are the implications of that? How commensurable are our worlds, if at all?
So that is a deep philosophical issue and it's clearly very related to what is under analysis here. But perhaps you could also say that what this chapter gets at is a structure that even is prerequisite for being able to think about that example. Because you could also say that okay, there is something, whichever way we might want to classify it philosophically, which is the basis for these appearances, distinct appearances. So in that case it would be something that is characterized as being that, being a thing that can contribute to very distinct perceptions in the minds and mind streams of distinct sentient beings. So in one way it's the same as saying water is fluid and liquid, that's what characterizes water, wetness and so on. And saying things are such that they give rise in the minds of different sentient beings to radically different perceptions. Yeah? Does that make sense? So that shows very nicely I think just how deep this structuring of the world is in us, that there are things and those things are in a certain way. It seems very natural and sort of unavoidable to think in those terms. But then again as we're used to Nāgārjuna says, "Is it really so?" No matter how natural and unquestionable the relevance of whichever framework it is that we're looking at may seem to be, he nevertheless says, "Okay, so you think, but is it really so?" And that's what the chapter is about exploring then. Any other comments about the framework that is under analysis here? Meaning, yeah, as we just said, that there are things and those things for them to be there have to be in a certain characteristic way. That there are things with characteristics. Is it possible to think in any other way and still make sense of the world? And again we can say if we think that's not the case and if we then can't make sense of things and their characteristics after having done a few of these verses, then we are in a very difficult situation, no? If we think, A) it is not possible to make sense of the world unless we have access to the idea of things and things that have characteristics, and then B) when I examine the idea of things with characteristics, I find no basis for it. If we end up thinking like that, then we are in a situation where by our own lights we are no longer able to make sense of the world. So that seems to be what is at stake here, no?
And we started already with the first two verses, and maybe we can just run over them one more time.
The first stanza says, "Before the characteristics of space, there is no space whatsoever. If it existed before its characteristics, it would follow that it has no characteristics," or that it had no characteristics. So before the characteristics of space, traditionally the characteristic of space is openness, the open, accommodating quality that allow for things to occur. That space is space. It's just this accommodating factor. If there was no space in this room, then we would not be able to move about. It's because there is this openness, that it's possible to do all the things that we're doing right now in here. We can sit here, I can speak, and so on. It's all by virtue of there being space in here. So there is something, it's called space, and that space has its particular characteristic, namely that it allows for things like this to happen by not impeding, not hindering. It's the sort of non-hindering quality, which is space. But before the characteristics of space, it is then clear that there is no space either. Before there is this accommodating quality that is characteristic of space, there is no space. Otherwise, it would follow that the kind of space we're talking about is not accommodating and does not allow for the occurrence of things, and that would not be space then. So "Before the characteristic of space, there is no space whatsoever." "Something without characteristics does not exist anywhere at all." That's what we were contemplating a bit before. Since this is how it is, since, for example, there is no space whatsoever before the characteristics of space, then how could we possibly say that there exists things without characteristics? If something exists, it has a certain something that characterizes it as that particular thing.
Even if we say that it exists without characteristics, then that becomes the characteristic, no? It's that thing which exists uncharacterized or something like that. "Since there is no thing without characteristics, to what do the characteristics apply?" So since there never is an occasion at which we can access something that has no characteristics, how can we make sense of this idea that we have that there are things and then the characteristics? How is that possible? How could we possibly get that idea? Since there are no things without characteristics, then why do we think in this way, separating the thing and then its characteristics? Perhaps if we can understand that, we have understood a lot about dependent origination. If we can understand how on earth could we think that there are things and then characteristics, since we never have anything that exists without characteristics. In other words, since there's never a time or place or occasion at which we can say, "Okay, here's a thing. Now those are its characteristics." That sort of distinction can never be made in any substantial way. Because the thing that we notice is not separate in any way at all from its characteristics. It doesn't have any existence in the absence of those characteristics. So what do the characteristics apply to? What is it that we talk about when we say this and this is characterized by such and such?
"Characteristics do not apply to what has them, nor do they..." That's in stanza 3 then, yeah? "Nor do they apply to what does not have them."
If we then say that things always have characteristics, then the idea that there are characteristics that apply to something is not accurate, right? It's not an accurate observation about the way things are, because if the thing in question... If we're looking at something that is already characterized as a pair of glasses, then..
If by nature this thing is characterized already as a pair of glasses, then what are the characteristics that we would like to associate with them? There's then no difference whatsoever between this and the characteristics. So the idea of having something that... A set of characteristics that capture what this is and that in this way really apply to what this is, is a baseless idea. If we assume that things already come with characteristics, then what are we talking about when we say that they have such and such characteristics and those characteristics apply to them? Once you understood them, you will understand what the thing is. That's also the idea of characteristics, no? Characteristics are the features that really capture what the thing in question is. So once you get the characteristics, you know what the thing is. And if you don't know what characterizes it, you don't really know what the thing is either. But what basis can we find for that idea if they already have characteristics?
"Characteristics do not apply to something other than..." So nor do they apply to what does not have them, and that's what we just talked about. If something has no characteristics, it's not possible to say that there's something for characteristics to apply to. So whether we talk about something that comes ready-made, so to speak, with characteristics, or whether we talk about something that exists in the absence of characteristics, there's nothing with which we can associate characteristics. And then finally, "Neither do characteristics apply to something other than what does or does not have them." What would it be for something to both have and have characteristics, or for something to be something that is neither characterized nor not characterized?
Either something bears characteristics or it does not, no, seemingly? Otherwise what would it mean for something to be both characterized and not characterized, or neither? So let's try to think a little bit more about that. Why couldn't it be the case that this is a pair of glasses, it has certain characteristics, and I can come to understand those, I can communicate those to you, and in this way there are different characteristics. There is a set of characteristics that can be conveyed and understood, and once we understand them then we understand what this is. What is so problematic about that, if at all? It was said that if this is something that already has these characteristics, then what is it that, what are the characteristics that I am applying to them?
Isn't this a sort of artificial way of thinking about things, a forced way of thinking?
If not, then try and formulate why it would not be? Why something that has characteristics already cannot be said to have characteristics that applies to it?
Student: "Thank you Thomas. Can something.. so we're saying, you know, looks like now this verse between characteristics and the thing itself, there is a temporal relationship and we think that doesn't, we cannot establish, but can something just come with, like co-exist, can a thing just co-exist at the same time with its characteristics? Like I don't know, if you say like the mind, like the mind it's innately or from the beginning it's self-aware and clear, can a thing just come without having to say who comes first?" Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's a great question. And I guess it's in the next chapter, yeah, co-existence is under analysis, yeah.
But basically for something, and this of course is a wonderful example to look at, no? The mind is supposed to have certain characteristics, no?
Otherwise what are we talking about when we talk about mind?
Then.. those characteristics, and space is also a good example also for understanding mind. The Buddha says that if our understanding the nature of things, space is one of the, if not the best example, yeah? Because it's something that we are very comfortable with talking about, space. We feel intuitively that we know what it is and that we see space as the Buddha says. People widely proclaim that they see space, but then he says, "but examine here the meaning, how do you see space?" So it's a very profound example that is under analysis here also in the chapter, no? But then you're saying, so couldn't it just be that things and their characteristics co-exist, yeah? But then what is this co-existence in terms of? Is there really something that has characteristics? In that case, the characteristics and the thing in question would have to be different, no? If there really is something that really has characteristics, then that thing and its characteristics can't be one and the same, no? But if they are one and the same, then there's nothing that has characteristics really, right?
And if there is nothing that has characteristics, then what are we talking about when we speak of the characteristics of things, yeah?
But it's very much like how you say, you know, we feel that the things come with characteristics, no? I mean, that's at least my impression, yeah? They are out there and they have characteristics, but yeah, I've already said it in a way that now we know cannot be sustained, no? They are out there and they have characteristics. No, they're not.
They couldn't be out there with characteristics, right? Because then the characteristics and them would have to be different and we can see very quickly and very clearly that they aren't, that they couldn't be different. So what are we talking about? What do we think when we say this, yeah? Why do we think the way we think?
What has made it such that now we all think in this way? When we can clearly see that there's no basis for that type of idea?
If there is a mystery, you know, then that is a good candidate for the status of mystery, you know? Why do we all agree that this kind of thinking is necessary and natural? And presumably we also agree that there's no basis for it and that that baselessness can be recognized very quickly and very clearly.
Any feedback is welcome, of course.
Student: "So it's not possible that the things could actually completely be the characteristics?" Well if it means that characteristics and the thing that is characterized are just two names for the same thing, then what are we talking about? Why is it helpful to know characteristics?
I don't know what the characteristics of sunglasses are, but there must be some pretty okay characteristics. Two lenses and two of these guys, for example, make a part of what characterizes a pair of sunglasses. But if the sunglasses and those characteristics, if they really just refer to one and the same thing, what is it that I'm doing when I talk about the characteristics? What is it I'm feeling when I feel that I understand better because I was able to talk about characteristics? Why is it we get a sense that now we know better what we're talking about because you and I talk about characteristics? Why can't I just say sunglasses and that's all? "Maybe something like, it's hard to express with one word, like I'm just thinking of fire, like if it's hot you can become warm by standing next to it, but you could also burn yourself and injure yourself. So there's kind of related things that you kind of need to talk about, but I'm not sure if they're really separate." Yeah, they're not really separate. Nāgārjuna would agree, no, that's why he praises the Buddha in the beginning for saying that dependent origination, whatever arises dependently, is not separate and not different. So now when we understand that and when we agree, then why do we agree? How do we agree? Is it just something that we have learned to say yes to? Or what?
Do we.. just we have learned to say that dependent origination is profound and most other people who haven't done the same kind of brain work that we have, they will say that it sounds banal or weird or something like that, but us, we can nod and sort of say, "no, no, no, it's very profound." Is that what it's about? Then it's hard to think why it would have.. knowledge of dependent origination would be such a big deal, no? If this would be what it comes down to.
Yeah? Student: "I'm still not convinced about the separation of a thing from its characteristics that it's.. that the thing is only existent in its characteristics and therefore it's non-existent." Sorry? You're not convinced that...? "I'm not convinced that a thing does not exist because of its.. it's only characterized by its characteristics. My question to you is about Schrödinger's cat, right? So with Schrödinger's cat, we don't know if the cat is alive or dead, right? But we know that we've placed a cat in the box, right? And so how can we say that the cat does not exist because its characteristics are at that time uncertain, right? So it's still.. I've still put something in that box despite me not knowing its characteristics. Its characteristics at that point are completely undefined." Yes. So that's similar to what you were mentioning also, no? The example from scripture. This is an example from quantum mechanics, no? In that case we could still say that there's something in there that has no.. I mean the implications of that also is I think what exactly they are, I think quantum physicists would also be able to disagree quite a bit about, yeah, the difference. But in any case, perhaps we could say without sort of prematurely closing any particular line of interpretation, we could say that at that point when we put the cat in the box, then there's something in there that has.. of which the characteristics aren't certain. So it's characteristically so. It's characteristically something that, of which the characteristics aren't certain. So similar to, should we call it water or what, which we all look at, me and representatives of the other classes of sentient beings, and we see radically different things, yeah? That which we look at is something that is, that characteristically gives rise to these six distinct perceptions. And you could perhaps say, I mean, this is certainly not my field of expertise, but you could perhaps still say that there's something which characteristically can be either a dead cat or a live cat in there. And just like the scriptural example can be used to show that therefore there is no thing there, in and of itself, that exists in any definite way by itself, but only in relation, not just in relation to other minds. It's not that there's something amazing about each of our individual subjective minds, but just because of dependent origination, the whole matrix of dependent origination, different minds see different things and different occasions present different results. So in the same way, you could also, I think, very well take that experiment with the cat as an example to show that at least you could use it in that way to say that hence this is good evidence of the fact that nothing exists intrinsically, but in dependence only. I mean, this has been done before by many no? But to say that quantum mechanics has this kind of potential for an alignment with many kinds of philosophies, such as Buddhist philosophy. And then when we begin to talk like that, then there are all sorts of bells and red lights that begin to go off in various quarters, and others will love it and so on, but that's a whole different issue.
Student: "My question is, yeah, but still in this Schrödinger's cat example, we still know there is a cat, and likewise with the water, it feels like all sentient beings perceive it also as something like moist and wet, you know?" No, not necessarily. "Is it not?" I mean, it's because, what is it? This is also one of the classic arguments. I guess some people say that, yeah, actually. So it's not that you are alone, yeah, but... "It's not that hell beings see it as a mountain suddenly or the fishes see it as a radio, but everything is like a liquid thing, sort of. Like with the cat, it's also like..." But okay, if that was really the case, then what about... I mean, then that means you have found the sort of transcendental character of things, no? There are certain things that no matter who you are, you're going to see it as liquid, no? I think it would be very difficult to carry through this kind of analysis, no? Come into the experience with the Mūlamadhyamaka with that idea that things, okay, to us it looks like something I can drink for others and so on and so on, but it's always something that can be... That is liquid, yeah? "I'm not on the side of trying to establish..." No, no, I'm not. "It's intrinsically liquid, but still I think a couple of years ago some of us, we discussed about it, why... But it is sort of striking the obvious that these are all liquid, you know? So like the cat, it's still a cat, you know?" Yeah, so it's very interesting to now go back to this kind of very juicy example, no?
So if that is what we get from that example with the six classes of sentient beings, yeah? I mean, whether that is what we have to get from it is a different issue, yeah? But if it is, then we have really found the thing and that which is the bearer of its... and that which is its characteristic, yeah? Because now we know that in the world there are things which human beings call 'water,' and yet if you belong to any of the other classes of sentient beings, you will see it in one of five alternative ways, yeah?
So then we have a really solid idea of bearers of characteristics and characteristics, and then it makes very good sense to ask precisely the questions that are being asked here, no? What is that thing, yeah? It's a wonderful analysis then to do, no? If we have looked at this example of the six classes of sentient beings looking at something that they say is water, ambrosia, et cetera, yeah? Then what is the bearer of the characteristics? And there couldn't be something which is not that, yeah? And if we say that it's something that is characteristically liquid, then it exists already with that characteristics. What do the... What does the characteristic then apply to? When I say 'liquid,' then what is it I'm talking about that's distinct from the thing itself, yeah? And if those two are not distinguishable, if they're just one and the same, how should it be possible for something like that, which is intrinsically liquidity, to appear in different ways, yeah? In the minds of different beings? This would go against the very idea of dependent origination.
What is... There are many ways of getting deeper into that. In my mind, it seems like really missing the point, no? If we say that there's something there which has very rudimentary characteristics, which can then be elaborated upon by different sentient beings, yeah? But it is a venerable position to take, I think, so. Student: "I think if you could take it a step further, though, if you would talk about gravitational force, physical properties, where as a... I guess maybe if you're thinking about it for the Hungry Ghost, it might be different now that I'm thinking about it." Sorry? "I don't know. I was just thinking about gravitational force and how it's going to act on everything the same. Gravitational force is going to act on a fish the same way it's going to act on me. The same way like properties of physics don't discriminate between beings that we can see and know. I mean, you could argue that, well, maybe hungry ghosts aren't subject to gravitational forces. But because we haven't directly experienced hungry ghosts in this realm, we can't for say sure that it does or does not. So we could only say that of the classes of beings that we have encountered, nothing escapes gravitational force, right? And so how could we say that gravitational force does not exist? Or I mean space, we're talking about space. That's a good example. Like fish, a fish is going to experience that there is... It may not like the space. I like space. Fish may not like space because there's no water. But that's not to say that it won't experience, that it won't, that it doesn't have the same open quality. But I think gravitational force might, like physical forces might be a better example because we've shown that it acts on all things independently. You know, like gravitational force isn't like being experienced differently by the fish than by me." That's also a very interesting example, yeah? Like natural laws. So if natural laws exist with characteristics,
yeah, if they exist with characteristics, like I don't know what would be a good definition, characterization of gravity, gravitational force? But I'm sure that we can quickly find some. So if there's something that exists with those characteristics, what is it that exists and has those? Or otherwise, if it's just that we look at certain things and then we end up thinking, here's an example of gravity, but in fact there's nothing, no such thing as gravity as such, that is very different. And perhaps that would be like being a Buddhist scientist maybe or something like that, yeah? If we have to think in those terms, no, but it would be a way of perhaps, of acknowledging dependent origination and still making use very well, perhaps brilliantly so, of the notion of gravity. It's to say, okay, we have something that is called the natural law of gravity and it applies in these and these circumstances. And all what I say about that, there's no such thing as gravity as such to which those descriptions apply. That might perhaps open, like scientists and physicists, I think in particular, are often encouraged not to buy into intuitively plausible scenario, but instead be open for something that is completely counterintuitive. So perhaps it is helpful if that is what we're trying to do, to be really able to think outside of the box, it is perhaps helpful to recognize that as we talk about gravitational force, we can talk about it very well, just like we can talk about my sunglasses and what characterizes those. We can also, if we are smart enough to do it, we can talk about gravitational force and what it is and what it does, at the same time knowing that there is no gravitational force that has such characteristics. Perhaps that could be very helpful as a practice for a serious physicist who is not just going to accept whatever framework is given and whatever seems intuitively plausible from her or his immediate perspective. But it's not necessarily a big deal either, because the physicist can also just think this is just something that I have to factor in, that under certain considerations, then the idea of such a thing as gravity that has characteristics falls apart. And then onto something new, just like the rest of us. So there's a possibility for completely sliding along without gaining much from it, except becoming a little bit smarter and being able to look a little bit more sophisticated. But it's also possible, I think it would follow, that it is possible to assume less in one's next experiment in physics.
But what these examples show is that things and their characteristics is something that go really, really deep. It's something that we use on a day-to-day level, and it's also what really supports
worldviews and scientific practices and so on.
"If characteristics have.." that is 4, "no application, it makes no sense that there should be bearers of them." So unless we can say that, as we tried to before, say that there are things to which characteristics apply, then the implication is that characteristics have no application. They don't apply to anything. And if the characteristics don't apply to anything, then what's the point of talking about characteristics? Characteristics without application are by default or by definition meaningless and useless, no? "If the bearers of characteristics are unreasonable, their characteristics cannot exist either." So if we cannot make sense of the bearer of characteristics, that's in a similar line as what was just said, then characteristics cannot exist. So unless we can meaningfully talk about something that has characteristics, then there's no recourse for us to say that characteristics exist. And then there's a conclusion in the first two lines of stanza 5. "Therefore, the bearers of characteristics do not exist, and characteristics themselves have no existence either." If we cannot find a place for bearers of characteristics that exist either with, either characterized or uncharacterized, then what is it that the characteristics apply to? If the characteristics don't apply to anything, then there are no characteristics. So therefore, the bearers of characteristics have no existence, and characteristics themselves have no existence. And "Yet," in C and D of stanza 5, "aside from bearers and characteristics, there are no entities." There is nothing apart from things and their characteristics. What should that be? What could that possibly be which isn't something or something that characterizes something? Something that makes something what it is?
So looking at characteristics we find, and bearers of characteristics, we find no bearers of characteristics, whether we say that they already come with their characteristics or whether we say that they exist without characteristics. Without bearers of characteristics, there are no characteristics. And then the application, the further conclusion that follows from that is that we now have no way of actually talking about the existence of anything at all. Because anything, whatever it might be, for it to be that, would have to be something that characterizes it, something that makes it what it is.
Then in the first two lines of 6 it says, "If there is is no entity, of what would there be no entity?" Meaning, so this is according to the commentaries, this is responding to a notion that's of space then that is really not an entity. So at this point if we're just talking about space and the characteristics of space up until this point, without any of the very vast implications that we have considered, if we're just strictly speaking talking about space, then it could be that at this point someone would say, "Well, space actually doesn't exist. It's not something that exists, it's a construct made in dependence on things that do exist, but it's just absence and absence doesn't exist." But then the verse here says, "If there is..." So that would in Buddhist philosophy that is like a Sautrāntika perspective, no? Who don't accept the substantial existence of unconditioned factors such as space, and say that it instead is something that has merely imputational existence, something that is imputed on the basis of something else. But if there are no entities, which is the upshot of what we have been saying, there are no things either with or without characteristics, so therefore if there are no things, then what do we talk about when we say that space is a non-entity? For that kind of description to make sense, it has to make sense to talk about entity in some fashion. But what we have now found is that entity doesn't apply to anything at all. 'Thing' and what makes the 'thing' what it is, the thing and its characteristics. We have seen that neither of those is founded on anything in reality. And therefore if there are no entities, what do I mean when I say non-entity or nothing? So this is also an important thing to keep in mind in general of course when we do this kind of Mādhyamaka analysis, because as we have talked about several times, it is easy to get the sense that there is a negative conclusion, emptiness as some sort of negation, etc., which is to be made by going through the analysis. But if there are no entities, if there are no things, then what do I mean by the emptiness of things? So emptiness does not mean non-existence or nothingness or non-entity. That is a point that is repeatedly made, but it's easy to overlook in the heat of the battle, sort of, no?
And then maybe let's wait with this subjective apprehension of space. That's also about the mind that you brought up before. There are just a couple of minutes left. Let's start there tomorrow. And if you have any remarks before we conclude, you're welcome.
So I think it would be interesting to think until tomorrow a little further about this question of, if this is the case now, if we can so quickly and decisively see that there are no things that have characteristics, then.. then why is it that we think this kind of framework is indispensable for making sense of anything? What made us think like that?
And also what do we do now? There's a framework that we find indispensable for making sense of anything. And now it seems that we have to dispense with it insofar as when we look at the the two principles, the thing and its characteristics, we find no basis for it. So what is all this in other words? Is the question for tomorrow. So try to note that and see where you are at and so on. And then we will resume tomorrow with the...
talking about that which is the subject of all of this. And whether it's possible to, by pointing to the subject, to then by that way be able to posit certain things that exist and others that don't exist. Okay, thank you very much.
"That which originates
dependently does not
cease and does not
arise, is not annihilated
and is not permanent,
does not come and
does not go, is not different
and not the same.
To the true teacher who reveals this peace,
the complete pacification of constructs,
to the perfect Buddha I bow down."
So today we continue with Chapter Five, which is the "Analysis of the Elements." And as we know the example that we're looking at in particular is space as one of these elements that constitute, that contribute to the construction of a person. So the way that the chapter progresses is in terms of looking at the idea of things and then the characteristics of things, which is of course a framework that we're used to operating with. There are certain things that are in certain ways, in certain important ways, so that they actually characterize the thing in question. There's something that makes a table a table, there's something that makes a house a house, a mountain a mountain and so on. Everything has its own characteristics. Of course we can discuss what those characteristics are, but the idea that things exist and that and that if they exist, there's something that characterizes them is perhaps an unavoidable assumption if we have to think and make sense of things in a way that just remotely resembles what we're used to or what you think. Let's perhaps first before we plunge into the further arguments of this chapter think about that. Is this.. how fundamental is this to think in terms of things and then the characteristics of things? Yeah, what do you think about that?
Is it something that we have to do or is it possible to think of things in a way that does not set us up for the kind of trouble that we are getting into otherwise in this chapter?
Student: "I was pondering about this on Friday and I'm just thinking of this example of water and how water represents itself to those six types of beings. So I think given that example, it seems that characteristics as we perceive them as humans may not stand and are not intrinsic when compared to the other beings. So I'm just wondering how to reconcile that with this?" Yeah, that's a very good observation. And...
Let's see that.
So one thing is that characteristics change and that our understanding rather perhaps of characteristics change.
What this chapter is analyzing is something deeper than.. it's not sort of problematizing characteristics that are set in stone, but the very idea of characteristics there is something that makes things what they are. And then of course the example that you mentioned is a very important one and exactly what it means is very much a contested issue. If we can say that here's a cup of water and if we invite representatives of the six classes of sentient beings to take a look at what we see as water, then what do they see? What would they say? What would they say is characteristic about this?
And of course the example, if that happens, if someone, a member of each of the six classes of sentient beings takes a look at what we see as a cup of water, then they will see very different things, just as you said. Like a fish may see a home and a starving spirit will see something repulsive that can barely be drunk, if at all. And beings in hell will see liquid metal or something like that. And gods will see something divine like ambrosia to drink, so what is it really that they look at? And there are many different accounts, like philosophical positions taken with respect to that issue. So what can we then say? Is there actually something in common that sentient beings look at or is there not? What is the conclusion to be had based on this example, which is an example from scripture? And it also makes good sense if you have radically different faculties, of course what you see is going to be radically different. This is also something which is thought widely about and deeply about in contemporary philosophy, you know? What are the implications of that? How commensurable are our worlds, if at all?
So that is a deep philosophical issue and it's clearly very related to what is under analysis here. But perhaps you could also say that what this chapter gets at is a structure that even is prerequisite for being able to think about that example. Because you could also say that okay, there is something, whichever way we might want to classify it philosophically, which is the basis for these appearances, distinct appearances. So in that case it would be something that is characterized as being that, being a thing that can contribute to very distinct perceptions in the minds and mind streams of distinct sentient beings. So in one way it's the same as saying water is fluid and liquid, that's what characterizes water, wetness and so on. And saying things are such that they give rise in the minds of different sentient beings to radically different perceptions. Yeah? Does that make sense? So that shows very nicely I think just how deep this structuring of the world is in us, that there are things and those things are in a certain way. It seems very natural and sort of unavoidable to think in those terms. But then again as we're used to Nāgārjuna says, "Is it really so?" No matter how natural and unquestionable the relevance of whichever framework it is that we're looking at may seem to be, he nevertheless says, "Okay, so you think, but is it really so?" And that's what the chapter is about exploring then. Any other comments about the framework that is under analysis here? Meaning, yeah, as we just said, that there are things and those things for them to be there have to be in a certain characteristic way. That there are things with characteristics. Is it possible to think in any other way and still make sense of the world? And again we can say if we think that's not the case and if we then can't make sense of things and their characteristics after having done a few of these verses, then we are in a very difficult situation, no? If we think, A) it is not possible to make sense of the world unless we have access to the idea of things and things that have characteristics, and then B) when I examine the idea of things with characteristics, I find no basis for it. If we end up thinking like that, then we are in a situation where by our own lights we are no longer able to make sense of the world. So that seems to be what is at stake here, no?
And we started already with the first two verses, and maybe we can just run over them one more time.
The first stanza says, "Before the characteristics of space, there is no space whatsoever. If it existed before its characteristics, it would follow that it has no characteristics," or that it had no characteristics. So before the characteristics of space, traditionally the characteristic of space is openness, the open, accommodating quality that allow for things to occur. That space is space. It's just this accommodating factor. If there was no space in this room, then we would not be able to move about. It's because there is this openness, that it's possible to do all the things that we're doing right now in here. We can sit here, I can speak, and so on. It's all by virtue of there being space in here. So there is something, it's called space, and that space has its particular characteristic, namely that it allows for things like this to happen by not impeding, not hindering. It's the sort of non-hindering quality, which is space. But before the characteristics of space, it is then clear that there is no space either. Before there is this accommodating quality that is characteristic of space, there is no space. Otherwise, it would follow that the kind of space we're talking about is not accommodating and does not allow for the occurrence of things, and that would not be space then. So "Before the characteristic of space, there is no space whatsoever." "Something without characteristics does not exist anywhere at all." That's what we were contemplating a bit before. Since this is how it is, since, for example, there is no space whatsoever before the characteristics of space, then how could we possibly say that there exists things without characteristics? If something exists, it has a certain something that characterizes it as that particular thing.
Even if we say that it exists without characteristics, then that becomes the characteristic, no? It's that thing which exists uncharacterized or something like that. "Since there is no thing without characteristics, to what do the characteristics apply?" So since there never is an occasion at which we can access something that has no characteristics, how can we make sense of this idea that we have that there are things and then the characteristics? How is that possible? How could we possibly get that idea? Since there are no things without characteristics, then why do we think in this way, separating the thing and then its characteristics? Perhaps if we can understand that, we have understood a lot about dependent origination. If we can understand how on earth could we think that there are things and then characteristics, since we never have anything that exists without characteristics. In other words, since there's never a time or place or occasion at which we can say, "Okay, here's a thing. Now those are its characteristics." That sort of distinction can never be made in any substantial way. Because the thing that we notice is not separate in any way at all from its characteristics. It doesn't have any existence in the absence of those characteristics. So what do the characteristics apply to? What is it that we talk about when we say this and this is characterized by such and such?
"Characteristics do not apply to what has them, nor do they..." That's in stanza 3 then, yeah? "Nor do they apply to what does not have them."
If we then say that things always have characteristics, then the idea that there are characteristics that apply to something is not accurate, right? It's not an accurate observation about the way things are, because if the thing in question... If we're looking at something that is already characterized as a pair of glasses, then..
If by nature this thing is characterized already as a pair of glasses, then what are the characteristics that we would like to associate with them? There's then no difference whatsoever between this and the characteristics. So the idea of having something that... A set of characteristics that capture what this is and that in this way really apply to what this is, is a baseless idea. If we assume that things already come with characteristics, then what are we talking about when we say that they have such and such characteristics and those characteristics apply to them? Once you understood them, you will understand what the thing is. That's also the idea of characteristics, no? Characteristics are the features that really capture what the thing in question is. So once you get the characteristics, you know what the thing is. And if you don't know what characterizes it, you don't really know what the thing is either. But what basis can we find for that idea if they already have characteristics?
"Characteristics do not apply to something other than..." So nor do they apply to what does not have them, and that's what we just talked about. If something has no characteristics, it's not possible to say that there's something for characteristics to apply to. So whether we talk about something that comes ready-made, so to speak, with characteristics, or whether we talk about something that exists in the absence of characteristics, there's nothing with which we can associate characteristics. And then finally, "Neither do characteristics apply to something other than what does or does not have them." What would it be for something to both have and have characteristics, or for something to be something that is neither characterized nor not characterized?
Either something bears characteristics or it does not, no, seemingly? Otherwise what would it mean for something to be both characterized and not characterized, or neither? So let's try to think a little bit more about that. Why couldn't it be the case that this is a pair of glasses, it has certain characteristics, and I can come to understand those, I can communicate those to you, and in this way there are different characteristics. There is a set of characteristics that can be conveyed and understood, and once we understand them then we understand what this is. What is so problematic about that, if at all? It was said that if this is something that already has these characteristics, then what is it that, what are the characteristics that I am applying to them?
Isn't this a sort of artificial way of thinking about things, a forced way of thinking?
If not, then try and formulate why it would not be? Why something that has characteristics already cannot be said to have characteristics that applies to it?
Student: "Thank you Thomas. Can something.. so we're saying, you know, looks like now this verse between characteristics and the thing itself, there is a temporal relationship and we think that doesn't, we cannot establish, but can something just come with, like co-exist, can a thing just co-exist at the same time with its characteristics? Like I don't know, if you say like the mind, like the mind it's innately or from the beginning it's self-aware and clear, can a thing just come without having to say who comes first?" Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's a great question. And I guess it's in the next chapter, yeah, co-existence is under analysis, yeah.
But basically for something, and this of course is a wonderful example to look at, no? The mind is supposed to have certain characteristics, no?
Otherwise what are we talking about when we talk about mind?
Then.. those characteristics, and space is also a good example also for understanding mind. The Buddha says that if our understanding the nature of things, space is one of the, if not the best example, yeah? Because it's something that we are very comfortable with talking about, space. We feel intuitively that we know what it is and that we see space as the Buddha says. People widely proclaim that they see space, but then he says, "but examine here the meaning, how do you see space?" So it's a very profound example that is under analysis here also in the chapter, no? But then you're saying, so couldn't it just be that things and their characteristics co-exist, yeah? But then what is this co-existence in terms of? Is there really something that has characteristics? In that case, the characteristics and the thing in question would have to be different, no? If there really is something that really has characteristics, then that thing and its characteristics can't be one and the same, no? But if they are one and the same, then there's nothing that has characteristics really, right?
And if there is nothing that has characteristics, then what are we talking about when we speak of the characteristics of things, yeah?
But it's very much like how you say, you know, we feel that the things come with characteristics, no? I mean, that's at least my impression, yeah? They are out there and they have characteristics, but yeah, I've already said it in a way that now we know cannot be sustained, no? They are out there and they have characteristics. No, they're not.
They couldn't be out there with characteristics, right? Because then the characteristics and them would have to be different and we can see very quickly and very clearly that they aren't, that they couldn't be different. So what are we talking about? What do we think when we say this, yeah? Why do we think the way we think?
What has made it such that now we all think in this way? When we can clearly see that there's no basis for that type of idea?
If there is a mystery, you know, then that is a good candidate for the status of mystery, you know? Why do we all agree that this kind of thinking is necessary and natural? And presumably we also agree that there's no basis for it and that that baselessness can be recognized very quickly and very clearly.
Any feedback is welcome, of course.
Student: "So it's not possible that the things could actually completely be the characteristics?" Well if it means that characteristics and the thing that is characterized are just two names for the same thing, then what are we talking about? Why is it helpful to know characteristics?
I don't know what the characteristics of sunglasses are, but there must be some pretty okay characteristics. Two lenses and two of these guys, for example, make a part of what characterizes a pair of sunglasses. But if the sunglasses and those characteristics, if they really just refer to one and the same thing, what is it that I'm doing when I talk about the characteristics? What is it I'm feeling when I feel that I understand better because I was able to talk about characteristics? Why is it we get a sense that now we know better what we're talking about because you and I talk about characteristics? Why can't I just say sunglasses and that's all? "Maybe something like, it's hard to express with one word, like I'm just thinking of fire, like if it's hot you can become warm by standing next to it, but you could also burn yourself and injure yourself. So there's kind of related things that you kind of need to talk about, but I'm not sure if they're really separate." Yeah, they're not really separate. Nāgārjuna would agree, no, that's why he praises the Buddha in the beginning for saying that dependent origination, whatever arises dependently, is not separate and not different. So now when we understand that and when we agree, then why do we agree? How do we agree? Is it just something that we have learned to say yes to? Or what?
Do we.. just we have learned to say that dependent origination is profound and most other people who haven't done the same kind of brain work that we have, they will say that it sounds banal or weird or something like that, but us, we can nod and sort of say, "no, no, no, it's very profound." Is that what it's about? Then it's hard to think why it would have.. knowledge of dependent origination would be such a big deal, no? If this would be what it comes down to.
Yeah? Student: "I'm still not convinced about the separation of a thing from its characteristics that it's.. that the thing is only existent in its characteristics and therefore it's non-existent." Sorry? You're not convinced that...? "I'm not convinced that a thing does not exist because of its.. it's only characterized by its characteristics. My question to you is about Schrödinger's cat, right? So with Schrödinger's cat, we don't know if the cat is alive or dead, right? But we know that we've placed a cat in the box, right? And so how can we say that the cat does not exist because its characteristics are at that time uncertain, right? So it's still.. I've still put something in that box despite me not knowing its characteristics. Its characteristics at that point are completely undefined." Yes. So that's similar to what you were mentioning also, no? The example from scripture. This is an example from quantum mechanics, no? In that case we could still say that there's something in there that has no.. I mean the implications of that also is I think what exactly they are, I think quantum physicists would also be able to disagree quite a bit about, yeah, the difference. But in any case, perhaps we could say without sort of prematurely closing any particular line of interpretation, we could say that at that point when we put the cat in the box, then there's something in there that has.. of which the characteristics aren't certain. So it's characteristically so. It's characteristically something that, of which the characteristics aren't certain. So similar to, should we call it water or what, which we all look at, me and representatives of the other classes of sentient beings, and we see radically different things, yeah? That which we look at is something that is, that characteristically gives rise to these six distinct perceptions. And you could perhaps say, I mean, this is certainly not my field of expertise, but you could perhaps still say that there's something which characteristically can be either a dead cat or a live cat in there. And just like the scriptural example can be used to show that therefore there is no thing there, in and of itself, that exists in any definite way by itself, but only in relation, not just in relation to other minds. It's not that there's something amazing about each of our individual subjective minds, but just because of dependent origination, the whole matrix of dependent origination, different minds see different things and different occasions present different results. So in the same way, you could also, I think, very well take that experiment with the cat as an example to show that at least you could use it in that way to say that hence this is good evidence of the fact that nothing exists intrinsically, but in dependence only. I mean, this has been done before by many no? But to say that quantum mechanics has this kind of potential for an alignment with many kinds of philosophies, such as Buddhist philosophy. And then when we begin to talk like that, then there are all sorts of bells and red lights that begin to go off in various quarters, and others will love it and so on, but that's a whole different issue.
Student: "My question is, yeah, but still in this Schrödinger's cat example, we still know there is a cat, and likewise with the water, it feels like all sentient beings perceive it also as something like moist and wet, you know?" No, not necessarily. "Is it not?" I mean, it's because, what is it? This is also one of the classic arguments. I guess some people say that, yeah, actually. So it's not that you are alone, yeah, but... "It's not that hell beings see it as a mountain suddenly or the fishes see it as a radio, but everything is like a liquid thing, sort of. Like with the cat, it's also like..." But okay, if that was really the case, then what about... I mean, then that means you have found the sort of transcendental character of things, no? There are certain things that no matter who you are, you're going to see it as liquid, no? I think it would be very difficult to carry through this kind of analysis, no? Come into the experience with the Mūlamadhyamaka with that idea that things, okay, to us it looks like something I can drink for others and so on and so on, but it's always something that can be... That is liquid, yeah? "I'm not on the side of trying to establish..." No, no, I'm not. "It's intrinsically liquid, but still I think a couple of years ago some of us, we discussed about it, why... But it is sort of striking the obvious that these are all liquid, you know? So like the cat, it's still a cat, you know?" Yeah, so it's very interesting to now go back to this kind of very juicy example, no?
So if that is what we get from that example with the six classes of sentient beings, yeah? I mean, whether that is what we have to get from it is a different issue, yeah? But if it is, then we have really found the thing and that which is the bearer of its... and that which is its characteristic, yeah? Because now we know that in the world there are things which human beings call 'water,' and yet if you belong to any of the other classes of sentient beings, you will see it in one of five alternative ways, yeah?
So then we have a really solid idea of bearers of characteristics and characteristics, and then it makes very good sense to ask precisely the questions that are being asked here, no? What is that thing, yeah? It's a wonderful analysis then to do, no? If we have looked at this example of the six classes of sentient beings looking at something that they say is water, ambrosia, et cetera, yeah? Then what is the bearer of the characteristics? And there couldn't be something which is not that, yeah? And if we say that it's something that is characteristically liquid, then it exists already with that characteristics. What do the... What does the characteristic then apply to? When I say 'liquid,' then what is it I'm talking about that's distinct from the thing itself, yeah? And if those two are not distinguishable, if they're just one and the same, how should it be possible for something like that, which is intrinsically liquidity, to appear in different ways, yeah? In the minds of different beings? This would go against the very idea of dependent origination.
What is... There are many ways of getting deeper into that. In my mind, it seems like really missing the point, no? If we say that there's something there which has very rudimentary characteristics, which can then be elaborated upon by different sentient beings, yeah? But it is a venerable position to take, I think, so. Student: "I think if you could take it a step further, though, if you would talk about gravitational force, physical properties, where as a... I guess maybe if you're thinking about it for the Hungry Ghost, it might be different now that I'm thinking about it." Sorry? "I don't know. I was just thinking about gravitational force and how it's going to act on everything the same. Gravitational force is going to act on a fish the same way it's going to act on me. The same way like properties of physics don't discriminate between beings that we can see and know. I mean, you could argue that, well, maybe hungry ghosts aren't subject to gravitational forces. But because we haven't directly experienced hungry ghosts in this realm, we can't for say sure that it does or does not. So we could only say that of the classes of beings that we have encountered, nothing escapes gravitational force, right? And so how could we say that gravitational force does not exist? Or I mean space, we're talking about space. That's a good example. Like fish, a fish is going to experience that there is... It may not like the space. I like space. Fish may not like space because there's no water. But that's not to say that it won't experience, that it won't, that it doesn't have the same open quality. But I think gravitational force might, like physical forces might be a better example because we've shown that it acts on all things independently. You know, like gravitational force isn't like being experienced differently by the fish than by me." That's also a very interesting example, yeah? Like natural laws. So if natural laws exist with characteristics,
yeah, if they exist with characteristics, like I don't know what would be a good definition, characterization of gravity, gravitational force? But I'm sure that we can quickly find some. So if there's something that exists with those characteristics, what is it that exists and has those? Or otherwise, if it's just that we look at certain things and then we end up thinking, here's an example of gravity, but in fact there's nothing, no such thing as gravity as such, that is very different. And perhaps that would be like being a Buddhist scientist maybe or something like that, yeah? If we have to think in those terms, no, but it would be a way of perhaps, of acknowledging dependent origination and still making use very well, perhaps brilliantly so, of the notion of gravity. It's to say, okay, we have something that is called the natural law of gravity and it applies in these and these circumstances. And all what I say about that, there's no such thing as gravity as such to which those descriptions apply. That might perhaps open, like scientists and physicists, I think in particular, are often encouraged not to buy into intuitively plausible scenario, but instead be open for something that is completely counterintuitive. So perhaps it is helpful if that is what we're trying to do, to be really able to think outside of the box, it is perhaps helpful to recognize that as we talk about gravitational force, we can talk about it very well, just like we can talk about my sunglasses and what characterizes those. We can also, if we are smart enough to do it, we can talk about gravitational force and what it is and what it does, at the same time knowing that there is no gravitational force that has such characteristics. Perhaps that could be very helpful as a practice for a serious physicist who is not just going to accept whatever framework is given and whatever seems intuitively plausible from her or his immediate perspective. But it's not necessarily a big deal either, because the physicist can also just think this is just something that I have to factor in, that under certain considerations, then the idea of such a thing as gravity that has characteristics falls apart. And then onto something new, just like the rest of us. So there's a possibility for completely sliding along without gaining much from it, except becoming a little bit smarter and being able to look a little bit more sophisticated. But it's also possible, I think it would follow, that it is possible to assume less in one's next experiment in physics.
But what these examples show is that things and their characteristics is something that go really, really deep. It's something that we use on a day-to-day level, and it's also what really supports
worldviews and scientific practices and so on.
"If characteristics have.." that is 4, "no application, it makes no sense that there should be bearers of them." So unless we can say that, as we tried to before, say that there are things to which characteristics apply, then the implication is that characteristics have no application. They don't apply to anything. And if the characteristics don't apply to anything, then what's the point of talking about characteristics? Characteristics without application are by default or by definition meaningless and useless, no? "If the bearers of characteristics are unreasonable, their characteristics cannot exist either." So if we cannot make sense of the bearer of characteristics, that's in a similar line as what was just said, then characteristics cannot exist. So unless we can meaningfully talk about something that has characteristics, then there's no recourse for us to say that characteristics exist. And then there's a conclusion in the first two lines of stanza 5. "Therefore, the bearers of characteristics do not exist, and characteristics themselves have no existence either." If we cannot find a place for bearers of characteristics that exist either with, either characterized or uncharacterized, then what is it that the characteristics apply to? If the characteristics don't apply to anything, then there are no characteristics. So therefore, the bearers of characteristics have no existence, and characteristics themselves have no existence. And "Yet," in C and D of stanza 5, "aside from bearers and characteristics, there are no entities." There is nothing apart from things and their characteristics. What should that be? What could that possibly be which isn't something or something that characterizes something? Something that makes something what it is?
So looking at characteristics we find, and bearers of characteristics, we find no bearers of characteristics, whether we say that they already come with their characteristics or whether we say that they exist without characteristics. Without bearers of characteristics, there are no characteristics. And then the application, the further conclusion that follows from that is that we now have no way of actually talking about the existence of anything at all. Because anything, whatever it might be, for it to be that, would have to be something that characterizes it, something that makes it what it is.
Then in the first two lines of 6 it says, "If there is is no entity, of what would there be no entity?" Meaning, so this is according to the commentaries, this is responding to a notion that's of space then that is really not an entity. So at this point if we're just talking about space and the characteristics of space up until this point, without any of the very vast implications that we have considered, if we're just strictly speaking talking about space, then it could be that at this point someone would say, "Well, space actually doesn't exist. It's not something that exists, it's a construct made in dependence on things that do exist, but it's just absence and absence doesn't exist." But then the verse here says, "If there is..." So that would in Buddhist philosophy that is like a Sautrāntika perspective, no? Who don't accept the substantial existence of unconditioned factors such as space, and say that it instead is something that has merely imputational existence, something that is imputed on the basis of something else. But if there are no entities, which is the upshot of what we have been saying, there are no things either with or without characteristics, so therefore if there are no things, then what do we talk about when we say that space is a non-entity? For that kind of description to make sense, it has to make sense to talk about entity in some fashion. But what we have now found is that entity doesn't apply to anything at all. 'Thing' and what makes the 'thing' what it is, the thing and its characteristics. We have seen that neither of those is founded on anything in reality. And therefore if there are no entities, what do I mean when I say non-entity or nothing? So this is also an important thing to keep in mind in general of course when we do this kind of Mādhyamaka analysis, because as we have talked about several times, it is easy to get the sense that there is a negative conclusion, emptiness as some sort of negation, etc., which is to be made by going through the analysis. But if there are no entities, if there are no things, then what do I mean by the emptiness of things? So emptiness does not mean non-existence or nothingness or non-entity. That is a point that is repeatedly made, but it's easy to overlook in the heat of the battle, sort of, no?
And then maybe let's wait with this subjective apprehension of space. That's also about the mind that you brought up before. There are just a couple of minutes left. Let's start there tomorrow. And if you have any remarks before we conclude, you're welcome.
So I think it would be interesting to think until tomorrow a little further about this question of, if this is the case now, if we can so quickly and decisively see that there are no things that have characteristics, then.. then why is it that we think this kind of framework is indispensable for making sense of anything? What made us think like that?
And also what do we do now? There's a framework that we find indispensable for making sense of anything. And now it seems that we have to dispense with it insofar as when we look at the the two principles, the thing and its characteristics, we find no basis for it. So what is all this in other words? Is the question for tomorrow. So try to note that and see where you are at and so on. And then we will resume tomorrow with the...
talking about that which is the subject of all of this. And whether it's possible to, by pointing to the subject, to then by that way be able to posit certain things that exist and others that don't exist. Okay, thank you very much.
So today we continue with Chapter Five, which is the "Analysis of the Elements." And as we know the example that we're looking at in particular is space as one of these elements that constitute, that contribute to the construction of a person. So the way that the chapter progresses is in terms of looking at the idea of things and then the characteristics of things, which is of course a framework that we're used to operating with. There are certain things that are in certain ways, in certain important ways, so that they actually characterize the thing in question. There's something that makes a table a table, there's something that makes a house a house, a mountain a mountain and so on. Everything has its own characteristics. Of course we can discuss what those characteristics are, but the idea that things exist and that and that if they exist, there's something that characterizes them is perhaps an unavoidable assumption if we have to think and make sense of things in a way that just remotely resembles what we're used to or what you think. Let's perhaps first before we plunge into the further arguments of this chapter think about that. Is this.. how fundamental is this to think in terms of things and then the characteristics of things? Yeah, what do you think about that?
Is it something that we have to do or is it possible to think of things in a way that does not set us up for the kind of trouble that we are getting into otherwise in this chapter?
Student: "I was pondering about this on Friday and I'm just thinking of this example of water and how water represents itself to those six types of beings. So I think given that example, it seems that characteristics as we perceive them as humans may not stand and are not intrinsic when compared to the other beings. So I'm just wondering how to reconcile that with this?" Yeah, that's a very good observation. And...
Let's see that.
So one thing is that characteristics change and that our understanding rather perhaps of characteristics change.
What this chapter is analyzing is something deeper than.. it's not sort of problematizing characteristics that are set in stone, but the very idea of characteristics there is something that makes things what they are. And then of course the example that you mentioned is a very important one and exactly what it means is very much a contested issue. If we can say that here's a cup of water and if we invite representatives of the six classes of sentient beings to take a look at what we see as water, then what do they see? What would they say? What would they say is characteristic about this?
And of course the example, if that happens, if someone, a member of each of the six classes of sentient beings takes a look at what we see as a cup of water, then they will see very different things, just as you said. Like a fish may see a home and a starving spirit will see something repulsive that can barely be drunk, if at all. And beings in hell will see liquid metal or something like that. And gods will see something divine like ambrosia to drink, so what is it really that they look at? And there are many different accounts, like philosophical positions taken with respect to that issue. So what can we then say? Is there actually something in common that sentient beings look at or is there not? What is the conclusion to be had based on this example, which is an example from scripture? And it also makes good sense if you have radically different faculties, of course what you see is going to be radically different. This is also something which is thought widely about and deeply about in contemporary philosophy, you know? What are the implications of that? How commensurable are our worlds, if at all?
So that is a deep philosophical issue and it's clearly very related to what is under analysis here. But perhaps you could also say that what this chapter gets at is a structure that even is prerequisite for being able to think about that example. Because you could also say that okay, there is something, whichever way we might want to classify it philosophically, which is the basis for these appearances, distinct appearances. So in that case it would be something that is characterized as being that, being a thing that can contribute to very distinct perceptions in the minds and mind streams of distinct sentient beings. So in one way it's the same as saying water is fluid and liquid, that's what characterizes water, wetness and so on. And saying things are such that they give rise in the minds of different sentient beings to radically different perceptions. Yeah? Does that make sense? So that shows very nicely I think just how deep this structuring of the world is in us, that there are things and those things are in a certain way. It seems very natural and sort of unavoidable to think in those terms. But then again as we're used to Nāgārjuna says, "Is it really so?" No matter how natural and unquestionable the relevance of whichever framework it is that we're looking at may seem to be, he nevertheless says, "Okay, so you think, but is it really so?" And that's what the chapter is about exploring then. Any other comments about the framework that is under analysis here? Meaning, yeah, as we just said, that there are things and those things for them to be there have to be in a certain characteristic way. That there are things with characteristics. Is it possible to think in any other way and still make sense of the world? And again we can say if we think that's not the case and if we then can't make sense of things and their characteristics after having done a few of these verses, then we are in a very difficult situation, no? If we think, A) it is not possible to make sense of the world unless we have access to the idea of things and things that have characteristics, and then B) when I examine the idea of things with characteristics, I find no basis for it. If we end up thinking like that, then we are in a situation where by our own lights we are no longer able to make sense of the world. So that seems to be what is at stake here, no?
And we started already with the first two verses, and maybe we can just run over them one more time.
The first stanza says, "Before the characteristics of space, there is no space whatsoever. If it existed before its characteristics, it would follow that it has no characteristics," or that it had no characteristics. So before the characteristics of space, traditionally the characteristic of space is openness, the open, accommodating quality that allow for things to occur. That space is space. It's just this accommodating factor. If there was no space in this room, then we would not be able to move about. It's because there is this openness, that it's possible to do all the things that we're doing right now in here. We can sit here, I can speak, and so on. It's all by virtue of there being space in here. So there is something, it's called space, and that space has its particular characteristic, namely that it allows for things like this to happen by not impeding, not hindering. It's the sort of non-hindering quality, which is space. But before the characteristics of space, it is then clear that there is no space either. Before there is this accommodating quality that is characteristic of space, there is no space. Otherwise, it would follow that the kind of space we're talking about is not accommodating and does not allow for the occurrence of things, and that would not be space then. So "Before the characteristic of space, there is no space whatsoever." "Something without characteristics does not exist anywhere at all." That's what we were contemplating a bit before. Since this is how it is, since, for example, there is no space whatsoever before the characteristics of space, then how could we possibly say that there exists things without characteristics? If something exists, it has a certain something that characterizes it as that particular thing.
Even if we say that it exists without characteristics, then that becomes the characteristic, no? It's that thing which exists uncharacterized or something like that. "Since there is no thing without characteristics, to what do the characteristics apply?" So since there never is an occasion at which we can access something that has no characteristics, how can we make sense of this idea that we have that there are things and then the characteristics? How is that possible? How could we possibly get that idea? Since there are no things without characteristics, then why do we think in this way, separating the thing and then its characteristics? Perhaps if we can understand that, we have understood a lot about dependent origination. If we can understand how on earth could we think that there are things and then characteristics, since we never have anything that exists without characteristics. In other words, since there's never a time or place or occasion at which we can say, "Okay, here's a thing. Now those are its characteristics." That sort of distinction can never be made in any substantial way. Because the thing that we notice is not separate in any way at all from its characteristics. It doesn't have any existence in the absence of those characteristics. So what do the characteristics apply to? What is it that we talk about when we say this and this is characterized by such and such?
"Characteristics do not apply to what has them, nor do they..." That's in stanza 3 then, yeah? "Nor do they apply to what does not have them."
If we then say that things always have characteristics, then the idea that there are characteristics that apply to something is not accurate, right? It's not an accurate observation about the way things are, because if the thing in question... If we're looking at something that is already characterized as a pair of glasses, then..
If by nature this thing is characterized already as a pair of glasses, then what are the characteristics that we would like to associate with them? There's then no difference whatsoever between this and the characteristics. So the idea of having something that... A set of characteristics that capture what this is and that in this way really apply to what this is, is a baseless idea. If we assume that things already come with characteristics, then what are we talking about when we say that they have such and such characteristics and those characteristics apply to them? Once you understood them, you will understand what the thing is. That's also the idea of characteristics, no? Characteristics are the features that really capture what the thing in question is. So once you get the characteristics, you know what the thing is. And if you don't know what characterizes it, you don't really know what the thing is either. But what basis can we find for that idea if they already have characteristics?
"Characteristics do not apply to something other than..." So nor do they apply to what does not have them, and that's what we just talked about. If something has no characteristics, it's not possible to say that there's something for characteristics to apply to. So whether we talk about something that comes ready-made, so to speak, with characteristics, or whether we talk about something that exists in the absence of characteristics, there's nothing with which we can associate characteristics. And then finally, "Neither do characteristics apply to something other than what does or does not have them." What would it be for something to both have and have characteristics, or for something to be something that is neither characterized nor not characterized?
Either something bears characteristics or it does not, no, seemingly? Otherwise what would it mean for something to be both characterized and not characterized, or neither? So let's try to think a little bit more about that. Why couldn't it be the case that this is a pair of glasses, it has certain characteristics, and I can come to understand those, I can communicate those to you, and in this way there are different characteristics. There is a set of characteristics that can be conveyed and understood, and once we understand them then we understand what this is. What is so problematic about that, if at all? It was said that if this is something that already has these characteristics, then what is it that, what are the characteristics that I am applying to them?
Isn't this a sort of artificial way of thinking about things, a forced way of thinking?
If not, then try and formulate why it would not be? Why something that has characteristics already cannot be said to have characteristics that applies to it?
Student: "Thank you Thomas. Can something.. so we're saying, you know, looks like now this verse between characteristics and the thing itself, there is a temporal relationship and we think that doesn't, we cannot establish, but can something just come with, like co-exist, can a thing just co-exist at the same time with its characteristics? Like I don't know, if you say like the mind, like the mind it's innately or from the beginning it's self-aware and clear, can a thing just come without having to say who comes first?" Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's a great question. And I guess it's in the next chapter, yeah, co-existence is under analysis, yeah.
But basically for something, and this of course is a wonderful example to look at, no? The mind is supposed to have certain characteristics, no?
Otherwise what are we talking about when we talk about mind?
Then.. those characteristics, and space is also a good example also for understanding mind. The Buddha says that if our understanding the nature of things, space is one of the, if not the best example, yeah? Because it's something that we are very comfortable with talking about, space. We feel intuitively that we know what it is and that we see space as the Buddha says. People widely proclaim that they see space, but then he says, "but examine here the meaning, how do you see space?" So it's a very profound example that is under analysis here also in the chapter, no? But then you're saying, so couldn't it just be that things and their characteristics co-exist, yeah? But then what is this co-existence in terms of? Is there really something that has characteristics? In that case, the characteristics and the thing in question would have to be different, no? If there really is something that really has characteristics, then that thing and its characteristics can't be one and the same, no? But if they are one and the same, then there's nothing that has characteristics really, right?
And if there is nothing that has characteristics, then what are we talking about when we speak of the characteristics of things, yeah?
But it's very much like how you say, you know, we feel that the things come with characteristics, no? I mean, that's at least my impression, yeah? They are out there and they have characteristics, but yeah, I've already said it in a way that now we know cannot be sustained, no? They are out there and they have characteristics. No, they're not.
They couldn't be out there with characteristics, right? Because then the characteristics and them would have to be different and we can see very quickly and very clearly that they aren't, that they couldn't be different. So what are we talking about? What do we think when we say this, yeah? Why do we think the way we think?
What has made it such that now we all think in this way? When we can clearly see that there's no basis for that type of idea?
If there is a mystery, you know, then that is a good candidate for the status of mystery, you know? Why do we all agree that this kind of thinking is necessary and natural? And presumably we also agree that there's no basis for it and that that baselessness can be recognized very quickly and very clearly.
Any feedback is welcome, of course.
Student: "So it's not possible that the things could actually completely be the characteristics?" Well if it means that characteristics and the thing that is characterized are just two names for the same thing, then what are we talking about? Why is it helpful to know characteristics?
I don't know what the characteristics of sunglasses are, but there must be some pretty okay characteristics. Two lenses and two of these guys, for example, make a part of what characterizes a pair of sunglasses. But if the sunglasses and those characteristics, if they really just refer to one and the same thing, what is it that I'm doing when I talk about the characteristics? What is it I'm feeling when I feel that I understand better because I was able to talk about characteristics? Why is it we get a sense that now we know better what we're talking about because you and I talk about characteristics? Why can't I just say sunglasses and that's all? "Maybe something like, it's hard to express with one word, like I'm just thinking of fire, like if it's hot you can become warm by standing next to it, but you could also burn yourself and injure yourself. So there's kind of related things that you kind of need to talk about, but I'm not sure if they're really separate." Yeah, they're not really separate. Nāgārjuna would agree, no, that's why he praises the Buddha in the beginning for saying that dependent origination, whatever arises dependently, is not separate and not different. So now when we understand that and when we agree, then why do we agree? How do we agree? Is it just something that we have learned to say yes to? Or what?
Do we.. just we have learned to say that dependent origination is profound and most other people who haven't done the same kind of brain work that we have, they will say that it sounds banal or weird or something like that, but us, we can nod and sort of say, "no, no, no, it's very profound." Is that what it's about? Then it's hard to think why it would have.. knowledge of dependent origination would be such a big deal, no? If this would be what it comes down to.
Yeah? Student: "I'm still not convinced about the separation of a thing from its characteristics that it's.. that the thing is only existent in its characteristics and therefore it's non-existent." Sorry? You're not convinced that...? "I'm not convinced that a thing does not exist because of its.. it's only characterized by its characteristics. My question to you is about Schrödinger's cat, right? So with Schrödinger's cat, we don't know if the cat is alive or dead, right? But we know that we've placed a cat in the box, right? And so how can we say that the cat does not exist because its characteristics are at that time uncertain, right? So it's still.. I've still put something in that box despite me not knowing its characteristics. Its characteristics at that point are completely undefined." Yes. So that's similar to what you were mentioning also, no? The example from scripture. This is an example from quantum mechanics, no? In that case we could still say that there's something in there that has no.. I mean the implications of that also is I think what exactly they are, I think quantum physicists would also be able to disagree quite a bit about, yeah, the difference. But in any case, perhaps we could say without sort of prematurely closing any particular line of interpretation, we could say that at that point when we put the cat in the box, then there's something in there that has.. of which the characteristics aren't certain. So it's characteristically so. It's characteristically something that, of which the characteristics aren't certain. So similar to, should we call it water or what, which we all look at, me and representatives of the other classes of sentient beings, and we see radically different things, yeah? That which we look at is something that is, that characteristically gives rise to these six distinct perceptions. And you could perhaps say, I mean, this is certainly not my field of expertise, but you could perhaps still say that there's something which characteristically can be either a dead cat or a live cat in there. And just like the scriptural example can be used to show that therefore there is no thing there, in and of itself, that exists in any definite way by itself, but only in relation, not just in relation to other minds. It's not that there's something amazing about each of our individual subjective minds, but just because of dependent origination, the whole matrix of dependent origination, different minds see different things and different occasions present different results. So in the same way, you could also, I think, very well take that experiment with the cat as an example to show that at least you could use it in that way to say that hence this is good evidence of the fact that nothing exists intrinsically, but in dependence only. I mean, this has been done before by many no? But to say that quantum mechanics has this kind of potential for an alignment with many kinds of philosophies, such as Buddhist philosophy. And then when we begin to talk like that, then there are all sorts of bells and red lights that begin to go off in various quarters, and others will love it and so on, but that's a whole different issue.
Student: "My question is, yeah, but still in this Schrödinger's cat example, we still know there is a cat, and likewise with the water, it feels like all sentient beings perceive it also as something like moist and wet, you know?" No, not necessarily. "Is it not?" I mean, it's because, what is it? This is also one of the classic arguments. I guess some people say that, yeah, actually. So it's not that you are alone, yeah, but... "It's not that hell beings see it as a mountain suddenly or the fishes see it as a radio, but everything is like a liquid thing, sort of. Like with the cat, it's also like..." But okay, if that was really the case, then what about... I mean, then that means you have found the sort of transcendental character of things, no? There are certain things that no matter who you are, you're going to see it as liquid, no? I think it would be very difficult to carry through this kind of analysis, no? Come into the experience with the Mūlamadhyamaka with that idea that things, okay, to us it looks like something I can drink for others and so on and so on, but it's always something that can be... That is liquid, yeah? "I'm not on the side of trying to establish..." No, no, I'm not. "It's intrinsically liquid, but still I think a couple of years ago some of us, we discussed about it, why... But it is sort of striking the obvious that these are all liquid, you know? So like the cat, it's still a cat, you know?" Yeah, so it's very interesting to now go back to this kind of very juicy example, no?
So if that is what we get from that example with the six classes of sentient beings, yeah? I mean, whether that is what we have to get from it is a different issue, yeah? But if it is, then we have really found the thing and that which is the bearer of its... and that which is its characteristic, yeah? Because now we know that in the world there are things which human beings call 'water,' and yet if you belong to any of the other classes of sentient beings, you will see it in one of five alternative ways, yeah?
So then we have a really solid idea of bearers of characteristics and characteristics, and then it makes very good sense to ask precisely the questions that are being asked here, no? What is that thing, yeah? It's a wonderful analysis then to do, no? If we have looked at this example of the six classes of sentient beings looking at something that they say is water, ambrosia, et cetera, yeah? Then what is the bearer of the characteristics? And there couldn't be something which is not that, yeah? And if we say that it's something that is characteristically liquid, then it exists already with that characteristics. What do the... What does the characteristic then apply to? When I say 'liquid,' then what is it I'm talking about that's distinct from the thing itself, yeah? And if those two are not distinguishable, if they're just one and the same, how should it be possible for something like that, which is intrinsically liquidity, to appear in different ways, yeah? In the minds of different beings? This would go against the very idea of dependent origination.
What is... There are many ways of getting deeper into that. In my mind, it seems like really missing the point, no? If we say that there's something there which has very rudimentary characteristics, which can then be elaborated upon by different sentient beings, yeah? But it is a venerable position to take, I think, so. Student: "I think if you could take it a step further, though, if you would talk about gravitational force, physical properties, where as a... I guess maybe if you're thinking about it for the Hungry Ghost, it might be different now that I'm thinking about it." Sorry? "I don't know. I was just thinking about gravitational force and how it's going to act on everything the same. Gravitational force is going to act on a fish the same way it's going to act on me. The same way like properties of physics don't discriminate between beings that we can see and know. I mean, you could argue that, well, maybe hungry ghosts aren't subject to gravitational forces. But because we haven't directly experienced hungry ghosts in this realm, we can't for say sure that it does or does not. So we could only say that of the classes of beings that we have encountered, nothing escapes gravitational force, right? And so how could we say that gravitational force does not exist? Or I mean space, we're talking about space. That's a good example. Like fish, a fish is going to experience that there is... It may not like the space. I like space. Fish may not like space because there's no water. But that's not to say that it won't experience, that it won't, that it doesn't have the same open quality. But I think gravitational force might, like physical forces might be a better example because we've shown that it acts on all things independently. You know, like gravitational force isn't like being experienced differently by the fish than by me." That's also a very interesting example, yeah? Like natural laws. So if natural laws exist with characteristics,
yeah, if they exist with characteristics, like I don't know what would be a good definition, characterization of gravity, gravitational force? But I'm sure that we can quickly find some. So if there's something that exists with those characteristics, what is it that exists and has those? Or otherwise, if it's just that we look at certain things and then we end up thinking, here's an example of gravity, but in fact there's nothing, no such thing as gravity as such, that is very different. And perhaps that would be like being a Buddhist scientist maybe or something like that, yeah? If we have to think in those terms, no, but it would be a way of perhaps, of acknowledging dependent origination and still making use very well, perhaps brilliantly so, of the notion of gravity. It's to say, okay, we have something that is called the natural law of gravity and it applies in these and these circumstances. And all what I say about that, there's no such thing as gravity as such to which those descriptions apply. That might perhaps open, like scientists and physicists, I think in particular, are often encouraged not to buy into intuitively plausible scenario, but instead be open for something that is completely counterintuitive. So perhaps it is helpful if that is what we're trying to do, to be really able to think outside of the box, it is perhaps helpful to recognize that as we talk about gravitational force, we can talk about it very well, just like we can talk about my sunglasses and what characterizes those. We can also, if we are smart enough to do it, we can talk about gravitational force and what it is and what it does, at the same time knowing that there is no gravitational force that has such characteristics. Perhaps that could be very helpful as a practice for a serious physicist who is not just going to accept whatever framework is given and whatever seems intuitively plausible from her or his immediate perspective. But it's not necessarily a big deal either, because the physicist can also just think this is just something that I have to factor in, that under certain considerations, then the idea of such a thing as gravity that has characteristics falls apart. And then onto something new, just like the rest of us. So there's a possibility for completely sliding along without gaining much from it, except becoming a little bit smarter and being able to look a little bit more sophisticated. But it's also possible, I think it would follow, that it is possible to assume less in one's next experiment in physics.
But what these examples show is that things and their characteristics is something that go really, really deep. It's something that we use on a day-to-day level, and it's also what really supports
worldviews and scientific practices and so on.
"If characteristics have.." that is 4, "no application, it makes no sense that there should be bearers of them." So unless we can say that, as we tried to before, say that there are things to which characteristics apply, then the implication is that characteristics have no application. They don't apply to anything. And if the characteristics don't apply to anything, then what's the point of talking about characteristics? Characteristics without application are by default or by definition meaningless and useless, no? "If the bearers of characteristics are unreasonable, their characteristics cannot exist either." So if we cannot make sense of the bearer of characteristics, that's in a similar line as what was just said, then characteristics cannot exist. So unless we can meaningfully talk about something that has characteristics, then there's no recourse for us to say that characteristics exist. And then there's a conclusion in the first two lines of stanza 5. "Therefore, the bearers of characteristics do not exist, and characteristics themselves have no existence either." If we cannot find a place for bearers of characteristics that exist either with, either characterized or uncharacterized, then what is it that the characteristics apply to? If the characteristics don't apply to anything, then there are no characteristics. So therefore, the bearers of characteristics have no existence, and characteristics themselves have no existence. And "Yet," in C and D of stanza 5, "aside from bearers and characteristics, there are no entities." There is nothing apart from things and their characteristics. What should that be? What could that possibly be which isn't something or something that characterizes something? Something that makes something what it is?
So looking at characteristics we find, and bearers of characteristics, we find no bearers of characteristics, whether we say that they already come with their characteristics or whether we say that they exist without characteristics. Without bearers of characteristics, there are no characteristics. And then the application, the further conclusion that follows from that is that we now have no way of actually talking about the existence of anything at all. Because anything, whatever it might be, for it to be that, would have to be something that characterizes it, something that makes it what it is.
Then in the first two lines of 6 it says, "If there is is no entity, of what would there be no entity?" Meaning, so this is according to the commentaries, this is responding to a notion that's of space then that is really not an entity. So at this point if we're just talking about space and the characteristics of space up until this point, without any of the very vast implications that we have considered, if we're just strictly speaking talking about space, then it could be that at this point someone would say, "Well, space actually doesn't exist. It's not something that exists, it's a construct made in dependence on things that do exist, but it's just absence and absence doesn't exist." But then the verse here says, "If there is..." So that would in Buddhist philosophy that is like a Sautrāntika perspective, no? Who don't accept the substantial existence of unconditioned factors such as space, and say that it instead is something that has merely imputational existence, something that is imputed on the basis of something else. But if there are no entities, which is the upshot of what we have been saying, there are no things either with or without characteristics, so therefore if there are no things, then what do we talk about when we say that space is a non-entity? For that kind of description to make sense, it has to make sense to talk about entity in some fashion. But what we have now found is that entity doesn't apply to anything at all. 'Thing' and what makes the 'thing' what it is, the thing and its characteristics. We have seen that neither of those is founded on anything in reality. And therefore if there are no entities, what do I mean when I say non-entity or nothing? So this is also an important thing to keep in mind in general of course when we do this kind of Mādhyamaka analysis, because as we have talked about several times, it is easy to get the sense that there is a negative conclusion, emptiness as some sort of negation, etc., which is to be made by going through the analysis. But if there are no entities, if there are no things, then what do I mean by the emptiness of things? So emptiness does not mean non-existence or nothingness or non-entity. That is a point that is repeatedly made, but it's easy to overlook in the heat of the battle, sort of, no?
And then maybe let's wait with this subjective apprehension of space. That's also about the mind that you brought up before. There are just a couple of minutes left. Let's start there tomorrow. And if you have any remarks before we conclude, you're welcome.
So I think it would be interesting to think until tomorrow a little further about this question of, if this is the case now, if we can so quickly and decisively see that there are no things that have characteristics, then.. then why is it that we think this kind of framework is indispensable for making sense of anything? What made us think like that?
And also what do we do now? There's a framework that we find indispensable for making sense of anything. And now it seems that we have to dispense with it insofar as when we look at the the two principles, the thing and its characteristics, we find no basis for it. So what is all this in other words? Is the question for tomorrow. So try to note that and see where you are at and so on. And then we will resume tomorrow with the...
talking about that which is the subject of all of this. And whether it's possible to, by pointing to the subject, to then by that way be able to posit certain things that exist and others that don't exist. Okay, thank you very much.
17:26
