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Root of The Middle Way – Session 24

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  • Buddhist Classics and Philosophy
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  • Rangjung Yeshe Institute - Nepal
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The chapter initiates with an analysis of form, drawing parallels to contemporary physics, raising questions about emergence and the connection between particles and appearances.

Session 24 delves into the intricate relationship between causal and resultant forms. Causal forms, represented by subtle particles embodying the four elements, serve as the foundation for the physical world and sensory objects. Resultant forms encompass objects of perception and perceiving faculties, all arising from causal forms. The lecture centers on the inseparability of form from its causes and the challenges of explaining diverse phenomena’s origin. Causality emerges as a key concept, highlighting the interconnectedness of particles and the physical world. The lecture concludes by emphasizing that the existence or absence of form renders the idea of a cause for form nonsensical, offering profound insights into Mādhyamaka philosophy.

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"That which originates dependently does not cease and does not arise, is not annihilated and is not permanent, does not come and does not go, is not different and not the same. To the true teacher who reveals this peace, the complete pacification of constructs, to the perfect Buddha I bow down."
So we began yesterday the Chapter Four, which is an analysis of the aggregates. And the aggregates, the first of the five aggregates is the aggregate of form. And the aggregate of form has causal aspects and resultant aspects. So there are causal forms and resultant forms. And the causal forms are particles, impermanent subtle particles that combine to give rise to the coarse objects that we can access. So there are four types traditionally of particles, one for each of the four elements: earth, water, fire and wind, and they then combine in various ways to produce all of this. That is the idea. So all of this meaning put concisely in the Abhidharma way would be to say that there are the five objects of visual form of that which can be heard, of that which can be smelled, tasted and touched. So the objects that are accessible by these five distinct fields of perception. And then not only are there those, there are of course also faculties that make those fields accessible. So there are some physical components that make the eye faculty the way it is, and then the eye faculty according to the Abhidharma is not our physical eyeball, but something much more subtle than that. Nonetheless it's made by these particles, the causal forms, and the faculty itself is a resultant form. The same with the faculty for hearing, for smelling, tasting and touching. They are also subtle forms that are made by much subtler forms, namely the causal forms. So in this way causal forms give rise to resultant forms. But it is also very nice that the chapter begins with an analysis of the element of form, because in this way we can think very conveniently about the way we tend to think about the physical world, in the contemporary ways of thinking about the physical world, modern ways of thinking about the physical world, which is also typically a story of particles, and particles that combine in various ways to give rise to perceptions of something that is ultimately responsible for what we have here.
So in other words when we now analyze the relationship between the subtle forms, the causal forms, and the resultant ones, it should have implications for also how we understand the scientific framework of physics that says that there are these subtle physical components which, as they come together in various ways, create or give rise to one way or the other, an appearance of something that seems very different from these particles, and yet it is caused by them.
So just last time we then said that "apart from the causal form, form is not observed, because if there were form apart from its causes," oh sorry, "Apart from the causal form, form is not observed." And then, "Likewise aside from so-called form, no causal form can be observed either." So then here the critique is in terms of saying that
apart from the cause of form, form is not observed, meaning all of these things couldn't be something else than their alleged causes, because if they were something else than their alleged causes then they would be uncaused results. And of course uncaused results is a contradiction. And why would they then turn into uncaused results? Because in that case there would be nothing that connected them, and we can recall what we had to say about causes arising from something, results arising from something that is different from themselves, in that case there would be no connection. But also, if what we see here is something essentially different than the particles that are meant to be behind that and responsible for that manifestation that we can access, then the idea that they depend on those is no longer tenable. "If there were form apart from its causes it would follow that form has no cause." If form could exist, if we could take a look at this and say, "This is a resultant form, and that is something else than the causal forms." In other words, if I could take a look at this and say, "okay, this is my phone and it's made of particles, that's the stuff that it's made of, but that itself is not just that, it's my phone." If I say that, then I'm now talking about something that is not causally dependent. In other words, I'm talking about an inexplicable phenomenon, the phone. And this inexplicable phenomenon I think is at the heart of all this talk about emergence. It's something that many people are aware of these days, that how can it be that we talk about
a physical reality which is at a particular level, a particle level, and then that's supposed to somehow create all of this, which seems very different and much more in many ways than the particles. And so very brilliant minds have come up with various accounts of how that is possible by virtue of something called 'emergence.'
Yesterday we ended up asking then how...
whether just this observation that if this is different than its particles, that are it's cause in that way in the sense that it is what it's made of, that this then renders... If we say that it is different from the particles that are its causes, then we have arrived at something that has no causes. That's a causeless effect or a causeless thing, and there are no such things. Is that an argument that survives? Probably none of us are experts about emergence, unfortunately. But would you say that this is an argument that remains, that still stands? Also if we try to think about emergence as we understand it obviously, but for better or worse.
Did any of you think about that?
If there were form apart from its causes, it would follow that form has no cause. It's pretty strong, yes?
But why should it have such dramatic consequences?
Student: "Is the question how do these particles which... Do you mean like the particles don't look like the thing?" No they definitely don't. So if that's enough to say... So they're not just the same, they're different. This is different from those particles.
"Like in the same way a table leg is different from a table?" Yes, a table what? "The leg of a table." Not the label. The 'label'? "The leg." The leg? No, somewhat different because this is like the... But similar, yeah related of course, you have something different. You have one... If all the parts of the table and the table itself, their relation, if that is, if there's no difference.. if we want to say that there's a difference, then that commitment to those two being different means that now the table has no causes. But it becomes even... It's slightly more difficult to see in the case of a table, but not so much in terms of particles because we never see particles. And yet we believe that these things are caused by particles, no? Probably, to some extent at least, we believe that. "I'm not sure if it's the case, but when you think of things like... It's probably a grosser level, but things like stem cells and..." Stem cells? "Or parts of the things that, the smallest things that make up a body, like they do have a relationship to the final result." But is the final result different from them? "Yes." So then Nāgārjuna says that that means that it has no cause, that it's uncaused. "Okay." Is this... Yes?
Student: "So I really relate to this kind of analysis. I've actually gone back to some basic high school chemistry as well, where there's a periodic table of elements and at its most fundamental level each atom consists of tiny particles: electrons and protons, and none of these have properties that come about when they reach a certain configuration. If you add one electron to an atom, it becomes an atom with completely different properties, and that's totally miraculous I think. I do struggle, however, with framing this in terms of cause and effect. Like I can totally see that we're dealing here with a composite, like things are put together. So I can easily apply this kind of neither one nor many analysis, but like if we start talking cause and result, that would almost become again like some vajra splinter, and I don't see so much of a causal relationship as well. It's just we're dealing with a compound of particles, which... I don't know, the whole framing of it in terms of causality is a bit difficult for me." I guess if something is made of something else, we can think of that as, okay, what does it take to make a paper box? And then we can go down to a subtler level as we can and say, well, it takes such and such and such and such particles, this many kinds and this many numbers, and when you combine them in this way, then you get that. That's what causes then this thing to come into being, which is something else than the particles. "It could work." But what otherwise would it be? Like if you say combination has no causal impact, that's also strange, no? "Yeah, I guess." Well.. "For me, if I put these two objects together, then what is the cause? Like seeds and sprouts are sort of easy, like the seed gives rise to this sprout. But these two things put together, like it seems there is an external, like a hand picking it up and putting the two things together. So it's kind of like a force that jams them together as a result of which they take on different properties." But perhaps we could say the same about the seed, no? That we have a seed that we plant in the soil, but then there are so many things, so many forces that have to act on the seed and the seed has to participate in so many relationships. "Yeah. So this is in essence still like then a vajra splinter kind of argument?"
I don't know if necessarily, like... I mean, the sameness and difference thing is clearly related, yeah? But it is also just a way of... Like with the vajra splinter, it's exactly as you point out, no? That's where we have more of a sense of a... More of a sense of a temporal process of coming into being, no? Like there's the causal point and then we think like from seed to sprout, it doesn't happen just like that, no? There's some... So it seems to be particularly about that sort of causal arising, no? But there's also another kind of... And you said seems miraculous almost, no? But we don't want it to be miraculous, no? If we're scientists or trying to figure out what the world is, unless we ourselves are magicians and know how to do magic, no? Then we don't want this to be miraculous. We want to find out how it works, yeah? But because... But yeah, I think that people still, very brilliant minds struggle with this still, no? How to avoid the miraculous aspect, yeah? And if you want to avoid miracles, then I think it's necessary to bring in causality, no? That's almost the only way to go about it, no? Unless you can say it's because of this that that happens. Then it's just miraculous, no? If you had like a sorcery, you take different things from them into the pot, poof! Then you have something else, no? If that's how the story of the physical reality, that's not very satisfying at all, no? For a physicist or anyone who tries to figure out scientific ways of knowing the world so that we can manipulate and predict in ways that make sense for us.
Yeah. "But in this context, I guess this could be a way into again arriving at emptiness, no? Because the end result is not separate from its causes but also not the same. So yeah, that sense of the miraculous can then open up into an appreciation again of dependent origination or emptiness, no?" Yeah, I think so. And it's also not entirely miraculous in the sense that it's inexplicable. I mean.. it is and it's not explicable, yeah? Like we can tell this about dependent origination and then when we see what is really meant there, then of course object, agent, and action, all of those components that are necessary for maintaining an explanatory framework, they fall apart, yeah? But it's still possible to... We don't... perhaps that is also huge, no? If that is really true. We don't have to wonder why it is like that. We don't have to be mystified by the fact of emergence because of Mādhyamaka. That means if that is true, then Mādhyamaka has a huge potential as a scientific framework, yeah?
Then in 3, did we have that already? No. I think not. "If aside from form there were a cause of form, there would be a cause with no effect, Yet there are no causes without effects." So maybe we did. In any case, so.. if apart from... This is also a very interesting way of looking at it, no? Think of these particles, we're used to thinking of them as something real, very important and real and so on, and as something that we can indeed like zoom in on and think those are the particles. They are the ones that come together to create this world, yeah?
But if they were ever just like that, if they were ever just those things and didn't produce anything, then there would be a cause without effect, yeah? Because what is it that these things do, yeah? Like when you talked about high school physics and chemistry and so on, those things are actually never alone, no? And it's the same with the Abhidharma particles. You don't get them just like, here's a box of only earth particles, yeah? It never happens. So if it were possible, then you would have a cause without effect, because the real thing with these particles is that they always have that causal impact, yeah? So like Jan, he was wondering whether it makes sense to really call it causality, no? Because it's basically just different factors coming together in a sort of composite. But if we don't call that a causal event, then it has no causal significance and it's just like random manifestation, yeah? Which is not what we want to talk about when we talk about particles in physics, no? It's not seeking to get a way of calling all of this random, no? And not explicable in any causal framework. That's not the point, no? Quite the opposite.
So if there ever were a time and place where these causal forms could be just that without an effect, then there would be an instance of a causal form that has no, of a cause that has no effect, period. Yeah? So that's never possible. Then what is it really that we talk about when we say that it's made of those things, those producers?
At the same time, no one can question the relevance of talking about particles and talking about it in relation to all of this, no? Good luck with that.
But so in this way, this kind of analysis can also become a way of understanding how emptiness actually explains why it's possible to get something from thinking in terms of particles. It's not because there actually are particles, but it's because of dependent origination. The apparent dependencies between dependent factors, then it can be sometimes useful to conceive of something as the cause of something else and other times it won't work, yeah? So one of these constructs is then the whatever framework that we have for explaining what the physical world is and then whatever framework that we have for explaining what all of this is, like all of that which I can see and so on, yeah? So either one of them, it's not that the particle story is more constructed than this, nor the other way around, yeah? It's not that the particle story is more true and less constructed than what I have to say about this. They totally depend on each other.
That is also pretty amazing if we can, I mean, and in many ways big news, no? If we can say that decisively, that there's no privileged status of this or the subtle physical reality. Because usually what we try to do is we want to say, "well, this physical reality is maybe more real than this," or we want to say, "no, no, no, how could you say that?" "There's so much beauty and whatever in this that is not captured by physics." We don't have to worry about any of those alternatives.
Then in 4: "When form exists, a cause of form does not make sense. Yet when form does not exist, a cause of form does not make sense either." So that's what we just were talking about, right? When the form, well, not exactly the same, but has very much to do with where we were coming from just before. When then form exists, when we have this and we say, "okay, here it is, this is the resultant form," then how can we say that there is a causal form? And this is also part of why we were hesitating to call compositional processes 'causal processes,' because once you have this, then how can we say that it has causes in the form of particles, yeah? It doesn't make sense. If it is here and manifests in something that we can see as a result, then its causes for appearing in that way have done what they need to do, yeah? So they're not there as causes anymore. And yet when there's nothing of that sort, then it doesn't make sense to say that there are causal factors for that form either, no? Either it's here and it has no such causes at the particle level, or it's not here and then it doesn't have any such causes at the particle level either.
Yeah?
Student: "I can see what you're positing for physical reality, but how would Nāgārjuna treat stories and histories? Since those causes are no longer existing, but the causes are only existing in our brains, but we can't point to any certain particle and be like, "That's the particle that remembers Homer's Iliad," you know? How do you treat that?" But wouldn't what we were talking about before, that doesn't help us identify particular causes. It's very much a work in progress or in dissolution, our explanatory models for what this is made of, in the same way as I can say something about why I can remember Homer's Iliad and what I feel like when I do and what happens when I tell it to others if I could, and so on, yeah? Does that make sense? We're not saying that there are really causes. I guess I didn't quite understand where you were coming from with that. "Just based on what you were talking about just now, when you were saying something either exists and it has the cause inherent in its form or if it does not exist, then the cause does not exist, right?" Yeah, or if it exists like this, then the alleged causal role played by these subtle particles has already been performed, yeah? And so we have this, and because it's already been performed, there are no causes of that sort when the result is present, when this result is present, yeah?
So how about when this result is not present? At that time, the causal factors are not there either, because if they were, this would be here. So I think this, if anything, makes it only much more one fabric to talk about the physical world and stories and literature, art, whatever. "You don't think we can apply the same logic to stories and literature and ideas?" Yes, I think definitely. This goes for everything. "But the form is not existent anymore. You can't see the direct causes. Like you can theorize the causes, but you can't actually see the cause inherent in an idea or a story." But you can't see the causes of this either. You can theorize about it, but... No? "I mean, I could see that the cause existed because it exists, right? I can see that the cause is inherent in all the form in this room." We say that, no? But if the cause existed, then that's then saying that there was a time when the cause existed, but not the effect. That doesn't make sense, no? There was a time that the cause of this existed, but not this. If the cause of this existed, by necessity this would have to have existed also, no? As soon as all what is necessary for a form of this kind to be present has come together, then this is there right away. And when it's here, then it doesn't make sense either for the causes to be there.
So I think in terms of us having to theorize, it's the same whether we talk about the physical reality or art, storytelling and so on. And in terms of perception, it's also the same. There's something perceptually available in either case. So this is an explanation that is relevant for science and art, but does not conflate them. We can still very well distinguish.
And then it says in 5, "A form without cause is impossible.." That's what we just talked about, no?
It's utterly impossible and therefore do not give… So because these things couldn't exist without causes and because we have seen that those causes make no sense either at a time when the effect, the resultant form, is there or not there. Therefore, since in this… Therefore form without causes… Well, "A form without cause is impossible, utterly impossible". There could not be a form that is not the product of these things, right? And yet we have seen that talking about these things does not give us form. Does that make sense? There couldn't be a form such as this without the particles that it's made by. If we assume the existence of particles, then there could never be any such thing without those particles. Yet the particles do not make sense at a time when this is not present either, nor does it make sense to talk about them when this is already here. So "Therefore," in 5.c-d, "do not give rise to any thoughts about form at all." So just forget it. So how to understand that is of course also an open question, no? But it's perhaps a natural idea to get, no? That in that case might as well forget about it, no?
So why don't you try and think about that until tomorrow? How to understand that instruction? "Therefore do not give rise to any thoughts about form at all." So I think each of you what to make of that, yeah? Is that a good idea? Is that... and so on, yeah? If it is, then why? And if not, then why isn't it a good idea? "It is not right to say that effects resemble their causes. It is not right to say that effects do not resemble their causes." So that's... now we look at the fact that the particle level of reality and the coarse, medium-sized dry level goods that we have accessible to us, they are very, very different. They look and behave very different from each other.
So how can we say that the causes and effects resemble each other? There's dramatic difference, yeah? The commentator, he says there's as much as difference between the causal forms and the resultant forms as there is between samsara and nirvana. So it is not right to say though that effects do not resemble their causes, because if there's no resemblance at all, then he says very interestingly it would be as if cause and effect were as different as samsara and nirvana. So whenever I try to think through that, yeah, I end in some strange space there. If I say... so in one way, it's not right to say that cause and effect, these causes and those effects resemble, it's not right to say that the particles and the objects that they produce resemble each other, because they're so, so different. If we think about what physics will tell us about the particle level of reality, it has no resemblance whatsoever with what we experience, no? So the commentator says causal forms and resultant forms are as different as samsara and nirvana. But if cause and effect would have no resemblance whatsoever, then they would be just as different as samsara and nirvana.
Yeah, interesting, no? "With feeling, identification, formation, mind and all things, the steps are, in all regards, the same as in the case of form." So if we talk about the other aggregates, which are not physical, then it's the same situation though that we get to as with the aggregate of form. So in other words, when we talk about the causes for an event of identification taking place, this is that sort of, this is a telephone, noticing-level of things, the causes for that and the manifest event of identification have the same, not same and not different relation, as is the case with the particles and the manifest form. But it is easier to access and get the point when talking about the physical. I think rather than talking about these mental causes and mental effects, it seems much more tangible, of course, to talk about, it is much more tangible to talk about the physical reality than the mental. It seems much easier to point out a physical factor than a mental one. But that doesn't mean that there's any real difference because we are talking about cause and effect throughout. And then there's these two famous verses that says, "When a critique is made using emptiness, whatever may be replied will not be a reply, but the same as what is still to be proven." So whenever this critique of the Mādhyamaka is put forward, like for example in the beginning of Chapter One when it said that things do not arise from themselves, from others, from both are uncaused. Then whatever objection we may have at that time will not be a way of actually countering the argument, but just taking for granted what is still to be proven. So if we'll say, "Well, I can see a sprout growing from a seed," then that is assuming that this is evidence of things actually coming into being. But of course, this does not explain, this does not counter the arguments that are brought forth to begin with. It's just coming up with a seeming, what someone thinks is an example of something that is not compatible with emptiness, but because nothing is incompatible with emptiness, whatever one may think is a counterargument is actually perfectly explicable as evidence of emptiness. This is something that we have talked about before.
So if someone says, "I can see a sprout growing from a seed," then for example one could say, "Well, you also know that, you also tell me that when you have a dream and dream about a sprout that grows from a seed, you will say that although you see it, it is not real." So it's not. It's assuming the availability of what is yet to be proven, namely something that has independent true existence. And that is never to be found anywhere, and so whatever may be replied will not be a reply, but just identical with the issue at hand, with that which is under critique. "When an explanation is given using emptiness, whatever flaws one may find will not be found to be flaws, but the same as what is still to be proven." So then one explains emptiness through the vajra splinter, for example, the argument in the first stanza of the first chapter. Then one may say that, "How come then that it's possible to see things coming into being?" And then in that way you cannot explain why things come into being, but of course we can very well explain how things appear to come into being. For example, in the same way as we just did, you yourself agree that it's possible for things that are not real to appear to come into being, so there's apparent arising but no real arising, and so on and so forth. This is just about how the critique of the Mādhyamaka works and how any kind of opposition to that fails.
So those are very famous and there's a lot of commentarial literature around this also, what this exactly means.
And that is the chapter on the aggregates. This is the conclusion to the chapter on the aggregates.
He calls it advice or instruction in superior debate method. These last two verses here. So to know that whatever anyone might put forward to criticize the teaching of emptiness is never a real criticism, can by definition never be a successful criticism, because it always will amount to nothing more than just repeating that which still needs to be proven, namely that things exist in and of themselves, have independent real existence. That things are something in and of themselves and not just by virtue of other things, which again are by virtue of other things and so on, infinitely. And similarly, that whenever one talks about emptiness and someone says, "But hey, what are you talking about? You're denying all this and that." It is again the same issue. You're not denying anything, but it's that person who thinks that whatever idea about, who thinks that the appearance of a flower is somehow in conflict with the teaching of emptiness. There's nothing more to it than that.
And what follows is Chapter Five. And Chapter Five is now about the elements, so the three chapters that come after the analysis of going and coming and of conditions and of going and coming, they address sense sources, aggregates and elements. So these basic Abhidharma principles that the aggregates contain all of conditioned phenomena and the sense sources and the elements contain all factors, period. So to show the emptiness of those is to show the emptiness of all factors, not just personal self, but all factors. And here in Chapter Five, we will now be looking at...
So the elements here, the elements in the chapter here are specifically the six, like according to the commentary,
the elements that this particularly concern are the elements that there's mention of in, for example, the "Sūtra of the Meeting of Father and Son," when it says, "Great king, the individual or person comes down to six elements." So those are the six elements that are earth, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness. Those are the elements in particular that we're looking at here. And then we will talk about what characterizes those. So if we say that there are these elemental components, but in any case, elements being like ultimate, the ultimate inventory of existence, this is what it all can be really boiled down to. For example, we may say that there's an element of space,
and that element of space has characteristics, of course. If we say whatever set of elements we like to talk about, then these elements that we identify, we identify by means of certain characteristics. Otherwise, how could we talk about an elemental framework? So each of the elements, they will have their own defining characteristics. And so also with space, so we could say that space is the open and accommodating quality that allows things to take place. That openness is space. That would be an Abhidharma definition of space. And it's also, if we want to talk about space, then that's a very good candidate for a definition of space. So now we're going to look closer at this framework of something and its characteristics.
If that… Yeah, sorry, was there something?
"Andrew, online, did you want to ask a question? Sorry, I left you there for a bit." Student: "No worries. I just wanted to ask a question about these last two verses of the previous chapter. Mostly just to check to see if I had understood you. Is it somewhat in the ballpark to take Nāgārjuna as saying that if an opponent wants to refute emptiness, meaning they would like to assert a really existing whatever, X, then, or basically like in order to put up resistance against emptiness period, they will be put in the circumstance of asserting a really existing X and that sort of assumes itself. Is that somewhat along the lines of what he's getting at?" Yeah, I think so. Very much. "It kind of reminds me of how it seems in dealing with these arguments, and I would accuse myself of this, and it seems like sometimes we've in fact done this ourselves, like we almost create these sort of like… like in bumping up against Nāgārjuna's arguments, like we will create a different realm where we can sort of get rid of and inside of it, and it's interesting that he's sort of like pointed out that we… in other words, there will have to be some kind of like axiom maybe, is how I'm taking the sense of this, like we will have to posit some anchor for us to strike back at emptiness. Is that something like it?"
Yeah. And of course it also is very fascinating then to think of.. if any sort of objection that we can have is not a real objection but just more fuel for the fire, so to speak, then what does the argument for emptiness prove?
Like with many types of logic there has to be what you're trying to prove and then what you're not… the sort of… the opposite, yeah? I'm not putting it so clearly, but if whatever we can find as cause to object against emptiness is by definition in itself, when understood properly, further evidence of emptiness, then what is emptiness? We cannot distinguish it actually, no? If we cannot ultimately distinguish that from any of the things that seem to be in conflict with emptiness, then what is it that we are talking about? So this is perhaps a way also of remembering that emptiness too is supposed to be empty, no? That we are not proving emptiness but showing misunderstandings to be wrong, yeah?
And were we to prove emptiness then there's something still imperfect, no?
That would have to follow, no?
Okay.
So there's just three minutes left. I don't know if anyone has a question we can do that.
We can also just open the discussion there. So "Before the characteristics of space, there's no space whatsoever. If it existed before its characteristics, space, it would follow that it has no characteristics." So that is a very nice and concise way of putting it, So if space is that open and accommodating quality, then since that is what space is, there couldn't be any space before its characteristics, no? That follows because space is characterized by being this, no? By being this open accommodating qualities that allows for events to occur. So before that characteristic, there is no space. "If it existed before its characteristics, then it would follow that it had no characteristics." If space existed before its characteristic openness, then it would be space that is not open, yeah? That cannot be, yeah? "And something without characteristics does not exist anywhere at all." Everything that is in any way also has characteristics. That's why we say that it is in some way, because we know its certain characteristic.
So "Since there is no thing whatsoever that has no characteristics, to what do the characteristics apply?" Still we want to say that there are things that have characteristics. But since there are never any things that don't have characteristics, then why do we say that things like space or like my hand, exist and they have characteristics. They possess certain characteristics, no?
Space has the characteristic openness and my hand is something made of, that has five fingers and whatever else I want to say is characteristic of my hand, yeah? So why do we make that distinction between things and their characteristics, no? And we do that all the time, no? When we talk about things, we talk about the thing and then what characterizes it. But there couldn't ever, before the appearance of the characteristic, before the manifestation of the characteristics, there couldn't be anything. Anything that exists always has characteristics, must have, otherwise what would we talk about?
And since there never exists anything without characteristics that could receive characteristics, then what is it that we say characteristics apply to? And then we'll stop there, yeah? Have a nice weekend.
"That which originates dependently does not cease and does not arise, is not annihilated and is not permanent, does not come and does not go, is not different and not the same. To the true teacher who reveals this peace, the complete pacification of constructs, to the perfect Buddha I bow down."
So we began yesterday the Chapter Four, which is an analysis of the aggregates. And the aggregates, the first of the five aggregates is the aggregate of form. And the aggregate of form has causal aspects and resultant aspects. So there are causal forms and resultant forms. And the causal forms are particles, impermanent subtle particles that combine to give rise to the coarse objects that we can access. So there are four types traditionally of particles, one for each of the four elements: earth, water, fire and wind, and they then combine in various ways to produce all of this. That is the idea. So all of this meaning put concisely in the Abhidharma way would be to say that there are the five objects of visual form of that which can be heard, of that which can be smelled, tasted and touched. So the objects that are accessible by these five distinct fields of perception. And then not only are there those, there are of course also faculties that make those fields accessible. So there are some physical components that make the eye faculty the way it is, and then the eye faculty according to the Abhidharma is not our physical eyeball, but something much more subtle than that. Nonetheless it's made by these particles, the causal forms, and the faculty itself is a resultant form. The same with the faculty for hearing, for smelling, tasting and touching. They are also subtle forms that are made by much subtler forms, namely the causal forms. So in this way causal forms give rise to resultant forms. But it is also very nice that the chapter begins with an analysis of the element of form, because in this way we can think very conveniently about the way we tend to think about the physical world, in the contemporary ways of thinking about the physical world, modern ways of thinking about the physical world, which is also typically a story of particles, and particles that combine in various ways to give rise to perceptions of something that is ultimately responsible for what we have here.
So in other words when we now analyze the relationship between the subtle forms, the causal forms, and the resultant ones, it should have implications for also how we understand the scientific framework of physics that says that there are these subtle physical components which, as they come together in various ways, create or give rise to one way or the other, an appearance of something that seems very different from these particles, and yet it is caused by them.
So just last time we then said that "apart from the causal form, form is not observed, because if there were form apart from its causes," oh sorry, "Apart from the causal form, form is not observed." And then, "Likewise aside from so-called form, no causal form can be observed either." So then here the critique is in terms of saying that
apart from the cause of form, form is not observed, meaning all of these things couldn't be something else than their alleged causes, because if they were something else than their alleged causes then they would be uncaused results. And of course uncaused results is a contradiction. And why would they then turn into uncaused results? Because in that case there would be nothing that connected them, and we can recall what we had to say about causes arising from something, results arising from something that is different from themselves, in that case there would be no connection. But also, if what we see here is something essentially different than the particles that are meant to be behind that and responsible for that manifestation that we can access, then the idea that they depend on those is no longer tenable. "If there were form apart from its causes it would follow that form has no cause." If form could exist, if we could take a look at this and say, "This is a resultant form, and that is something else than the causal forms." In other words, if I could take a look at this and say, "okay, this is my phone and it's made of particles, that's the stuff that it's made of, but that itself is not just that, it's my phone." If I say that, then I'm now talking about something that is not causally dependent. In other words, I'm talking about an inexplicable phenomenon, the phone. And this inexplicable phenomenon I think is at the heart of all this talk about emergence. It's something that many people are aware of these days, that how can it be that we talk about
a physical reality which is at a particular level, a particle level, and then that's supposed to somehow create all of this, which seems very different and much more in many ways than the particles. And so very brilliant minds have come up with various accounts of how that is possible by virtue of something called 'emergence.'
Yesterday we ended up asking then how...
whether just this observation that if this is different than its particles, that are it's cause in that way in the sense that it is what it's made of, that this then renders... If we say that it is different from the particles that are its causes, then we have arrived at something that has no causes. That's a causeless effect or a causeless thing, and there are no such things. Is that an argument that survives? Probably none of us are experts about emergence, unfortunately. But would you say that this is an argument that remains, that still stands? Also if we try to think about emergence as we understand it obviously, but for better or worse.
Did any of you think about that?
If there were form apart from its causes, it would follow that form has no cause. It's pretty strong, yes?
But why should it have such dramatic consequences?
Student: "Is the question how do these particles which... Do you mean like the particles don't look like the thing?" No they definitely don't. So if that's enough to say... So they're not just the same, they're different. This is different from those particles.
"Like in the same way a table leg is different from a table?" Yes, a table what? "The leg of a table." Not the label. The 'label'? "The leg." The leg? No, somewhat different because this is like the... But similar, yeah related of course, you have something different. You have one... If all the parts of the table and the table itself, their relation, if that is, if there's no difference.. if we want to say that there's a difference, then that commitment to those two being different means that now the table has no causes. But it becomes even... It's slightly more difficult to see in the case of a table, but not so much in terms of particles because we never see particles. And yet we believe that these things are caused by particles, no? Probably, to some extent at least, we believe that. "I'm not sure if it's the case, but when you think of things like... It's probably a grosser level, but things like stem cells and..." Stem cells? "Or parts of the things that, the smallest things that make up a body, like they do have a relationship to the final result." But is the final result different from them? "Yes." So then Nāgārjuna says that that means that it has no cause, that it's uncaused. "Okay." Is this... Yes?
Student: "So I really relate to this kind of analysis. I've actually gone back to some basic high school chemistry as well, where there's a periodic table of elements and at its most fundamental level each atom consists of tiny particles: electrons and protons, and none of these have properties that come about when they reach a certain configuration. If you add one electron to an atom, it becomes an atom with completely different properties, and that's totally miraculous I think. I do struggle, however, with framing this in terms of cause and effect. Like I can totally see that we're dealing here with a composite, like things are put together. So I can easily apply this kind of neither one nor many analysis, but like if we start talking cause and result, that would almost become again like some vajra splinter, and I don't see so much of a causal relationship as well. It's just we're dealing with a compound of particles, which... I don't know, the whole framing of it in terms of causality is a bit difficult for me." I guess if something is made of something else, we can think of that as, okay, what does it take to make a paper box? And then we can go down to a subtler level as we can and say, well, it takes such and such and such and such particles, this many kinds and this many numbers, and when you combine them in this way, then you get that. That's what causes then this thing to come into being, which is something else than the particles. "It could work." But what otherwise would it be? Like if you say combination has no causal impact, that's also strange, no? "Yeah, I guess." Well.. "For me, if I put these two objects together, then what is the cause? Like seeds and sprouts are sort of easy, like the seed gives rise to this sprout. But these two things put together, like it seems there is an external, like a hand picking it up and putting the two things together. So it's kind of like a force that jams them together as a result of which they take on different properties." But perhaps we could say the same about the seed, no? That we have a seed that we plant in the soil, but then there are so many things, so many forces that have to act on the seed and the seed has to participate in so many relationships. "Yeah. So this is in essence still like then a vajra splinter kind of argument?"
I don't know if necessarily, like... I mean, the sameness and difference thing is clearly related, yeah? But it is also just a way of... Like with the vajra splinter, it's exactly as you point out, no? That's where we have more of a sense of a... More of a sense of a temporal process of coming into being, no? Like there's the causal point and then we think like from seed to sprout, it doesn't happen just like that, no? There's some... So it seems to be particularly about that sort of causal arising, no? But there's also another kind of... And you said seems miraculous almost, no? But we don't want it to be miraculous, no? If we're scientists or trying to figure out what the world is, unless we ourselves are magicians and know how to do magic, no? Then we don't want this to be miraculous. We want to find out how it works, yeah? But because... But yeah, I think that people still, very brilliant minds struggle with this still, no? How to avoid the miraculous aspect, yeah? And if you want to avoid miracles, then I think it's necessary to bring in causality, no? That's almost the only way to go about it, no? Unless you can say it's because of this that that happens. Then it's just miraculous, no? If you had like a sorcery, you take different things from them into the pot, poof! Then you have something else, no? If that's how the story of the physical reality, that's not very satisfying at all, no? For a physicist or anyone who tries to figure out scientific ways of knowing the world so that we can manipulate and predict in ways that make sense for us.
Yeah. "But in this context, I guess this could be a way into again arriving at emptiness, no? Because the end result is not separate from its causes but also not the same. So yeah, that sense of the miraculous can then open up into an appreciation again of dependent origination or emptiness, no?" Yeah, I think so. And it's also not entirely miraculous in the sense that it's inexplicable. I mean.. it is and it's not explicable, yeah? Like we can tell this about dependent origination and then when we see what is really meant there, then of course object, agent, and action, all of those components that are necessary for maintaining an explanatory framework, they fall apart, yeah? But it's still possible to... We don't... perhaps that is also huge, no? If that is really true. We don't have to wonder why it is like that. We don't have to be mystified by the fact of emergence because of Mādhyamaka. That means if that is true, then Mādhyamaka has a huge potential as a scientific framework, yeah?
Then in 3, did we have that already? No. I think not. "If aside from form there were a cause of form, there would be a cause with no effect, Yet there are no causes without effects." So maybe we did. In any case, so.. if apart from... This is also a very interesting way of looking at it, no? Think of these particles, we're used to thinking of them as something real, very important and real and so on, and as something that we can indeed like zoom in on and think those are the particles. They are the ones that come together to create this world, yeah?
But if they were ever just like that, if they were ever just those things and didn't produce anything, then there would be a cause without effect, yeah? Because what is it that these things do, yeah? Like when you talked about high school physics and chemistry and so on, those things are actually never alone, no? And it's the same with the Abhidharma particles. You don't get them just like, here's a box of only earth particles, yeah? It never happens. So if it were possible, then you would have a cause without effect, because the real thing with these particles is that they always have that causal impact, yeah? So like Jan, he was wondering whether it makes sense to really call it causality, no? Because it's basically just different factors coming together in a sort of composite. But if we don't call that a causal event, then it has no causal significance and it's just like random manifestation, yeah? Which is not what we want to talk about when we talk about particles in physics, no? It's not seeking to get a way of calling all of this random, no? And not explicable in any causal framework. That's not the point, no? Quite the opposite.
So if there ever were a time and place where these causal forms could be just that without an effect, then there would be an instance of a causal form that has no, of a cause that has no effect, period. Yeah? So that's never possible. Then what is it really that we talk about when we say that it's made of those things, those producers?
At the same time, no one can question the relevance of talking about particles and talking about it in relation to all of this, no? Good luck with that.
But so in this way, this kind of analysis can also become a way of understanding how emptiness actually explains why it's possible to get something from thinking in terms of particles. It's not because there actually are particles, but it's because of dependent origination. The apparent dependencies between dependent factors, then it can be sometimes useful to conceive of something as the cause of something else and other times it won't work, yeah? So one of these constructs is then the whatever framework that we have for explaining what the physical world is and then whatever framework that we have for explaining what all of this is, like all of that which I can see and so on, yeah? So either one of them, it's not that the particle story is more constructed than this, nor the other way around, yeah? It's not that the particle story is more true and less constructed than what I have to say about this. They totally depend on each other.
That is also pretty amazing if we can, I mean, and in many ways big news, no? If we can say that decisively, that there's no privileged status of this or the subtle physical reality. Because usually what we try to do is we want to say, "well, this physical reality is maybe more real than this," or we want to say, "no, no, no, how could you say that?" "There's so much beauty and whatever in this that is not captured by physics." We don't have to worry about any of those alternatives.
Then in 4: "When form exists, a cause of form does not make sense. Yet when form does not exist, a cause of form does not make sense either." So that's what we just were talking about, right? When the form, well, not exactly the same, but has very much to do with where we were coming from just before. When then form exists, when we have this and we say, "okay, here it is, this is the resultant form," then how can we say that there is a causal form? And this is also part of why we were hesitating to call compositional processes 'causal processes,' because once you have this, then how can we say that it has causes in the form of particles, yeah? It doesn't make sense. If it is here and manifests in something that we can see as a result, then its causes for appearing in that way have done what they need to do, yeah? So they're not there as causes anymore. And yet when there's nothing of that sort, then it doesn't make sense to say that there are causal factors for that form either, no? Either it's here and it has no such causes at the particle level, or it's not here and then it doesn't have any such causes at the particle level either.
Yeah?
Student: "I can see what you're positing for physical reality, but how would Nāgārjuna treat stories and histories? Since those causes are no longer existing, but the causes are only existing in our brains, but we can't point to any certain particle and be like, "That's the particle that remembers Homer's Iliad," you know? How do you treat that?" But wouldn't what we were talking about before, that doesn't help us identify particular causes. It's very much a work in progress or in dissolution, our explanatory models for what this is made of, in the same way as I can say something about why I can remember Homer's Iliad and what I feel like when I do and what happens when I tell it to others if I could, and so on, yeah? Does that make sense? We're not saying that there are really causes. I guess I didn't quite understand where you were coming from with that. "Just based on what you were talking about just now, when you were saying something either exists and it has the cause inherent in its form or if it does not exist, then the cause does not exist, right?" Yeah, or if it exists like this, then the alleged causal role played by these subtle particles has already been performed, yeah? And so we have this, and because it's already been performed, there are no causes of that sort when the result is present, when this result is present, yeah?
So how about when this result is not present? At that time, the causal factors are not there either, because if they were, this would be here. So I think this, if anything, makes it only much more one fabric to talk about the physical world and stories and literature, art, whatever. "You don't think we can apply the same logic to stories and literature and ideas?" Yes, I think definitely. This goes for everything. "But the form is not existent anymore. You can't see the direct causes. Like you can theorize the causes, but you can't actually see the cause inherent in an idea or a story." But you can't see the causes of this either. You can theorize about it, but... No? "I mean, I could see that the cause existed because it exists, right? I can see that the cause is inherent in all the form in this room." We say that, no? But if the cause existed, then that's then saying that there was a time when the cause existed, but not the effect. That doesn't make sense, no? There was a time that the cause of this existed, but not this. If the cause of this existed, by necessity this would have to have existed also, no? As soon as all what is necessary for a form of this kind to be present has come together, then this is there right away. And when it's here, then it doesn't make sense either for the causes to be there.
So I think in terms of us having to theorize, it's the same whether we talk about the physical reality or art, storytelling and so on. And in terms of perception, it's also the same. There's something perceptually available in either case. So this is an explanation that is relevant for science and art, but does not conflate them. We can still very well distinguish.
And then it says in 5, "A form without cause is impossible.." That's what we just talked about, no?
It's utterly impossible and therefore do not give… So because these things couldn't exist without causes and because we have seen that those causes make no sense either at a time when the effect, the resultant form, is there or not there. Therefore, since in this… Therefore form without causes… Well, "A form without cause is impossible, utterly impossible". There could not be a form that is not the product of these things, right? And yet we have seen that talking about these things does not give us form. Does that make sense? There couldn't be a form such as this without the particles that it's made by. If we assume the existence of particles, then there could never be any such thing without those particles. Yet the particles do not make sense at a time when this is not present either, nor does it make sense to talk about them when this is already here. So "Therefore," in 5.c-d, "do not give rise to any thoughts about form at all." So just forget it. So how to understand that is of course also an open question, no? But it's perhaps a natural idea to get, no? That in that case might as well forget about it, no?
So why don't you try and think about that until tomorrow? How to understand that instruction? "Therefore do not give rise to any thoughts about form at all." So I think each of you what to make of that, yeah? Is that a good idea? Is that... and so on, yeah? If it is, then why? And if not, then why isn't it a good idea? "It is not right to say that effects resemble their causes. It is not right to say that effects do not resemble their causes." So that's... now we look at the fact that the particle level of reality and the coarse, medium-sized dry level goods that we have accessible to us, they are very, very different. They look and behave very different from each other.
So how can we say that the causes and effects resemble each other? There's dramatic difference, yeah? The commentator, he says there's as much as difference between the causal forms and the resultant forms as there is between samsara and nirvana. So it is not right to say though that effects do not resemble their causes, because if there's no resemblance at all, then he says very interestingly it would be as if cause and effect were as different as samsara and nirvana. So whenever I try to think through that, yeah, I end in some strange space there. If I say... so in one way, it's not right to say that cause and effect, these causes and those effects resemble, it's not right to say that the particles and the objects that they produce resemble each other, because they're so, so different. If we think about what physics will tell us about the particle level of reality, it has no resemblance whatsoever with what we experience, no? So the commentator says causal forms and resultant forms are as different as samsara and nirvana. But if cause and effect would have no resemblance whatsoever, then they would be just as different as samsara and nirvana.
Yeah, interesting, no? "With feeling, identification, formation, mind and all things, the steps are, in all regards, the same as in the case of form." So if we talk about the other aggregates, which are not physical, then it's the same situation though that we get to as with the aggregate of form. So in other words, when we talk about the causes for an event of identification taking place, this is that sort of, this is a telephone, noticing-level of things, the causes for that and the manifest event of identification have the same, not same and not different relation, as is the case with the particles and the manifest form. But it is easier to access and get the point when talking about the physical. I think rather than talking about these mental causes and mental effects, it seems much more tangible, of course, to talk about, it is much more tangible to talk about the physical reality than the mental. It seems much easier to point out a physical factor than a mental one. But that doesn't mean that there's any real difference because we are talking about cause and effect throughout. And then there's these two famous verses that says, "When a critique is made using emptiness, whatever may be replied will not be a reply, but the same as what is still to be proven." So whenever this critique of the Mādhyamaka is put forward, like for example in the beginning of Chapter One when it said that things do not arise from themselves, from others, from both are uncaused. Then whatever objection we may have at that time will not be a way of actually countering the argument, but just taking for granted what is still to be proven. So if we'll say, "Well, I can see a sprout growing from a seed," then that is assuming that this is evidence of things actually coming into being. But of course, this does not explain, this does not counter the arguments that are brought forth to begin with. It's just coming up with a seeming, what someone thinks is an example of something that is not compatible with emptiness, but because nothing is incompatible with emptiness, whatever one may think is a counterargument is actually perfectly explicable as evidence of emptiness. This is something that we have talked about before.
So if someone says, "I can see a sprout growing from a seed," then for example one could say, "Well, you also know that, you also tell me that when you have a dream and dream about a sprout that grows from a seed, you will say that although you see it, it is not real." So it's not. It's assuming the availability of what is yet to be proven, namely something that has independent true existence. And that is never to be found anywhere, and so whatever may be replied will not be a reply, but just identical with the issue at hand, with that which is under critique. "When an explanation is given using emptiness, whatever flaws one may find will not be found to be flaws, but the same as what is still to be proven." So then one explains emptiness through the vajra splinter, for example, the argument in the first stanza of the first chapter. Then one may say that, "How come then that it's possible to see things coming into being?" And then in that way you cannot explain why things come into being, but of course we can very well explain how things appear to come into being. For example, in the same way as we just did, you yourself agree that it's possible for things that are not real to appear to come into being, so there's apparent arising but no real arising, and so on and so forth. This is just about how the critique of the Mādhyamaka works and how any kind of opposition to that fails.
So those are very famous and there's a lot of commentarial literature around this also, what this exactly means.
And that is the chapter on the aggregates. This is the conclusion to the chapter on the aggregates.
He calls it advice or instruction in superior debate method. These last two verses here. So to know that whatever anyone might put forward to criticize the teaching of emptiness is never a real criticism, can by definition never be a successful criticism, because it always will amount to nothing more than just repeating that which still needs to be proven, namely that things exist in and of themselves, have independent real existence. That things are something in and of themselves and not just by virtue of other things, which again are by virtue of other things and so on, infinitely. And similarly, that whenever one talks about emptiness and someone says, "But hey, what are you talking about? You're denying all this and that." It is again the same issue. You're not denying anything, but it's that person who thinks that whatever idea about, who thinks that the appearance of a flower is somehow in conflict with the teaching of emptiness. There's nothing more to it than that.
And what follows is Chapter Five. And Chapter Five is now about the elements, so the three chapters that come after the analysis of going and coming and of conditions and of going and coming, they address sense sources, aggregates and elements. So these basic Abhidharma principles that the aggregates contain all of conditioned phenomena and the sense sources and the elements contain all factors, period. So to show the emptiness of those is to show the emptiness of all factors, not just personal self, but all factors. And here in Chapter Five, we will now be looking at...
So the elements here, the elements in the chapter here are specifically the six, like according to the commentary,
the elements that this particularly concern are the elements that there's mention of in, for example, the "Sūtra of the Meeting of Father and Son," when it says, "Great king, the individual or person comes down to six elements." So those are the six elements that are earth, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness. Those are the elements in particular that we're looking at here. And then we will talk about what characterizes those. So if we say that there are these elemental components, but in any case, elements being like ultimate, the ultimate inventory of existence, this is what it all can be really boiled down to. For example, we may say that there's an element of space,
and that element of space has characteristics, of course. If we say whatever set of elements we like to talk about, then these elements that we identify, we identify by means of certain characteristics. Otherwise, how could we talk about an elemental framework? So each of the elements, they will have their own defining characteristics. And so also with space, so we could say that space is the open and accommodating quality that allows things to take place. That openness is space. That would be an Abhidharma definition of space. And it's also, if we want to talk about space, then that's a very good candidate for a definition of space. So now we're going to look closer at this framework of something and its characteristics.
If that… Yeah, sorry, was there something?
"Andrew, online, did you want to ask a question? Sorry, I left you there for a bit." Student: "No worries. I just wanted to ask a question about these last two verses of the previous chapter. Mostly just to check to see if I had understood you. Is it somewhat in the ballpark to take Nāgārjuna as saying that if an opponent wants to refute emptiness, meaning they would like to assert a really existing whatever, X, then, or basically like in order to put up resistance against emptiness period, they will be put in the circumstance of asserting a really existing X and that sort of assumes itself. Is that somewhat along the lines of what he's getting at?" Yeah, I think so. Very much. "It kind of reminds me of how it seems in dealing with these arguments, and I would accuse myself of this, and it seems like sometimes we've in fact done this ourselves, like we almost create these sort of like… like in bumping up against Nāgārjuna's arguments, like we will create a different realm where we can sort of get rid of and inside of it, and it's interesting that he's sort of like pointed out that we… in other words, there will have to be some kind of like axiom maybe, is how I'm taking the sense of this, like we will have to posit some anchor for us to strike back at emptiness. Is that something like it?"
Yeah. And of course it also is very fascinating then to think of.. if any sort of objection that we can have is not a real objection but just more fuel for the fire, so to speak, then what does the argument for emptiness prove?
Like with many types of logic there has to be what you're trying to prove and then what you're not… the sort of… the opposite, yeah? I'm not putting it so clearly, but if whatever we can find as cause to object against emptiness is by definition in itself, when understood properly, further evidence of emptiness, then what is emptiness? We cannot distinguish it actually, no? If we cannot ultimately distinguish that from any of the things that seem to be in conflict with emptiness, then what is it that we are talking about? So this is perhaps a way also of remembering that emptiness too is supposed to be empty, no? That we are not proving emptiness but showing misunderstandings to be wrong, yeah?
And were we to prove emptiness then there's something still imperfect, no?
That would have to follow, no?
Okay.
So there's just three minutes left. I don't know if anyone has a question we can do that.
We can also just open the discussion there. So "Before the characteristics of space, there's no space whatsoever. If it existed before its characteristics, space, it would follow that it has no characteristics." So that is a very nice and concise way of putting it, So if space is that open and accommodating quality, then since that is what space is, there couldn't be any space before its characteristics, no? That follows because space is characterized by being this, no? By being this open accommodating qualities that allows for events to occur. So before that characteristic, there is no space. "If it existed before its characteristics, then it would follow that it had no characteristics." If space existed before its characteristic openness, then it would be space that is not open, yeah? That cannot be, yeah? "And something without characteristics does not exist anywhere at all." Everything that is in any way also has characteristics. That's why we say that it is in some way, because we know its certain characteristic.
So "Since there is no thing whatsoever that has no characteristics, to what do the characteristics apply?" Still we want to say that there are things that have characteristics. But since there are never any things that don't have characteristics, then why do we say that things like space or like my hand, exist and they have characteristics. They possess certain characteristics, no?
Space has the characteristic openness and my hand is something made of, that has five fingers and whatever else I want to say is characteristic of my hand, yeah? So why do we make that distinction between things and their characteristics, no? And we do that all the time, no? When we talk about things, we talk about the thing and then what characterizes it. But there couldn't ever, before the appearance of the characteristic, before the manifestation of the characteristics, there couldn't be anything. Anything that exists always has characteristics, must have, otherwise what would we talk about?
And since there never exists anything without characteristics that could receive characteristics, then what is it that we say characteristics apply to? And then we'll stop there, yeah? Have a nice weekend.
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